JOSE ALCANTARA, PETITIONER, VS. DIONISIA YAP, PACIFICO YAP AND HON. NICASIO YATCO, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, RESPONDENTS.

On June 25, 1960, respondents Dionisia Yap and Pacifico Yap filed
with the Court of First Instance of Rizal a complaint (Civil Case No.
Q-5241) against petitioner Jose Alcantara alleging, inter alia,
that in 1951, respondents bought on installment plan from J. M. Tuason
& Co., Lots Nos. 2 and 3, Block 359 of the Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision, located at A. Bonifacio St., San Jose, Quezon City, under
contracts to sell Nos. 7052 and 7065; that upon the signing of said
contracts, the possession of said lots was delivered to respondents by
said company; that at the time respondents bought said lots, petitioner
“has been occupying a portion of 100 square meters” thereof which are
adjacent, and built his house and other constructions thereon, without
respondents’ consent nor of said company; that as a consequence of the
acts of usurpation committed by petitioner, respondents have suffered
and will continue to suffer damages at the rate of P40.00 a month,
representing the fair rental value of the premises. Respondents prayed
that judgment be rendered ordering petitioner and all other persons
claiming under him to vacate the premises in question and to remove the
house and other constructions therefrom; to pay respondents the sum of
P40.00 a month from January 1, 1952 until they are restored to the
possession thereof; and to pay the costs of the suit.

To this complaint, petitioner filed his answer on August 20, 1960,
alleging as special defenses that petitioner’s complaint states no
cause of action because according to paragraph 4 thereof, respondents
have never been in possession of the property subject matter of the
case; that respondents have no personality to sue, because the alleged
owner of said lots is J. M. Tuason & Co. and respondents are mere
purchasers on installment plan, who have not yet been issued a final
deed of sale; that petitioner is the owner of the parcel of land
subject matter of the case, by virtue of a right of inheritance, having
inherited the same from his deceased father; that petitioner has always
been in continuous, open, and uninterrupted possession of the same from
time immemorial to the present time; that said property is included in
the subject matter of Civil Case No. 3623 (Alcantara vs. J. M. Tuason
& Co.) pending before Branch II of the same court (Court of First
Instance of Rizal); that the parcel of land subject matter, of the case
is not included in the title of J. M. Tuason & Co. (TCT No. 31977),
because it is located west of the road to Novaliches and is, therefore,
beyond the western boundaries of the Hacienda de Sta. Mesa; that
Gregorio Araneta, Inc., agent of J. M. Tuason & Co. had no
authority to dispose of said property which is situated beyond the
limits of TCT No. 31977; and that respondents are purchasers in bad
faith, having purchased the property in question with full knowledge
that at the time of the execution of said contracts of sale, J. M.
Tuason & Co. was not in possession thereof because petitioner was
in possession of the same. Petitioner prayed that the complaint be
dismissed; that the hearing of the case be held in abeyance pending the
decision of Civil Case No. 3623; that J. M. Tuason & Co. be
summoned to appear as a necessary party defendant; and that petitioner
be declared owner of said property.

Issues having been joined, the case was tried and, after trial, the
court, on January 27, 1961, rendered a decision which in its pertinent
parts, reads:

‘ DECISION

“This is a case for the recovery of possession and
damages filed by plaintiffs Dionisia G. Yap and Pacifico Yap against
the defendant Jose Alcantara, over lots Nos. 2 and 3, Block No, 359 of
the Sta. Mesa Heights Subdivision located at A. Bonifacio St., San
Jose, Quezon; City; under ‘Contracts to Sell’ Nos. 7052 and 7065, under
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 53198 and 53199, respectively, of
the Register of Deeds of Quezon City in the name of the plaintiffs.

“It
was the contention of the defendant that, the referred. lots were
outside the property of the Tuasons, for defendant claims to have
inherited the same from his deceased father.

“The Court takes
judicial notice that the above lots were registered in the name of
plaintiffs’ predecessor-in-interest since 1914 as decided in the case
of Tiburcio vs. Peoples Homesite and Housing Corporation (G.R. No.
L-13429, prom, on October 31, 1959). And, inasmuch as plaintiffs have
derived their title from J. M. Tuason & Co., Inc., from whom they
bought the lots in question, then plaintiffs are innocent purchasers
for value and their title cannot now be questioned by the defendant
or anybody else for that matter.

