PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. DEMETRIO JARDIN, ACCUSED-APPELLEE.

Two constitutional rights – speedy trial and freedom from double
jeopardy – are interposed as defenses by the accused in this petition for
review on certiorari.

The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, which
dismissed the criminal cases against accused Demetrio
Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy
trial was allegedly violated.

The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of
the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the
Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary
criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public
documents on six counts.

The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton
V. Angeles who set them for preliminary investigation. The accused moved to
postpone the preliminary investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.

On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed
to appear. In spite of their absence, the preliminary investigation was
conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations
were filed against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 16052
(0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054 (0045-M), 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and
16057 (0048-M). The arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.

The records show that from May
9, 1967, the arraignment was re-set for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August 16,
the same was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for postponement filed at the instance
of the accused. (Original records [0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and
69).

When the arraignment of the accused was called on September 5, 1967, counsel for the
accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was
not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary
investigation. This was granted by the court and the first rein­vestigation was
set on November 24, 1967. On
this date, however, the Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed said reinvestigation due to the non-­appearance
of accused and his counsel and re-set the date for December 21, 1967.

A series of postponements was again filed by the accused causing
further delays of the reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968, accused and his counsel appeared together
but requested for a period of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.

In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the investigating
Fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these cases
he returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.

The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order
transferring the six (6) cases to the new branch (Branch V) of the Court of
First Instance at Mauban, Quezon.
Upon receipt by the latter of the records of these cases, the arraignment and
trial were set for December 3, 1968.

On the latter date, the
counsel for the accused sought again the postponement of the arraign­ment and
this was followed by more postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records, [0043-M], pp. 90, 93, 120 and 125).

On March
31, 1969, counsel for
the accused moved for the postponement of the arraignment and requested the
court that the records be returned again to the Office
of the Fiscal for further reinvestigation. This was granted and the
reinvestigation was again set for May 5, 1969. The accused and his counsel, however,
failed to appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for June 2,
1969. On this date,
counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5) days within which to
file a written sworn statement of the accused which would constitute
the defense of the latter, subject to the cross-examination of the
Investigating Fiscal.

Considering the fact that
the period to file such sworn statement had already expired without anything
being filed, the records of the cases were returned to the court which set said
cases for arraignment and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused
again moved for postponement.

When these cases were
called for arraignment on September 8, 1970, Demetrio Jardin,
pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged,
after which he re­quested that the trial be postponed and re-set for September
29, 1970.

On September
29, 1970, the trial
scheduled on that day was postponed again on motion of counsel for the accused.
The trial was re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.

On October
12, 1970, when the
said criminal cases were called for hearing, no one appeared for the
prosecution, except a state witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala
of the Provincial Auditor’s office who remained silent during the proceedings.

Invoking his client’s
constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing the opportunity to take
advantage of the prosecution’s failure to appear on that day, the defense
counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases. The respondent court granted the
oral motion for dismissal “for reasons of constitutional rights of the
accused Demetrio Jardin.”

Two questions are now
raised by the People in this appeal:

I.   Considering
the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was the respondent Court correct in dismissing the cases and
in predicating the dismissal on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial?

II.  
Does the present appeal place the respondent accused in double jeopardy?

The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional right of the
accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means that the accused is
free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be
free from
anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having
his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the
presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose.
(See Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216)

From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in the prosecution of the cases
were caused by the accused himself. All the postponements of proceedings were
made at his instance and for his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a
speedy trial afforded to an accused by our Constitution cannot be invoked. From
the start of the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the trial on the
merits, the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through
postponements and requests for reinvestigation. It would, therefore, be a
mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be allowed to
benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers intended to frustrate
the administration of justice. By his own deliberate acts, he is deemed to have
waived or abandoned his right to a speedy
trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:

“In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the right to a
speedy trial in the first case when the herein petitioners sought and obtained
several postponements of the trial: first, when they asked for the deferment of
the arraignment because the accused Ladislao Tacipit was not present;
second, when they asked for the postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968
upon the ground that they have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation of the ease; and finally,
when they agreed, with the prosecution, to postpone the hearing set for November
28, 1968 to January 4, 1969.”x x x.

