CONSTANTINO LEDUNA, VICTORIO CAÑETE, FRANCISCO OLIVEROS, SOTERO ESTENZO, TELESFORO LAPERA, GABRIEL LAZAGA, BONIFACIO SERMON, LEON MAHIDLAON, LORENZO CAMARIN, APOLINARIO URBANO, …

Leduna versus San Carlos Milling

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari with mandatory preliminary injunction filed by a group of laborers and employees of the San Carlos Milling Company against the company, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros Occidental, and the judge of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The company had sued the employees for ejectment from the free housing it had provided them, on the theory that by not returning to work they had ceased to be employees. The employees countered that they were on an unfair labor practice strike, and that the question of their employment status belonged exclusively to the Court of Industrial Relations. The case matters because it draws the boundary between the ordinary courts and the industrial court, and because it settles how a pending unfair labor practice case affects an ejectment suit that depends on the same employment relationship.

Procedural History

The company commenced the ejectment action in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental. The parties entered into a partial stipulation of facts. At the continuation of the hearing, neither the employees nor their counsel appeared, and the trial court, presided over by the respondent judge, rendered judgment for the company on the same date. The company then moved for immediate execution, which the court granted. The employees filed a verified motion for new trial, and later a motion for reconsideration grounded on a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations finding the company guilty of unfair labor practice. The trial court denied both motions. The employees then came to the Supreme Court on certiorari with a prayer for a mandatory preliminary injunction, which the Court issued upon the approval of the requisite bond.

Facts

The employees were laborers and employees of the company, and by reason of their employment they were assigned houses owned by the company, free from the payment of any rental. The privilege of free housing was lodged solely and exclusively with the manager. On April 12, 1956, the employees joined a strike declared by their union, the Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union, and from that date they ceased to work. An unfair labor practice case was filed against the company in the Court of Industrial Relations and was pending decision.

On June 21, 1957, the company sued the employees for ejectment, alleging that having voluntarily refrained from returning to their customary jobs, they had ceased to be employees and had forfeited their free housing privileges, and that despite demands they refused to vacate the houses, which the company needed for its other employees. The employees answered that the stoppage of work was temporary, that they had offered to return to work without prejudice to the outcome of the labor case, and that the labor case would fully resolve the issues raised in the ejectment suit.

The parties partially stipulated that the employees had ceased to work since April 12, 1956 by reason of the strike, that the dispute was pending before the Court of Industrial Relations, and that the employees remained in possession of the premises. At the hearing on March 3, 1958, neither the employees nor their counsel appeared, and the trial court rendered judgment for the company that same day. Counsel for the employees had received the notice of hearing in Cebu on February 26, 1958, and had sent a motion for postponement by air, which reached the clerk of court on March 3 at ten in the morning, after the case had already been disposed of at a quarter to nine. On April 30, 1958, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered its decision finding the company guilty of unfair labor practice and ordering it to reinstate the employees to their former positions under the same terms and conditions existing before the strike, and to pay their back wages.

Issues

• Whether or not certiorari was the proper remedy despite the availability of an appeal from the decision and orders of the trial court.
• Whether or not the decision of the trial court was already final and executory when the petition was filed.
• Whether or not the respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion for new trial and the motion for reconsideration.
• Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to decide the ejectment case notwithstanding the pending unfair labor practice case in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Applicable Provisions

Section 5, paragraph a, of Republic Act Number 875, the Industrial Peace Act, provides:

The Court of Industrial Relations shall have jurisdiction over the prevention of unfair labor practices, and the power to prevent unfair labor practices is exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement, code, law or otherwise.

This exclusivity is the pivot of the decision, because the employment status of the striking employees was a matter committed to the industrial court.

Section 5, paragraph d, of the same Act provides:

The Court shall have power to decide all incidental motions and all other matters relative to such dispute.

This confirms that the industrial court may resolve every question arising from the labor dispute, including the status of the strikers.

Section 5, paragraph e, of the same Act provides:

The Court shall have all the inherent power of a Court of Justice provided in Rule One hundred twenty four of the rules of court.

This supplies the procedural authority by which the industrial court exercises its exclusive jurisdiction.

Section 6 of the same Act provides:

An appeal from said decision shall not stay its effects and the person or persons named in the Court order shall meanwhile obey said order.

This means the reinstatement order of the industrial court carries immediate effect even while it is not yet final.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that certiorari was proper. The sheriff was already threatening to oust the employees from their dwellings when they filed notice of their intention to apply for the writ, and by the time the petition was filed they had already been ejected. In these circumstances, an appeal would not have afforded them a relief sufficiently adequate to remedy their extremely precarious condition.

On the second issue, the Court held that the decision of the trial court was not yet final and executory when the case was begun. The employees received a copy of the decision on March 29, 1958 and filed their motion for new trial ten days later. They received the order denying it on May 24, 1958 and filed their motion for reconsideration two days later. They received the order denying reconsideration on June 16, 1958 and commenced this case nine days later. At that time, only twenty-one days had elapsed of the reglementary period to appeal.

On the third issue, the Court held that the respondent judge should have granted the motion for new trial and the motion for reconsideration, and committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying both. Counsel had received the notice of hearing in Cebu only days before the hearing in Bacolod City, and had no reasonable opportunity to confer with his clients and their witnesses in San Carlos, Negros Occidental, and bring them to Bacolod City. Moreover, the answer raised a genuine issue on whether the employees remained in the employment of the company, an issue intimately related to the effect of the strike upon the employer-employee relationship, and that allegation could not be dismissed as fanciful and entirely unfounded, since an unfair labor practice charge had actually been filed and was pending decision.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that the main issue in the ejectment case, whether the employees had lost their status in relation to the company, depended mainly upon the outcome of the unfair labor practice case. The Court stressed that the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to prevent unfair labor practices is exclusive, and that in the exercise of such authority it may take affirmative action, including reinstatement of employees with or without backpay. Owing to the exclusive nature of this authority, its decision in proper cases would be binding upon the ordinary courts of justice and would prevail over their orders and determinations on the same matter. The respondent judge should therefore have deferred the disposition of the ejectment case until the decision in the unfair labor practice case had become final and executory. The lack of finality of that decision did not detract from its character as prima facie proof of the merits of the employees' claim, and under Section 6 an appeal would not stay its effects.

Doctrine

First, the power of the Court of Industrial Relations to prevent unfair labor practices is exclusive and is not affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention. Second, where the issue of whether strikers have lost their employment status depends on the outcome of a pending unfair labor practice case, the ordinary court should defer the disposition of a related ejectment suit until the labor case becomes final and executory. Third, a decision of the industrial court ordering reinstatement is prima facie proof of the merits of the employees' claim and, under Section 6, is not stayed by appeal. Fourth, certiorari may be availed of where an appeal would not afford a relief sufficiently adequate and speedy, as where the employees had already been ejected from their dwellings.

Disposition

The Court set aside the decision of the respondent judge dated March 3, 1958 and his orders of April 10, May 10 and June 7, 1958, with costs against the San Carlos Milling Company.

Remember This

Memorize the line that the power to prevent unfair labor practices is exclusive and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention, and that the industrial court's ruling on the employment status of strikers prevails over the ordinary courts. Examiners use this case on the boundary between the labor court and the regular courts, and on the propriety of certiorari where an appeal is inadequate.