THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. PELAGIO CONDEMENA, CASAMERO PETIÑO, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, RICARIDO CAUSING @ GARIDO, DEFENDANTS, SIMPLICIO ANIEL, DEFENDANT-APP…

Pelagio Condemena, Casamero Patiño, Ricarido Causing and Simplicio Aniel were charged with the crime of robbery in band with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Leyte,
with the qualifying
circumstance of treachery, and aggravating
circumstances of nocturnity, abuse of superior strength and dwelling.

After trial, the court found all the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of rob­bery in band with homicide without,
however, making a finding on any of the aggravating circumstances alleged in the information, instead it
took into consideration the lack of instruction and education in mitigation of
their criminal liability, and sentenced each to a penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay P6,000.00 to the heirs of the
victim, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
proportionate costs.

Pending their appeal in this Court, Pelagio
Condemena, Ricarido causing
and Casamero Patiño withdrew their appeal which was granted in a resolution
of the Court of June 5, 1964.  As the record now stands, only Simplicio Aniel remained as the
appellant.

The evidence for the prosecution has established that on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, Barcelisa
Lamoste was sitting by the side of the cradle of her
child facing her husband Fermin Lamoste
who was on the yard of the house.  Their
el­dest daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, 14 years old at
that time, was at the door of their house together with her younger brothers
and sisters.

Suddenly, four men arrived at their house.  Of these
four, Barcelisa Lamoste
recognized Pelagio Condemena
who had been living in Mambajao, Villaba,
Leyte, for quite a long time
as their neighbor.  Barcelisa
Lamoste did not know the names of the companions of Pelagio Conemena, but she
recognized them by their faces.  On the
witness stand, Barcelisa Lamoste
pointed and identified Pelagio Condemena
to be one of the four men who were in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, the date and approximate time
of the commission of the crime.  In the words of the trial Judge, “Barcelisa Lamoste also unhesitantly and unmistakenly, in
open court, pointed to the three companions of Pelagio
Condemena on that fateful day and time
above-mentioned who turned out to bear the names of Ricarido Causing @ Garido, Casamero Patiño and Simplicio Aniel.” (p. 2, Dec.)

She further testified
that Simplicio Aniel and Casamero Patiño were armed with
guns, and Pelagio Condemena
and Ricarido Causing were armed with bolos when these
four men arrived in their house on October 6, 1962, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon.  That upon their arrival, Simplicio
Aniel rushed towards her and pointed the gun, about
one foot long, at her face, telling her the following words:  “Do not shout.  If you shout, I will kill you.” Barcelisa Lamoste, out of
fear, did not in fact shout.  While Simplicio Aniel was thus pointing
the gun at her, the three other men went directly towards where her husband
was.  Two of them, Casamero
Patiño and Ricarido
Causing, each held the hands of her husband and when resistance from Fermin Lamoste was already
impossible, Pelagio Condemena,
with the use of his bolo, stabbed
her husband on the right side of the breast. 
Upon being hit with the bolo-stab, she heard her husband said:  “Dong, why did you stab me when I did
not commit any wrong?” After Fermin Lamoste was stabbed, Pelagio Condemena, Ricarido Causing and Casamero Patiño dragged her husband towards the kitchen of
the house.  Pelagio
Condemena stayed outside while Casamero
Patiño and Ricarido Causing
went up the house through the kitchen.

Esmeralda Lamoste, who was at the door of the house together with her
young brothers and sisters, saw Ricarido Causing stab
her father with a bolo on the right breast below the nipple. 
Then Casamero Patiño and Ricarido Causing approached Simplicio
Aniel, at
the time still pointing his gun towards her mother, and demanded from Barcelisa their money. 
Her mother, out of fear, pointed to Ricarido
Causing their trunk.  Ricarido
Causing opened the trunk and took the
amount of P200.00 from it.

Barcelisa Lamoste explained
that the money was the proceeds of the sale
of their carabao on October 5, 1962, the day previous to the
incident.  After taking the money, the
four men, Pelagio Condemena,
Ricarido Causing, Simplicio
Aniel and Casamero Patiño fled towards the same direction where they had come
from.  After they were gone, Barcelisa Lamoste shouted for
help.  Crispin Bactol
was the first person who responded to the call for help.

Crispin
Bactol testified that at about 6 o’clock in the
afternoon on October 6, 1962, he saw four men going to the house of Fermin Lamoste.  He recognized Pelagio Condemena to be one of the group.  Later on, he heard a woman’s voice from the
house of Fermin Lamoste
calling for help.  On his arrival at the house of Fermin Lamoste in answer to the call for help, he saw Fermina Lamoste dead.  He asked Barcelisa Lamoste who were the persons who killed her husband.  Barcelisa Lamoste answered that of the four men, she only knew Pelagio Condemena.

