G.R. No. L-21504. September 15, 1967
MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND BELEN GLENDO VDA. DE GANDO, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS GUARDIAN AD LITEM OF HER MINOR CHILDREN, ALEJ…
SANCHEZ, J.:
Appeal from a decision of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission
granting P4,000.00 as death compensation, P700.00
for medical expenses, and
P200.00, attorneys’ fees; and directing the payment of P41.00 to the Workmen’s
Compensation Fund and P5.00 as the
costs of review.
Alejandro Gando was, from March 1, 1947 up to October 7, 1959, the time of his
death, petitioner’s employee. At first,
he was a coalman. But, from July 1,
1952 to his demise, he was a lubricator-greaseman. His
job was to grease train cars
and wagons. Which exposed him to all
weather conditions, to avoid delay of train schedules. On August
2, 1949, on the occasion of the company’s annual physical check-up,
the company physician gave Gando a clean bill of
health, declared him fit for work. On February 27, 1952 and January 5, 1953, Dr. Fernando C. Jusay of the Quezon
Provincial Chest
Center diagnosed him to be
suffering from “P.T.B., minimal right.” Petitioner allowed him to continue with
his work. Dr. Jusay’s
examinations, on two subsequent occasions, October 25 and November 23, 1958,
show that Gando was afflicted with “moderately
advanced pulmonary tuberculosis, right; infiltration 1st interspace
to 3rd rib, left.” He was again allowed to work. Such was his condition upon examination by
the same physician on August 15, 1957.
One year thereafter, petitioner’s own physician found him with only his
right lung weak. And, he remained in his
job.
But then, on September 11, 1959, Gando
was struck on the chest by an iron bar which he was at the time using to remove
the axle cover of a drum. He failed to
report for work since then. He suffered
continuous hemoptysis. First taken home, he was, on September 28, 1959, removed to the Quezon
Institute. On October 7, 1959, he died
of “bilateral, far advanced pulmonary tuberculosis.”
On August 11, 1960, his wife, Belen Glendo
Vda. de Gando, formally
registered with the Department of Labor a claim for death compensation. On October 22, 1960, petitioner filed its
employer’s report.
Hearing on the merits was
had before Roman Caringal, hearing officer,
who awarded compensation to Gando’s dependents. On appeal, the Chairman of the Workmen’s
Compensation Commission affirmed with but slight modifications. The Commission en banc approved
the Chairman’s decision.
Hence, this appeal.
1. First of the questions to claim attention is the dependents’
right to death benefits. Controlling
here is Section 2 of the Workmen’s
Compensation Law which provides that “[w]hen an employee suffers personal
injury from any accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, or
contracts tuberculosis or other illness directly caused by such employment, or
either aggravated by or in result of the nature of such employment, his
employer shall pay compensation in the sums and to the persons hereinafter
specified.
That Section 8 of the law,[1] which
defines the death benefit, does not mention aggravation, as petitioner contends, is
inconsequent. Because Section 8 itself
speaks of death caused by a “disease contracted or injury received” as
provided in Section 2 hereinbefore quoted, which in turn makes compensable,
injury or illness aggravated by the nature of the employment. It does not matter that the word
“aggravated” was only inserted in Section 2 by a later amendment thru
Republic Act 772, which took effect on June 20, 1952. It bears repetition that death here took
place on October 7, 1959. And a rule,
elementary in legal hermeneutics, is that an amended statute should be
construed as if it had been originally passed in its amended form.[2]
On the merits, the finding below, on which we place our stamp of
approval, emphatically negates petitioner’s claim of non-compensability. Says the Commission decision:
“The fact that the deceased was in the best of health at the
time he was taken in by respondent [MRR]
and was allowed to continue with his job even after he was discovered to
be afflicted with tuberculosis remains undisputed. So, is the fact that the deceased died of
pulmonary tuberculosis, far advanced, bilateral, 26 days after he quit working
on September 12, 1959. What the
respondent seems to dispute, however, is the fact that the deceased’s
employment had something to do with the acceleration of his death due to
pulmonary tuberculosis. For it is of the
opinion that the demise of the deceased was due to the natural progress of his ailment.
We could not agree with the respondent on the above opinion. If the deceased were separated from the
service immediately upon being discovered to be afflicted with tuberculosis in
its early stage and since then his illness had gradually progressed to
moderately advanced stage we might say that respondent’s view is tenable. But, such was not the situation in this
case. Instead of persuading the deceased
to go on vacation to enable him
to recuperate from his illness, respondent had explicitly assured the former
that there was nothing wrong with his continuing with his job because he was
merely suffering from weak lungs (Exhs. ‘1’, ‘2’,
‘3’ and ‘4’ for respondent). Only to
find later that he was already afflicted with the disease in its moderately
advanced stage, and bilateral at that.
