THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. VICENTE QUESADA Y BERNAL, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Vicente Quesada y Bernal was charged with frustrated homicide before
the Court of First Instance of Manila who, upon arraignment, pleaded
not guilty. When the case was tailed for hearing, Dr. Crisostomo
Arcilla, a physician working at the Philippine General Hospital, was
presented by the fiscal as witness for the prosecution, and testified
regarding the wounds suffered by the victim Hugodino Lim y Cosin.
Later, when the hearing was resumed, the accused petitioned thru
counsel that he be allowed to withdraw his former plea of not guilty
and substitute it with that of guilty. The petition was granted. Upon
rearraignment, he pleaded guilty, after which he was allowed to prove
the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. After hearing, the
court rendered decision sentencing him to suffer a penalty of not less
than 2 years 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, and not more than 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P3,000.00, and to pay the costs.

The accused appealed to the Court of Appeals, but the case was
certified to us on the ground that only questions of law are involved.

The main issue raised by appellant is that the trial court erred in
not considering his plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance and in
not imposing upon him the corresponding penalty after considering said
mitigating circumstance. He avers that his plea of guilty was free and
spontaneous despite the fact that he did so after the prosecution had
presented a witness, because at that stage there was yet no prima facie
evidence that the accused had committed the crime charged, and that
when he asked that his former plea be changed he did so because of his
sincere desire to repent for what he has done.

The claim has no merit. Article 13, paragraph 7, of the Revised
Penal Code, as interpreted by this Court, requires that the plea of
guilty, to be entertained, be made (1) in open court; (2)
spontaneously; and (3) prior to the. presentation of the evidence for
the prosecution (People vs. Dela Peña, 66 Phil., 451; People vs. Co Chang, 60 Phil., 29S; People vs.
Dela Cruz, 63 Phil., 874). Requirements 2 and 3 are not here present.
The record shows that appellant committed the felonious act on March
22, 1956 and when arrainged on May 14, 1956, he pleaded not guilty, and
it was only on August 11, 1957, or about 1 year 3 months and 7 days
afterwards that he felt a contrite and repentant act by Changing his
former plea of not guilty to that of guilty. Obviously, his plea of
guilty was not spontaneous, and apparently was done not because of his
sincere desire to repent, as he claims, but because of his fear of
eventual conviction. Indeed, if it was really his desire to repent and
to reform realizing the implication of what he has done, he could have
had pleaded guilty at the very first opportunity when his arraignment
was first set. He only changed his mind more than one year afterwards.

Even if it be granted that his plea was spontaneous or one born of
his sincere desire to repent, still he cannot be given credit for that
plea because he did so after the prosecution had commenced presenting
its evidence, which is contrary to one of the requirements of the law.
As this Court has aptly said: “Confession of guilt constitutes a cause
for the mitigation of the penalty, because it is an act of repentance
and respect for the law; it indicates a moral disposition in the
accused favorable to his reform. These benefits are not deserved by the
accused who submits to the law only after the presentation of some
evidence for the prosecution, believing that in the end the trial will
result in his conviction” (People vs. Dela Cruz, supra).

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Endencia, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., concurs in the result.