Jose P. Burgos, municipal
judge of Villaba, Leyte,
testified that on December 3, 1962, Pelagio Condemena, accompanied by a certain P. C. soldier, appeared
before him and sworn to the truth and veracity of his confession, Exhibit “B”, the pertinent portions
of which are:

“9.   Q.-
What are the names of your four(4) companions in going to the house of Fermin Lamoste?

A.- I know their
names but I do not know their surnames.

10.  Q.-
Who are they and where are they residing at present?

A.- x x x @ Simplicio
Aniel, from bo. Oson, x x x.

11.  Q.- What arms are you carrying and your
companions in go­ing to the house of Fermin Lamoste?

A.- x
x x @ Simplicio
Aniel is carrying shorten Japanese Rifle, x x x.”

Judge Burgos further
testified that on December 11, 1962, in the presence of Felix Arañez, Chief of Police of Villaba,
Leyte, accused Casamero Patiño appeared before him and sworn to the truth and
veracity of his statement.  Exhibit
“C”, its translation is Exhibit “C-1”, with the following
pertinent portions:

“5.   Q.-
Why are you detained here, what
crime are you charged?

A.- Because I
was with the robbery and to the murder of Fermin Lamoste.

“6.   Q. – Do you know
the robbers and those who murdered Fermin Lamoste?

A.- Yes, sir.  They
x x x and Simplicio Aniel.”

As evidenced by the
medical certificate, Exhibit A and A-1, the victim suffered the following injuries:

1.  Incised wound on right hypochondrium 3/6″ x 1/2 cm. x 1 cm. obliquely
directed.

2.  Incised wound in the anterior
axillary line on the right hypochondrium
1-1/2″ from the first wound obliquely directed 3/4″ x 1/2 cm. up to the abdominal
cavity.

Appellant
Simplicio Aniel, in
exculpation, interposed the
defense of alibi.  He presented Benjamin (Benigno) Corpin, a 73-year
old man, who testified that on October 6, 1962, he was in the market fair of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, selling
salted fish.  His companion on that date
was Simplicio Aniel whom he
hired
to help him.  The two of them left Considra (or Consuegra), Leyte, at 7:00 o’clock in the morning
and returned home to Considra from the market fair at
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
the same day.  They arrived together in
his house at Considra where the two of them took
their meals.  Then after that, Simplicio Aniel went to his
house.  Aniel’s
house was only about 10 to 15 meters away from his
home.

Felix Arañez,
Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte,
also testified for the defense.  He
testified that on October 7, 1962, a day after the robbery and the killing
occurred, he went to the house of Fermin Lamoste in Sitio Mambajao, Villaba, Leyte.  His
purpose was to investigate the incident which was reported to him by the Barrio
Lieutenant of Cagnocot.  During his investigation, Barcelisa Lamoste, wife of the
deceased, informed him that at about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October
6, 1962, there were unidentified persons who went up their house while she was
holding her baby in the cradle; that Fermin Lamoste was outside the house and when he was bought up the
house, he was already stabbed; that one of them pointed his gun at her; that
she was not able to identify the robbers, not even one, because it was already dark; that Barcelisa Lamoste pointed to the
two sons of Segundo Mesa as the
persons she suspected to be responsible for the robbery because on the day of
the incident, these two went to their house to buy corn and they promised to
come back the following afternoon; that he investigated the two sons of Segundo
Mesa but he had to release them for lack of evidence; that when he further
asked Barcelisa Lamoste
whether there were other persons who were responsible for the commission of the
crime aside from the two sons of Mesa, she said that she and Pelagio Condemena had a
misunderstanding a week before the crime was committed; that when he found out
later on that this Pelagio Condemena
did not go inside the house, he abandoned the investigation of Pelagio Condemena because he had
received information that before the commission of the crime, Pelagio Condemena had already
abandoned his house in Mambajao.

On the basis of these facts, the question before the Court hinges
on whether or not appellant Simplicio Aniel has been sufficiently identified as one of the four
men who participated in the commission of the crime charged.

