DRA. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO, PETITIONER, VS. ALLIANCE TRANSPORT SYSTEM, INC. AND JOSE LEYSON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS.

PARAS, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision^[1] of the Court of Appeals dated
May 4, 1971 in CA-G.R. No. 34832-R entitled Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado v.
Alliance Transport System, Inc. and Jose Leyson, which modified the
decision^[2] of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-5235 reducing the amount of
moral damages from P25,000 to P2,000 and eliminating the award of exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees but granting actual damages of P2,451.27.

The
decretal portion of said decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby modified,
ordering appellants jointly and severally to pay plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27
for actual damages representing the cost of the repair of the car of Plaintiff;
(2) the sum of P2,000.00 as moral damages.  No pronouncement as to
costs.”

The antecedent facts of this case as found by the trial court
and by the Court of Appeals are as follows:

At about 2:05 p.m. of May 11,
1960, Dra. Sofia L. Prudenciado was driving her own Chevrolet Bel Air car along
Arroceros Street with the intention of crossing Taft Avenue in order to turn
left, to go to the Philippine Normal College Compound where she would hold
classes.  She claimed that she was driving her car at the rate of 10 kmph; that
before crossing Taft Ave. she stopped her car and looked to the right and to the
left and not noticing any on-coming vehicle on either side she slowly proceeded
on first gear to cross the same, but when she was almost at the center, near the
island thereof, Jose Leyson who was driving People’s Taxicab owned and operated
by Alliance Transport System, Inc., suddenly bumped and struck Dra.
Prudenciado’s car, thereby causing physical injuries in different parts of her
body, suffering more particularly brain concussion which subjected her to
several physical examinations and to an encephalograph test while her car was
damaged to the extent of P2,451.27.  The damage to the taxicab amounted to
P190.00 (Decision in Civil Case No. Q-5235, CFI, Rizal; Record on Appeal, pp.
63-64; Decision, CA-G.R. No. 34832-R, Rollo, pp. 37-38).

Dra.
Prudenciado filed a complaint for damages at the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Quezon City against the Alliance Transport System and Jose Leyson
docketed as aforestated, Civil Case No. Q-5232 (Record on Appeal, pp.
2-11).

After due hearing, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon
City, found Jose Leyson guilty of negligence in the performance of his duties as
taxicab driver which is the proximate cause of the accident in question.  On the
other hand, defendant Alliance Transport System, Inc. failed to prove to the
satisfaction of the court that it had exercised the required diligence of a good
father of the family in the selection, supervision and control of its employees
including defendant Leyson.  Consequently, both defendants were held jointly and
severally liable for the physical injuries suffered by the plaintiff Dra. Sofia
L. Prudenciado as well as for the damage to her car, in addition to the other
consequential damages prayed for.

The dispositive portion of said
decision reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS judgment is rendered,
one in favor of plaintiff and against the defendants, by ordering the said
defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiff the sum of P2,451.27 for
actual damages representing the cost for the repair of the car of plaintiff;
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and the further sum
of P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees, with costs against the defendants.” (Record on
Appeal, pp. 71-73).

On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
on May 14, 1971 and denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration in its
resolution dated July 20, 1971.

Hence, this petition.

The petition
was given due course in the resolution of this Court dated September 6, 1971 and
petitioner filed her brief on November 10, 1971 (Rollo, p. 69) while
respondents filed their brief on January 24, 1972 (Rollo, p. 86). 
Petitioner filed her Reply Brief on March 1, 1972 (Rollo, p. 96); after
which the case was considered submitted for decision on the same date
(Rollo, p. 99).

In her brief, petitioner raised the following
assignment of errors:

I

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REDUCING THE AWARD OF
MORAL DAMAGES TO THE PETITIONER FROM P25,000.00 AWARDED BY THE COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF RIZAL, BRANCH V, QUEZON CITY, TO P2,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT THERE WAS NO FINDING THAT THE AWARD WAS PALPABLY AND SCANDALOUSLY EXCESSIVE
AS TO INDICATE THAT IT WAS THE RESULT OF PASSION OR CORRUPTION ON THE PART OF
THE TRIAL COURT;

II

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ELIMINATING THE AWARD
OF EXEMPLARY DAMAGES OF P5,000.00 NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE FINDING OF
THE SAID COURT ON THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW APPLICABLE JUSTIFIED THE AWARD OF
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AS HELD BY THE SAID TRIAL COURT;

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT HER DEMOTION IN RANK
AS A PROFESSOR IN THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT SUBSTANTIATED AND IN MAKING THIS
FINDING A BASIS FOR THE REDUCTION OF THE AWARD OF MORAL DAMAGES, NOTWITHSTANDING
THAT IT IS ALREADY TOO FAR-FETCHED AND IT MERELY CONFIRMS THE TRUTH OF THE FACT
THAT THE ACCUSED SUFFERED LOSS OF HER USUAL LIVELINESS, VIVACITY, ACTIVITY
SELF-CONFIDENCE AND THAT SHE FEELS UNCERTAIN AND INSECURE AND THAT SHE WAS
SUBJECTED TO EXTREME FRIGHT AND SERIOUS ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF LOSING
HER LIFE OR HER SENSES OR REASON AND OF HER PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME AND THAT
SHE SUFFERED GREAT SHOCK AND SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER
SPINAL COLUMN OF THE LUMBAR REGION;

