MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. MARIANO RIVERA AND THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review of the decision dated April 6, 1964
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission as well as of its resolution en
banc dated May 25, 1964 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

Respondent Mariano Rivera was employed with petitioner Manila
Railroad Company as a Laborer in its maintenance section, Engineering
Department, since December 1923 up to January 1942.  In 1953, after a pre-employment physical examination,
he was re-employed by petitioner as a trackman for about three (3) months,
after which he was promoted to maintenance capataz
in a temporary capacity at a monthly salary of P140.00.

On January 13, 1961 a chest X-ray examination of respondent
Rivera showed the following results:

“x x x moderate fibro-caseous
infiltrators in the right upper lung field with marked pleural thickening and
traction of the right superior mediastinum superiorly
and to the right.  There are
likewise fibroacinar infiltrates in the LUL from the
apex (own to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd anterior, i.e., Left hilus
likewise tracted superiorly x x
x” (Exh. C).

In a memorandum dated June 8, 1961, petitioner, thru its division
engineer, informed respondent Rivera that he was afflicted with pulmonary
tuberculosis which disqualified him for employment and that he should stop
working immediately until he could again qualify physically.  Rivera stopped working on June 16, 1961.  However, his service was officially
terminated on the following July 31.

On October 10, 1961 respondent Rivera filed the required notice
of injury or sickness and claim for compensation.  On November
10, 1961 petitioner filed with the Department of Labor the
employer’s report of accident or illness.

The claim was heard and on August 22, 1962, Hearing Officer Pedro
P. Pelaez rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, respondent Manila Railroad Company is hereby
ordered to pay claimant, Mariano Rivera, thru this Office the amount of ONE
THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWO PESOS and 18/100 as compensation already due him, and
a weekly compensation of P19.39 starting, from August 28, 1962 until the
remaining period of the 208 weeks shall have been completed and in no case
shall exceed the maximum compensation of P4,000.00, unless sooner his illness
shall have been cured; and to reimburse the amount of P110.00 duly incurred for
medical expenses, and to provide further medical, surgical, hospital services
and supplies as the nature of his illness may require.  Respondent is also ordered to pay this Office
the amount of P13.00 as fees, plus an additional sum of P1.00 per P100.00 of
subsequent compensation payment pursuant to Section 35 of the Act.”

In due time, petitioner sought a review of the above-quoted
decision of the Hearing Officer and on April 6, 1964, the Commission, thru
Chairman N. Baens del Rosario, rendered a decision
the dispositive part of which reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby affirmed and
the respondent is hereby ordered:

1. To pay the claimant, thru this Commission, the amount of TWO
THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED FIFTY-EIGHT and 64/100 PESOS (P2,858.64)
in lump sum and the weekly com­pensation of P19.39 from April 17, 1964 un­til
the remaining period of 208 weeks shall have been completed but in no case
shall the total compensation amount exceed P4,000.00, unless sooner his illness
shall have been pronounced cured by competent medical authority;

2. To reimburse the claimant the amount of ONE’ HUNDRED TEN NO/100
PESOS (P110.00) for medical expenses incurred;

3. To furnish the claimant with medical, surgical and hospital
services and supplies as the nature of his illness may require;

4. To pay this Commission the amount of P39.00 as fees (including
the review fee and postponement fee assessed against the respond­ent as per
order dated May 29, 1962 of Hearing Officer Pedro P. Pelaez)
pursuant to Sec. 55 of the Act 3428, as amended; and

5. To pay the attorney’s fees in the amount of P214.40, which is equivalent to 7.5% of the amount due the claimant.“

Petitioner moved, to reconsider, but the motion was denied by the
Commission en banc in a resolution dated May 25, 1964.  Petitioner filed the instant petition for
review and avers:   (1) that in workmen’s
compensation cases an injury or disease, to be compensable, must be one which
produces disability; (2) that the claim for compensation was filed out of time
and hence barred by the statute of limitations; and (3) that the award is based
on findings contrary to, and not supported by, the evidence on record.

The first question is predicated on the contention that
respondent claimant, being a temporary employee of the petitioner company, was
dismissed from his employment for failure to qualify for permanent appointment
and not by reason disability.

