G.R. No. L-2990. December 17, 1951
OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT
BENGZON, J.:
publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
Philippines or any of the duly constituted authorities thereof or which
suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to
stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of t he community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted
in the court of first instance of Bohol of a violation of the above
article. The conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, because
according to said court,
“About the time comprised between June 9 and June
24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbiliran, Bohol, Oscar
Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he
were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the
limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a
barrel (Exhibits A, C-1). After securing copies of his photograph,
Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of
general circulation, (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I) not only in the province
of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear
that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and
addressed to the latter’s supposed wife translation of which letter or
note is hereunder reproduced:
“Dearest wife and children,
bury me fire meters deep. Over my grave don’t plant a cross or put
floral wreaths, for I don’t need them”“Please don’t bury me
in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have
committed suicide, I still have the right to be buried among Christians”“But don’t pray for me. Don’t remember me, and don’t feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.
“My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I
did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell
the whole world about this.“And if they ask why I did not
like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in
Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the
banditry of Leyte.“Dear wife, write to President Truman and
Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is
infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.“Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one”
“I committed suicide because I am ashamed, of our government under
Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty
government.“I committed suicide because I have no power to
put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I
sacrificed my own self.”
The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdag and
other local periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto
Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and
posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture taken wherein he was
shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree.”
The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.[1] It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators.
And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction
or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the
government.[2]
Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the
government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government
are against the public peace, and are criminal not only because they
tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive
to the destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am, Law Rep.
1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal
proceedings since early times in England. (V. op. cit.)
As explained by Patarson,[3]
“* * * the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign,
the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must all
be recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to
be defended and treated with an established and well-nigh unalterable
respect. Each of these great institutions has peculiar virtues and
peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the
weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum
reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each
burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference
towards the depository, for the time being, of every great
constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing
is sedition. And yet within that limit there is ample room and verge
enough for the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures
on the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority.”
Naturally, when the people’s share in the government was
restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticisms of
the ruler or the departments of government. But as governments grew to
be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and
freedom of expression grew apace. Yet malicious endeavors to stir up
public strife continue to be prohibited.
The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July
14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142.
Analogous prohibitions are found in the Espionage Act of June 1917 and
the Seditious Libel Amendment thereto in May, 1918.
Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to
become a weapon of Intolerance constraining the free expression of
opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so long as there is a
sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant
to produce illegal action such legislation aimed at anarchy and
radicalism presents largely a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in Article 142 and the law must be applied.
In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the
fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech
secured by the Constitution “does not confer an absolute right to speak
or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose.” It is not
“unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.” [4]
So statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative
of such fundamental guaranty, although they should not be interpreted
so as to unnecessarily curtail the citizen1s freedom of expression to
agitate for institutional changes. [5]
Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticise
his government and government officials and to submit his criticism to
the “free trade of ideas” and to plead for its acceptance in “the
competition of the market.” However, let such criticism be specific and
therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government setup. Such wholesale attack is
nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the
article now under examination one will find no particular objectionable
actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a
dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or
commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with malevolence
and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse
animosity towards all public servants headed by President Roxas whose
pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger
generation to destroy. Analysed for meaning and weighed in its
consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that
it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating
language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer’s
simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its
failure to particularise. When the use of irritating language centers
not on per/uading the readers but on creating disturbance, the
rationale of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is
removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.
If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire
governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply
is that article 142 punishes not only all libels against the Government
but also “libels against any of the duly constituted authorities
thereof.” The”Roxas people” in the Government obviously refer at least
to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom
the adjectives “dirty”, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed.
On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.[6]
As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious
conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the people against the
constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from opposition groups
who may seek to silence the writer.[7] Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.
