JOSE SETON AND JULIANA SETON, PETITIONERS VS. HON. JOSE S. RODRIGUEZ, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE (BRANCH IV) OF CEBU, AND IGNACIO SETON, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to annul an
order of the Court of First Instance of Cebu requiring the petitioners Jose
Seton and Juliana Seton to surrender the owner’s duplicate of Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-783 (0-244) to the Register of Deeds for the
annotation of the rights acquired by the respondent Ignacio Seton in the land
covered by the title.

It appears from the recolrd that the original certificate of title above
mentioned, which is in the possession of the petitioners Jose and Juliana Seton,
was issued in the name of their parents Baldomero Seton and Severa Quimada, who
died Intestate sometime in 1918 and 1940, respectively, leaving as their
legitimate heirs their four children, namely, the said petitioners and Andrica
and Jacinto. On May 29, 1959, Jacinto’s son, herein respondent Ignacio Seton,
filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against Jose, Andrica
and Juliana for the partition of the real estate left by the deceased spouses,
with damages, alleging, among other things, that on June 10, 1952 he acquired by
purchase and for valuable consideration all the rights and interests of his
father therein. (Civil Case No. 6174.)

On June 3, 1959, Ignacio Seton also filed a motion in another branch of the
Court of First Instance of Cebu in the original land registration proceedings,
praying that Jose and Juliana Seton be ordered to deliver the owner’s duplicate
of Original Certificate of Title No. RO-783 (0-244) to the Register of Deeds so
that the deed of sale executed by his father in his favotr may be annotated
thereon.

Jose and Juliana Seton opposed the motion, alleging that the lots covered by
the Torrens title had been partitioned among the heirs thereto, including
Ignacio Seton’s father; that shortly after the death of their mother in 1940,
Jacinto Seton, Ignacio’s father, sold his shares to Jose Seton and one Pedro
Quimada, which transaction was known to Ignacio; and that consequently, the deed
of sale sought to be registered was ‘fictitious, false and fraudulent”. The
oppositors also invoked the pendency of the action for partition filed by
Ignacio Seton against them and Andrica Seton, wherein the validity of the sale
between Jacinto Seton and his son Ignacio was raised. Accordingly, in a
“petition for writ of preliminary injunction” filed in the same proceedings, the
said oppositors prayed that the consideration of the motion for the surrender of
title and annotation be held dn abeyance until after the action for partition
and damages is decided.

Before the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction^[1] could be heard, however, the Respondent
Judge on September 15, 1959 issued the order now complained of, requiring Jose
and Juliana Seton to surrender the owner’s duplicate of Original Certificate of
Title No. 0-783 (0-244) to the Register of Deeds of Cebu for the annotation of
the rights acquired by Ignacio Seton from his father Jacinto Seton.
Reconsideration of the order having been denied, Jose Seton and Juliana Seton
filed a notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal. The appeal, however,
was not allowed, the court below citing the ruling in the case of Government of
the Philippines vs. Payva (44 Phil, 629), “to the effect that the order
requiring the holder of a duplicate certificate to surrender the same for
annotation of attachment or any other lien under Section 72 of the Land
Registration Act is not appealable.” From this order, Jose and Juliaba Seton
brought the case to this Court thru the present petition for certiorari. As
prayed for, the writ of preliminary injunction was issued upon the petitioners
posting a bond of P200.00.

At the outset, it should be stated that the lower court erred in dismissing
petitioners’ record on appeal on the authority of the ruling of this Court in
the case of Government of the Philippines vs. Payva, supra.
For it was precisely held there by this Court that an order of the registration
court requiring the holder of a duplicate certificate of title for the purpose
of annotating an attachment, lien, or adverse claim under section 72 of Act 496
is appealable because it resolves important questions as to the
respective rights of the parties.

Going into the merits of the case, we do not, however, think that the lower
court committed any error, or much less abused its discretion, in issuing the
order complained of requiring the petitioners to surrender the owner’s duplicate
certificate of title for the annotation of the deed of sale in favor of
respondent Ignacio Seton. Registration is a mere ministerial act by which a
deed, contract or instrument is sought to be inscribed in the records of the
Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the certificate of
title covering the land subject of the deed, contract or instrument. Its purpose
is to give notice thereof to all persons (sec. 51, Act No. 496) and does not
declare that the recorded instrument is a valid and subsisting interest in the
land. This is so because the effect or validdty of the instrument can only be
determined in an ordinary case before the courts, not before a court acting
merely as a registration court which has no jurisdiction over the same.
(Agricultural Credit Cooperative Association of Hinigaran vs. Yusal,
107 Phil., 791.) In other words, registration only operates as a notice of the
deed, contract or instrument to others, but neither adds to its validity nor
convert an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties. In the case
of Gurbax Singh Pabla & Co. et al. vs. Reyes, et al., (92 Phil.,
177; 48 Off. Gaz. 4365), this Court had occasion to rule that “The supposed
invalidity of the contracts of lease is no valid objection to their
registration, because invalidity is no proof of their nonexistence or a valid
excuse for denying their registration * * * . If the purpose of registration is
merely to give notice, then questions regarding the effects or invalidity of
instruments are expected to be decided after, not before, registration. It must
follow as a necessary consequence that registration must first be allowed, and
validity or effect litigated afterwards. (See also Register of Deeds of Manila
vs. Tinoco Vda. de Cruz, 95 Phil., 818; 53 Off. Gaz., 2804; Samanilla
vs. Cajucom et al., 107 Phil., 432; 57 Off. Gaz. [33] 5876.)

In the case at bar, it will be noted that all that respondent Ignacio demands
or prays for is the surrender of the owner’s duplicate of the original
certificate of title so that the contract of sale in his favor affecting a
portion of the land covered by the title may be annotated thereon. Following the
ruling in the cases above cited, the pendency of the partition proceedings
instituted by the respondent Ignacio Seton against his father’s co-heirs,
wherein the validity of the sale of the latter’s share to him is in issue, does
not preclude said Ignacio Seton from requesting that said sale be registered at
the back of the certificate of title covering the land. Both cases may proceed
independently of each other. Where the claim or sale is adjudged to be invalid,
its annotation may be cancelled and if found by the court to be frivolous or
vexatious the court may tax the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion. (Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco Vda. de Cruz,
supra.)

Wherefore, the order complained of is affirmed, and the preliminary
injunction heretofore issued dissolved. With costs against the petitioners.

Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Order affirmed.

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^[1] Subsequently denied in an order
dated September 26, 1959.