ESTRELLA, E. SERRANO, LEONOR E. ALMAZAN, CONCEPCION E. TOBIAS, LETICIA E. SALVADOR AND PAZ E. TOLENTINO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ANDRES REYES, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE…

This is an original petition for mandamus filed by petitioners Estrella E.
Serrano, Leonor E. Almazan, Concepcion E. Tobias, Leticia E. Salvador, and Paz
E. Tolentino, under Section 15, Rule 41, of the Rules of Court, to compel
respondent Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, to certify and elevate
to this Court the record on appeal in Special Proceedings Nos. 2598 and
2600.

It appears that Special Proceedings Nos. 2598 (In the Matter of the Testate
Estate of the deceased Jose L. Elchico, Eduardo V. Elchico, Petitioner), and
2600 (In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Jose L. Elchico,
Florencio Elchico, et al., Petitioners) were joined together in the sala of
respondent Judge since 1957, the above-mentioned petitioners Estrella E.
Serrano, et al., on the one hand, and respondents Eduardo V. Elchico, Florencio
Elchico, Elena V. Elchico, Dominador Elchico, Alfredo Elchico, Clara E. Casanas,
Gloria E. Aldana, and Rosalinda de Pano, on the other hand, being the contending
parties.

On February 23, 1959, respondent Judge issued an order of the following
tenor, approving a Compromise Settlement executed by the parties:

“Petitioner Eduardo V. Elchico, assisted by counsel, submitted a
manifestation on February 21, 1959, together with the conformity thereto in
writing of Florencio Elchico, one of the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 2600,
alleging that the compromise settlement between the parties had been duly signed
by them, a copy of which is attached to said manifestation, and in view of the
unnecessary delay and the confusion that confront the parties, arising from the
retention of Atty. Navarro of the original thereof and duplicate originals,
petitioner Eduardo V. Elchico, ‘is left no other alternative but to submit’ the
said compromise settlement for the approval by this Court, the pertinent
portions of which read as follows:

‘1. That all the assets of the estate of the decedent, Dr. Jose L. Elchico,
shall be divided into fourteen (14) equal portions, after all the debts, taxes
and other charges shall have been paid:

‘2. That the fourteen (14) equal portions shall then be distributed as
fellow’s:

a. To Eduardo Elchico shall pertain two-fourteenths (2/14);

b. To Elena V. Elchico, Alfredo V. Elchico, Gloria E. Aldana, Concepcion E.
Tobias, Dominador V. Elchico, Florencio V. Elchico, Leonor E. Almazan, Leticia
E. Salvador, Estrella E. Serrano, Clara E. Casanas and Rosalinda L. de Pano,
shall pertain one-fourteenths (1/14) each; and

c. To Paz E. Tolentino shall pertain one-twenty-eight (1/28) and Vicente and
Visitation Elchico, shall pertain the remaining one-twenty-eight
(1/28).

‘3. In the interest of family peace, all charges and countercharges of all
the parties in the above-entitled cases shall be as they hereby are considered
withdrawn so that no one shall be held liable on the basis of said charges and
countercharges;

‘4. That pending the liquidation of the estate of the decedent Dr. Jose
Elchico, the administration of the properties of the estate shall devolve
jointly on Eduardo Elchico and Florencio Elchico;

‘5. That pending the payment of the debts other charges of the estate, the
management of the transportation business, the New Angat Transportation Company
shall be, as it is hereby vested in:

Florencio Elchico, Manager, and
Eduardo Elchico, Treasurer-Cashier.

That all checks, disbursements and withdrawals shall be signed by Florencio
Elchico, as manager, and countersigned by Eduardo Elchico, as Treasurer;
Provided that in the event of mismanagement or maladministration or
unjustifiable orders or instructions on the part of Florencio Elchico or
mishandling of funds and/or unjustifiable refusal to countersign on the part of
Eduardo Elchico, both of them shall be subject to recall, upon order of this
Honorable Court.

‘6. That Florencio Elchico and Eduardo Elchico shall exert all efforts to
settle as soon as feasible all the charges against the estate, liquidate the
business, and distribute and partition the estate in accordance with the
proportions established in par. 2 hereof.