The contention is without merit. 
It is not disputed that on June
8, 1961 respondent Rivera was informed by petitioner that he was afflicted
with pulmonary tuberculosis and ordered to stop working.  Rivera actually stopped working on June 16,
1961, although the official termination of his service was on July 31, 1961.  Petitioner’s memorandum of June 8,1961 shows quite clearly that such termination was due to
his disability on account of sickness and not to the expiratic
of his temporary appointment.  In fact,
as found by respondent Commission, Rivera’s appointment as maintenance capataz became permanent on August 16, 1960, as
evidenced by his appointment papers (Exh. D).

Petitioner claims that respondent’s notice of injury and claim
for compensation was filed beyond the two-month period prescribed by Section 24
of Act 3428 and was therefore barred.  It
is true that respondents affliction was already known
in January 1961 and that the notice of injury or sickness and claim for
compensation was filed only on October
10, 1961.  However, the rule
is that the failure on the of an employee to comply with the requirement of
Section 24 of Act 3428 concerning the giving of notice and the filing of the
claim within the prescribed period is non-jurisdictional in nature and does not
constitute a bar to the proceeding if it is shown that the employer, his agent
or representative, has knowledge of the injury, sickness or death, or that the
employer did not suffer by such delay or failure (Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-21902, August 10, 1967; Rio y Compania vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al.,
L-21467, August 30, 1967; National Development Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commis­sion, et al., L-21963, August 30, 1967). 
In the case at bar, petitioner had knowledge of respondent’s illness
since January 1961, when the company physician confirmed from the chest X-ray
examination that the respondent had pulmonary tuberculosis despite which
petitioner failed to controvert the right to compensation either on or before
the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after knowledge of the
illness.  Such failure has been held to
be a waiver of the right to controvert the claim.^[1]

Petitioner argues that the findings of respondent Commission as
to the nature respondent’s work does not find support in the evidence and that
the X-ray examination of the claimant revealed that he was suffering from
pulmonary tuberculosis in the minimal and not in the moderately advanced
stage.  This point raises a question of
fact, and have consistently ruled that findings of fact by the Commission
binding upon this Court as long as there is substantial evidence to support the
same.  The pertinent findings of the
Commission are as follows:

“x x x He
performed the work of a trackman, which is to repair damaged rails, lift ‘traviezas‘, adjust and replace ties, cut grass along the,
railroad tracks, and repair washouts. 
While as a ‘capataz‘ he had four men under him
he also helped them in their work of maintenance of the tracks, especially
during emergencies, when the work had to be done through the night.  x x x

x x x                 x x x

“The foregoing finding which is interpreted to be the
moderately advanced stage of pulmonary tuberculosis is confirmed by the
statement of respondent’s physician to the effect that the claimant must have
been afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis in its minimal stage three or four
years prior to January, 1961, (t.s.n. p. 26, March
18, 1962).  And this could have been
possible in view of the fact that pulmonary tuberculosis in its minimal stage
is practically symptomless and could not have been
detected by ordinary physical examination. 
Considering that the work of the claimant involved strain and exposure
to the inclemencies of the weather, even when he was
a ‘capataz‘, and more so, when he, was a trackman –
the conclusion is inevitable that his employment with the respondent aggravated
his ailment.  The respondent’s physician
himself admitted that ‘even with good food, further work has aggravated
tuberculosis especially if there is no treatments’ (t.s.n.
p. 26, March 18, 1962).”

In any event, since the illness occurred during employment, there
is a rebuttable presumption that the same arose out
of or was at least aggravated by, such employment.  The claimant is relieved from the burden of
proving causation once the illness or injury is shown to have arisen in the
course of the employment.  The burden to
overthrow the presumption is laid by the statute on the employer.  In the case at bar, no substantial evidence
exists to overcome said presumption (Magalona vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-21849, December 11, 1967; National
Development Co. vs. Ayson, L-23450, May 24, 1967).

We come now to the award for medical expenses in the amount of
P110.00 incurred by the claimant.  It is
admitted that the aforesaid expenses are not supported by receipts; and there
is no showing that the attending physician was presented at the hearing to
substantiate the claim.  The same should
therefore be disallowed.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed,
with the modification mentioned above.  Costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

^[1] Manila.
Railroad Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-21902, supra;
Rio y Compania vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., supra; National Development Co. vs. Workmen’s
Compensation Commission, et al., supra; Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., L-21504, Sept. 15, 1967; Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Workmen’s Compensation
Commission. et al.