The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the respondent court on the ground
that his right to speedy, trial had been violated was devoid
of factual and legal basis. The order denying the motion for reconsideration is
similarly in firm. There being no basis
for the questioned orders, they are consequently null and void.

Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused in double jeopardy?

In order that the protection
against double jeopardy
may inure to the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be
present in the first prosecution: (a) a
valid complaint or information; (b) a competent court;            (c) the defendant had pleaded to the
charge; and (d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Rule 117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma,
73 SCRA 77). The last requisite assumes a valid acquittal presupposes a
valid judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction. Since in the instant
cases, the dismissal was void for having been issued without legal basis, it
follows that the acquittal brought about by the dismissal is also void. Hence,
no jeopardy can attach from such acquittal. The act of respondent judge in
dismissing the cases amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent
double jeopardy from attaching. In the case of People v. Court of Appeals (101, SCRA 450) we ruled:

“Private respondents further argue that a judgment of
acquittal ends the case which cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise, they
would be put twice in jeopardy
for the same offense. That is the
general rule and presupposes a valid judgment.
As earlier pointed out, however, respondent Courts’ Resolution of acquittal was
a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy
attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. (Comia
v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it, no rights are divested. Through it, no
rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded
upon it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722
[1925]; Chavez v. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Paredes v. Moya,
61 SCRA 526, [1974]).” x x x.

We also note that the dismissal of the criminal cases was upon
motion and with the express consent of respondent Demetrio
Jardin. For double jeopardy to attach, the general ruIe is that the dismissal of the case must be without the
express consent of the accused. (People v. Salico,
84 Phil. 722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People
v. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).

If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if
some other basic right had been impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right
to invoke double jeopardy would not apply
even if the accused had expressly moved for the termination of
proceedings. In the instant case, however, the defendant had deliberately used
all the available dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the principle
that the accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal
charge. The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this purpose.

Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion, we also rebuke the
attorneys for both the defense and the prosecution and to a certain extent, the
court itself because of the breach of duties to the courts and to the
administration of justice apparent in this case.

The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include:

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means only as are con­sistent with truth and honor, x x x

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

(g)  Not to encourage either the commencement or
the continuance of an action or
proceeding, or delay any man’s cause, from any corrupt motive or interest.

xxx                            xxx                               xxx

The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of
both the judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate the
delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.

As aptly stated:

12.09 Obstructing the administration of
justice

An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in
the due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument
to advance its cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation
Board v. Cloribel, G. R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31
SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm. Case No. 134-J, Jan.
21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this reason, any act on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the administration of justice
constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him. (Cantorne v. Ducasin,
57 Phil. 23 [1932]; De los Santos v. Sagalongos,
69 Phil. 406 [1940]).

Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice
may take many forms. They
include such acts as instructing a complaining witness in a criminal action not
to appear at the scheduled hearing so that the case against the client, the
accused, would be dismissed, (Cantorne v. Ducasin, supra) asking a client to plead guilty to a
crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno
v. Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933])
advising a client who is detained for a crime to escape from prison, (Cf.
Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept. 30, 1974)
employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly valid claims, (Pajares v. Abad Santos, G.R. No.
29543, Nov. 29, 1969, 30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly frivolous cases or
appeals to drain the resources of the other party and compel him to submit out
of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co. v. Arnado, G. R. No. 22304, July 30, 1968) and filing multiple
petitions or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the
false expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos v, Potenciano,
G. R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy
Kim, G. R. No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar nature are grounds for disciplinary action.” (Agpalo, Legal Ethics, U.P. Law Center, 1980 Edition, pp.
405-406)

The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent
is without merit.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned
orders of the respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046-M, 0047-M, and
0048-M are reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with all
deliberate speed in these cases.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera and Vasquez, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., no part.

Plana, J., in the result.

Relova, J., for the reason that the dismissal was with the express consent of the
accused, he was not in jeopardy.