ATLAS CONSOLIDATED MINING & DEVELOP­MENT CORPORATION, PLAINTIFF?APPELLANT, VS. PROGRESSIVE LABOR ASSOCIATION, BERNARDO O. CALANG, AND DELFIN MERCADER, DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES.

Before Us is a motion to dismiss the appeal of
plaintiff-appellant, filed by the defendants-appel­lees,
on the ground that the record on appeal filed by the plaintiff-appellant does not “contain such data as
will show that the appeal was perfected on time”, as required by Section
6, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court.

The record on appeal in question shows that on Aug­ust 31, 1966, the Court of First
Instance of Cebu dis­missed, for lack of
jurisdiction, the complaint for breach of contract, damages and injunction.  On Septem­ber
15, 1966, the plaintiff filed a motion for reconsi­deration.  On October
8, 1966, the motion for reconsi­deration was denied.  On November
14, 1966, the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal, and on the 19th
of the same month and year, the record on appeal was filed.  The re­cord, however, does not show such
important data as:  (1) when the
plaintiff received notice of the order of dismis­sal of the case, from which
would commence the period for appeal; and (2) when it received notice of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration, from which date, the pe­riod for
appeal would again resume to run. 
Without stat­ing in the
record on appeal the respective dates when the plaintiff had received notice of
the order of dismis­sal of the
case and of the denial of the motion for recon­sideration, the record on
appeal, on its face, shows that the appeal was perfected fifty three (53) days
after the rendition of the order dismissing the case.  The omission of such important data in the
record on appeal, makes it impossible for Us to determine from the face of the
re­cord whether or not the appeal was perfected on time.

Section 6 of Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Court, which
enumerates the pleadings and documents that should be stated in the record on appeal,
provides that the re­cord on appeal shall also state “such data as will
show that the appeal was perfected on time.” This was not required under
the old Rules,^[1]
and the reason for the amendment is stated in the opinion of this Court in Ara­neta vs. Madrigal & Co., Inc., et al., G.R. No. L-26277-78, promulgated on October 25, 1966, to wit:

“This Court noticed, however, that issues were often raised in
appellate courts on whether the appeal had been perfected on time or not, owing
to the fact that the data pertinent thereto was not set forth in the record on
ap­peal.  Inasmuch as the records of the
trial courts, in cases appealed by re­cord on appeal, are not forwarded to appellate courts, the latter had no means
of checking or verifying the conflicting allegations of fact made, either in
the briefs, or in the motion to dismiss the appeal and the opposition thereto,
filed by the parties.  As a consequence,
appellate courts had to examine such evidence as the par­ties may have
submitted thereto, in support of their respective conten­tions.  This entailed additional work and unnecessary
waste of time, that contributed to the delay in the final determination of
appealed cases.  To eliminate such
obstacles to the speedy administration of justice, this Court deemed it best
not only to rephrase the first sentence of said section 6 but, also to add, at
the end thereof, the clause “together with such data as will show that the appeal was per­fected
on time.”

To give efficacy to said amendment,
Section 1, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court specifies as one of the grounds for
dismissal of an appeal “(a) failure of the record on ap­peal to show on
its face that the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these
rules.”^[2]

Since the effectivity of the new Rules
of Court, in a number of appeals in which the appellants therein failed to
comply with the abovementioned rule, this Court has invariably held that this
kind of deficiency in the record on appeal is fatal.^[3]

The appellant here, as that in the case of Araneta
vs. Madrigal, et al., supra, although not denying the pointed
deficiencies in the record on appeal, maintains that the appeal, anyway, had
been actually perfected within the reglementary
period as certified to by the clerk of court, and submitting in support of its
opposition to the motion to dismiss, a certification from the Clerk of Court of
the court below giving the dates when said appellant received the notices of
dismissal and denial of its motion for re­consideration.  But, as stated in that case of Araneta vs. Madrigal, et al., supra, “the
amendment (of the Rule) would become useless and its purpose completely
defeated, if we gave thereto the interpretation advocated by the main
respondent herein (appellant in our case) x x x we would have the same issues and the same waste of time
that were sought to be eliminated by the amendment.”

In Government of the Philippines,
etc. vs. Antonio et al., supra, this Court held that the requirement as
to what should be included in the record on appeal is mandatory and jurisdictional, for unless the appeal is perfected
on time, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction over the appealed case.^[4]
The certification by the clerk of court that the appeal was filed within the reglementary period cannot now bring the case within the
jurisdiction of the court, since it was submitted after the expiration of the
period for appeal.^[5]

WHEREFORE, for failure of the appellant to comply with
section 6, Rule 41, in conjunction with section 1, Rule 56,^[6]
of the Rules of Court, the appeal must be, as it is hereby, dismissed, pursuant
to section 1 (a), Rule 50 of the same Rules.  Without pronouncement as to costs.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro, and Fernando, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Section 6, Rule 41, old Rules of Court.

^[2]
Also a new provision.

^[3]
See Government of the Phil. etc. v. Antonio, et al., G.R. No. L-23736, Oct. 19, 1965; Development Bank of
the Phil. v. Santos, G.R.
No. L-26387, Sept 27, 1966;
Araneta v. Madrigal, supra.

^[4]
Citing Bellos vs. Fernando, G.R. No. L-16970, January 30, 1962; Caisip
vs. Catanga, G.R. No. L-14684, August 26, 1960; Espartero
vs. Ladaw, 49 O.G. 1439.

^[5]
See Gov’t of the Phil. etc, vs. Antonio, et al. supra,
citing Alvaro vs. de la Rosa, 76 Phil. 428, 433.

^[6]
Provision to the effect that “procedure in the Supreme Court in original
as well as in appealed cases shall be the same as in the Court of Appeals, except as hereafter provided.”