The defense argued that the identification in open court made by Barcelisa Lamoste and her
daughter, Esmeralda Lamoste, should not have been
considered by the trial court as a “positive identification” which
could sustain the conviction of Simplicio Aniel for the crime charged.  It is contended that the testimony of Barcelisa Lamoste that Simplicio Aniel was the person
who pointed the gun at her, while his three other companions killed her husband
and, thereafter, robbed their house, was more than
sufficiently contradicted, rebutted and destroyed by the testimony of
Felix Arañaz, the Chief of Police of Villaba, Leyte, who investigated
the crime the day following the commission of the offense; that the court
should have given credence to the testimony of Benjamin Corpin
with whom Simplicio Aniel
was together on October 6, 1962, from 7:00 o’clock in the morning up to 5:00
o’clock in the afternoon, selling
salted fish in the market fair of Celso Muertigue in Wague, Leyte, at the time the robbery and killing of Fermin Lamoste took place; that
while it may be true that this witness was not able to recall the other dates
when he hired Simplicio Aniel
to carry salted fish to Wague, Leyte,
aside from October 6, 1962, Benjamin Corpin had given
the reason why he particularly remember the hiring of Simplicio
Aniel on that day, because on that same day, he was
reminded by his son-in-law who for the first time went fishing in Gotosan, and this being the first time his son-in-law
fished in Gotosan, it is not strange that that date
made a deep impression in his memory.

The lower court, however, did not believe the testimony of
Benjamin Corpin because he was not able to account
the whereabout of Simplicio
Aniel after 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October
6, 1962, the time they returned home to Considra from
Wague, Leyte.  According to the trial court, Corpin was sure that they arrived in Consuegra
(or Considra), Leyte, at
5:00 o’clock in the afternoon of October 6, 1962, be­cause Juan Delanta told them that it was exactly 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon when asked by Benjamin Corpin.  On cross-examination, however, Corpin admitted that he treated Simplicio
Aniel as his son, because Simplicio
Aniel is the nephew of Corpin‘s son-in-law.  He
also admitted that he did not remember the other dates, not even the last time,
when he hired Simplicio Aniel
to carry his salted fish to Wague, Leyte. 
Thus, the court who had personally seen and observed the behavior and
manner of the witness while testifying, concluded that his testimony is not
worthy of belief because it is tainted with bias and interest of the
witness to obtain a judgment of acquittal. 
His memory is also faulty.  The
fact that a person has reached the
“twilight of his age” is
not always a guaranty that he
would tell the truth, the trial
court further added.

With
respect to the testimony of the
chief of police Arañez,
We are more impressed
into believing that he had attempted to tailor his testimony in an effort to bolster the validity of the defense of alibi.  We are not persuaded to
accord credence to the testimony
of the chief of police that Barcelisa Lamoste told him that she was not able to identify the robbers, because he himself swore to the truth of the
information after he had gathered evidence pointing to Simplicio Anie
and his companions as the perpetrators of the crime.

He declared thus:

“Q.- Is it your purpose or intention
to impress the Court that you do not believe that Pelagio
Condemena, et al., have been charged falsely?

A.- No, sir.

Q.- What do you mean by that?

A.- I mean that these persons now who are
accused are the ones responsible of the crime committed.

Q.- That is why you were the one who
actually signed the criminal complaint in this case, is that right?

A.- Yes, sir, when the complaint was
amended.

Q.- The incident took place on October 6, 1962 and the filing of the
complaint took place on October 24,
1962, can you explain why the filing of the complaint was delayed?

A.- Because we were searching for more evidence, and when
we were able to gather sufficient evidence, we filed this case.  (tsn
pp. 56-57, Pareja.)

Well settled is the rule that the defense of alibi is weak where the prosecution witnesses positively
identified the accused.  To prosper such
a defense,
it must be established by clear and convincing evidence and not merely supported by witnesses who bear close ties
of relationship to the accused.  The
degree of the evidence must be such as to preclude any doubt that the accused could not have been physically present at the place of
the crime or its immediate vicinity, at the time of its commission.

Barcelisa Lamoste, in the
words of the trial judge who had personally seen and observed her behavior and
manner of testifying on the witness stand, “unhesitantly
and unmistakenly” pointed to Simplicio
Aniel as the person who rushed towards her and
pointed his gun, about one foot long, at her face, warning her at the same time
not to shout or else she will be killed. 
Esmeralda Lamoste substantially corroborated
the testimony of her mother.  And Crispin
Bactol’s testimony has demonstrated a circumstance of
strong persuasion when he recognized Condemeno and
his companions when they were passing in front of his house.  The credibility of their testimony was never
successfully impugned by the defense when they were cross-examined on the
witness stand.  No motive was shown by
the defense why these witnesses should impute so grave a crime to Simplicio Aniel who they did not
even know before the crime was committed.

The
positive identification of appellant Simplicio Aniel was further bolstered when Pelagio
Condemena and Casamero Patiño, in their sworn statements Exhibits “B”
and “C”, named Simplicio Aniel as one of them in the group when they killed Fermin Lamoste and robbed the
house of P200.00 on October 6, 1962, at about 6:00 o’clock in the afternoon.