The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate
tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses;
that is to say to induce people to resort to illegal methods other than
those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which
press upon their minds. [8]
“The idea of violence pervades the whole letter”
says Justice Paredes of the Court of Appeals “The mere fact that a
person was so disgusted with his “dirty government” to the point of
taking his own life, is not merely assign of disillusionment; it is a
clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its
duly constituted authorities. The mention made in said letter of the
situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps, Julio Guillen and the
banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks
against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but be
interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the
open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against the constituted government,
the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless
depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a
state of lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better
than the maladministration of said President and his men.
To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he
committed suicide because he had “no power to put under juez de
cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power” Knowing, that the
expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of
the Knife, a “summary and arbitrary execution by the knife”, the idea
intended by the appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody,
violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the
administration of Roxas and his men.
The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a
question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals
conclusive upon us.[9]
Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or
assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet
and a majority of Legislators including the Chief Executive himself).
And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.
In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters
with several persons in a public place uttered these words: “Filipinos
must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head—referring to the then
Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to
sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the
Philippine Reports. That precedent is undeniably apposite. Note that
the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who
has been most outspoken on freedom of speech. Adopting his own words we
could say, “Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief
Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the
Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a
democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from
promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive attacks. But in
this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds
of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could
easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.”
The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there
being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the
decision will be affirmed with costs.
Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, and Reyes JJ., concur.
[1] “Scurrilous” means low, vulgar, mean, foul (U.S. vs. Strong, 263 Fed.., 789; U.S. vs. Ault, 263 Fed., 800).
[2] U.S. vs. Dorr, 2 Phil., 332.
[3] Liberty of the Press 2nd Ed. p. 371.
[4] People vs. Nabong, 57 Phil., 455.
[5] U. S. vs. Apurado, 7 Phil., 422.
[6]
But we will not rest conviction on this, aware as we are that the
prohibition could be pushed to the point where it will silence all
criticism against public officials, and thereby infringe the
constitutional freedom of speech. Too much danger that men wull be
prosecuted, simply because they criticize the power that be.
[7] Terminiello vs. Chicago 337 U. S. Rep. p. 1.
[8] Peterson, Liberty of the Press, Speech andPublic Workshop, p. 81; note Hale and Benson Law of the Press, p. 359.
[9] People vs.
Most, 64 N.E. 175, 58 L.R.A. 509. The question whether the words had
the effect of inciting or counseling disturbance of the peace is often
a question of degree, which in the U.S. is largely for the jury. this
means it is a question of fact. (Cf. Schenk vs. U.S., 249 U.S. 47, 52.)
Jugo, J., concurs in the result.
DISSENTING
TUASON, J.,
Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended entitled “Inciting to Sedition”, provides:
“The penalty of prision correccional
in its maximum period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon any person who, without taking any direct part in the
crime of sedition, should incite others to the accomplishment of any of
the acts which constitute sedition, by means of speeches,
proclamations, writings, emblems, cartoons, banners, or other
representations tending to the same end, or upon any person or persons
who shall utter seditious words or speeches, write, publish, or
circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the United States
or the Government of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, or any of the
duly constituted authorities thereof, or which tend to disturb or
obstruct any lawful officer in executing the functions of his office,
or which tend to instigate others to cabal and meet together for
unlawful purposes, or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies
or riots, or which lead or tend to stir up the people against the
lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the community, the safety
and order of the Government, or who shall knowingly conceal such evil
practices.”
In the case of U. S. vs.
Dorr, 2 Phil. 332, this Court traced the origin and history of the
predecessor of Article 142 and expounded its meaning. Mr. Justice Ladd,
who wrote the decision, saids
“Several
allied offenses or modes of committing the same offense are defined in
that section, viz: (1) The uttering of seditious words or speeches; (2)
the writing, publishing, or circulating of scurrilous libels against
the Government of the United States or the Insular Government of the
Philippine Islands; (3) the writing, publishing or circulating of
libels which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in
executing his office; (if) or which tend to instigate others to cabal
or meet together for unlawful purposes; (5) or which suggest or incite
rebellious conspiracies or riots; (6) or which tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the peace of the
community, the safety and order of the Government; (7) knowingly
concealing such evil practices.”
