PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. LUDIVICO D. ARCIAGA, AS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ILOCOS SUR, BRANCH I VIGAN, ILOCOS SUR, TAURINO SINGSON A…

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
August 5, 1968 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 41582-R^[*] which dismissed petitioner’s petition for
certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction on the ground
that the allegations made therein are insufficient to justify further
process.

The undisputed facts of this case, as found by the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:

“On August 24,
1960, Taurino Singson, resident of Cabugao,
Ilocos Sur, as paying
passenger on board bus No. 215 belonging to the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. sustained multiple serious physical injuries when the said bus crashed
against an acacia tree at Balaoan, La Union, so he
brought a complaint for contractual tort (Record 27-31).  In its
answer, defendant interposed the defense that the
collision was due to a fortuitous event (Rec. 42).  The case was
set for trial on December 23,
1965 (45), but upon motion of both counsels, the same was transferred
to February 3 and 4, 1966 (55).  On October 6, 1966, the Court
noted that no pre-trial has ever been conducted in the case and so both parties
were ordered to confer with one another for a compromise agreement at the office
of the Philippine Rabbit at Tarlac, Tarlac, and the trial was postponed to November 14, 1966
(57), and then transferred again upon petition filed by counsel for Philippine
Rabbit for January 20, 1967 (58) and then postponed again to April 29,
1967.  At the scheduled trial of April 29, 1967, at 8:40
a.m., only the defendant Philippine Rabbit appeared and upon motion
of its counsel, the Court dismissed the case for nonappearance of plaintiff
(59).

“It appears that the order of dismissal of April 29, 1967 alluded to
was sent to Atty. Constante Pimentel, counsel for
plaintiff Taurino Singson,
at Vigan, Ilocos Sur, by registered mail on May 3, 1967 and was received by
Miss May Altuna, addressee’s agent, on May 6, 1967
(70).  On July 6, 1967 (61 days from receipt of dismissal), counsel
for plaintiff Taurino Singson filed a Petition for Relief accompanied by an
affidavit of said plaintiff alleging that on April 29, 1967 (the date of the
trial), he went to Vigan for the purpose of attending
the trial of his case, boarding a passenger jeepney at
Cabugao, his hometown, but when the vehicle reached
Lapog, it had engine trouble, causing him to reach the
court 15 minutes late and found thereupon that the court had already dismissed
the case (60-62).  Opposition was filed to the Petition for Relief
by defendant Philippine Rabbit.  On August 16, 1967, the lower court granted plaintiff Taurino Singson’s Petition for
Relief (66).  On September
14, 1967, counsel for Philippine Rabbit filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order granting the petition for Relief (67-69). 
In an order dated November 28, 1967, the lower court denied the
motion for reconsideration of the Philippine Rabbit on the ground that
‘considering the particular nature and circumstances of the case at bar and also
the fact that petition for relief under Rule 38 is premised on equity
and is allowed on exceptional circumstances, and that as far as possible failure
of justice should be avoided; and that, further, in the absence of a clear lack
of intention to delay, a case should not be allowed to go off on procedural
points to the end that technicalities should not override the merits of the
case, this court believes that justice is best served if in this particular case
the plaintiff will be given his day in court’ (71-72).”  (pp.
22-25, Rollo)

On July
9, 1968, herein petitioner Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines,
Inc. filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus with Preliminary
Injunction in the Court of Appeals, docketed therein as CA-G.R. No.
41582-R.

In a Resolution dated August 5, 1968, the Court of Appeals
denied the petition on the ground that the allegations made therein are
insufficient to justify its giving it due
course.  Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration, but in a Resolution dated October 1, 1968, the Court of
Appeals denied the same.  Hence, the instant petition (Record, pp.
4-20).

In a Resolution dated November 15, 1968 (Ibid., p.
47), this Court gave due course to the petition.

On January 23, 1969, petitioner filed its
Brief (Ibid., p. 56), and on February 19, 1969, private respondent
filed his Brief (Ibid., p. 63).  On March 29, 1969,
petitioner filed its Reply Brief (Ibid., p. 67).

In its brief, petitioner raised the following assignment of
errors:

I

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE 60-DAY
PERIOD PROVIDED IN SEC. 38 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS MANDATORY AND
NON-EXTENDIBLE.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING THE RULE OF EQUITY IN THE
CASE AT BAR.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTIORARI DOES
NOT LIE IN THE INSTANT CASE.