‘7. This agreement shall take effect upon its approval by the Court.

‘Whereof, the parties respectfully submit this compromise settlement to this
Honorable Court, with the prayer that the same be approved and the
above-entitled cases considered terminated and closed as to them.

‘Manila for Pasig, Rizal, December 22, 1958.

(Sgd) Eduardo Elchico	(Sgd) Leticia E. Salvador
(Sgd) Elena Elchico	(Sgd) Estrella E. Serrano
(Sgd) Alfredo Elchico	(Sgd) Clara E. Casanas
(Sgd) Gloria E. Aldana	(Sgd) Rosalinda L. de Pano
(Sgd) Concepcion E. Tobias	(Sgd) Paz E. Tolentino
(Sgd) Dominador V. Elchico	(Sgd) Vicente Elchico
(Sgd) Florencio V. Elchico	(Sgd) Visitacion Elchico
(Sgd) Leonor E. Almazan

Assisted by:

(Sgd) Jovito R. Salonga Counsel for Eduardo Elchico, et al.

(Sgd) Emiliano Navarro Counsel for Florencio Elchico, et al.

“Considering the allegations of said manifestation, together with the written
conformity of Florencio Elchico, and finding said compromise settlement to be in
order the Court hereby approves said compromise settlement and enjoins the
parties to faithfully comply with the terms and conditions, thereof. Pursuant to
said compromise and pending the liquidation of the estate, Eduardo V. Elchico
and Florencio Elchico are hereby appointed joint administrators of the estate,
with powers, duties and obligations to perform their respective functions under
the agreement and under the provisions of the Rules of Court. The administrators
are ordered to exert utmost efforts to liquidate unpaid debts and obligations of
the estate, including payment of the corresponding inheritance and estate taxes
due on the, estate, and to submit a quarterly accounting of the income and
expenses of the estate.

It is so ordered.”

On March 4, 1959, petitioners filed a motion to set aside said order
alleging, inter alia, that although said compromise settlement was
signed by them, it was never intended to be delivered to become effective; that
respondent Florencio Elchico obviously retained or smuggled a carbon copy
thereof which he showed to the court on February 21, 1959; that their counsel
(Atty. Emiliano R. Navarro) retained the deed of settlement with their full
knowledge an4 consent, as they wanted a few alterations made thereon, due to
subsequent discoveries, and they did not intend to settle on its original terms;
and that they never authorized respondent Florencio Elchico to deliver said
settlement to the court, nor were they notified of, nor present at said
presentation of the settlement in court; however, this motion to set aside.
“would not have been necessary had not Florencio Elchico. withdrawn his
resignation and Attorney Salonga objected to his substitution.” On March 9,
1959, petitioners filed a supplemental motion, reciting supposed violations of
the canons of professional ethics committed by Atty. Jovito R. Salonga,
respondents’ counsel, in securing the order in question. To this motion,
respondents duly filed an opposition on’ March 10, 1959, emphasizing that the
compromise settlement was agreed upon in the presence of the court and later
signed by all the parties, and that even the manifestation and urgent motion of
the petitioners recognized the validity of the compromise settlement and were
ready to abide by it, were it not for certain questionable. acts of Florencio
Elchico, for which reason, they wanted him to be removed as co-administrator.
Finally, respondents called attention to the fact “that there is no pretense on
the part of movants (petitioners) that their signatures were obtained through
deceit, violence or intimidation.”

On July 7, 1959; respondent Judge issued an order denying said motion to set
aside.

On July 15, T959, petitioners filed a notice of appeal.. They filed their
appeal bond and record on appeal on July 17 and August 12, 1959,
respectively.

On August 15, 1959, respondents filed an opposition to, said record on
appeal, on y the grounds that (1) the order complained of is unappealable, as it
embodies a compromise settlement which is res judicata; and (2) even if
said order is appealable, said record on appeal is defective. To this
opposition,. petitioners duly filed a reply on August 20, 1959.

On August 28, 1959, respondent Judge issued an order disallowing said record
on appeal for the reasons, among others, that an order or judgment of a court
approving a compromise voluntarily and freely entered into, is res
judicata from the moment it is rendered, and that no evidence of any kind
was offered to prove any of the legal grounds for revoking or setting aside ar
compromise agreement or for altering any of its terms.

