GAVINO R. ALEJO, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. FELIMON C. MARQUEZ, LEONARDO D. SERRANO, RICARDO SUAREZ AND ABELARDO SUBIDO, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Petitioner in this mandamus and quo warranto
suit seeks judicial relief from what he considers to be an illegal ouster from
his position as Chief of Police of Obando, Bulacan. 
Unfortunately, he was not sufficiently alert in the defense of his
rights before courts of justice.  He was
notified of the cessation of his services as such as far back as January 3, 1964.  He waited until April 14, 1967 before filing his petition.  He pro­crastinated too long.  Such delay is fatal, the applicable Rules of
Court provision giving him only one year from his separation for the invocation
of the appropriate judicial remedy. 
Necessarily the lower court had no choice left but to dismiss his
petition.  Hence this appeal, which has
an air of futility that hangs around it, the state of law being what it
is.  We affirm.

The appealed decision, after setting forth the nature of the
action as one for quo warranto and mandamus
filed by petitioner with Felimon C. Marquez, Mayor of
Obando, Bulacan; Leonardo
D. Serrano, Chief of Police of Obando, Bulacan; Ricardo Suarez, Municipal Treasurer of Obando, Bulacan; and Abelardo Subido, Commissioner of
Civil Service, as respondents, immediately referred to the decisive fact of the
late filing of this petition.  Thus:  “One of the defenses alleged by the respondents,
Marquez, Serrano and Suarez, is that the present action was filed by the
petitioner three years after respondent Serrano had been appointed and assumed
the office of Chief of Police of Obando, Bulacan, and, therefore, it has already prescribed.  This defense is well taken for it is expressly
alleged in paragraph 5 of the petition that on January 3, 1964, respondent Felimon C. Marquez, Mayor of Obando,
Bulacan, terminated petitioner’s service as Chief of
Police of said municipality by reason of his alleged lack of Civil Service
Eligibility and the present action was filed only on April 14, 1967.  According to Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules
of Court, petitions for quo warranto must be filed
within one (1) year after the cause of the ouster or the right of petitioner to
hold office arose.  Pursuant to the
consistent decisions of the Supreme Court, this one (1) year period begins to
run when the petitioner might lawfully have assumed office, and not from the
date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of the office.  The reason for this limitation is that title
to public office cannot be left to continued uncertainty.”^[1]
The lower court likewise found that on the merits petitioner could not make out
a persuasive plea for his reinstatement, lacking as he did the necessary civil
service eligibility when he was appointed, thus impressing the temporary
character to his tenure.  Such an issue
need not be inquired into as the failure to institute the action within the
one-year period constitutes, as pointed out in the decision, more than a
sufficient basis for its dismissal.

The controlling Rules of Court provision constitutes an
insuperable obstacle to plaintiff’s persistent efforts to regain the office of
Chief of Police of Obando, Bulacan.  It explicitly provides that the action
arising from an ouster from office should “be commenced within one (1)
year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold such
office or position, arose; * * *.”^[2]
Such a provision was formerly incorporated in the very same section but of Rule
68 of the 1940 Rules of Court.  Abeto v. Rodas^[3]
supplies an authoritative interpretation. 
Thus:  “We note that this
action was commenced only on March 2,
1948, or more than one year from October 12, 1946, when, according to his own theory, the
petitioner should have been reinstated. 
Actions for quo warranto are now governed by
Rule of Court No. 68, section 16 of which provides that ‘Nothing contained in
this rule shall be construed to authorize an action * * * an officer for his
ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one year after the cause
of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold office, arose; * * *.’ A
similar provision in the Code of Civil Procedure was given effect in Bautista
vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil., 624, wherein this Court
held:  ‘It cannot be supposed that the
Legislature intended that the right to a public office, when dependent upon
prescription, should be subject to continued uncertainty; and the public
interest clearly requires that such right should be determined as speedily as
practicable.’ We would go farther by holding that the period fixed in the rule
is a condition precedent to the existence of the cause of action, with the
result that, if a complaint is not filed within one year, it cannot prosper
although the matter is not set up in the answer or motion to dismiss.”^[4]
As is made clear from the above excerpt, the doctrine goes back to Bautista v. Fajardo,^[5] a
1918 decision, which interpreted the then applicable section of the Code of Civil
Procedure.^[6]

It is thus apparent that plaintiff, by his failure to abide by
the controlling Rules of Court provision, did preclude the judiciary from
inquiring into the merits of his case. 
Whatever sympathy might be enlisted by his firm and inflexible
determination to correct what in his opinion is a failure by respondents to
follow the governing legal norms cannot prevail as against a definite rule that
cautions a person who deems himself aggrieved by an illegal ouster to go to
court within the one-year period specified upon pain of losing what could have
been an appropriate judicial remedy.  The
lower court decision must be affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court of February 8,
1968 is affirmed.  No costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Decision of the lower court, Appendix to Brief for the Appellant,
pp. 22-23.

^[2]
Section 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court reads as follows:  “Nothing contained in this rule shall be
construed to authorize an action against a corporation for forfeiture of
charter unless the same be commenced within five (5) years after the act complained
of was done or committed; nor to authorize an action against a public officer
or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the plaintiff to hold
such office or position, arose; nor to authorize an action for damages in
accordance with the provisions of the last preceding section unless the same be
commenced within one (1) year after the entry of the judgment establishing the
plaintiff’s right to the office in question.” Cf. Cui v. Cui,
L-18727, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 755; Morales v. Patriarca,
L-21280, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 766; Villaluz v.
Zaldivar, L-22754, Dec. 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 710;
Villegas v. de la Cruz, L-23752, Dec, 31, 1965, 15 SCRA 720; Castro v.
del Rosario, L-17915, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 196; National Shipyards and Steel
Corp. v. CIR, L-21675, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 134; De la Maza v. Ochave, L-22336,
May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 142; De la Cruz v. Gabor,
L-30774, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 325.

^[3] 82 Phil. 59 (1948).

^[4] Ibid., pp. 60-61. 
The following decisions apply the one-year limitation period of bringing
action for reinstatement; Tumulak v. Egay, 82 Phil. 828 (1949); Tavora
v. Ofiana, 83 Phil. 672 (1949); Argos v.
Veloso, 83 Phil. 929 (1949); Torres v. Quintos, 88 Phil. 436 (1951); Brillo
v. Enage, 94 Phil. 732 (1954); Mesias v. Jover, 97 Phil.
899 (1955); Unabia v. City Mayor, 99 Phil. 253
(1956); Abella v. Rodriguez, 102 Phil. 543
(1957); Erauda v. Del Rosario, 103 Phil. 489
(1958); Pinullar v. Pres. of Senate, 104 Phil.
131 (1958); De la Cerna v. Osmeña,
105 Phil. 774 (1959); Madrid v. Aud. Gen., 108
Phil. 578 (1960); Mendiola v. Tancinco, 109 Phil. 317 (1960); Bumanglag
v. Fernandez, L-11482, Nov. 29, 1960; Alipio v.
Rodriguez, L-17336, Dec. 26, 1963, 9 SCRA 752.

^[5] 38 Phil. 624. Cf. Agcaoili
v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676 (1926); Lim v.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161 (1935).

^[6] Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, insofar as
material, reads as follows:  “Nor
shall an action be brought against an officer to be ousted from his office
unless within one year after the cause of such ouster, or the right to hold the
office arose.”