WILLIAM LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. CLARIZA MONDRAGON SAÑOPAL, AND WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, RESPONDENTS.

Appeal from the decision of the Workmen’s Compensa­tion Commission
requiring petitioner William Lines, Inc., to pay respondent Clariza Mondragon
Sañopal compensation benefits, burial expenses, attorney’s fees and costs in
connection with the death of her husband, Salvador Saño­pal.

The deceased was employed as watchman by William Lines, Inc. on
its motor vessel Kolambugan, with a monthly salary of P122.00.  His duty was from 4:00 to 8:00 in the morning
and then from 4:00 to 8:00 in the evening, for a daily total time of eight
hours.  At about 8:30 o’clock in the
evening of August 31, 1962, while on board the vessel, which was then docked at
Pier 6, Tondo, Manila, Salvador Sañopal complained of not feeling well.  He un­folded a cot on the third class
passenger deck and lay down to rest.  The
ship’s physician attended to him, but two hours later he expired, a victim of
coronary thrombo­sis.  The undertaking
arrangements were made by a funeral parlor engaged by petitioner, after which
the body was flown to Iloilo City at petitioner’s expense, and thence to San
Joaquin, Iloilo, at the widow’s personal expense.

On May 10, 1963 respondent Clariza Mondragon Sañopal, the widow,
filed a claim for compensation with the Department of Labor, Regional Office
No. VII, Iloilo City.  Petitioner filed
an answer and moved to dismiss the claim on the ground of prescription.  After trial, the hearing officer awarded
compensation upon a finding that the cause of death arose out of and in the
course of the employment.  Upon review
this decision was affirmed by the Workmen’s Compensation Commission in a
decision dated April 23, 1965. 
Petitioner moved to reconsider but the Commission, in a resolution en
banc dated June 3, 1965, denied the motion.

Petitioner poses two principal issues, namely:  (1) whether or not the cause of Sañopal’s
death arose out of and in the course of his employment; and (2) whether or not
the claim had already prescribed when it was filed some eight (8) months after
his death and, hence, beyond the three-month period provided for in Section 24
of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.

Petitioner contends that Sañopal’s death did not arise out of and
in the course of his employment.  It is
pointed out, first, that when his heart attack came he was not on duty; and
second, that as watchman he was not required to lift heavy objects or to exert
any kind of physical effort, which according to the Commission was what he was
doing at the time he was stricken.

The decision appealed from states:

“x x x There exists unrebutted proof
showing that before watchman Salvador S. Sañopal had passed away, he was busy
arranging, or at least helping in the loading of cargoes on board the M/V
KOLAMBUGAN.  We have learned that on
August 31, 1962, there were plenty of cargoes to be loaded to the vessel which
contributed to the delayed sail­ing of the ship.  The boat was some four (4) hours behind the
schedule when it finally left shore.  It
would not be un­natural, therefore, nay improbable, for watchman Sañopal, even
granting for the sake of argument, that he was not actu­ally obliged to lift
heavy cargoes, to have voluntarily helped in the loading of the cargoes, to
facilitate loading thereof and thus paved the way for the early departure of
the vessel which was already behind schedule. 
The act of Sañopal in going out of his way, as watchman, in helping the
‘stevedores’ who were supposed to have loaded the heavy volume of cargoes on
that par­ticular day, may be easily construed as an exercise of ordinary
discretion to promote the business of the employer.

Is it not but natural for the deceased watchman-sailor Sañopal to
have extended an extra hand that expedited the loading of the unusually heavy
car­goes on that day, especially bearing in mind that the vessel was already
delayed for the regularly scheduled sailing time?  Even granting, as we have stated, that the
late Sañopal was not duty bound to lift heavy cargoes, which duty belongs to
the ‘stevedores’, there seems to be no logic in entirely excluding or even
preventing deceased in freely and volun­tarily aiding the said ‘stevedores’
load the cargoes to the ship.  The
unwritten duty of the deceased watchman to lend a hand as required by the
circumstances was understood and demanded in a working group where a good
teamwork should be maintained.  It is
obvious therefore, that on that fatal date on August 31, 1962, Salvador S.
Sañopal actually assist­ed or helped in the loading and arranging of the
cargoes of the M/V KOLAMBUGAN, even far beyond his regular duty as a
watchman.  And since, Sañopal’s coronary
thrombosis took place around 10:30 p.m. or immediate­ly after he had exerted
some efforts in lifting heavy cargoes of the respondent’s vessel, his death, as
a consequence there­of, must have been precipitated by the strain.”

