G.R. No. L-41955. December 29, 1977

ELISCO-ELIROL LABOR UNION (NAFLU) AND ITS OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, PETITIONERS, VS. CARMELO NORIEL, IN HIS CAPA­CITY AS DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF LABOR RE…

Decisions / Signed Resolutions December 29, 1977 FIRST DIVISION TEEHANKEE, J.:
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TEEHANKEE, J.:


The Court sets aside respondent director’s appealed resolution
and rules in accordance with the prevailing law and settled jurisprudence that
the petitioner union consisting of the members-employees of respondent
corporation is the principal party to the collective bargaining agreement
(rather than the respondent mother union which is merely its agent) and is
therefore entitled to be recognized as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representa­tive entitled to administer and
enforce the collective bargaining agreement with the employer corporation.

The undisputed antecedent
facts which gave rise to the present petition are stated in the petition as
follows:

“2. That
sometime on February 1974, petitioner­-Elisco Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU), negotiated and executed a
collective bargaining agreement with res­pondent-Elizalde
Steel Consolidated, Inc.[1]

“3. That upon
verification by individual petitioners at the Registration Division, Bureau of
Labor Relations, Department of Labor, the Elisco-Elirol
Labor Union (NAFLU), the contracting party in said collective bargaining
agreement, was not then registered and therefore not entitled to the benefits
and privileges embodied in said collective bargaining agreement; thus on March
3, 1975, the members of petitioner-appellant union in a general membership
meeting decided in a resolution to register their union to protect and preserve
the integrity and inviolability of the collective bargaining agreement between
the Elisco-Elirol Labor Union (NAFLU) and the Elizalde Steel Consolidated, Inc.

“4. That said
resolution of the members of petitioner-appellant union was passed upon by the
officers and members of the Board of Directors on May 20, 1975, at a special meeting called for the
purpose, resolution No. 6, s.  1975 was approved requesting the Acting
Directors, Registration Division, Bureau of Labor
Relations, to register the union Elisco-Elirol Labor
Union (NAFLU).

“5. That by
virtue of resolution No. 6, Peti­tioner-appellant union applied for
registration with the Bureau of Labor Relations, hence on May 28, 1975, Certificate of Registration No.
8511-IP was issued by said Office.

“6. That with
the issuance of the certificate of registration petitioner-appellant acquired a
person­ality separate and distinct from any other labor union.

“7. That steps
were taken by petitioner-appel­lant to enforce the collective bargaining
agreement as the principal party to the same representing the workers covered
by such agreement immediately  after the issuance of the certificate
of registration.

“8. That on
June 10, 1975, at a special meeting called for the purpose, the general
membership of petitioner union decided that their mother union, the National
Federation of Labor Unions, can
no longer safeguard the rights of its members insofar as work­ing conditions
and other terms of employment are concerned and that the interest and welfare
of petitioner can be served best if it will stay independent and dis­affiliated
from said mother union, hence, the general membership adopted a resolution to
disaffiliate from the National Federation of Labor Unions.

“9. That on June 11, 1975, petitioner, acting
through its President Hilario Riza
informed respondents of said disaffiliation by means of a letter, and subse­quently
requested respondents to recognize petitioner as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
thereof.

“10. That respondent without any
justifiable reason refused and continues to refuse to recognize petitioner as
the sole and exclusive bargaining repre­sentative of its employees and, now
actually dismissed the petitioner union’s officers and board members.[2]
In this connection, a complaint for unfair labor prac­tice was filed by
petitioners against respondents for the latter’s refusal to bargain
collectively with peti­tioner, which complaint is presently dockected
as Case No. LR-RO4-6-1662.

“11. That by
virtue of said refusal of respondent company to recognize petitioner as the
sole and exclu­sive bargaining representative of the employees, peti­tioners
filed a petition before the Bureau of Labor Relations, Department of Labor on
July 2, 1975, with Case No. LR-861 against respondents Elizalde
Steel Consolidated, Inc. and the National Federation of Labor Unions be ordered
to stop from presenting itself as the collective bargaining agent and pursuant
thereto, a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunc­tion be issued.

“12. That on August 19, 1975, the Bureau of Labor
Relations, through Med-Arbiter Reynaldo B. Carta,
before whom the case was heard, issued an Order dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.”

On appeal to respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, said respondent issued his Resolution of October 30, 1975 affirming the dismissal of
petitioner-union’s petition as follows:

“On February, 1974 the members of the petitioner union who were then yet affiliated
with the National Association of Free Labor Union nego­tiated and executed with
the respondent company a collective bargaining agreement with expiry date in
November, 1976.