On September 11, 1959, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said
order to which, respondents filed an opposition on September 18,1959. On
September 28, 1959, respondent Judge issued an order denying said motion for
reconsideration, on the ground that petitioners failed to substantiate their
allegations of fraud and connivance relative to the issuance of said order of
February 23, 1959 which approved the compromise settlement in question,
notwithstanding the opportunity afforded them to prove or substantiate the same.

Hence, this petition for mandamus.

Petitioners claim that the respondent Judge erred in disallowing their record
on appeal.

We find no merit in this contention. As a rule, a judgment on a compromise is
not appealable and is immediately executory, unless a motion is filed to set
aside the compro- mise on the .ground of fraud, mistake, or duress, in which
event, an appeal may be taken from the order denying the motion (De los Reyes
vs. Ugarte, et al., 75 Phil., 505; Enriquez vs. Padilla, et
al., 77 Phil., 373). The reason for the. rule is that when both parties enter
into an agreement to end a pending litigation and request that a decision be
rendered approving said agreement, it is only natural to presume that such
action constitutes an implicit, as undeniable as an express, waiver of the right
to appeal against the decision. For a party to reserve under the circumstances,
the right to appeal against said decision, is to adopt an attitude of bad faith
which courts cannot countenance (De los Reyes vs. Ugarte,
supra). To be entitled to appeal from a judgment approving a
compromise, a party must move, not only to set aside said judgment, but also to
annul or set aside the compromise itself, on the ground of fraud, mistake, or
duress, vitiating his consent to said compromise.

In the instant case, petitioners did not ask the lower court (and neither do
they seek in their attempted appeal) to have the compromise settlement entered
into by them with respondents set aside. Instead, they manifested their
recognition of the due execution and validity of said compromise settlement, as
well as their willingness to abide by it, if only respondent Florencio Elchico
would resign as administrator of the estate subject thereof. Thus, Atty.
Emiliano R. Navarro, acting as counsel for petitioners, manifested to the court,
on February 24, 1959, that the only change he wanted in the terms of the
compromise settlement was the removal of respondent Florentio Elchico as
administrator of said estate and as manager of the estate’s transportation
business “if the group represented by him would so vote or decide”, and that his
clients (herein petitioners) “need not annul the order of this court (of
February 23, 1959) referred to above”, if such change could be made. And, in
their very motion dated March 4, 1959, to set aside the order (of February 23)
approving the compromise settlement, petitioners declared that “this motion
would have been unnecessary had not Florencio Elchico (respondent) withdrawn his
resignation (as administrator of the estate) and Atty. Salonga (respondents’
counsel) objected to his substitution.” In fine, petitioners seek to use their
attempted appeal (which was disallowed, and which they pray this Court to compel
the lower court, by mandamus, to allow) not to set aside the compromise
settlement between them and respondents co-heirs, but only to compel an
alteration or amendment of the same, by the removal of respondent
Florencio Elchico as administrator of the estate and, if this is done, they
would not even push through their motion to annul the order approving the
compromise settlement. In this connection, the lower court observed:

“There is no dispute that the duplicate original submitted to this Court
contains the terms of settlement agreed between the heirs. No signature
appearing thereon has been challenged by anyone as not genuine. There is no
assertion that in affixing their signatures, or in the preparation and execution
of the settlement, error, fraud, force or intimidation intervened. The said
Compromise Settlement, signed by all the heirs, contains a formal petition
stating that in their desire to settle amicably their differences and thereby
preserve family unity and harmony in deference to the memory of the decedent,
they have agreed to compromise the above-entitled cases, under the terms and
conditions set forth therein, and asking this Court to approve the same and that
‘the above-entitled cases be considered terminated and closed as to them.’
That is precisely what this Court did in its order of February 23, 1959. The
claim as to lack of notice regarding a settlement and petition, signed by all of
the heirs including the movants themselves, is not therefore correct.