It is a settled rule that findings of fact of an administrative
body, such as the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, are conclusive as long as
they are supported by substantial or credible evidence (Rio y Compania vs. WCC,
20 SCRA 1196, and cases cited therein).

The credibility and substantial nature of the evidence presented
by the claimant is questioned by petitioner on the ground that it consists
solely of the testimony of a certain Serafin Segovre, who had been, up to July
1962 and before Sañopal’s death on August 31, 1962, a watchman on another
vessel belonging to said pe­titioner. 
The evidence he gave is that he went to the M/V Kolambugan in the
evening of August 31 to visit Sañopal, who was a friend of his.  They took their sup­per together on board and
he, Segovre, was present when Sañopal felt ill and when death overtook him.  In fact it was Segovre who, upon the
captain’s instruction, carried the deceased down the vessel and accompanied him
to the funeral parlor.  The Commission
found his testimony to be credible, and there is no sufficient reason for us to
hold otherwise, for the task of ascer­taining the credibility and weight of
conflicting evi­dence is beyond the province of the reviewing tribunal in
appeals by certiorari (Basaysay vs. WCC, 3 SCRA 530, and cases cited
therein).

Owing to the nature of the deceased’s employment he had to stay
on board most of the time, especially when the vessel was at sea or about to
sail.  Although the deceased suffered the
heart attack when he was not supposed to be on duty, the fact that he was actually
helping in the loading operations of the vessel, which was then already delayed
in its sailing schedule, puts him within the coverage of the law.  In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation vs. Pepito,
18 SCRA 1028, it was held that the disappearance of a crew member of a vessel
during the voyage is an accident arising out of the course of employment,
although the crew member might have been off-duty, since he had no choice but
to be in the vessel.  And in Del Rosario
vs. Del Rosario, 6 SCRA 1051, 1056, We stated:

“Under the personal doctrine ‘injuries occurring on the
premises during a regular lunch hour arise in the course of employment, even
though the interval is technically outside the regular hours of employment in
the sense that the worker receives no pay for that time and is in no degree under
the control of the employer, being free to go where he pleases.’ (Larson’s
Workmen’s Compen­sation Law, Vol. I, p. 298). 
This prin­ciple is justified in part ‘on a sort of presumption that as
long as the employee is on the premises he is subject to all the environmental
hazards associated with the employment, and also that although he may be free
to go elsewhere during the interval, he is in some degree subject to the
control of the employer if he actually chooses to remain on the pre­mises,
merely by virtue of being on the employer’s property.’ (Larson, op. cit., Vol.
I, p. 300).”

The other issue raised by petitioner is that of
prescription.  It is true that under
Section 24 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act a claim for compensation should be
made not later than three months after death. 
But the same provision states that “if the employer has voluntarily
made the compensation payments, the claim for compensation to be made within
the time limit above established shall no longer be necessary.” In this
case petitioner defrayed the expenses in the transportation of the deceased to
Iloilo, where he was buried.  Such
expenses are considered part of the death benefits due to the heirs of the
deceased according to Section 8 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, the same
being in the nature of burial expenses, and consequently the volun­tary payment
thereof by petitioner rendered it unneces­sary for the claim to be filed within
the three-month period.  (Visayan
Stevedore Transportation Co. vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-22135, Dec. 27, 1963;
A.D. Santos, Inc. vs. De Sapon, et al., 16 SCRA 791, and cases cited.)

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with
costs against petitioner.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.