Extra-judicial
confessions, independently made without collusion, which are identifical with each other in their essential details and
are corroborated by other evidence on record, are admissible as circumstantial
evidence against the person implicated to show the probability of the latter’s
actual participation in the commission of the crime.  As this Court has said:

“While confession of a coconspirator are not ordinarily admissible
as evidence against another co-conspirator, the fact that they implicate the
latter and were made soon after the commission of the crime, is circumstantial
evidence to show the probability of their co-conspirator having actually
participated therein,” (People vs. Lumahang, et
al., L-6357 May 7, 1954.)

The commission of the crime was attended by treachery.  The act
of the accused in suddenly rushing towards the victim, then two of them, each
holding the hands of the victim, and the third of them stabbed the victim, is characterized by treachery insuring the accomplishment
of their purpose without risk to
themselves from any defense or re­taliation the victim might offer.

The conspiracy among the accused is evident and equally proven. 
Their acts collectively and individually
executed have clearly demonstrated the existence of a common design towards the accomplishments of the same unlawful purpose and objective –
to rob the house of Lamoste.  Altho the killing of Fermin Lamoste was
accomplished by only three of the intruders without any physical participation thereof by the appellant Simplicio Aniel‘, however, as
conspiracy has been established, the crime committed is robbery in band, and the homicide was committed on the occasion thereof, all the members of the band are liable
for robbery with homicide (People vs.
Evangelista, et al., L-2489, April 12, 1950).  And

“x x x any
member of a band who is present at the commission of a robbery by the band,
shall be punished as principal of any of the assaults committed by the band,
unless it be shown that he attempted to prevent the same.” (Art. 296,
Revised Penal Code.)

the appellant Simplicio Aniel is liable as
principal because the evidence does not show that he had attempted to prevent
the assault and the killing of Fermin Lamoste.  (People vs. Garduque, et al., L-10133,
July 31, 1958.)

The information charging appellant Simplicio
Aniel, and the three other accused, of the crime of
robbery in band with homicide alleged three aggrava­ting circumstances, namely,
nocturnity, use of superior strength, and commission
of the crime in the dwelling of the offended party.  The lower court, however, after finding all the four accused guilty of the crime
charged, did not consider the
above aggravating
circumstances when it imposed the penalty, instead took into account lack of
instruction and education in mitigation of their liability.  In this respect, the trial court was in
error.  Existing jurisprudence has
settled that lack of instruction and education as mitigating circumstance in
the crime of theft or robbery is not recognized,^[1] although it might
be under certain situations in cases of homicide.^[2] As to the aggravating circumstances of
dwelling and superior strength, the evidence has clearly established the
presence thereof in the commission of
the crime.  Two of the four accused each
held the hands of Fermin Lamoste,
who was at the time unarmed, before he was stabbed, while Simplicio Aniel,
the appellant herein, guarded the wife, Barcelisa Lamoste,
with the gun pointed at her face, and the crime was committed in the dwelling of the victim.  The trial
court, therefore, should have considered dwelling and superior strength as
aggravating circumstances.  (People vs. Sine-on, L-15631, May 27, 1966.)

The aggravating
circumstance of nocturnity, however, cannot be
appreciated.  The record does not show
that the peculiar advantage of nighttime was purposely sought by the accused in
the commission of the deed.

As this Court has pointed
out:

“x x
x in default of any showing or evidence that
the peculiar advantages of nighttime was purposely and deliberately sought by
the accused, the fact that the offense was committed at night will not suffice
to sustain nocturnidad.  It must concur with the intent or design of the offender to capitalize on the intrinsic
impunity afforded by darkness of night.” (People vs.
Boyles, et al., L-15308, May 29, 1964.)

The penalty imposable on persons found guilty of the crime of
robbery in band with homicide, under Article 294, paragraph 1, Revised Penal
Code, is reclusion perpetua to
death.  Considering that appellant Simplicio Aniel acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused, and there is no evidence that said appellant
attempted to prevent the commission of the offense charged, and taking into
account the two aggravating circumstances of dwelling and superior strength,
without any mitiga­ting circumstance to offset the same, in the opinion of the
writer, the appellant Simplicio Aniel
should be made to suffer the extreme penalty of death.  However, in view of the lack of the requisite
vote, the sentence imposed on him by the trial court is hereby affirmed.  Costs against said
appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes,J.B.L.,  Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Castro,
JJ., concur.

^[1]
People vs. Melendrez, 59 Phil. 154; People vs. de la
Cruz, 77 Phil. 444; People vs. Mendoza, L-7039, Jan. 31, 1957; and People vs. Semanada,
L-11361, May
26, 1958.

^[2]
People vs. Huberto, 61 Phil. 64.