“The Court understands, however, that after the signing of the Compromise
Settlement, certain iilejgpd irregularities on the part of Florencio Elchico
pertaining to the management at the transportation business were supposedly
discovered by the members of this group, and for this reason a motion to revoke
or reconsider the order of February 23, 1959, approving the Compromise
Settlement was submitted. Movants’ alleged discovery of certain
irregularities imputed to one who used to be in their own group and who was
appointed under the settlement as a co-administrator, as a result of their own
insistence, does not justify the setting aside of the Compromise
Settlement. It is clear to this Court, that if Florencio Elchico has
resigned from his position as Manager of the transportation business and as
Administrator of the estate of the deceased, as the movanta themselves wanted in
their urgent motion dated February 25, 1959, and as stated by them in their
motion dated March 4, 1959, there would have been no controversy at all. In
other words, movants’ quarrel is with Florencio Elchico, and not with the.
Compromise Settlement. Their own urgent motion of Fdenary 25, 1959, seeking the
replacement of Florencio Elchico as manager of the transportationbusiness and as
co-administrator of the estate, on the strength of an alleged resignation from
these positions”, recognizes the binding effect of the Compromise Settlement, as
otherwise there would be no point in the alleged resignation of Florencio
Elchico. inasmuch as it was under this Compromise Settlement that Florencio
Eichico was appointed.

“When the motion to revoke or reconsider the order of February 23, 1939
was set for hearing and actually heard on June 27, 1959, no evidence of any kind
was offered to prove any of the legal grounds for revoking or setting aside a
compromise agreement or for altering any of its terms. Attorney Mojica, who
then represented the movants, merely submitted the said motion for the
resolution of this Court, without argument and without proof, or even say, offer
of proof. Before Atty. Mojica came into the picture, the attorney who
represented the movants was Atty. Magpoc who asked this Court, in the presence
of the movants, sufficient time to allow movants to propose for the
consideration of the other heirs certain amendments to the Compromise
Settlement. This was granted by this Court in its order of March 10, 1959, as
follows:

‘By agreement of the parties, the hearing of all pending motions filed by
Atty. Navarro is postponed until further assignment in order to give the movants
time to settle amicably with the opposing party on amendments to the existing
amicable settlement.’

This Court was afterwards informed by the parties, through their attorneys,
that the proposed amendments, were not acceptable to most of the heirs.

“It is clear then that if movants’ desire was to oust Florendo Elchico,
the setting aside of the settlement is hot the remedy. As pointed out by the
oppositors, there is a provision in the’Compromise S&tlement that disposes
of this situation, sinde under Paragraph 4 thereof, in the event of
mismanagement or maladministration on the part of Florencio Elchico, he is
subject to ouster.” (Order of Aug. 28, 1959; italics
supplied.)

Furthermore, petitioners were given the opportunity to present evidence to
substantiate their allegations of fraud and connivance in connection with the
submission to, and approval bythe lower court of the compromise settlement in
question,, but tjtey; failed to present the same. On this point,.the.iow;er
i^drt stated.

“* * * On the scheduled hour of hearing of the Motion.for Reconsideration of
-the Order of-August 28,. 1-959 on September IS, 1959, which was-set at the
request of. movants, neither movaats nor their attorney appeared. However, Atty.
Salonga, in representation of Eduardo Elehico, et al. (herein respondents) asked
that the Motion be called again after the disposition of the other motions on
the calendar of this Court to give movants the opportunity to prove their
allejgations of fraud found in said Motion. The alleged fraud relates to”the
promulgation of the Order of this. Court of February 23, 1959 which approved the
Compromise Settlement of December 22, 1958. Acceding to the request, this
Court called the ‘aforesaid Motion at 9:20 o’clock. A certain Amado Tobias, who
signed the motion as attorriey-in-fact of Concepcion E. Tobias, one of the
heirs, appeared in Court with a pleading ‘Reiteration of Opposition wherein
counsel asked that two Motions of the adverse parties of August 26, 1959,
regarding the sale of personal properties, be lield in abeyance ‘pending
resolution of the various pending incidents in these cases.’ One of these
pending incidents is a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of August 28,
1959. Notwithstanding this act, Atty. Salonga (of Respondents herein) asked
this Court to give a third opportunity to the movants tend their counsel, Atty.
Malolos to substantiate their allegations of fraud and connivance as found in
said Motion, so that this Court may have the benefit of evidence in
disposing of said Motion, The Opposition filed by Atty. Salonga, and signed by
the latter’s clients, challenging movants to prove their allegations was
furnished Amado Tobias and transmitted to Atty. Malolos thru a letter dated
September 19, 1959 of Atty. Salonga, and which the latter read into the records
of this case. A copy of said letter, showing proof of service, has been
furnished the Clerk of Court.

