IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF FELISA LIM (ALIAS LAM BIT SHA) FOR REPATRIATION UNDER COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 63.  FELISA LIM (ALIAS LAM BIT SHA), PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. REPUBLI…

Appeal, taken by the Solicitor General, from a decision of the
Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

“WHEREFORE, the Court finding the petition to be meritorious
on the ground that the petitioner Felisa Lim has all
the qualifications as required by law, hereby GRANTS the same and the herein
petitioner Felisa Lim is permitted to take her oath
of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and declared repatriated.”

On September 30, 1960, petitioner Felisa
Lim (alias Lam Bit Sha) filed with said court a
petition alleging, inter alia, that she
was formerly a citizen of the Philippines; that she lost her Philippine
citizenship, on December 10, 1943, by reason of marriage to a Chinese in
Canton, China, by whom she had two children; that her husband died in Canton,
China, on April 15, 1955; that it is her intention to reacquire Philippine citizenship and to renounce all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign potentate, state or sovereignty and, particularly,
to China, of which she is at present a citizen; that she has all the qualifications to be
repatriated, as shown by an affidavit of two Filipino citizens, appended to the
petition; and that she and her minor children are holders of immigration papers
and were admitted into the Philippines, as permanent residents, on March 14,
1960.  Premised upon these allegations, Felisa Lim prayed that she “be permitted to take the
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen and thus repatriated.” Despite
the opposition thereto of the Government, the lower court rendered the
aforementioned decision declaring that Felisa Lim was
a citizen of the Philippines
before her marriage and that she may be repatriated as such citizen.  Hence, this appeal by the Solicitor General
who maintains that the lower court erred “in declaring petitioner
‘repatriated’ as a citizen of the Philippines,” upon the ground, inter
alia, that she had not duly established either
the nationality of her alleged father, Lorenzo, or her alleged relation with
him, and that –

“‘Under our laws, there can be no action or proceeding for the
judicial declaration of the citizenship of an individual’ (Republic vs. Maddela, supra). 
‘Only as an incident of the adjudication of the rights of the parties to
a controversy may the Court pass upon and make a pronouncement relative to
their status.  Otherwise, such
pronouncement is beyond judicial power‘ (Republic vs. Maddela, supra).”

The appeal taken by the
Government is well taken.  The procedure
for the repatriation of a female citizen of the Philippines, who has lost her citizenship by reason of
marriage to an alien, is as simple as it can possibly be.  All that is required of her, upon termination
of her marital status, is for her to take the necessary oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines and to register said oath in the proper
civil registry.^[1] In fact, the allegations and, particularly,
the prayer in the petition of appellee herein suggest
that she is aware of the pertinent legal provisions.  It is, moreover, apparent that her objective
is to settle her political status prior to marriage.  In other words, thru her petition herein, she
hopes to establish that she was a citizen of the Philippines before she contracted marriage.  As a consequence, her petition is, in effect,
one for a declaratory relief, which this Court has repeatedly held to be
inapplicable to the political status of natural persons.

Thus, the petitioner in Feliseta Tan v. Republic^[2] had sought the cancellation of her alien
certificate of registration and that of her children, upon the ground
that she is a Filipino citizen and that she is not married to the father of her
children, who is a Chinese.  She
subsequently amended her petition so as to convert it into one for a
declaration that she is a citizen of the Philippines, she being the illegitimate child of a Filipino woman and a
Chinese citizen, and that her children are, likewise, citizens of the
Philippines, she having begotten them outside wedlock with another citizen of
China, who was her common-law husband. 
In due course, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which was:

“‘WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby renders
judgment declaring said Eleuteria Feliseta
Tan a Filipino citizen; that her registration as an alien has been a clear
mistake on her part and on the part of the City Treasurer of Ozamis City and therefore, the Commissioner of Immigration
is hereby ordered to cancel the Alien Certificate of Registration of the herein
petitioner as well as those of her children born out her relationship as
husband and wife without benefit of marriage with Tan King Pock, namely:  Loreta Tan, Nenita Tan, Lourdes Tan, Leonila
Tan, Tan King Pock, Jr., and William Tan.'”

This judgment was set
aside by the Supreme Court upon the ground that:

“Declaratory relief in this jurisdiction is a special civil
action which may lie only when ‘any person interested under a deed, will, contract
or other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by statute or
ordinance,’ demands construction thereof for a declaration of his rights thereunder.  None of
the above circumstances exists in the case under consideration.  And this Court has already held that there is
no proceeding established by law or the rules by which any person claiming to
be a citizen may get a declaration in a court of justice to that effect or in
regard to his citizenship.”

