THE IMPERIAL INSURANCE, INC., PETITIONER, VS. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND VALDEMONTE FINANCE CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.

In civil case 62707 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, the
Valdemonte Finance Corporation (hereinafter referred
to as the respondent) obtained a judgment in its favor against the Imperial
Insurance, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as the petitioner).  The decision a quo dated April
29, 1966 ordered the petitioner to pay the respondent “the sum of P140,000
with interest thereon at the legal rate from the com­mencement of the
action” until its full satisfaction, and the further sum of P10,000
“as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation,” plus costs.

On May 26, 1966
the petitioner filed with the court a quo its notice of appeal,
an appeal cash bond of P120, and its typewritten record on appeal.  There being no opposition to the approval of
the record on appeal, the court on June 4, 1966 approved the same and directed
the transmittal of the record of the case, together with all the evidence
adduced, to the Court of Appeals (hereinafter referred to as the respondent
court).  On April 26, 1967 the petitioner filed its brief as appellant
in the case.^[1]

On October 11 of the same year, the respondent moved to dismiss
the appeal on the ground that the petitioner’s record on appeal (whether
typewritten or printed) fails to show on its face the per­fection of the appeal
within the period fixed by the Rules of Court. 
The petitioner filed its opposition.

Subsequently, the respondent court, in a resolution dated December 12, 1967, granted the
respondent’s motion to dismiss the petitioner’s appeal, stating:

“The record on appeal, however, does not contain such
important data as will show that ap­pellant had also filed its appeal bond and
the date the same bond was filed.  While
established juris­prudence condones the absence of a formal notice of appeal
and treats the filing of a record on appeal as a sufficient notice, the filing
of an appeal bond is imperative and without such bond no appeal could, as a
general rule, be perfected.”

The petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of December 28, 1967 was denied by the
respondent court on February 7, 1968.

Hence, the present petition for certiorari, filed on
February 28, 1968, seeking the reversal of the resolution of the respondent
court on the ground that the said court gravely erred “in finding that
petitioner’s record on appeal failed to show sufficient data showing that
petitioner’s appeal had been perfected on time,.” and in “granting
respondent Valdemonte’s motion to dismiss
petitioner’s appeal and in denying said petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration.”

Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court requires the inclusion
in the record on appeal of

“… the order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, and, in
chronological order, copies of only such pleadings, petitions, motions and all
interlocutory orders as are related to the appealed order or judgment and
necessary for the proper understanding of the issue involved, together with such
data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time.” (emphasis
supplied)

Non-compliance with that part of the
foregoing section requiring the inclusion in the record on appeal of “such
data as will show that the appeal was perfected on time” constitutes a
ground for the dismissal of the appeal under section 1 (a) of Rule 50 which
provides:

“SECTION 1.  Grounds
for dismissal of ap­peal.  – An
appeal maybe dismissed by the Court of Appeals, on its own motion or on that of
the appellee, on the following grounds:

“(a) Failure of
the record on appeal to show on its face that the appeal was perfected within
the period fixed by these rules.”

Pursuant to sections 3 and 9 of Rule 41,
the perfection of an appeal requires, inter alia,
the filing of the appeal bond in due time and the approval of such appeal bond
other than a cash bond.

We do not find in the record on appeal of the petitioner any
mention of or reference whatsoever to the filing of the appeal bond. The
failure of the said record on appeal to state that the petitioner filed an
appeal bond and to mention the date of the filing of such bond constitutes a
fatal omission of one of the essential data to apprise the appellate court of
the timeliness of the appeal.  The
absence of a statement in the record on appeal of the filing of the appeal bond
and the date of such filing amounts to non-compliance with the re­quirements,
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, of section 6 of Rule 41 and justifies
the dismissal of the appeal.^[2]

Concededly, sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court make no express provision as to the precise sequence of the steps to be
followed for the perfection of an appeal. 
All that the aforementioned sections require is that the party appealing
shall file his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal within thirty
days from notice of the order or judgment appealed from.

Verily, no rule requires the filing of the notice of appeal or
the appeal bond ahead of the filing of the record on appeal.  There­fore, where a party files his appeal
bond within the period fixed by the Rules but after the submission of the
record on appeal, the petitioner claims that “it is impossible to include
in the record on appeal as thus prepared and filed, the filing of the appeal
bond.” We, however, find the excuse offered by the petitioner for the
defect of its record on appeal belied by the record of this case.  The record shows that the petitioner filed
its notice of appeal, its appeal bond of P120 in cash which therefore required
no express approval, and its typewritten record on appeal on the same day – May 26, 1966.  The record evinces as well that the court a
quo approved the record on appeal on June 4, 1966, and that the clerk of the said court a
quo, on October 10, 1966,
certified to the truth and correctness of the copies of the pleadings, order
and decision included in the record on appeal. 
During the long intervening period of about four and one-half (4-1/2)
months from May 26 to October 10, 1966, the petitioner exerted no effort
whatsoever to ask the court a quo to allow the inclusion in the
record on appeal of a statement certifying, with explicit mention of the proper
dates, to the filing of its notice of appeal as well as its appeal bond within
the period fixed by the Rules. 
Application for inclusion in the record on appeal of such a
certification needed only minimum effort on the part of the petitioner.  To sanction the stand of the petitioner – its
feeble attempt to justify the non-inclusion in its record on appeal of data
relating to the filing of the appeal bond because of the fact of the filing of
the notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal on the same day – would
be to nullify and set at naught the provisions of section 1, paragraph (a) of
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.  This we
cannot countenance.

