RAFAEL MARCELO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. EULOGIO MENCIAS ETC., ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

The issue in this petition for certiorari and mandamus is whether
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting as a land registration
court, has jurisdiction or authority to order the demolition of
improvements, as a consequence of a writ of possession issued by it.

On June 9, 1954, petitioner Rafael Marcelo applied for registration
in his name, 3 parcels of land (lots 1, 2, and 3) located at Taguig,
Rizal. His application was opposed by Leocadio Pagsisihan, father and
predecessor-in-interest of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan.

On February 28, 1955, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, sitting
as a land registration court, rendered a decision in favor of
petitioner, declaring him to be the owner of only 1 of the 3 lots
applied for; denying the opposition of the then oppositor Leocadio
Pagsisihan; and declaring the 2 other lots to be public lands. Not
satisfied with the decision, petitioner appealed to the Court of
Appeals; not so the oppositor Pagsisihan. The appellate court reversed
the decision of the land registration court, holding that petitioner is
also the owner of the 2 other lots which were declared public lands.

After said judgment of the Court of Appeals became final and
executory, respondent Judge, upon petitioner’s motion, issued an order
for the issuance of a decree in favor of the latter, and forthwith a
certificate of title was issued for all said lots in the name of
petitioner.

Since respondent Clemente Pagsisihan refused to deliver possession
of the 2 lots (lots 2 and 3) which were occupied by him, petitioner
filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of possession, which
petition was duly opposed by said respondent. On March 14, 1959,
respondent Judge granted the petition, stating.

“Rafael Marcelo, applicant in the above-entitled
land registration case, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of
possession and particularly over that portion of the land occupied by
Leocadio Pagsisihan. Counsel for one Clemente Pagsisihan (herein
respondent) who is not a party to the case objected to the petition
stating that Leocadio Pagsisihan who opposed the application is not in
possession of any portion of the property object of the case as he died
on August 28, 1958. In the case of Manlapas vs. Llorente, 48
Phil., 298, it was held that after the registration of the land is
decreed in favor of the applicant, the latter may ask the proper court
for the issuance of a writ of possession provided the same has not been
issued before. In the case of Pasay Estate Company vs. Del
Rosario, 11 Phil., 391, as well as in the above cited case, it was held
that the writ of possession maybe issued not only against the person
who has been defeated in the registration case but also against anyone
occupying the land or portion thereof during the registration
proceeding. In view of the foregoing, the Court is of the opinion that
the petition is well-taken.”

In spite of the issuance of the writ of possession to petitioner,
respondent Clemente Pagsisihan. refused to surrender the possession of
said lots 2 and 3 and to remove his house standing thereon. Petitioner,
therefore, filed a petition for demolition. On May 2, 1959, respondent
Judge denied the same, in an order of this tenor:

“The Court, acting as Land Registration Court not
having jurisdiction to order the demolition sought for in the present
petition, thereby denied the said petition.”

From this order, petitioner, on May 19, 1959, filed a motion for reconsideration (Annex A) contending, inter alia,
that under the jurisprudence on the matter, the court has jurisdiction
to issue an order of demolition which is simply the coercive process or
remedy to render effective the writ of possession already issued by it.
On June 8, 1959, said motion was denied by the court, in an order which
reads:

“ORDER”

“This is a motion
for reconsideration of the order of this Court dated May 2, 1959
denying movant’s motion praying for tire issuance of a writ of
demolition directed against the house of one Clemente Pagsisiban
(herein respondent) on the ground that this Court acting as a land
registration court does not have jurisdiction to order the demolition
prayed for. Movant contends that this Court under the authority of
decisions rendered in Demorar vs. the Hon. Judge Ibañez, et al.; 51 Off. Gaz., No, 6, p. 2872; Pasay Estate Co., Ltd. vs. the Hon. Judge del Rosario, 11 Phil., 891; and Follosco vs.
Director of Lands, G.R. No. L-4991, March, 23, 1953, has jurisdiction
to issue an order of demolition. The first two cases speak of the
issuance of a writ of possession in favor of the movant in the case.
The last cited case ia not in point. The doctrine speaks of a final
judgment involving delivery or restitution of property. Under Section
13, Rule 39, the officer called upon to enforce such judgment according
to the doctrine laid down may do so by placing the plaintiff in
possession of such property and a special order of demolition may be
issued after the defendant has failed to remove the improvements on the
property within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court and after
such defendant shall have been given a due hearing. The instant case is
not an action involving delivery or restitution of property but one for
the purpose of determining whether applicant or the oppositor is the
owner of tho property sought to he registered and to order the
registration of the title of the person who is found to have a
registrable title thereto. As a matter of fact, in the first case cited
by movant, it speaks only of the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the successful claimant. Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court in the opinion of the Court refers only to ordinary action
involving the delivery or restitution of property and not to
proceedings under the Land Registration Law. The provision of the Land
Registration Law are silent on the point.