“On May 28, 1975,
after the same members, by valid resolution of the Board of directors
and approved by the general membership, have formed themselves into an independent
organization
and applied for registration
as a union, a certificate of registration was issued by the Department of
Labor.  And on
June 10, 1975 again by a valid resolution the same
members disaffiliated with the NAFLU.

“The issue for resolution is –

“Which of the two unions should be
recognized as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees
and ultimately recognized to admin­ister and supervise the enforcement of the
collective bargaining agreement.

“Petitioner-union contends that it having the necessary interest and being the real
party
must be the sole union to be recognized and given authority to
bargain with the company.

“Setting aside jurisprudence and the collective bargaining
agreement of the parties, the appellant is correct.   For
to grant to the former mother union (NAFLU) the authority
to
administer and enforce their collective bargaining agreement without
presumably any members in the bargaining unit is quite absurd
.  But to transfer also the authority to the newly
formed union although the members of the same were the same members who
composed then the local chapter of the mother union is also in violation of the
CBA particularly article IV which is the union security clause, wherein it is a condition for a continued
employment in the company to maintain membership in the Union.  Theoretically therefore, when the
employees disaffiliated from the mother union and formed themselves into a new
union, their status as employees was also
terminated.  As such they could not therefore absolutely
and legally claim that they still
comprise the majority of the
bargaining unit.

“Secondly, to vest, upon the new union the authority to
bargain is in violation of the whole CBA, under the theory that when the mother
union (NAFLU) entered and executed the same in its separate and distinct
personality aside from the people composing the same.  In fine, the CBA then was executed by and
between the company and the (NAFLU) with the latter as an entity having its own
capacity and person­ality different from the members composing the same.

“Lastly, to preserve and avoid unstability
and disorder in the labor movement as correctly ruled by the med-arbiter, the
status quo should be preserved, there being no compelling reason to alter the
same.”[3]

Hence, the petition at bar.  We find the petition to be clearly
meritorious and reverse the appealed resolution.

1.  Respondent director
correctly perceived in his Resolution that “to grant to the former mother
union (NAFLU) the authority to administer and enforce their collective
bargaining agreement without presumably any members in the bargaining unit is
quite absurd” but fell unto the grave error of holding that “when the
employees disaffiliated from the mother union and formed them­selves into a new
union, their status as employees was also terminated.”

His error was in not perceiving that the employees and members of
the local union did not form a new union but merely registered the local union
as was their right.  Petitioner Elisco­-Elirol Labor Union-NAFLU, consisting of employees
and members of the local union was the principal party to the
agreement.  NAFLU as the “mother
union” in participating in the execution of the bar­gaining agreement with
respondent company acted merely as agent of the local union, which
remained the basic unit of the associa­tion existing principally and freely to
serve the common interest of all its members, including the freedom to
disaffiliate when the circumstances
so warranted as in the present
case.

2.  Contrary to respondent
director’s misimpression, our jurisprudence fully supports petitioner’s
stand.  In Liberty
Cotton Mills Workers
Union vs. Liberty
Cotton Mills, Inc.
[4],
the Court expressly cited and affirmed the basic principle that “(T)he
locals are separate and distinct units primarily designed to secure and maintain an equality of
bargaining power between the employer and their employee-members in the
economic struggle for the fruits of the joint productive effort of labor and
capital; and the association of the locals into the national union (as
PAFLU) was in furtherance of the same end
. 
These associations are consensual entities capable of entering into such
legal relations with their members.  The
essential purpose was the affiliation of the local unions into a common
enterprise to in­crease by collective action the common bargaining power in
respect of the terms and conditions of labor. 
Yet the locals remained the basic units of association, free to serve
their own and the common interest of all, subject to the restraints imposed by
the Constitution and By-Laws of the Association, and free also to renounce the
affiliation for mutual welfare upon the terms laid down in the agreement which
brought it into existence
.”

Corollarily, the “substitutionary” doctrine likewise fully
supports petitioner’s stand.  Petitioner
union to whom the employees owe their allegiance has from the beginning
expressly avowed that it “does not intend to change and/or amend the provi­sions
of the present collective bargaining agreement but only to be given the chance
to enforce the same since there is a shift of allegiance in the majority of the
employees at respondent company.” As was stressed by the Court in Benguet Consolidated Inc. vs. BCI Employees,
& Workers Union-PAFLU
[5]
–

“x x This principle, formulated by
the NLRB as its initial compromise solution to the problem facing it when there
occurs a shift in employees’ union allegiance of after the execution of a
bargaining contract with their employer, merely states that even during the effectivity of a collective bargaining agreement executed
between employer and employees thru their agent, the employees can change said
agent but the contract continues to bind them up to its expiration date.  They may bargain however for the shortening
of said expiration date.

