THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ENRIQUE EGUAC, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The main reliance in this appeal from a conviction for the crime of
rape by Enrique Eguac is the constitutional
presumption of innocence.^[1]
It is the contention of counsel that the proof coming primarily from the
offended party falls short of the standard of demonstrating guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.  It is true that there
is need to scrutinize most care­fully the version as testified to by the
complainant to avoid the possibility of
injustice being committed.  A conscientious appraisal of the transcript as well as the
other evidence presented yields the same conclusion arrived at by the lower
court.  There is more than ample
justification for the finding that rape was indeed committed by appellant.  In addition to complainant’s recital of the sexual
abuse inflicted on her, there was the impartial testimony coming from the
doctor who conducted the physical examination. 
The constitutional presumption of innocence clearly has been
overcome.  A reversal is far from
indicated.  We affirm, with modification
as to the pecuniary penalty imposed.

It appears from the testimony of the complainant Fermina Manginsay that on the
afternoon of March 9, 1970,
she was selling tuba at Sitio Cogon, in the
barrio of Tubod, San Juan,
Siquijor.^[2]
After about an hour, at 5:30 of the same afternoon,
she went home accompanied by appellant Eguac, her
partner in that business and her brother-in-law, his wife being her younger
sister.^[3]
They took a shorter way, a footpath, and upon reaching the middle of such trail
he asked her to stop as he had something to tell her, all the while holding her
by the arm.^[4]
Not agreeable to such a suggestion, she managed to free herself and to run away
from appellant.^[5]
He soon overtook her, however, and notwithstanding her efforts she was held
firmly by him.^[6]
She was pushed down and when she fell to the ground, he placed himself on top
of her. ^[7]
Once again, she was able to free
herself momentarily and to get up, but he never let go of her completely and
was able to push her down once more. ^[8] He placed himself anew on top of her, at the
same time warn­ing her not to shout for help — although she managed to do so in
a loud voice —because if she did she would be killed as he had a hunting knife
with him.^[9] She did continue struggling to escape from
him, but she did not succeed.^[10] He kissed her twice and pulled off her
panties; after which he was able to perform the sexual act.^[11] Then when he was through he told her
not to tell her husband about what happened but she said she was going to
report the occurrence.^[12]
She immediately went to see the Chief of Police, Leon Ontolan,
of the Municipality of San
Juan who sent a policeman to apprehend appellant,
and it was done on the evening of the same day, March 9, 1970 at around 10:00
o’clock.^[13]
Thereafter they went to the municipal building of San Juan,
and, upon being asked by the Chief of Police what appellant did to her, she
answered that she was raped.^[14]
From the municipal building, they went to a hospital at Siquijor
where she was examined medically by Dra. Antonia Igana Ladion.  She suffered wounds or abrasions in her
buttocks, right hip and right foot.^[15]
She was given a more thorough examination the next day, March 10, 1970, by the same doctor.^[16]

The first witness called was Dra. Antonia Igana Ladion
who performed the medical examination on the complainant not only on the
evening of the occurrence, March 9, 1970, but likewise
the next morning.  As noted in the
medical certificate prepared by her after such examination, complainant
suffered from linear and multiple abrasions in the sacro-lumbar
region, upper back and face; contusions at the right hip as well as the left
wrist.^[17]
Also, there was this finding in such medical certificate: “Vaginal and
cervical smears reveal occasional sperm cells and a small grain of sand.”^[18]
The lady doctor was likewise questioned extensively by the court.  She explained that it was she who conducted
the examination of complainant as she “was the physician on duty that
night, your Honor.”^[19]
She was examined because “she came to the hospital claiming that she was raped.”^[20] That was her request.^[21] She informed the doctor “that earlier
that night, she was walking home from the tabo;
that she was attacked by the person who was with her.”^[22] As to the finding of vaginal and cervical
smears revealing occasional sperm cells and a small grain of sand, she
explained further: “The sperm cells, we already found under the
microscope.  We got the smear and
examined it under the microscope because that cannot be seen by the naked
eye.”^[23] She affirmed that such sperm cells were
extracted from “the cervical smear.”^[24] It was taken from “the vagina.”^[25] When asked as to what is the implication of
such sperm cells being found therein, this was her answer: “That shows
that a male has introduced the same.”^[26]

The decision convicting
appellant of the crime of rape and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua was premised on the above evidence, the
lower court accepting the version of the complainant rather than that offered
by the defense.  Appellant admitted that
sexual intercourse was in fact committed, but it was his submission that there
was consent on the part of the complainant. 
The lower court, however, was not convinced that the sexual act was not
accompanied by force or intimidation.  A
perusal of the sixteen-page brief of appellant is quite revealing.  The defense was hardly touched upon.  Instead, as was noted at the outset, the
emphasis in the first three errors assigned was the failure of the prosecution
to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt, as a result of which
the constitutional presumption of innocence should prevail.  Also, as previously set forth, such a
contention does not suffice for a reversal.