“In view of all the foregoing considerations, the Court resolves to deny the motion for reconsideration. “So ordered.”

Hence, this petition for certiorari and mandamus. Respondents court
and oppositor have filed no answer to this petition.

It is contended that respondent Judge erred in denying the petition
for demolition. To this we agree. Section 13, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, provides:’

“SEC. 13. How execution for the delivery or restitution of property enforced.—The
officer must enforce an execution for the delivery or restitution of
property by placing the plaintiff in possession of such property, and
by levying as hereinafter provided upon so much of the property of the
judgment debtor as will satisfy the amount of the costs, damages,
rents, and profits included in the execution. However, the officer
shall not destroy, demolish or remove the improvements made by the
defendant or his agent on the property, except by special order of the
court, which order may only issue upon petition of the plaintiff after
due hearing and upon the defendant’s failure to remove the improvements
within a reasonable time to be fixed by the court.”

Respondent Judge is of the view that the above-quoted provision of
the Rules of Court applies only to ordinary actions involving the
delivery or restitution of property, and not to proceedings under the
land registration law which, according to him, is silent on the point.
The view is not correct, for the reason that the provisions of the
Rules of Court are applicable to land registration cases in a
suppletory character (Rule 132). Put differently, if the writ of
possession issued in a land registration proceeding implies the
delivery of possession of the land to the successful litigant therein
(Demorar vs. Ibañez, 97 Phil., 72; 51 Off. Gaz., 2872; Pasay Estate Company vs. Del Rosario, et al., 11 Phil., 391; Manlapas vs.
Llorente, 48 Phil., 298), a writ of, demolition must, likewise, issue,
especially considering that the latter writ is but a complement of the
former which, without said writ of demolition, would be ineffective.

Apparently, respondent Judge, in refusing to issue the writ of
demolition to petitioner, was of the belief that the latter has another
remedy, namely, by resorting to ordinary civil actions in the regular
courts, such as that of forcible entry and detainer, or the recovery of
possession, in which instances, said courts would then be competent to
issue said writ. Such a situation, in our opinion, could not have been
intended by the law. To require a successful litigant in a land
registration ease to institute another action for the purpose of
obtaining possession of the land adjudged to him, would be a cumbersome
process. It would foster unnecessary and expensive litigations and
result in multiplicity of suits, which our judicial system abhors. In
this connection, this Court on one occasion, said:

“But this construction of the law entirely defeats
its purpose. It would compel a successful litigant in the Court of Land
Registration to commence other actions in other courts for the purpose
of securing the fruits of his victory. The evident purpose of the law
was to prevent that very thing; * * * (Pasay Estate Co. vs. Del Rosario, et al., supra.)

Furthermore, Section 6, Rule 124, of the Rules of Court states that—

“When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a court of
judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or
officer; and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules, any
suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears
most conformable to the spirit of said rules.”

As already stated, provisions of the Rules of Court are applicable
to land registration cases in a suppletory character. Pursuant to the
provision just quoted, respondent Judge has the power to issue all
auxilliary writs, including the writ of demolition sought by
petitioner, processes and other means necessary to carry into effect
the jurisdiction conferred upon it by law in land registration cases to
issue a writ of possession to the successful litigant, the petitioner
herein.

Lastly, in the case of Shioji vs. Harvey, 43 Phil., 333, we
pointed out that “Independent of any statutory provision, * * * every
court has inherent power to do all things reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction.”^[1]
In line with this doctrine, it may be stated that respondent judge, in
the instant case, has the inherent power to issue the writ of
demolition demanded by petitioner. Needless to say, its issuance is
reasonably necessary to do justice to petitioner who is being deprived
of the possession of the lots in question, by reason of the continued
refusal of respondent Clemente Pagsisihan to remove his house thereon
and restore possession of the premises to petitioner.

Wherefore, the orders of respondent Judge dated May 2, 1959 and June
8, 1959 are set aside, and the case remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings on petitioner’s petition for an order of
demolition, pursuant to Section 13, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court.
Respondent Clemente Pagsisihan will pay the cost. So ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Endencia, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., on leave, took no part.

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^[1] Suanes vs. Chief Accountant, 81 Phil., 818 see also Eraña vs. Vera, 74 Phil., 272. Fernando vs. Aragon, 76 Phil., 609.