“x x x If
the petition seeks to compel the Commissioner of Immigration to cancel her and
her children’s alien certificate of registration, this petition would not lie
because such a remedy of cancellation of alien certificate of registration can
only be had by virtue of a judgment of a competent court in an action where the
citizenship of parties is a material matter in issue, declaring the Filipino
citizenship of the petitioner and her children, and such declaration cannot be
obtained directly because there is no proceeding at present provided by law or
the rules for such purpose.”

For the same reasons, in Santiago
v. Commissioner of Immigration,1 the
decision of a Court of First Instance declaring Santiago
a Filipino citizen and ordering the cancellation of his alien certificate of
registration, as prayed for by Santiago,
was reversed by the Supreme Court.

To the same effect was
Board of Commissioners v. Domingo.2 Said Board having ordered the exclusion and
deportation of one Muya, the latter instituted a certiorari
proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila to annul the decision of
the Commissioners of Immigration.  The
case having been dismissed for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, Muya filed with the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan an action for a declaratory judgment with mandamus
and injunction, to declare him a Filipino citizen, to restrain his deportation
and compel the Commissioners of Immigration to release him.  Said court having issued a writ of mandatory
injunction to set Muya free, the Board of Commissioners
applied from the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari to annul said
writ, which We did, upon the ground, among others, that “it is now well
settled x x x that there is
no proceeding established by law, or the rules, for the judicial declaration of
the citizenship of an individual x x x and that citizenship is not a proper subject for
declaratory judgment.”

In Tiu
Navarro v. Commissioner of Immigration,3 which was a proceeding to declare that
petitioner therein was a citizen of the Philippines and to, accordingly, cancel
his alien certificate of registration, the judgment rendered by the lower court
granting the relief prayed for was, on appeal, reversed by the Supreme Court,
upon the theory that an action for a declaratory relief is not proper to
resolve doubts concerning one’s citizenship.

Channie Tan v. Republic4 went a little farther.  It held that, under a petition for
naturalization alleging that petitioner is a Chinese and praying that he be
naturalized as a citizen of the Philippines,
the court had no authority to declare him a Filipino citizen.  This view was reiterated in Tan Yu Chin v.
Republic,5 in which We postulated:

“Even assuming, therefore, that herein petitioner has shown
that he is already a Filipino citizen, the lower court exceeded its power,
authority, and jurisdiction in declaring him to be such in these naturalization
proceedings.”

Of particular relevance
to the case at bar is the following pronouncement made in Delumen
v. Republic of the Philippines1:

“x x x
there is nothing in the petition which even intimates that the alleged status
of the appellees as Filipino citizens had in any instance
been questioned or denied by any specific person or authority.  Indeed, the petition alleges that the appellees have considered themselves and were considered by
their friends and neighbors as Filipino citizens, voted in the general
elections of 1946 and 1947, and were registered voters for the elections of
1951, and it is not pretended that on any of said occasions their citizenship
was controverted. 
It is not accurate to say, as appellees do,
that an actual controversy arose after the filing by the Solicitor General of
an opposition to the petition, for the reason that the cause of action must be
made out by the allegations of the complaint or petition, without the aid of
the answer.  As a matter of fact, the answer
herein alleges that the petition states no cause of action.  In essence, the appellees
merely wanted to remove all doubts in their minds as to their citizenship, but
an action for declaratory judgment cannot be invoked solely to determine or try
issues or to determine a moot, abstract or theoretical question, or to decide
claims which are uncertain or hypothetical. 
(1 C. J. S., p. 1024.) And the fact that appellees‘
desires are thwarted by their ‘own doubts, or by fears of others * * * does not
confer a cause of action.’ (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1952 ed.,
Vol. II, p. 148, citing Willing vs. Chicago Auditorium Assn., 277 U.S.,
274, 289, 48 Sup. Ct., 507,
509.).”

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is
hereby, reversed and another one shall be entered dismissing the petition
herein, with costs against petitioner-appellee Felisa Lim.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz
Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
and Villamor,
JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., did not take part.

^[1]
Sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 63.

^[2]
L-16108, October 31, 1961.

1 L-14653, January 31, 1963.

2 L-21274, July 31, 1963.

3 L-15100, December 29, 1960.

4 107 Phil. 632.

5 L-15775, April 29, 1961. To the same effect, also, are Soria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24102, Jan. 30, 1971; Tan Pong v.
Republic, L-21010, Nov. 29, 1969;
Chua Tan Chuan v. Republic, L-25439, March 28, 1969; Dy Poco v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-22313, March 31, 1966; Lao v.
Republic, L-19107, and 19109, Sept.
30, 1964; Palaran v. Republic,
L-15041, Jan. 30, 1962.

1 94 Phil. 287, 289.