1.  An excerpt from a
recent decision, People v. Andal,^[27]
finds relevance: “There would appear to be more than sufficient basis to
warrant the conclusion that the constitutional presumption of innocence cannot
be availed of by the appellants.  The medical
findings constitute mute but eloquent proof of the ordeal to which she was
subjected.  She survived the grilling attendant to an intensive cross-examination;
at the most, only minor inconsistencies were revealed.  The one undeniable fact was that she was the
unfortunate victim of a brutal act. * * * The constitutional presumption of
innocence must yield to what had been so amply and persuasively demonstrated.” ^[28]

2.  More specifically, the
first error assigned harped on the force employed by him not “being
sufficient to vitiate her consent.”^[29] Then the brief went on to state: “In order that a crime of rape can be
committed, complainant must prove that anent her verbal refusal, she exerted or
showed physical struggle taxing her powers to the utmost, so it may not be
fairly inferred that she was just concerned with saying appearances than with
defending her honor.”^[30] Two recent cases by this Tribunal were thus
ignored by him.  In People v. Gan,^[31] this
Court, through Justice Antonio, held: “It is an accepted rule that the
force employed in rape need not be so great nor of such character as could not
be resisted.  It is only that the force
used by the accused be sufficient to enable him to consummate his
purpose.”^[32] In
People v. Olden,^[33] the then Justice, now retired Chief Justice,
Makalintal, reiterated such a view: “Appellants
point out that even assuming that they had sexual intercourse with Edwina Maranga, there is no evidence that they employed force or
intimidation.  It is true that she could
have shown greater physical resistance to their advances than she actually
did.  Another woman would probably have
tried to fight them off, even to the jeopardy of life or limb.  But not all women are of the same
mettle.  What is clear and indisputable
here is that Edwina was far from being a willing victim, and if her
protestations lacked vigor and vehemence, it was obviously because of the fact
that some of the men who took turns with her were armed with guns and others
with bolos which they displayed to cow her into submission.  If there was no appreciable force employed,
there was definitely intimidation.”^[34] There was reference in the brief of
appellant to United States v. Villarosa,^[35] a 1905 decision.  That was a mistake on his part.  It suffices to cite this portion of the
decision of Justice Torres as ponente:
“It is a doctrine well established by the courts that in order to consider
the existence of the crime of rape it is not necessary that the force employed
in accomplishing it to be so great or of such character as could not be
resisted; it is only necessary that the force used by the guilty party be
sufficient to consummate the purpose which he had in view.  (Judgment May 14, 1878,
supreme court of Spain.) A simple reading of the medical certificate and
the testimony of the physician who examined and attended the outraged girl
fixes the measure of the character and class of force used by the defendant in
the act of rape.”^[36]

3.  The last sentence of
the Villarosa opinion is particularly apropos.  For the coherent straightforward testimony of
complainant was reinforced by the certi­fications of the attending physician.^[37]
It is quite obvious that she was subjected to physical force.  How else account for the abrasions, linear
and multiple in the sacro-lumbar region, upper back,
arms and face; the contusions in the left wrist and the right hip; as well as
the shallow wound in the left sole? As was certified to by the attending
physician likewise, the injuries would require from five to nine days to heal
in the absence of complication.  The
defense that the sexual act was entered into freely and voluntarily was thus
completely negated.  There is more­over,
the attendant circumstance, as noted in the lower court decision, that the
complainant was so grievously offended by what was done to her that immediately
upon reaching her home “she wasted no time and reported directly to the
Chief of Police of San Juan who was also residing in Tubod
on the very night when she arrived there.”^[38]

4.  The futility of
inspiring belief in the defense offered that there was consent on the part of
complainant is thus apparent.  Nor should
a semblance of plausibility be imparted to such a defense by the laborious effort
to show the alleged improbability of what was testified to by her.  All that is needed to render unmistakable its
rather flimsy character is to go over her recital as to what did transpire, to
which she adhered notwithstanding an
intensive cross-examination.  Appellant
likewise did attempt to have the lower court look upon the sexual act as devoid
of the element of force by his testimony that it was complainant who initiated
him one evening in 1962, eight years before this occurrence, in the mysteries of
sex, as a young man of sixteen, then living in her house upon the request of
her husband who had to go to Mindanao. ^[39] Nor was that the only time, so again he did
testify, as in 1964 there was a repetition of such intimacy, this time likewise
when the two of them were living in the same house, the husband being
providentially absent.^[40] If such were indeed the case, still the
defense that there was no force was not made out for the only
question involved in this prosecution was whether on the night of March 9, 1970, he was
guilty of raping complainant.  In the
light of the evidence of record, the conclusion that rape was committed was
more than fully justified, the constitutional presumption of innocence not
sufficient to call for exculpation even as reinforced by the assertion that
previously such favors were enjoyed by him with the acquiescence, it not at the
instigation, of complainant.  In the
light of the above, there is no warrant for reliance on the constitutional
presumption of innocence.