The petition is impressed with merit.

Sec. 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of Court clearly states that
“A petition provided for in either of the preceding sections of this rule must
be verified, filed within sixty (60) days after the petitioner learns of the
judgment, order or other proceeding to be set aside, and not more than six (6)
months after such judgment or order was entered or said proceeding was
taken.”

It is undisputed that the Petition for Relief
in this case was filed 61 days from receipt of the
notice of dismissal or one day late.  In fact, the records show
that counsel for private respondent learned of the dismissal on the same day,
April 29,
1967, when he arrived late for the hearing so that the
Petition for Relief was at least eight (8) days late.  The records
further show that counsel for private respondent did not move for
reconsideration of the Order of dismissal, nor for new
trial.  Neither did he appeal, thereby allowing the decision to
become final and executory.  As
a last resort, he could have availed of the sixty day period
provided for by Rule 38 to file a Petition for Relief from judgment but again he
allowed this opportunity to lapse.  Indeed, to him is applicable,
the well known maxim that “equity aids the vigilant, not those who slumber on
their rights.” (Henson v. Director of Lands, 55 Phil.
586).

In the case of Turqueza v. Hernando (97 SCRA 488
[1980]) the Supreme Court in
disallowing the reopening of the case which has become final, ruled that there
is no justification in law and in fact, for respondent judge’s void act of
ordering the reopening of the case which has become final and executory.

Thus, the Court held:

“The Court has said time and again that the doctrine of
finality of judgments is grounded on fundamental considerations of public
policy and sound practice that at the risk of occasional error the judgments of
courts must become final at some definite date fixed by law.  The
law gives an exception or ‘last chance’ of a timely petition for relief from judgment
within the reglementary period (within 60 days
from knowledge and 6 months from entry of judgment) under Rule 38
supra, but such grace period must be taken as ‘absolutely fixed,
inextendible, never interrupted and cannot be subject to any
condition or contingency.  Because the period fixed is
itself devised to meet a condition or contingency (fraud, accident, mistake or
excusable neglect), the equitable remedy is an act of grace, as it were, designed to give
the aggrieved party another and last
chance‘ “and failure to avail of such last chance
within the grace period fixed by the statute or Rules of Court is
fatal.” (Turqueza v. Hernando,
supra).

In expressly reiterating the above-quoted decision the Supreme
Court in Arcilla v. Arcilla (138
SCRA 56 [1985]), held that the Rule is that, for a petition for relief under
Rule 38 to be entertained by the court, the petitioner must satisfactorily show
that he has faithfully and strictly complied with the provisions of said
Rule.  Consequently, it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show
that the said petition was filed within the reglementary period specified in Sec. 3, of the same,
otherwise on this ground alone, the petition should be dismissed.

For the foregoing reasons, neither can private respondent
invoke equity as a ground for the reopening of the case “there being an express
provision of law under which the remedy can be invoked.” (Barrios v. Go Thong &
Co., 7 Phil. 542 [1963]).  The rule is, “equity follows
the law” and as discussed in Pomeroy’s Equity
Jurisprudence Vol. 2 pp. 188-189 (as cited in Appellant’s Brief p. 20), the
meaning of the principle is stated as follows:

“There are instances, indeed, in which a court of equity gives a
remedy, where the law gives none; but where a particular remedy is given by the
law, and that remedy is bounded and circumscribed by particular rules, it would
be very improper for the court to take it up where the law leaves it and to
extend it further than the law allows.”

In the same manner, the issue as to whether or not
certiorari is proper in the instant case, has been laid to rest in the
case of Turqueza vs. Hernando,
(supra) where a petition for certiorari directly filed with the
Supreme Court was granted and the Court set aside the questioned order
issued by respondent judge to reopen the case below for reception of
respondent-defendant’s evidence notwithstanding the lapse of the reglementary period within which respondent could file a
petition for relief from judgment.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the resolution of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. No. 41582-R and the questioned Order dated August 16, 1967 of Judge
Ludivico D. Arciaga in Civil
Case No. 2539 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and said Civil Case is declared
TERMINATED.

SO
ORDERED.

Fernan, (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Padilla, Bidin, and Cortes,
JJ., concur.

Alampay, J., on leave.

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^[*] Penned by Justice Antonio G. Lucero
concurred in by Justices Nicasio A. Yatco and Jose M. Mendoza.