That the deceased’s illness was worsened and his death hastened by a
harm associated with his employment, which consisted primarily of greasing
train cars and wagons under any weather condition to avoid delay in the
schedule of their trips, is best
evidenced by the fact that he had recurrent hemoptysis
during the period of his employment. And
this holds true, even if we ignore entirely the alleged incident met by the
deceased while in the performance of his job and even if we assume that other
factors foreign to the employment had likewise contributed to the aggravation
of his illness. After all, the law does
not weigh the relative weight of the contribution made by the employment to
the illness. It is enough that it did
contribute to its aggravation even in a small degree. (See The Law of Workmen’s Compensation by
Arthur Larson, Vol. I, p. 50).”
In ITEMCOP vs. Florzo,
G.R. No. L-21969, August 31, 1966,
we said:
“At any rate, the law presumes, in the absence of substantial
evidence to the contrary, that the claim is compensable. The burden to disconnect, by substantial
evidence, the injury or sickness from employment, is laid at the employer’s door. Petitioner failed to discharge this
burden. So rigid is the rule that even
where the cause of the employee’s death is unknown – as petitioner claims –
the right to compensation subsists.
Reason for this is that the Workmen’s Compensation Act is a social
legislation; it is designed to give relief to the workman; therefore, to
effectuate its purpose, it must be liberally construed.” [Citing
Section 44 (1), Workmen’s Compensation Act; Naira vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-18066, October
30, 1962; Agustin vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, et al., G.R.
No. L-19957, September 29, 1964;
Vda. de Acosta, et al. vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-19772, October 31, 1964, citing Blue Bar
Coconut Co., et al. vs. Boo, 53 O.G. 3471, 3474; Batangas
Transportation Co. vs. Rivera, et al., G.R. No. L-7658, May 8, 1956; Vicente vs. Workmen’s Compensation
Commission, et al., G.R. No. L-18241, December
27, 1963. See also: Madrigal Shipping Co. vs. Melad,
et al., G.R. Nos. L-17362, L-17367-69, February
28, 1963; Batangas Transportation Co. vs.
Perez, et al., G.R. No. L-19522, August
31, 1964].
Upon the law and the facts, the claim here involved is
compensable.
2. That Alejandro Gando suffered the accident heretofore adverted to on
September 11, 1959, we do not doubt.
Evidence then is that immediately after the accident, two of his
co-laborers took him home. From thence,
he was, on September 23, 1959, taken to the Quezon
Institute. He did not report for duty
from September 1959. The man died on October 7, 1959. Petitioner did not say that it did not have any knowledge of
such death. And yet, petitioner was
remiss in its duty, set forth in Section 37 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
to report the injury “[a]s soon as possible after the occurrence”
which resulted “in absence from work for a day or more”, and to
report the death of the employee. Laches, therefore, on the part of the individual
respondents in filing their claim would not bar recovery.[3]
3. Neither did petitioner
comply with Section 45 of the Act.
Because, it did not controvert the right to compensation (death benefit
“on or before the fourteenth day of disability or within ten days after he
has knowledge” thereof. In fact, petitioner
only bestirred itself after respondent Belen Glendo Vda. de Gando had already filed
the claim for compensation. Guilty
itself of delay in filing the report, petitioner cannot now invoke a similar
delay on the part of the claimant to avoid the latter’s claim for
compensation. More than this, petitioner’s
failure to explain lack of controversion for an
unreasonable length of time constitutes “a renunciation of his right to
challenge the claim.”[4]
4. Petitioner’s averment
that the compensation award should not have been given to the minor children of
the Gandos deserves but passing mention. It is true that it was only Belen Glendo Vda. de Gando who signed the claim; that she did not expressly hold
herself out therein as representing their children; and that she was not
appointed guardian ad litem in the case. But it is equally true that, as stated in the
Commission decision, Item 7 of the claim lists the names of the minors as
surviving dependents of the deceased, together with their respective dates of
birth, addresses, and relationship (children) with the deceased. These dependents, by Section 9 of the law,
are entitled to compensation. And, there
is no necessity for Belen Glendo Vda.
de Gando to be appointed guardian ad litem. For, she is,
by Article 320, Civil Code, the legal administrator of the property of her
children. At the very least, we say that
form does not override substance.
For the reasons given, we vote to affirm the decision
under review.
With costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Angeles, and Fernando, JJ., concur.
[1]
“SEC. 8. Death benefit. – If
the disease contracted or injury received by the employee as provided in
section two hereof cause his death within two years from the date of such
injury or sickness the employer shall pay the compensation to the persons
entitled thereto, and in case there shall be none, he shall pay to the person representing the
deceased employee the burial expenses not to exceed two hundred pesos,
and shall also pay to or for the following persons, in the order of priority
and during the periods hereinafter set forth, a weekly compensation equivalent
to the following percentages of the average weekly wages of the employee, as determined
in section nineteen of this Act:
x x x.”
[2]
Crawford, Statutory Construction, 1940 ed., p. 618.
[3]
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-19377,
January 30, 1964, ITEMCOP vs.
Florzo, supra, citing cases.
[4]
ITEMCOP vs. Florzo, supra;
NADECO vs. Ayson, G.R. No. L-23450, May 24, 1967; Manila Railroad Co. vs.
Workmen’s Compensation Commission, G.R. No. L-21902, August 10, 1967.