5.  There is, to quote from
the recent decision of People v. Villamala,^[41]
“less than full awareness of the principle invariably followed by this
Tribunal that on the question of the credence to which the conflicting versions
of prosecution and defense are entitled, the answer given by the trial court is
generally viewed as correct and thus entitled to the highest respect.”^[42]
It is worthwhile repeating that even in the absence of such a well-settled
doctrine, a fair and impartial appraisal of the evidence fails to yield the
conclusion that appellant is entitled to acquittal.  The facts as proven justified the decision
now sought to be reversed.

6.  The last error assigned
to the effect that the lower court erred in attaching legal significance to a
statement of appellant not under oath elicited from
him without the aid and assistance of a lawyer need not be discussed.  The conviction of the accused was predicated
on the testimony of complainant as well as that of the attending physician.  There was more than sufficient proof beyond
reasonable doubt for a finding that the accused was guilty of the crime of
rape.  It is true that reference was made
in the decision to a state­ment of appellant on the night he was
apprehended.  That was all.  It certainly was not made the basis for the
conclusion reached.  Even on the
assumption, therefore, that an error was committed, it was a harmless
error.  The evidence credible and
competent on which a finding of guilt could be made was more than sufficient.

WHEREFORE, the decision of October 18, 1972, finding
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape as defined and
penalized in the third paragraph of Article 335 and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua is affirmed, the only modification in
the aforesaid decision consisting of increasing the indemnity to complainant Fermina S. Manginsay to
P12,000.00.  Costs
against appellant.

Barredo, Antonio, Aquino,
and Concepcion,
Jr., JJ., concur.

Santos, J., on official leave.

^[1]
According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution insofar as
relevant:  “In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved, * * *.”

^[2]
T.s.n., Session of May 4, 1972, 3-4.

^[3]
Ibid, 4.

^[4]
Ibid, 5.

^[5]
Ibid, 5-6.

^[6]
Ibid., 6.

^[7]
Ibid.

^[8]
Ibid, 6-7.

^[9]
Ibid, 7.

^[10]
Ibid, 7-8.

^[11]
Ibid, 8.

^[12]
Ibid.

^[13]
Ibid, 10.

^[14]
Ibid, 11.

^[15]
Ibid, 12.

^[16]
Ibid, 13.

^[17]
T.s.n., Session of February 5, 1971, 5-6.

^[18]
Ibid, 9.

^[19]
Ibid, 14.

^[20]
Ibid, 15.

^[21]
Ibid.

^[22]
Ibid.

^[23]
Ibid.

^[24]
Ibid.

^[25]
Ibid, 16.

^[26]
Ibid.

^[27] L-39763,
March 8, 1976, 70 SCRA 30.

^[28]
Ibid, 35-36.

^[29]
Brief for Appellant, 6.

^[30]
Ibid, 6-7.

^[31]
L-33446, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 667.

^[32]
Ibid, 677.

^[33]
L-27570 and 27571, September 20, 1972, 47 SCRA 45.

^[34]
Ibid, 52-54,

^[35]
4 Phil. 434.

^[36]
Ibid, 437.

^[37]
Cf. Vide, Exhibits A and B.

^[38] Decision, 6.

^[39]
T.s.n., Session of May 6, 1972, 47-48.

^[40]
Ibid, 48-50.

^[41]
L-41312, July 29, 1977.

^[42]
Ibid. Cf. People v. Carandang,
L-31012, Aug. 15, 1973, 52 SCRA 239;
People v. Baylon, L-35785, May 29, 1974, 57
SCRA 114; People v. Cudalina, L-34969, April
29, 1975, 63 SCRA 499; People v. Cawili,
L-30543, July 15, 1975, 65 SCRA 24; People v. Ordonio,
L-33829, Dec. 19, 1975, 68 SCRA 397; People v. Sarile,
L-37148, June 30, 1976, 71 SCRA 593; People v. Velasco, L-31922, Oct.
29, 1976, 73 SCRA 574.