“This Court granted the motion of Atty. Salonga and thereupon set the hearing
for Tuesday, September 22, 1959 at 8:30 in the morning. The records show that
Atty. Malolos and the movants have been duly informed of this hearing, and the
letter of Atty. Salonga of September 19, 1959 also informed Atty. Malolos of
this fact.

“Again on September 22, 1959, neither the movants nor their counsel appeared,
and instead a certain Urgent Motion dated September 21, 1959 was filed by Atty.
Malolos for the immediate consideration of this Court. Said Urgent Motion
states:

‘That if undersigned counsel will be required to present evidence as Atty.
Salonga demands in his opposition, undersigned counsel would like to have some
time to consider whether or not to present evidence before the Court;

‘That, in any event, undersigned counsel would be unable to present his
evidence within such short notice; and

‘That undersigned counsel has a previous engagement for
tomorrow.’

“The records show that since August 20, 1959, in a ‘Reply to Opposition to
Record on Appeal’ Atty. Malolos has made the same serious allegations of fraud
and connivance. Hence, his assertions that at such short notice, he cannot
present evidence of fraud is not supported by his own acts, unless he made the
allegation without taking into account any kind of supporting proof. This
Court also finds the position of movants inconsistent, since on the one hand
they make before this Court serious allegations of fraud and connivance, but on
the other hand assert that they still have ‘to consider whether or not to
present the evidence before the Court.’ For that reason, this Court has
resolve to deny, as it hereby denies, the Urgent Motion for lack of merit,
taking into account the fact that movants have been given three occasions to
make good their allegations of fraud and connivance, twice on September 19,
1959, and a third time on September 22, 1959.” (Order of Sept. 11, 1959;
Italics supplied.)

The case of Enriquez vs. Padilla, et ah, supra, relied upon
by petitioners as authority in support of their petition, is inapplicable to the
case at bar, because in said case, petitioner assailed the validity of the
compromise itself and not merely the judgment of the lower court based
thereon. In the Enriquez case, it appears that the parties were
summoned by then Judge Alfonso Felix of the Court of First Instance during the
pendency of the action in his sala, for a conference regarding an amicable
settlement of the case. The parties and their attorneys appeared, proposals and
counterproposals were made, and then Judge Felix rendered a decision containing
the agreement of the parties and approving the same. Petitioner then filed a
motion for reconsideration, on the ground that “he had not in fact agreed to
some of the conditions stated” in the stipulations on which the judgment was
based. In the instant case, petitioners do not assail the fact that they freely
entered into and signed the compromise settlement in question, and that they
agreed to all its terms when they executed and signed the same.

At this juncture, it may be pointed out that we dismissed the petition for
mandamus to compel the certification and approval of petitioner’s record on
appeal in the Enriquez case, not only because the allegations of fraud
or mistake he made were found to be untrue, but also because his “motion for
reconsideration did not appear to have pointed out any misstatements or
inaccuracies in the decision; it was limited to proposing new matters for
incorporation into the decision.” In the present case, the same situation
obtains. From the record, it is clear that petitioners’ allegations of fraud and
connivance are unproved, and their motion to set aside the order approving the
compromise settlement, instead of pointing out inaccuracies or misstatements in
said order relative to the terms of the compromise settlement, is limited to
proposing the change of respondent Florencio Elchico as administrator of the
estate, which change, if granted by the lower court or acceded to by
respondents, would render it unnecessary (in the very words of petitioners
themselves) for them to annul the said order approving the compromise
settlement.

For all the foregoing the writ prayed for is denied, and the petition
dismissed, with costs against the petitioners. So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Labrador, J., concurs in the result.

Writ denied, petition dismissed.