SEGUNDO SANTOS, PETITIONER, VS. SECRETARY OF LABOR, RAOUL M. INOCENTES, COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SERVICE, RICARDO TIONGCO AND CASHIER, REGIONAL OFFICE NO. 4, RESPONDENTS.

Segundo Santos was, for a
number of years, employed as Labor Conciliator I (Regional Office No. 4) of the
Department of Labor.  His monthly pay was
P259 per month, or P3108 per annum.  On August 24, 1960, he was extended an
appointment (promotion) as Labor Conciliation II (Regional Office No. 3, Manila),
with compensation per annum of P3493 vice Juan Mendoza, Jr., resigned.  This appointment, effective September 1,
1960, was approved by the Commissioner of Civil Service on May 14, 1962, and
released to the Department of Labor on May 25, 1962.

In June of 1962, respondent Secretary of Labor appointed Ricardo Tiongco, one of the respondents, to the same position of
Labor Conciliator II.^[1]

Petitioner’s demand for the revocation of respondent Tiongco’s appointment and payment to him (Santos) of salary
differentials was rejected by respondent Secretary of Labor.

From the foregoing events
stemmed the present petition for mandamus filed on August 20, 1962 – three days before Santos actually retired from the service which was on August
23, 1962.^[2] The petition prays, inter alia, that
respondents be commanded to nullify the appointment of Tiongco, and to uphold as legal and existing pe­titioner’s
appointment, as Labor Conciliator II, from September 1, 1960; and that the salary differentials aforesaid
be paid petitioner.  Respondents
seasonably answered the petition.

Before the case could be tried on the merits, that is, on
February 14, 1963, Santos died.  A motion
to substitute the “Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased,” represented
by Rodolfo Santos, one of the heirs, was
filed.  This triggered a move on
respondents’ part to seek dismissal of the case.

The court, on April 10, 1963, dismissed the petition without
costs.  Hence, this appeal on purely
questions of law.

1. The threshold question is this: 
May the Estate of Segundo Santos, deceased, be substituted in place of
petitioner herein?

Public office is a public trust.^[3]
It is personal to the incumbent thereof or appointee thereto.  In this sense, it is not property which
passes to his heirs.  None of the heirs
may replace him in that position.  It is
in this context that we say that the Estate of the deceased Segundo Santos may
not press Santos’ claim that he be allowed to continue holding office as Labor Conciliator II.  Actio personalis moritur cum persona.

But jurisdiction of the court had attached before the death of
Santos.  That jurisdiction continues
until the termination of the suit.  It is
true that what is left is a money claim for salary differentials.  But death will not dislodge jurisdiction on
that money claim – it subsists. 
Resolution of this question depends upon the right of Segundo Santos to
the position of Labor Conciliator II.

We rule that the Estate
of the deceased Segundo Santos may be substituted for him in the present proceedings.  We do so now.

2. We go to the merits.

Stripped of unnecessary
details, the facts are:  On August 24,
1960, petitioner, a second grade
eligible, was appointed Labor Con­ciliator II at an annual compensation of P3493 effective September 1, 1960.  As far as salary is concerned, no law, rule or regulation has
been violated.  Because, an annual pay of
P3493 is well within the range provided for second grade civil service eligibles.^[4]

Respondents challenge the legality of petitioner’s appointment as Labor Conciliator II.  They say
that such appointment is within the prohibition set forth in the
memorandum circular of the Civil Service Commission dated February 16, 1961,
thus:  “Employees should not be
assigned or promoted to positions the initial rate of the salary allocation of
which exceed the maximum allowable for their eligibility.  Respondent likewise aver that it was because
of this circular, that the appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II
was recalled on September 7, 1961.  The circular was not violated.

And the withdrawal of petitioner’s appointment is not a proven
fact.  What the record clearly disclose
is that the original appointment of petitioner as Labor Conciliator II was not taken
out of the Civil Service Commission; it was approved by the Commissioner of
Civil Service on May 14, 1962
and released to the Secretary of Labor on May 25, 1962.

