EMILIO SY, PETITIONER-APPELLANT, VS. THE HON. JUDGE MANUEL DALMAN AND JOSEFA VDA. DE RAMOS, RESPONDENTS-APPELLEES.

Appeal from the judgment dated August 3, 1961 of the Court of
First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte dismissing appellant’s petition
therein.  The case was submitted for
decision here without appellees’ brief in answer to that of appellant.

Appellee Josef& A, Vda. de Ramos was the applicant in a
miscellaneous sales application with the Bureau of Lands over a parcel of land specifically described as Lot No. 345, Dipolog Cadastre, Zamboanga del
Norte.  On June 13, 1950 she and appellant Emilio Sy entered
into a contract whereby the former
leased to the latter for a period of five (5) years, renewable for another ten
(10) years, the property described in the deed of lease.

The pertinent provision thereof reads:

“That the LESSOR is the absolute owner of Lot No. 345,
situated in Rizal Avenue, Dipolog, Zamboanga, and hereby agrees to construct a
cine building on the said lot; that said building shall be 112 feet long and 52
feet wide; that said buildings shall have a flooring made of cement; it shall have four (4) flush
toilets, (2 upstairs, 1 for men and 1 for women), 2 downstairs, (1 for men and 1 for women); it shall have a balcony and a stage inside
said building; it shall have double walling and said walls shall be painted
inside and outside; it shall have a room for ticket sellers which a dimension
of 2 meters long, 1 meter wide and 8 feet
high and it shall contain a
fireproof projecting room and the parties hereby agree to adopt and be bound by the following conditions:  x x x”

During the existence of the contract of lease appellee’s sales
application was cancelled by the Bureau of Lands and the land was forfeited in favor of the
government in a decision rendered by the Executive Secretary on April 27, 1954
as follows:

“x x x In view thereof, her application is hereby cancelled but she shall be
entitled to reimbursement by the successful bidder at public auction air the
value of the improve­ment introduced by her. 
In the absence of a successful bidder and the land in question remains
property of the government, the ap­plicant, Mrs. Josefa A. Vda. de Ramos, shall have the right to remove
the house at her expense if the Government does not decide to reimburse
her for the value thereof.”

The land was advertised for sale and in the public auction held
on March 31, 1960 was sold to herein
appellant as the highest bidder, for the price of P142,000.00.  The building in question was assessed at P27,350.00, and pursuant to the decision of the Executive Secretary the parties agreed that
appellant should pay the value thereof in five equal annual installments.  Appellant then paid the first
installment of P5,470.00.  The second
installment in the same amount was likewise
paid on February 24, 1961.

Meanwhile, on March 3,
1960, appellant filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte Civil Case No. 1150 for the recovery
of expenses for major and minor repairs and other material improvements, plus
damages, incurred by him on the moviehouse subject-matter of the lease.  Thereafter, appellant did not pay to appellee the subsequent monthly rentals of P250.00 each, despite two separate
demands made by the latter on
June 12 and 25, 1960.  On August 23, 1960 appellee
instituted the instant case (Civil Case No. 1261) for unlawful detainer against appellant in the justice
of the peace court of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte.

Appellant moved to dismiss the complaint on the fol­lowing
grounds:  (1) that the complaint stated
no valid cause of action; (2) that the court had no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter of the complaint; (3) that there was a pending civil action over
the same cause of action between the same parties; (4) that the complaint was
defective for failure to include all the necessary parties.

On September 8, 1960 the justice of the
peace court issued the following order:

“After considering the motion to dismiss filed by counsel for
the defendant, the Court finds that the same is not well taken.  As shown by the admission of the counsel for
the defendant that the latter has only paid the first of the five installments
of the purchase price of the movie house which is fixed at P27,350, the
defendant is not entitled to claim full and absolute ownership of the
building.  The Court refrains from
further elucidation on this point until such time that this case will be submitted
to the Court for the decision on its merits.”