IV

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO ERRED IN ELIMINATING THE
AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES TO THE PETITIONERS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID
AWARD IS LEGAL AND PROPER;

V

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ELIMINATING THE COSTS
TAXED AGAINST THE RESPONDENTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SAID COSTS ARE LEGAL
AND PROPER;

VI  

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CLAIM
OF DR. SOFIA L. PRUDENCIADO OF HER LOSS OF HER USUAL LIVELINESS, VIVACITY,
ACTIVITY AND HER USUAL SELF CONFIDENCE, SUCH THAT SHE NOW FEELS UNCERTAIN AND
INSECURE… EXTREME FRIGHT AND SERIOUS ANXIETY, SERIOUS APPREHENSION OF LOSING
HER LIFE OR HER SENSES OR REASON, OF HER PHYSICAL MOBILITY ANYTIME … GREAT
SHOCK AND SEVERE PAINS ON HER BACK NEAR THE LEFT SIDE OF HER SPINAL COLUMN IN
THE LUMBAR REGION IS UNCORROBORATED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT OF THE CERTIFICATE,
EXHIBIT “G” OF DR. DOMINADOR VERGARA, OF THE VETERANS MEMORIAL HOSPITAL AND DR.
CONRADO ARAMIL, BRAIN SPECIALIST AND THE CORROBORATING TESTIMONY OF THE LATTER
AFTER EXAMINATION AND TREATMENT OF PETITIONER;

VII

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN SO MODIFYING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT IT HAD NO POWER
TO DO SO UNDER THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AS FOUND BY THE COURT OF
APPEALS;

VIII

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MODIFYING THE DECISION
OF THE TRIAL COURT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE DECISION OF SAID TRIAL
COURT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court are in accord in the
finding that the accident was caused by the negligence of the taxi driver. The
bone of contention is however in the award of damages, which crystalizes the
errors assigned into one main issue, which is whether or not the Court of
Appeals is justified in modifying or changing the grant of damages by the trial
court.

It is well settled that factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are binding on the Supreme Court, but said findings are subject to scrutiny if
such are diametrically opposed to those of the trial court (Samson v. CA, et
al., G.R. No. L-40071, January 29, 1986).

The Court of Appeals
concedes that a concussion of the brain was suffered by Dra. Prudenciado but as
to how serious was the concussion or how it had later become, and the disastrous
extent of the injuries which she alleges to have sustained as a result of the
accident, are seriously doubted by said Appellate Court.

Specifically,
said Court finds that Dra. Prudenciado’s claim (which was sustained by the trial
court) that because of aforesaid concussion, she eventually lost her usual
liveliness, vivacity, activity and her usual self-confidence, to the extent that
now she feels uncertain and insecure, not to mention a sense of extreme fright
and serious anxiety, serious apprehension of losing her life, or her senses or
reason or her physical mobility momentarily, plus experiences of great shock and
severe pains on her back near the left side of her spinal column in the lumbar
region, was not supported by the deposition of Dr. Conrado Aramil, the
specialist who attended to the plaintiff from May 14 to May 26, 1960 (TSN, July
13, 1960, pp. 72-73).  From said deposition, it was gathered that Dra.
Prudenciado suffered a mild abnormality, compatible with mild concussion of the
brain (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 47-48); that the symptoms of any brain concussion
usually are headache, dizziness, vomiting and lack of pep or alertness; and that
the possible after effects that may be produced are persistent or irregular
headaches, fluctuating dizziness.  Accordingly, Dra. Prudenciado was advised
“Just to watch herself if she would develop any alarming symptoms such as
headache, dizziness or vomitings, to have her rechecked after several months for
her to be sure.” (Ibid., pp. 51-52).  It might also produce
intellectual deterioration or lessening of intelligence, and even
insanity.

Dra. Prudenciado sought to establish that she had precisely
suffered all those after effects except insanity; but the Court of Appeals ruled
that her proof consisted merely in her own uncorroborated testimony.  In support
of her allegation she could not show any medical certificate tending to prove
that she was indeed medically treated abroad for her brain ailment nor was there
any showing in the documents presented that she was demoted to the rank of
technical assistant because the San Francisco State College does not believe in
her mental capacity any more.

Finally, her statements that she is almost
completely losing her voice, that she has a terrible headache when her head is
pressed, that she has lost her sense of taste, that she is nervous and
temperamental and that she has lapses of memory, are belied by the deposition of
Dr. Aramil that the patient’s EEG was already normal on May 26, 1960; and on
cross-examination he declared that she was clinically symtomless when she was
discharged from the hospital (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp. 75-76;
78-79).

