VALDERRAMA LUMBER MANUFACTURERS COMPANY, INC., PETITIONER VS. L. S. SARMIENTO, CO., INC., HON. MACAPANTOS ABBAS AND THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF, RESPONDENTS

Petitioner company applied for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary and/or preliminary mandatory injunction, alleging that the
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao committed a
clear abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in ordering the immediate execution of an appealed decision of the
Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao.

It appears that on September 26, 1960, the petitioner, which has
been occupying and using a parcel of foreshore land as its log pond in
its logging business, was notified in writing by counsel for respondent
L. S. Sarmiento & Company to vacate the premises, within ten days
from receipt of notice, as the land has already been leased to it by
the government. Not having complied with the demand to vacate within
the said period, respondent company instituted an action for ejectment
against the petitioner in the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini,
Davao, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 33. Answering the
complaint, the petitioner interposed the affirmative defense, among
others, of lack of jurisdiction over the case because it had been in
prior, peaceful, and open possession of the premises since 1958, more
than one year before the suit was commenced, and that there was a
conflict pending between the parties in the Bureau of Lands over the
land which has not been finally resolved.

After trial, the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, rendered
judgment against the petitioner, and ordered it to vacate completely
the premises within 5 days from receipt of a copy of the decision, to
pay rentals in the amount of P239.82 a month, commencing from September
5, 1960 until surrender of possession of the land in question, and to
pay the sum of P500.00 as attorney’s fees and the costs. Upon motion
for reconsideration by petitioner and/or new trial, the judgment was
amended as follows:

“a. To vacate the premises completely after the
decision shall have become final or sooner upon immediate execution of
the judgment pursuant to Section 8, Rule 72 of the Rules of Court.

“In
view of the foregoing, the motion for new trial and/or reconsideration
is hereby denied and the decision rendered in the above-entitled case
dated December 15, 1960, as modified, shall remain in full force and
effect.”

Not satisfied with the aforesaid judgment, petitioner company
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Davao by filing on time its
Notice of Appeal and a supersedeas bond, which was not objected to by
opposing company and which was approved by the court in the amount of
P2,178.74, “in order to stay execution of the decision rendered in the
present case, dated December 15, 1960, in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 72, Section 8, of the Rules of Court”, and
“conditioned for the performance of the judgment appealed from in case
it be affirmed wholly or in part”. Upon failure of petitioner to
deposit within the first ten days of March, 1961 the adjudged monthly
rent of P239.82 allegedly corresponding to the month of February, 1961,
while the appeal was pending in the court of first instance, L. S.
Sarmiento & Company filed a motion for immediate execution. Over
the opposition of the petitioner, the court granted the motion, and
respondent Provincial Sheriff complied with the writ of execution on
June 21, 1961 (Exhibit 7). However, when respondent company received
the Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by the Supreme Court on June
29, 1961, it “allowed the petitioner the use” of the premises (par.
5(b), p. 5, Answer). A motion to dissolve the said writ of this Court
was filed in July 28, 1961.

It is not disputed that the petitioner, on August 18, 1958, applied
for a permit to use and occupy the log pond in question with the Bureau
of Forestry; the District Forester of Davao having permitted petitioner
company to construct a pier and log pond, it introduced improvements
thereon and since November 3, 1958 had been depositing its log products
in, and shipping them for export from this pond. However, to clear
doubts as to the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry, petitioner
also filed with the Davao District Land Office a lease application for
the same property on March 30, 1959. On January 6, 1960, petitioner was
informed that the area was being surveyed by Bureau of Lands surveyors
in connection with a lease application of the respondent; thereupon,
petitioner protested to the Bureau of Lands, but its protest was not
entertained by this Office because the respondent, as successful bidder
at public auction, had already been awarded the right to lease the
property, and that the petitioner’s lease application with the Davao
District Land Office on March 30, 1959 did not appear on the records of
the Bureau of Lands in Manila. On August 30, 1960, the Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, entered into a contract of lease over the property in
dispute with the respondent company.

The main issue in this case is whether or not the Justice of the
Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, had jurisdiction over the ejectment case.