We do not here rule that a party appealing a case needs to file
his notice of appeal and appeal bond before he files his record on appeal.  To repeat, compliance with sections 3, 4, 5
and 6 of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court only requires that the notice of appeal,
appeal bond and record on appeal are all filed within the reglementary
period.  The procedural sequence of
filing them the rules leave to the sound discretion of the party-appellant,
provided he files them within the period fixed by the said rules.  Of course, we neither exclude nor leave out
the possibility that force of circumstances may impel a party-appellant to file
his notice of appeal, appeal bond and record on appeal not only on the same day
but also simul­taneously – that is, at the same time on the same day – or even
probably, on the last day of the thirty-day period provided by the rules for
the perfection of an appeal.  Even in
such eventuality, however, the intendment of section 1 (a) of Rule 50 is that
the appellant must exercise the requisite care and take the necessary steps so
that his record on appeal will show on its face, that his appeal was perfected
on time.

The petitioner further claims that the respondent is in estoppel for failure to interpose any objection to the
deficiency of the record on appeal upon its receipt of a copy of the
typewritten record on appeal and, later, a copy of the printed record on
appeal.  It suffices to state that the
provisions of the Rules of Court relating to the perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period consti­tute not only
mandatory but also jurisdictional requirements. 
Failure to comply with such provisions causes the judgment complained of
to become final and executory.  As a consequence, the trial court loses
jurisdiction to sanction an appeal therefrom, and the
appellate court does not acquire jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.  And any question as to the jurisdiction over
a case may be raised at any stage of the proceedings.^[3]

At the expense of being repetitious, we re-state what we stressed
in two earlier cases^[4]
on this matter of non-statement in the record on appeal of essential data
showing the perfection of the appeal in due time.  We said:

“This Court notes with regret that although these requirements
on the contents of a record on appeal have been in effect since 1964, there are
still lawyers and litigants who do not comply with the same:  either they have not perused the Revised
Rules, or choose not to comply therewith. 
Liberality in this regard is by now unwarranted, and would be unjust to
numerous litigants or counsel who exer­cise diligence in observing the Rules of
Court.”

Overlooking the jurisdictional defect, however, we are
nonetheless persuaded, from a reading of the record, that the judgment a
quo is substantially correct and morally just.

Civil case 62707 originated as an action for a sum of money filed
by the respondent against the petitioner. 
The record shows that the respondent extended a discounting line in
favor of the Ajax International Corporation; that to secure the payment of the
discounted notes, the petitioner executed a surety bond in the amount of P140,000
in favor of the respondent; that, subsequently, the Ajax defaulted in the
payment of several accounts amounting to more than P300,000, evidenced by
invoices, assigned by it to the respondent; that the respondent, unable to
collect from the Ajax, demanded from the petitioner the payment of the sum of
P140,000, the latter’s total liability as surety under the surety bond; and
that the petitioner refused to pay.

The respondent predicated its action primarily on the surety bond
liability of the petitioner.  The
petitioner, for its part, denied liability, alleging that the surety bond it
issued secured the payment of the Ajax
liabilities to the respondent only in relation to the discounting line, which
discounting line included only promissory notes and excluded invoices.

The court a quo resolved the case mainly on the
question of whether the discounting line included the accounts, evidenced by
invoices, assigned to the respondent by the Ajax.  In finding for the respondent, it relied on
the terms of the surety bond executed by the parties.  Such surety bond, according to the court,
makes no specification as to the nature of the discounting line.  Thus, considering the entire surety bond, the
use therein of the words “promissory notes assigned” includes not
only promissory notes, as the petitioner insists, but also

“… all receivables where a promise to pay an amount certain
for a fixed period is made.  The invoices
discounted by the plaintiff [respondent herein] contain this promise or
undertaking which has the character of a promissory note.”^[5]

ACCORDINGLY, the resolution of the respondent Court of
Appeals of December 12, 1967
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal is affirmed, at petitioner’s cost.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Docketed as CA -G.R. 38346-R of the Court of Appeals.

^[2]
Reyes vs. Carrasco and CA, G.R. No. L-28738, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 296; Tello,
et al. vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-32395, March 31, 1971, 38 SCRA 296; Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc.
vs. Augusto, et al., G.R. No. L-31060, July 29 1971; De Guia
vs. CA, et al., G.R. No. L-33101, July 30, 1971.

^[3]
Miranda vs. Guanzon, et al., 92 Phil. 168; Valera vs. CA, et al., G.R.
No. L-29416, January 28, 1971,
37 SCRA 80.

^[4]
Workmen’s Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Augusto, et
al., supra; De Guia vs. CA, et
al., supra.

^[5]
Record on Appeal, p. 22.