More important now is that the defense of recall has been
abandoned by respondents.  The case was
ready for trial below.  They did not go to trial.  Instead, they thought it advantageous to them
– upon petitioner’s death – to submit their case on their motion to dismiss
based solely on legal grounds, namely, that the death of petitioner
extinguished the controversy, and that the remaining claim for damages is
ancillary to mandamus and is also abated by death.

The money claim here involved, however, descended to Santos’
heirs.  And, as we have earlier in this
opinion stated, his Estate may prosecute that claim to its conclusion.

It will not be in harmony
with our sense of justice to return this case
to the court below – at this stage – just to allow respondents to prove
their defense of recall of petitioner’s appointment.

Respondents had a choice:
 To go to trial on the merits upon
the issues raised in their
answer or, seek to overthrow petitioner’s case on legal issues.  They did elect the latter.  They cannot be permitted once again to return
to the lower court for a trial on the merits.^[5] Suitors should not normally be allowed to
gamble with court proceedings in the hope of obtaining beneficial results.  It is unfair that this case should, on
respondents’ choice, be made to bounce from the lower court to this Court, and
back to the lower court and perhaps only to be appealed once again to an
appellate court.  The ensuing delay,
increased cost of litigation, and trouble and anxiety and harassment to be
caused to the adverse party, the wastage of the courts’ time – these are
reasons potent enough to support this view.

At all events,
petitioner’s right to salary differentials and the duty to pay him are both
clear.  Civil Service approval completed
petitioner’s appointment,^[6]
clinched the case for him.

3. The rest is a question of mathematical computation.  Pe­titioner’s pay as Labor Conciliator I was
at the rate of P259 per month or P3108 per annum.  His increased compensation as Labor
Conciliator II from September 1, 1960,
to August 23, 1962, the
date of his retirement, is at the rate of P3493 per annum, specified in his
promotional appointment, and reiterated in the 5th indorsement
of the Commissioner of Civil Service to the Secretary of Labor dated May 22, 1962.  He is entitled only to the pay set forth in
his appointment, and no more – absent a legal adjustment thereof.  There is no such adjust­ment here.  Petitioner’s salary differentials during the
period covered amounts to P761.68.  And
this should be paid to his Estate.

Upon the view we take of
this case, we vote to reverse the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April
10, 1963, and to
direct the Secretary of Labor and the corresponding Cashier to pay the
Estate of the deceased petitioner Segundo Santos the sum of P761.68

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro, Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Respondents’ answer [par. 5(b)]states that Tiongco’s
appointment was made on February 23,
1962.

^[2]
Civil Case 51313, Court of First Instance of Manila,
entitled “Segundo Santos, Petitioner, vs. The Secretary of Labor,
et al., Respondents.”

^[3]
Morfe vs. Mutuc,
L-20387, January 31, 1968.

^[4]
Section 9, Civil Service Act of 1959 before amendment.

^[5]
In pari materia:  Moody, Aronson & Co. vs. Hotel Bilbao, 50 Phil. 198, 200, where it was held that:  “The defendant who, after the plaintiff
has submitted his evidence, makes a motion to dismiss which the trial court in
a decision grants, and who, on appeal of the plaintiff, has the judgment
reversed, cannot then be permitted to produce evidence in defense.  The defendant in offering a motion to dismiss
in effect elects to stand on the insufficiency of the plaintiff’s case.  Otherwise, the result will be to invite unnecessary
litigation.  As a shining example is the
case at bar involving some P400 brought on appeal in two instances, and which
in addition, if we accede to the petition of the defense, will have to be
retried which the possibility of
still another appeal.” See:  Demetrio vs. Lopez, 50 Phil, 45, 51-52; Arroyo vs.
Azur, 76 Phil. 493, 498-503; Guido vs. Castelo, 81 Phil. 81, 82-83; Cotaoco
vs. Dinglasan, 83 Phil. 681-682; Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525, 529-530; Atun vs. Nuñez, 51 O.G.
No. 11, pp. 5628, 5631.

^[6]
Mitra vs. Subido,
1967C Phild.
681, 691.