“On the other hand,
defendant did not present any title, whether perfect or imperfect that
we call under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act).1 is, indeed, a
misfortune that no surveyor (expert) and no relocation was ever made to
show semblance of defendant’s contention that the property is not
within the title of the Tuasons. The testimony of laymen, Jose
Alcantara and Elias Benin could not be taken seriously to overcome an
indubitable title of plaintiffs supported by Torrens Title in their
name. If the contention of the defendant is correct, no register of
deeds will issue titles to plaintiffs, as they are bonded officers and,
therefore, answerable for damages.

* * * * * * *

“Evidently, plaintiffs proved by indubitable
documents that, they were not only possessors of the property in
question, but also they are the exclusive owners of the same. The only
thing left to be determined is the reasonable damages to which they are
entitled for the occupancy of the lots. In this respect, they are
entitled to the amount of P40.00 a month from January 1, 1952 until the
date the premises are vacated.

“In view of the foregoing, the
Court renders judgment one in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant to vacate the premises and remove the house and other
constructions therefrom; to pay plaintiffs the sum of  P40.00 a month
from January 1, 1952 until
the plaintiffs are restored to the possession thereof, and costs. So ordered.”

From this decision of which he received notice on February 10,1961,
petitioner filed a “motion for reconsideration and new trial” on
February 22, 1961, on the grounds that (1) the evidence was
insufficient to justify the decision, and (2) the decision is contrary
to law. To this motion, respondents filed an opposition on February 24.
On March 4, 1961, the court issued an order denying said motion for
reconsideration and new trial, of this tenor:

“ORDER

“Upon due consideration of the motion for
reconsideration and new trial of counsel for the defendant and the
opposition thereto of counsel for the plaintiffs and, it appearing that
after an examination of the records of this case, the said motion for
reconsideration and new trial is not supported by the evidence counsel
for the defendant has presented during the hearings in this case;

“The said motion for reconsideration and new trial is hereby denied.

“So Ordered.”

Notified of this order on March 16, 1961, petitioner filed a notice
of appeal, record on appeal, and appeal bond, on the following day- But
on March 28, 1961, respondent Judge disapproved the record on appeal,
in an order stating:

“It appearing that the record on appeal filed by the
defendant was filed beyond the reglementary period, as the motion for
reconsideration and new trial did not stop the running of the period to
appeal because, upon a perusal of the same, the Court believes that the
.said motion for reconsideration is merely a pro forma motion;

“The
record on appeal of the defendant is hereby disapproved and the appeal
of the said defendant is not given due course. “So ordered.”

Petitioner duly filed a motion for reconsideration of said order on
May 4, 1961, but the same was denied by respondent Judge in an order
dated May 13, 1961, which reads:

“ORDER

“Upon due consideration of the motion for
reconsideration of the defendant and the opposition thereto of the
plaintiff, and finding the motion for reconsideration to be without
sufficient merits, as the court still believes that the motion for
reconsideration and new trial dated February 22, 1961, which was
previously denied by the Court, is a pro forma motion;

“The instant motion for reconsideration is hereby denied. So ordered.”

On June 23, 1961, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari, to which we gave due course.

Petitioner claims that respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction
and acted with grave abuse of discretion in considering his motion for
reconsideration and new trial of February 22, 1961 as a pro forma
motion, and in his approving the record on appeal filed by him on March
17, 1961.

The only question to be determined in this case is whether petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and new trial in question is pro forma.

Section 2, Rule 37, of the Rules of Court provides that when a
motion for new trial is made on the ground that “the evidence was
insufficient to justify the decision, or it is against the law”, it
must “point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the
judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary
to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary
evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such
findings or conclusions.” Perusal of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and new trial in question, shows that said provision of
the Rules of Court had been complied with by him, if not strictly, at
least, substantially. In his said motion, petitioner pointed out the
findings and conclusions of respondent Judge not supported by the
evidence or against the law, and made express reference to the
testimonial or documentary evidence contrary to such findings or
conclusions, to wit:

“During the course of the trial, defendant has shown
that the carretera provincial de Rizal para Novaliches’ adjoining the
Cementerio del Norte which forms the Northwestern boundary of the land
covered by TCT No. 31997, is no other than the A. Bonifacio Road. The
attention of this Honorable Court was invited to the fact that this
Honorable Court, now sitting in Quezon City within and the province of
Rizal, should take judicial notice of the fact that the A. Bonifacio
Road is the same as the ‘Carretera provincial de Rizal para Novaliches.’ The land whose possession is sought to be recovered is located west of
the A. Bonifacio Road and is not covered, therefore, by the title of J.
M. Tuason & Co. Inc., from which plaintiffs derived their title.
The land in litigation, not being covered by TCT No. 31997, remains as
unregistered land. * * * Defendant’s evidence showed that the land
possessed and owned by him is bounded on the East by Novaliches Road.
This Honorable Court admits in its decision the contention of the
defendant that the land sought to be recovered by the herein plaintiffs
is outside the boundaries of the land owned by J. M. Tuason & Co.
Inc. from which the plaintiffs’ TCT No. 53198 and TCT No. 53199 were
derived. The defendant contends that TCT No. 31997 of J. M. Tuason
& Co. Inc. clearly states that the land covered by said title is
bounded on the Northwest by the ‘carretera provincial de Rizal para
Novaliches’ adjoining the Cementerio del Norte is no other than the A.
Bonifacio Road. * * * The defendant, on the other hand, has shown that
the land of the defendant is bounded on the East by the Novaliches Road
(t.s.n. p. 6 and 46, Dec. 21, 1960). The documentary evidence presented
by the defendant (Exh. 3, Exh. 3-A, and Exh. 4) clearly shows that the
land of the defendant is bounded on the East by the A. Bonifacio Road
which is the Provincial Road of Rizal to Novaliches. The land covered
by TCT No. 31997 (Exh. 5, Exh. 6-A, Exh. 6-B) converted into the Sta.
Mesa Heights Subdivision, is bounded on the Northwest by the same
Novaliches Road (A. Bonifacio Road) which is the boundary of the
defendant’s land on the East. It is, therefore, very clear that the
common boundary line between the land covered by TCT No. 31997 and the
land of the defendant Jose Alcantara is the Novaliches Road (A.
Bonifacio Road). It is, indeed, surprising why, in the Decision of this
Honorable Court, no finding of fact was made as to the nature of the A.
Bonifacio Road or the Novaliches Road which Is the bone of contention
between the herein plaintiffs and the herein defendant. * * * We,
therefore, respectfully ask this Honorable Court to make a clear
finding of fact and a clarification of its Decision as to the nature of
the A. Bonifacio Road. * * * If the A. Bonifacio Road is the same as
the ‘carretera provincial de Rizal para Novaliches’, as in fact it is,
it is therefore, incontrovertible and clear as crystal that the Title
of J. M. Tuason & Co. Inc. cannot cover the land of the defendant
located west of the ‘carretera provincial de Rizal para Novaliches’ (A.
Bonifacio Road). * * * We respectfully submit that the Decision
rendered by this Honorable Court on January 27, 1961 is likewise
against the law. We have shown in the preceding argument that the lot
sought to be recovered in the present case is not covered by TCT No.
31997. Not being covered by TCT No. 31997, the provisions of the Land
Registration Law, or the decisions of the Supreme Court with respect to
registered lands is not applicable in this case. The land4 located west
of the ‘carretera provincial de Rizal para Novaliches* (A. Bonifacio
Road) owned by the defendant and other property owners are still
unregistered property up to the present time. * * * The lands west of
the A. Bonifacio Road are, up to the present, unregistered lands. Being
unregistered lands, we have shown by both oral and documentary evidence
(t^.n. pp. 9, 24, 25, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, Dec. 21 1960; Exhs. 1, 2, 3,
3-A, 4, 7 and 8), that the defendant has been in continuous, adverse,
public, and open possession of the property since time immemorial, has
been paying taxes on said property and has been in possession of the
same up to the present time. This fact shows clearly his Title to the
land. * * *.”

Having shown that petitioner’s motion in question complied with the
aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court, it follows that said
motion is not pro forma. Respondent Judge should have, therefore,
approved petitioner’s appeal otherwise admittedly filed within the
reglementary period for appeal.

Respondents contend that to allow petitioner’s appeal would only
give him false hopes, as it is legally impossible for him to seek a
reversal of the decision of respondent Judge because this Court has
already sustained the validity of the title of J. M. Tuason & Co.
(respondent’s predeces-sor-in-interest) over the Sta. Mesa Heights
Subdivision in the cases of J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Santiago, 99
Phil., 615; 52 Off. Gaz., 5217 and Santiago vs. J. M. Tuason & Co.
110 Phil., 16. The contention is untenable because petitioner’s claim
is, not that J. M. Tuason & Co.’s title is invalid, but that the
property subject matter of the present case is outside the boundaries
or limits of the title of J. M. Tuason & Co.

For all the foregoing, the writ of certiorari prayed for by
petitioner is hereby granted; the order disallowing the appeal (dated
March 28, 1961) is set aside; and the lower court is hereby directed to
approve and give due course to the record on appeal, if found correct,
to the Court of Appeals. No costs. So ordered.

Padilla, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.