Not satisfied with the above-quoted order, appellant filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition with pre­liminary injunction in the
Court of First Instance, alleging that the justice of the peace court acted
with grave abuse of discretion or in excess of jurisdiction in taking
cognizance of the case (Civil Case No. 1261) and reiterating the grounds
alleged in its motion to dismiss in the court below.

On August 3, 1961
the Court of first instance rendered its decision, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

“Concluding, the Court declares that the justice of the peace
court of Dipolog, Zamboanga del Norte, presided over by respond­ent Manuel D.
Dalman, has the exclusive
original jurisdiction to try and decide Civil Case No. 1261 for unlawful
detainer filed therewith by respondent Josefa Vda. de Ramos against
petitioner.  Corollary to this is the
declaration that respondent Justice of the Peace Manuel D. Dalman has not acted
with grave abuse of discretion in issuing his orders in said case, dated September 8, 1960 and October 29, 1960, denying
respectively, petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of said denegatory order.

Wherefore, judgment is hereby
rendered dismissing this action, with costs taxed against petitioner.”

Appellant comes to us
raising the same issues as those stated in his petition for certiorari in the
Court of First Instance.  He claims that
the justice of the peace court lacked jurisdiction over the subject-matter of
the case, considering that the issue of possession is directly interwoven with
that of ownership.

It should be noted that
in the justice of the peace court appellant, instead of filing his answer to
the complaint, moved for its dismissal on the ground that as he was already the
owner of the building the court lacked jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case.  In ejectment cases what determines
jurisdiction of the justice of the peace court is the nature of the action as
pleaded in the complaint.  Appellant’s
claim of title over the building would not necessarily defeat jurisdiction
vested in said court by the allegations thus pleaded (Canaynay vs. Sar­miento,
79 Phil. 36).  Otherwise the ends of
justice would be frustrated by making the efficacy of an action of forcible
entry or detainer depend upon the defendant in all cases.  An exception is of course recognized where
the evidence ad­duced at the trial shows that the question of title is actually
involved in the litigation and must be resolved in order to decide the question
of possession (Zapanta vs. Bartolome, 83
Phil. 433; Savinada vs. Tuason & Co., Inc., 83 Phil. 840; De los
Reyes vs. Elepaño, 83 Phil. 691; Centeno vs. Gallardo, L-6165, May 15,
1953).  The present case does not fall
within the exception, since the trial had not yet started in the justice of the
peace court, appellant having immediately filed his motion to dismiss.

Appellant contends that
being the successful bidder at the public sale and having chosen to pay the
improvement on the land purchased by him he became the owner thereof, and
therefore the issue of possession is directly interwoven with his claim of
ownership.  Such claim, however, is a
matter of defense and raises an issue of fact which should be deter­mined from
the evidence at the trial.  Besides, as
stipulated by the parties below, “up to the present (April 27, 1961, which
was the date of the stipulation) there has been no award by the Bureau of Lands
in favor of the petitioner as a successful bid­der…”

Appellant further raises
the bar of another action pending, referring to Case No. 1150 in the Court of
First instance.  The same observations as
those already set forth with respect to the claim of ownership apply with equal
relevance here.

In any event an order
denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory and the remedy of the
unsuccessful movant is to await
the judgment on the merits and
then appeal therefrom (Harrison Foundry
& Machinery vs. Harrison Foundry Workers’ Assn., L-18432, June 20, 1963;
Bautista vs: De la Cruz, L-21107,
December 24, 1963; Arches vs. Bellosillo, L-23534, May 16, 1967); or, in an
action for unlawful detainer, where the jurisdiction of the justice of the
peace court is challenged
because the issue of ownership is necessarily involved, to raise said issue in
the answer and present evidence to support
it.  The denial of appellant’s motion to
dismiss, at the stage of the case when said motion was filed, is not a grave
abuse of discretion or an excess of jurisdiction to warrant the issuance of the
writ prayed for.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.