PEOPLE’S HOMESITE & HOUSING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICENTE ERICTA, JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH XVIII; THE ACTING BRANCH CLERK OF COURT, BRAN…

The Court dismisses for lack of legal basis and merit this
special civil action of certiorari and prohibition to set aside the
questioned orders of respondent judge granting execution of its final and executory decision and judgment ordering petitioner
corporation to execute the sale of the subject property in favor of private
respondent and to annul the corresponding transfer certificate of title issued
by respondent register of deeds in favor of said respondent pursuant to the
deed of sale executed by respondent branch clerk of court on behalf of
petitioner corporation as autho­rized by respondent judge.

Private respondent Jaime O. Rivera had obtained as plaintiff the
judgment of December 28, 1971 granting his action for specific performance and
“ordering the defendant [petitioner PHHC] to execute a deed of sale in
favor of the plaintiff [respondent Rivera] of the entire property described in
paragraph 2 of the complaint” and to pay P2,000.00. – attorney’s fees and
costs. The judgment was rendered pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act
3802 enacted by Congress on June 22, 1963 providing for the sale at cost to
registered tenants/lessees like respondent of the dwelling units occupied by
them and for the application in full in their favor of all the past rentals
paid by them to the purchase price. Petitioner failed to appeal the said
judgment which has long since become final and executory.
In fact, in Resolution No. 17 of its board approved on July 25, 1972, petitioner formally accepted
respondent’s proposal to waive the P2,000.00. – attorney’s fees awarded in his
favor by the judgment and approved the sale of the entire property (Lots 12-A
to 12-H, Block 447, together with the rowhouses
thereon) with one unit for residential purposes and the others for a general
and maternity clinic.

Nevertheless, petitioner failed to execute the corresponding deed
of sale in favor of respondent despite two writs of execution issued by
respondent judge at respondent’s instance, with the claim not set forth in the
aforesaid board resolution that respondent had not completed pay­ment of the
purchase price (at cost). Respondent consequently filed a motion for the lower
court to appoint and authorize the clerk of court to execute the deed of sale
on behalf of petitioner corporation in his favor, expressly asserting that
“as duly proven during the trial of this case, [that] he has completed
payment of the total consideration of the sale as he is covered by Republic Act
No. 3802 which provided for the sale at cost [of the properties] to registered
tenants.”^[1]
Overruling petitioner’s opposition thereto, respondent judge issued the
questioned Order of March 14, 1975
granting the motion, as follows:

“Acting on the plaintiff’s motion dated March 3, 1975, and the
defendant’s opposition thereto dated March 6, 1975, the Court hereby orders
Atty. Mercedes S. Gatmaytan, Acting Branch Clerk of
Court, to execute a Deed of Sale of the property described in paragraph 2 of
the complaint for the amount of P31,427.01 which, as per decision of this Court
dated December 28, 1971, had already been paid by the plaintiff to the
defendant People’s Homesite and Housing Corporation.

xxx                   xxx                  xxx

“The execution of this Deed of Sale shall be done at the cost
of the defendant People’s Homesite and Housing
Corporation and the Deed of Sale shall have the same effect as if it was
executed by the defendant itself.”^[2]

Petitioner filed an extended motion for reconsideration and res­pondent
judge, squarely meeting the issues raised, denied the same in the questioned
extended Order of April 21, 1975, as follows:

“The motion for reconsideration is based on the allegation
that the dispositive portion of the decision of this Court dated December 28, 1971 does not contain
the purchase price of the property and, therefore, its inclusion in the Order
of the Court dated March 14, 1975
is allegedly contrary to Rule 39, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The PHHC
contends that only the dispositive portion of the decision constitutes the real
judgment which should be executed.

“The dispositive portion which is being executed reads as
follows among others:

‘WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment ordering the defendant to
execute a deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff of the entire property described
in paragraph 2 of the complaint;’

“Precisely, the Order of the Court dated March 14, 1975 orders the
execution of the aforecited dispositive portion of
the decision. This decision has become final and executory.
The inclusion of the purchase price of P31,427.01 in the Deed of Sale
to be executed by the Clerk of Court does not prejudice the PHHC nor does it
alter the decision. Although the purchase price does not appear in the
dispositive part, it can be found on page two of the decision itself.

“The Court does not wholly subscribe to the view that the
judgment can be found only in the dispositive portion of the decision.

‘It is true that the resolution of the
court in a given issue, which determines and settles the rights of the parties,
is ordinarily embodied in the last or dispositive portion of the decision (Manalang vs. Rickards, G.R. No.
L-11986, promulgated July 31, 1958),
yet, not infre­quently such resolution or ruling may and does appear in other
parts thereof. Style in decision-making or preparation is personal to its
writer. As long as the decision satisfied the requirement of the law (Art. Sec.
12, Philippine Constitution; Rule 35, Sec. 1, Rules of Court), we find no
compelling reason to adopt a definite and stringent rule underlining how and
where the judgment would be framed. Indeed it is well said that to get the true
intent and meaning of a decision, no specific portion thereof should be
resorted to but same must be considered in its entirety (Escarella
vs. Director of Lands, 83 Phil. 491; 46 Off. Gaz. No.
11, p. 5487; I Moran’s Comments on the Rules of Court, 1957 Ed. p. 478, Policarpio vs. Philippine Veterans’ Board and Associates
Insurance & Surety Co., Inc., No. L-12779, dated August 28, 1929, 106 Phil. 125).'”^[3]

Hence, the present action of petitioner contending that
respondent judge’s court “abused its discretion or acted without or in
excess of its jurisdiction” in issuing the aforesaid questioned Orders
leading to the execution of the deed of sale by the clerk of court on behalf of
petitioner corporation and the issuance of T.C.T. No. 206668 of Quezon City in respondent’s favor “by adding therein
matters which were not included in the dispositive portion of the decision
dated December 28, 1971.” As above stated, the Court has found the
petition to be without legal basis and merit.

Respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion nor did
he act “capriciously or whimsically” as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned Orders. As correctly stated by respondent
judge in denying reconsideration, his court was merely ordering the execution
of the dispositive portion or judgment of the decision for “execution of a
deed of sale in favor of the plaintiff [herein respondent],” no more, no
less. Said judgment ordered the execution of such deed of sale unqualifiedly
and unconditionally and has long become final and executory.
The entire re­cord shows that no claim is made by petitioner that the amount of
P31,427.01 paid by respondent by way of rentals for a period of ten years (1954
to 1964) (as expressly found in the decision) does not cover the full cost to
it of the property. The decision’s clear implication is that these rentals did
fully cover the cost to petitioner of the property and therefore constituted
full payment of the purchase price as fixed by Republic Act No. 3802. Hence,
the judgment ordering unqualifiedly the execution of the sale to respondent,
subject to no further payment of any amount.

If petitioner wanted to dispute such judgment, it should have
appealed the same but it did not do so. Nevertheless, when respondent moved for
authority for the branch clerk of court to execute the sale due to petitioner’s
failure to heed the writs of execution, pursuant to Rule 39, section 10 of the
Rules of Court,^[4]
petitioner was given full opportunity both in its opposition and at the hearing
of respondent’s motion to show that such trials paid by respondent did not
cover the full cost to petitioner of the property (as fixed by the cited
covering Act) but it could not cite any deficiency. It still had another
opportunity when it filed its motion for reconsideration, but could not do so. Manifestly,
respondent’s rental payments fully covered the purchase price (at cost) of the
property. All petitioner could do was raise a technical question that the trial
court’s final decision of December
28, 1971 did not contain the purchase price of the property. This
was utterly untenable since the judgment unqualifiedly ordered the execution of
the sale without any further payment and petitioner failed to show that
respondent’s substantial rental payments over a ten-year period did not fully
cover the cost of the property. Finally, having submitted this issue for
respondent judge’s resolution, petitioner is now in estoppel
from “speculating on the fortunes of litigation” and now challenging
the adverse orders in these certiorari and prohibition proceedings.^[5]

Two other submittals of petitioner are equally without merit. First,
the fact that respondent branch clerk of court executed the deed of sale before
petitioner was furnished a copy of the execution order of March 14, 1975 (due
to an oversight of the mailing clerk) in no way constitutes a jurisdictional
defect that affects the validity of the order.^[6]
The order for execution of the deed of sale was a matter of right flowing from
a final and executory judgment and could have been
issued ex parte under Rule 39, section
1 of the Rules of Court. At any rate, petitioner had full opportunity to
contest the order, through its motion for reconsideration which was denied in
due course by respondent judge per the reasoned Order of April 21, 1975. Second, contrary to petitioner’s
claim, no abuse of discretion was committed when respondent judge issued the
execution order notwith

standing the pendency in the Court of Appeals at the time of
CA-G.R. No. 51545-R entitled “Jaime O. Rivera, petitioner-appellee vs.
PHHC, respondent-appellant,” which was an appeal by petitioner from the
adverse judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City permanently enjoin­ing it from enforcing an ejectment
order against respondent in view of petitioner’s subsequent approval of the
sale of the property to respondent pursuant to Republic Act No. 3802. Clearly,
the pendency of such appeal had no bearing on the
questioned execution orders at bar. At any rate, the ejectment
order had manifestly become moot and academic as correctly held therein by the
lower court. Finally, the records of said case show that as per judgment rendered
by the Court of Appeals on September
14, 1978, the judgment appealed from by herein petitioner PHHC was
affirmed and final entry of judgment was therein made on October 13, 1978.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed and the
temporary restraining order heretofore issued is lifted effective immediately. No
costs.

Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Vasquez, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Relova, J., no part.

^[1]
Record, at page 92.

^[2]
Annex P, Record, at page 106.

^[3]
Annex R, Record, at pages 114-115; emphasis supplied.

^[4]
The text thereof reads: “SEC. 10. Judgment for specific acts; vesting
title. – If a judgment directs a party to execute a con­veyance of land, or
to deliver deeds or other documents, or to per­form any other specific act, and
the party fails to comply within the time specified, the court may direct the
act to be done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other person
appointed by the court and the act when so done shall have like effect as if
done by the party. If real or personal property is within the Philippines, the
court in lieu of directing a conveyance thereof may enter judgment divesting
the title of any party and vesting it in others and such judgment shall have
the force and effect of a conveyance executed in due form of law.”

^[5] Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23
SCRA 29, and People vs. Munar, 53 SCRA 278,
citing Crisostorno vs. Reyes, 32 SCRA 54, and
Vera vs. People, 31 SCRA 711.

^[6]
Jaramillo vs. Jacinto, 43 Phil. 588.