Petitioner” attacks the jurisdiction of said court on the ground
that the complaint is insufficient in having failed to allege prior
possession of the land by the plaintiff; neither did it allege that the
deprivation of possession by the defendant was done through any of the
means mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72, of the Rules of Court, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy, or stealth; nor is there
anything averred as to any contractual relationship, or priority
thereof, between the parties over the land.

Respondent counters by arguing that the prior possession of the land
by petitioner was by tolerance of the Republic of the Philippines, and
that respondent, as lessee of the land, stepped into the shoes of the
lessor; and, inasmuch as tolerance of possession expires upon demand,
which was made by lessee-company upon petitioner, the latter lost the
right to possess the land, and, therefore, it cannot thereafter
withhold the possession of the land.

The allegations in the complaint are what determine the jurisdiction of the court (Baguioro vs. Barrios, 77 Phil. 120).

Here, the complaint for ejectment recites that the plaintiff, is the
lessee from the Republic of the Philippines of the foreshore land
occupied by the defendant; that on September 5, 1960, plaintiff
demanded of the defendant to vacate the premises within ten days from
notice as it desired to use said parcel of land itself, being entitled
to its possession and use thereof by reason of the aforementioned lease
agreement; that defendant refused to vacate the premises, and that
because of the “unwarranted acts of the defendant alleged hereinabove”,
plaintiff has been compelled to hire the services of counsel. Among
other things, the complaint prayed for judgment, ordering the defendant
“to vacate the premises in question and to restore the possession
thereof to the plaintiff”, and to pay rental value “until the
possession of the same is returned to the plaintiff”.

The complaint not only shows prior possession by petitioner herein,
but does not allege that plaintiff (respondent herein) was deprived of
possession by any of the means mentioned in Section 1, Rule 72, of the
Rules of Court), namely; force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and
stealth, that would have made out a case for forcible entry
(detentacion), nor that the right of possession of the petitioner had
terminated, and occupancy was being unlawfully withheld so as to
constitute unlawful detainer.

“If the dispossession did not take place by any of
these means, Courts of First Instance, not justice of the peace courts,
have jurisdiction.” (2 Moran 287, 1957 Ed.)

And, to make out a case of detainer (desahucio), the complaint must
show that the withholding of possession, or the refusal to vacate, was
unlawful, though not necessarily employing the terminology of the law
(Co Tiamco vs. Dias, 75 Phil. 672). On this jurisdictional requisite,
the complaint under scrutiny is fatally silent. While it is true that
the complaint uses the word “unwarranted”, the way it was used is
merely descriptive of the “acts of the defendant alleged hereinabove”;
and thereinabove (referring to the complaint), nowhere can be found any
word or phrase describing the withholding of possession by the
defendant as unlawful or of as similar tenor.

The Justice of the Peace Court not having acquired jurisdiction over
the case, the Court of First Instance of Davao did not acquire
appellate jurisdiction.^[1]
Hence, the respondents Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao
and Provincial Sheriff acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing
and enforcing the writ of execution.

With regard to the claim that the action to dispossess petitioner
should have been instituted by the government, as owner-lessor, and not
by the lessee, it should be observed that while under Article 1664 of
the Civil Code a lessee had no direct action against an intruder who
questions the lessee’s right to possession and asserts it in himself,
yet such issue can not be taken up now, as it does not affect ftie
jurisdiction of the court, and the point does not appear to have been
properly invoked before the respondent court.

In view whereof, judgment is hereby rendered, making permanent the
writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on June 29, 1961,
and declaring all proceedings had in connection with Civil Case No. 33
of the Justice of the Peace Court of Mabini, Davao, to be null and void
for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against respondent Sarmiento & Co.,
Inc.

Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

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^[1] 127 Torres vs. Pena, 78
Phil., 231; 44 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 2690; Penalosa vs. Garcia, 78
Phil., 231; 44 Off. Gaz., No. 8, p. 2709, cited in Juzon de Po vs.
Moscoso 93 Phil., 427; 49 Off. Gaz., No. 7, p. 2786.