Referring to case (2) scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or the Insular Government of the Philippine Islands which
the Court said may stand on a somewhat different footing from the rest
the Court went on to say:
“In the
determination of this question we have encountered great difficulty, by
reason of the almost entire lack of American precedents which might
serve as a guide in the construction of the law. There are, indeed,
numerous English decisions, most of them of the eighteenth century, on
the subject of libelous attacks upon the ‘Government, the constitution,
or the law generally,1 attacks upon the Houses of Parliament, the
Cabinet, the Established Church, and other governmental organisms, but
these decisions are not now accessible to us, and, if they were, they
were made under such different conditions fan those which prevail at
the present day, and are founded upon theories of government so foreign
to those which have inspired the legislation of which the enactment in
question forms a part, that they would probably afford but little light
in the present inquiry. In England, in the latter part of the
eighteenth century, any ‘written censure upon public men for their
conduct as such,’ as well as any written censure ‘upon the laws or upon
the institutions of the country,’ would probably . have been regarded
as a libel upon the Government. G. Stephen, History of the Criminal Law
of England, 348.) This has ceased to be the law in England, and it is
doubtful whether it was ever the common law of any American State. ‘It
is true that there are ancient dicta to the effect that any publication
tending to “possess the people with an ill opinion of the Government”
is a seditious libel (per Holt, C.J., in R. vs. Tuchin, 1704, 5 St. Tr., 532, and ELlenborough, C.J., in R. vs.
Cobbett, 1804, 29 How. St. Tr., 49), but no one would accept that
doctrine now. Unless the words used directly tend to foment riot or
rebellion or otherwise to disturb the peace and tranquility of the
Kingdom, the utmost latitude is allowed in the discussion of all public
affairs.’ (11 Enc. of the Laws of England 450.) Judge Cooley says
(Const, Lim., 528) : ‘The English common law rule which made libels on
the constitution or the government indictable, as it was administered
by the courts, seems to unsuited to the condition and circumstances of
the people of America, and therefore never to have been adopted in the
several States.”
After citing the Act
of Congress of July 14, 1798, commonly-and historically known as the
“Sedition Act,” and after noting that “the term ‘government1 would
appear to be used herein the abstract sense of the existing political
system, as distinguished from the concrete organisms of the Government
the Houses of Congress and the Executive which are also specially
mentioned,” the Court reached the opinion that “this is the (abstract)
sense in which the term is used in the enactment under consideration.”
The Court pointed out that, “while libels upon forms of government,
unconnected with defamation of individuals, must in the nature of
things be of uncommon occurrence, the offense is by no means an
imaginary one,” and cited a case (Republica vs. Dennie, 4 Yeates [Pa.], 267) in which the defendant was indicted ‘ for bringing into contempt and hatred the independence of the United States, the constitution of this Commonwealth and of the United States; for exciting popular discontent and dissatisfaction against the scheme of polity instituted;
for condemning the principles of the Revolution, and reviling the
characters of the patriots and statesmen; for endangering, subverting,
and totally destroying the republican constitutions and free governments of the said United States and the Commonwealth of-Pennsylvania.
In
consonance with the principles laid down, the Court held that the
article published by Dorr, in which he virulently attacked the policy
of the Civil Commission in appointing Filipinos to office, did not come
within the purview of the law, although it “may have had the effect of
exciting among certain classes dissatisfaction with the Commission and
its measures.” It found that there was nothing in the article which
could “be regarded as having a tendency to produce anything like what
may be called dissafection, or, in other words, a state of feeling
incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and
obedient to the laws.”
The message which the accused
herein caused to be published with his picture contained no libel or
criticism against the instituted system of government as distinct from
the administration. On the contrary, the gist of the, message was that
the author was desperate and was going to kill himself because many men
in the government were following the practices of absolute and despotic
rulers in other parts of the world. He wanted President Truman and Mr.