There is no argument that moral damages include physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.  Though
incapable of pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are
the proximate result of defendant’s wrongful act or omission (People v. Baylon,
129 SCRA 62 [1984]).

In the same manner, it is undisputed that the trial
courts are given discretion to determine the amount of moral damages
(Alcantara v. Surro, 93 Phil. 472) and that the Court of Appeals can
only modify or change the amount awarded when they are palpably and scandalously
excessive “so as to indicate that it was the result of passion, prejudice or
corruption on the part of the trial court (Gellada v. Warner Barnes &
Co., Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 7347, 7358; Sadie v. Bachrach Motors Co.,
Inc., 57 O.G. (4) 636 and Adone v. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., 57
O.G. 656).  But in more recent cases where the awards of moral and exemplary
damages are far too excessive compared to the actual losses sustained by the
aggrieved party, this Court ruled that they should be reduced to more reasonable
amounts.

Thus, in the case of San Andres v. Court of Appeals
(116 SCRA 85 [1982]) the Supreme Court ruled that while the amount of moral
damages is a matter left largely to the sound discretion of a court, the same
when found excessive should be reduced to more reasonable amounts, considering
the attendant facts and circumstances.  Moral damages, though incapable of
pecuniary estimation, are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claimant for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the
wrongdoer.

In a much later case (Siguenza v. Court of Appeals,
137 SCRA 578-579 [1985]), the Supreme Court, reiterating the above ruling,
reduced the awards of moral and exemplary damages which were far too excessive
compared to the actual losses sustained by the aggrieved parties and where the
records show that the injury suffered was not serious or gross and, therefore,
out of proportion to the amount of damages generously awarded by the trial
court.

In any case the Court held that “moral damages are emphatically
not intended to enrich a complainant at the expense of a defendant.  They are
awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversion or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone, by
reason of the defendants’ culpable action.” The award of moral damages must be
proportionate to the suffering inflicted (R & B Surety & Insurance
Co., Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 129 SCRA 745 [1984] citing
Grand Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr., 94 SCRA
966).

Coming back to the case at bar, a careful review of the records
makes it readily apparent that the injuries sustained by Dra. Prudenciado are
not as serious or extensive as they were claimed to be, to warrant the damages
awarded by the trial court.  In fact, a closer scrutiny of the exhibits showing
a moderate damage to the car can by no stretch of the imagination produce a
logical conclusion that such disastrous effects of the accident sought to be
established, actually took place, not to mention the fact that such were not
supported by the medical findings presented.  Unquestionably, therefore, the
damages imposed by the lower court should be reduced to more reasonable
levels.

On the other hand, it will be observed that the reduction of the
damages made by the Court of Appeals is both too drastic and unrealistic, to
pass the test of reasonableness, which appears to be the underlying basis to
justify such reduction.

While the damages sought to be recovered were not
satisfactorily established to the extent desired by the petitioner, it was
nonetheless not disputed that an accident occurred due to the fault and
negligence of the respondents; that Dra. Prudenciado suffered a brain concussion
which although mild, can admittedly produce the effects complained of by her and
that these symptoms can develop after several years and can lead to some serious
handicaps or predispose the patient to other sickness (TSN, July 13, 1960, pp.
52-54).  Being a doctor by profession, her fears can be more real and intense
than an ordinary person.  Otherwise stated, she is undeniably a proper recipient
of moral damages which are proportionate to her suffering.

As to
exemplary damages, Article 2231 of the Civil Code provides:

“In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if
the defendant acted with grave negligence.”

The rationale behind exemplary or corrective damages is, as the
name implies, to provide an example or correction for the public good
(Lopez, et al. v. Pan American World Airways, 16 SCRA 431). The
findings of the trial court in the case at bar which became the basis of the
award of exemplary damages are to the effect that it is more apparent from the
facts, conditions and circumstances obtaining in the record of the case that
respondent driver was running at high speed after turning to the right along
Taft Ave. coming from Ayala Boulevard, considering that the traffic was clear. 
Failing to notice petitioner’s car, he failed to apply his brakes and did not
even swerve to the right to avoid the collision (Record on Appeal, pp.
69-70).

The Court of Appeals conforms with aforesaid findings of the
trial court but is not prepared to accept that there was gross negligence on the
part of the driver to justify the imposition of exemplary
damages.

However, a driver running at full speed on a rainy day, on a
slippery road in complete disregard of the hazards to life and limb of other
people cannot be said to be acting in anything less than gross negligence.  The
frequent incidence of accidents of this nature caused by taxi drivers indeed
demands corrective measures.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the
assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby MODIFIED insofar as the
award of damages is concerned; and respondents are ordered to jointly and
severally pay the petitioner; (1) the sum of P2,451.27 for actual damages
representing the cost of the repair of her car; (2) the sum of P15,000.00 as
moral damages; (3) the sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) the sum of
P3,000.00 as attorney’s fees.  No pronouncement as to costs.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla,
Bidin, and Cortes, JJ., concur.