“In formulating the ‘substitutionary‘
doctrine, the only consideration involved was the employees‘ interest
in the existing bargaining
agreement.  The agent’s interest
never entered the picture.  In fact, the
justification for said doctrine was:

‘x x x that the  majority of the employees, as an
entity under the statute, is the true party in interest to the contract,
holding rights through the agency of the union representative.  Thus, any exclusive interest claimed by the
agent is defeasible at the will of the
principal.'”

3.  It need only be
mentioned finally that the Secretary of Labor in his decision of April 23, 1976
and order of January 10, 1977 denying reconsideration in the sister unfair
labor practice case and ordering respondent corporation to immediately lift the
suspension and reinstate the complainant officers and board members of
petitioner union[6]
has likewise adhered to the foregoing basic principles and settled
jurisprudence in contrast to respondent director (as well as therein respondent
NLRC which similarly adhered to the archaic and illogical view that the
officers and board members of petitioner local union committed an “act of disloyalty” in
disaffiliating from the mother union when practically all its members had so
voted to disaffiliate and the mother union [as mere agent] no longer had any
local union or members to represent), ruling that “(G)ranting arguendo that the disaffiliation
from the NAFLU is a legal cause for expulsion and
dismissal, it could not detract from the fact that only 13 individual
complainants out of almost 700 members who disaffiliated, were singled out for
expulsion and recommended for dismissal. 
The actuations of NAFLU conclusively constitute discrimination.  Since the suspension of the complainants was effected at the instance of NAFLU, it should be held liable
to the payment of back wages.

The Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo
B. Zamora has likewise dismissed as untenable in a similar case respondents’
views that “such maintenance of membership” clause be distorted as
“intended for the security of the union rather than the security of tenure
for the workers”, ruling that “(W)hat is
paramount, as it is expressly and explicitly emphasized in an exact­ing
language under the New Constitution, is the security of tenure of the workers,
not the security of the union.  To
impress, there­fore, such ‘maintenance of membership’ — which is intended for
the security of the union rather than the security of tenure of the workers —
as a bar to employees’ changing their affiliation is not only to infringe on
the constitutional right of freedom of associa­tion, but also to trample upon
the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and to render
meaningless whatever ‘adequate social services’ the State may establish or
maintain in the field of employment ‘ to guarantee the enjoyment by the people
of a decent standard of living.'”[7]

It is expected that with this decision, any suspension or lay-off
of the complainants officers and board members or employees of petitioner union
arising from the respondents’ misconception of the clearly applicable
principles and juris­prudence upholding the primacy of the employees and their
freely chosen local union as the true party in interest to the collective
bargaining agreement will be forthwith rectified and set aside.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted and the appealed
resolution is set aside and petitioner local union is declared to be the sole
and exclusive bargaining representative of the employees of respondent
corporation
entitled to administer and enforce any subsisting collective
bargaining agreement with said employer corporation.  This decision shall be immediately executory upon its promulgation.

Makasiar, Muñoz
Palma, Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Martin, J., no part.


[1]
The term of the agreement is for three years until November 1976, and
thereafter to be “deemed renewed from year to year, unless either party
gives written notice of its desire to introduce changes.”

[2]
The names of petitioner union’s officers and members as taken from the decision
of April 23, 1976 of the
Secretary of Labor in the unfair labor practice case, (NLRC Case No.
RB-1735-75) which arose out of the same facts and respondents’ suspension of
the local union’s officers and board
members are:  Hilario
Riza, Gumercindo Macapugas, Juanito Anacta, R
odolfo Herrera, Antonio Samaneda, Senon Garcia, Alfredo Gavia, Renato Millama, Jaime Pagkalinawan, Francisco Remegio, Rodolfo
Camerino, Conrado Gutierrez
and Francisco Sarmiento.

[3]
Emphasis supplied.

[4]
66 SCRA 512, 519, Emphasis copied.

[5]
23 SCRA, 465, 471.

[6] See
fn. 2, and paragraph 10, page 2
hereof.

[7]
Union Chemicals, Inc. vs. National Federation of Labor Unions, UCI Labor
Union-NAFLU Aquilino Candelita,
et al., NLRC Case No. LR-1045, Office of the President Decision by Presidential
Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo B. Zamora, Oct. 5, 1977.