Churchill, leading exponents of such democratic institutions as are
consecrated in the Philippine Constitution, to be informed that
President Roxas and others in his administration were unfaithful to the
tenets of constitutional government. He pointed to the turbulent
situation in Central Luzon, the rampant banditry in Leyte, the
attempted assassination of President Roxas by Guillen, etc., not as
examples to be emulated but as the direct outcome of what he claimed
widespread graft and corruption in the Government. He pretended to have
decided to take his life because he was impotent to remedy or suppress
this deplorable state of affairs, and he was ashamed of the way the
Government was being conducted. He likened some men in the government,
whom he did not specify, to Hitler and Mussolini, not that he idolized
those notorious characters but because, he felt, evil forces that
undermined the ideas and ideals of the Constitution were at work in our
republic. In short, far from advocating the overthrow or change of the
present scheme of polity, the article evinced intense feeling of
devotion to the welfare of the country and its institutions.
President
Roxas was the only official named in the article. But the defendant did
not counsel violence in his reference to the President and the
unnamed officials. In his statement to the effect that he was going to
kill himself because he could not kill President Roxas and the men who
surrounded the Executive, it is not a necessary deduction that he
wished others to do it. Let it be remembered that the message was
addressed to the writer’s “wife” and “children” who, it turned out,
were imaginary.
At best, the meaning of the sentence is
doubtful and the norm is that, where the defendant’s intention is
ambiguous he should be given the benefit of the doubt. The courts may
not subject an act or utterance to a microscopic examination in an
endeavor to find in it germs of seditious purpose. In prosecutions for
sedition utmost caution is called for lest the freedom of expression be
impaired. Although statutes against sedition have been held not to
violate the constitutional guaranty to the freedom of expression, the
courts are warned to so construe or interpret them as not to abridge
that freedom. (33 C.J. l64, citing U. S. vs. Apurado et al.,
7 Phil. 422.) It is axiomatic that the Constitution is the paramount
law and that legislation has to be adjusted thereto. Accordingly in the
solution of clashes, which frequently occur, between liberty of free
speech and prosecution for sedition, the criterion, it is submitted,
should be the presence or absence of real, not imaginary, danger of the
utterance materializing or inciting others to disloyalty to the
Government and Its laws.
There is no inciting to sedition
unless, according to Mr. Justice Holmes1 theory expressed in connection
with a similar topic, “the words used are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create clear and present danger that
they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right
to prevent.” In the very law punishing inciting to sedition there is
the requirement that the words alleged to be seditious or libelous lead or tend
to the consummation of the evils sought to be prevented. Even in the
ordinary offenses of threat and defamation, words are not taken at face
value, hut their import or gravity is gauged by the circumstances
surrounding each particular case.
The terms “lead” and
“tend” are used in Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code in their
ordinary signification. Thus understood, lead as a verb means “to draw
or direct by influence” or “to prevail on,” and tend means “to conduce
to an end.” (Webster’s International Dictionary)
Judged by
these tests, and granting for the present purposes that the defendant
did intend to incite others to sedition, the article was harmless as
far as the safety of the Government and its officers was concerned, and
should have been ignored, as many others more serious than this one
have been. The message, like an evil imagining from which no harm
proceeds except to the individual himself, was not conducive to the
attainment of the prisoner’s aims. If words are “the keys of
persuasion” and ” the triggers of action,” the article under
consideration was far from possessing either of these qualities, taking
into consideration the personality of the man who wrote it and what he
“did”. The reaction of the readers could not have been other than that
the whole thing was comical if it were not “tragic.” The general
reaction, it is fairly safe to say, was one of regret for a man of
eccentric and unbalanced mind or ridicule and curiosity for a grotesque
stunt. The witnesses for the Government themselves, some of whom were
constabulary officers stationed at Tagbilaran, stated that upon reading
the article and seeing the author’s picture they Just laughed it off,
“thinking, that this fellow must be crazy.” That was akin to our own
reaction, and there is little or no doubt that it exemplified the
general effect upon the minds of other readers of the article. It “is
certain that none would commit a rash act upon a vague suggestion of a
man who hanged himself and whom they had never heard of before, while
those who had known him, like the constabulary officers above
mentioned, were aware that the picture was a fake and thought the
subject was a crank.
Attacks more serious, virulent and
inflamatory than the one at bar, by persons well known in politics and
public life and having influence and large following, have frequently
appeared in the press or been launched on the platforms. What the
defendant did or said was very tame and mild by comparison.
Nevertheless, those critics have not been brought to court; and it is
to the everlasting credit of the administration and, in the long run,
for the good of the Government, that the parties reviled and the
prosecutors have adopted a tolerant attitude. A well-known author on
criminal law quoting classical writers on the same subject has truly
said.
“Yet while such is no
doubt the law, prosecutions of this class have recently fallen, in
England as well as in the United States, for several reasons, into
disuse. In the first place, it is now generally felt that unless
criticism be permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
government, revolution rather than reform may result. Time, says Bacon,
is the greatest of destructives; and truth is to be constantly employed
in repairing the breaches which time makes. The wise conservative,
therefore, is often apparently the most destructive radical; as he is
the most prudent repairer who, when the piers of a bridge are weakened
by a storm, advises that the work of reconstruction should begin at the
foundation. To prevent the application of revolutionary criticism to
government is of all modes of government the most revolutionary. And
closely allied with this position is another, that among countries used
to freedom libels only begin to bring the state into contempt when they
are prosecuted by the state as contemptuous. The sedition laws, for
instance, were among the chief causes of the overthrow of the
administration of John Adams; and their repeal one of the . chief
causes of the popularity of that of Jefferson, If, however, seditious
libels are to be prosecuted, it is well to keep in mind the noble words
of princes from whose edicts the English common law, imbued as it is in
so many other respects with the spirit of freedom, has much, in
reference to the law of libel, to learn: ‘Imppp. Theodosius, Arcadius
et Honorius, A.A.A. Rufino P. P. Si quis modestiae nescius et pudoris
ignarus improbo petulantique maledicto nomina nostra crediderit
lacessenda, ac temulentla turbulentus obtrectator teraporarum nostrorum
fuerit, eum poenae nolumus subiugari neque durum aliquid nee asperum
sustinere, quoniam, si ex levitate processerit, contemnedum est, si ex
insania. miseratione dignissimum. si ab injuria. remlttendum. ‘ ” (2
Wharton’s Criminal Law; Section 1947.)
In somewhat parallel vein is the dissent of Mr. Justice Holmes, joined in by Mr. Justice Brandeis, in U. S. vs. Abraxas, 250 U. S. 621, 629. Said Justice Holmes:
“Persecution
for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical. If you
have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result
with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep
away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate
that you think the speech impotent, as when a man says that he has
squared the circle, or that you do not care whole heartedly for the
result, or that you doubt either your power or your premises. But when
men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may
come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of
their own conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached oy
free trade in ideas—that the best twist of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and
that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be
carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is
an experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every
day we have to wager our salvation upon some prophecy based upon
imperfect knowledge. While that experiment is part of our system I
think that we should be eternally vigilant against attempts to check
the expresssion of opinions that we loathe and believe to be fraught
with death, unless they so imminently threaten immediate interference
with the lawful and pressing purposes of the law that an immediate
check is required to save the country. I regret that I cannot put into
more impressive words my belief that in their conviction upon this
indictment the defendants were deprived of their rights under the
Constitution of the United States.”
Moreover, the subject of this prosecution does not reveal personal
malice or hatred. Except for the “Juez de cuchillo” item which, like
words coming from a babe’s mouth, did not have the weight or chance to
sway the listeners, the article was but a statement of grievances
against official abuses and misgovernment that already were of common
knowledge and which more influential and responsible speakers and
writers had denounced in terms and ways more dangerous and
revolutionary.
Paras, C.J., and Feria, J., concur.