CONSTANTINO LEDUNA, VICTORIO CAÑETE, FRANCISCO OLIVEROS, SOTERO ESTENZO, TELESFORO LAPERA, GABRIEL LAZAGA, BONIFACIO SERMON, LEON MAHIDLAON, LORENZO CAMARIN, APOLINARIO URBANO, …

This is a petition for certiorari with mandatory preliminary injunction. The prayer in the petition is

“* * * that upon the filing of the proper bond, a
writ of mandatory preliminary injunction be immediately issued ordering
the respondent Provincial Sheriff to reinstate at once the petitioners
to the possession of the houses from which they were forcibly and
unlawfully ejected; and after due notice and hearing, a decision be
rendered ordering His Honor, the respondent Judge Eduardo D. Enriquez,
to dismiss Civil Case No. 4449 before his Court, entitled San Carlos
Milling Company, Ltd. versus Constantino Leduna, et als., for
lack of jurisdiction, and to set aside his decision rendered therein;
and ordering the respondent San Carlos Milling Company, Ltd. to pay the
costs of this proceeding.

“Petitioners further pray for such
other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Supreme Court may deem
just and equitable in the premises.”

Sometime after the filing of the petition and upon the submission
and approval of the requisite bond, we issued the writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction prayed for.

On June 21,1957, respondent San Carlos Milling Company, Ltd.,
hereinafter referred to as the company, sued the herein petitioners,
hereinafter referred to as the employees, in the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental—Civil Case No. 4449 of said court—for
ejectment, upon the ground that “having voluntarily refrained from
returning to their customary jobs and employment” as laborers and
employees of the company, said petitioners had “ceased to be employees”
thereof and automatically forfeited their jobs therein, as well as all
their privileges as company employees, including the free housing
privileges given to the latter, and that, despite repeated demands,
they had refused to vacate the houses occupied by them as former
employees of the company, which needs such houses for its other
employees and laborers.

In their answer dated August 5, 1957, the employees alleged that the
stoppage of their work was merely temporary, it being due to an unfair
labor practice strike declared on April 12, 1956, by the Philippine
Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) of which they are members, against
the company, and for which unfair labor practice Case No. 3-ULP-Iloilo
was filed against the latter in the Court of Industrial Relations in
which it was then pending decision; that they were still employees of
the company, which refused to accept the offer made by them at the
early stage of said strike, to return to their respective work, without
prejudice to the final outcome of said labor case; and that the
decision therein would fully resolve the issues raised in the ejectment
case.

On December 27, 1957, the parties therein partially stipulated:

“1. That plaintiff is a foreign corporation duly
licensed and permitted to do business in the Philippines, with offices
in Manila and operating a sugar central at San Carlos, Negros
Occidental;

“2. That defendants were employees of the
plaintiff company, and at the time of their employment they were
assigned and provided houses by the said company free from payment of
any rental, the prerogative of ascertaining to whom to grant the
privilege of free housing being lodged solely and exclusively with the
Manager. The houses occupied by the defendants are those indicated in
paragraph 2 of the complaint;

3. That since April 12, 1956,
the defendants have ceased to work with the plaintiff company by reason
of the fact that on the said date they joined in the strike declared by
the Philippine Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU) of which herein
defendants are members. The said dispute is presently pending before
the Court of Industrial Relations in CIR Case No. 3-ULP-Iloilo, and the
issues raised therein are still pending decision by said court up to
the present time;

“4. That up to the present moment, the said defendants have remained in possession of the said premises.”

subject to the right to introduce evidence on other facts pertinent
to said ejectment case. At the continuation of the hearing thereof, on
March 3, 1958, neither the employees, nor their counsel, appeared,
whereupon, the company presented its evidence, and the court, presided
over by respondent Judge, rendered judgment, on the same date, for the
company. Alleging that no appeal had been taken by the employees, and
that further delay in their ejectment would work undue prejudice and
damage to the company, the same moved on April 2, 1958, for the
immediate execution of said decision. This motion was granted by an
order dated April 10, 1958, upon the ground that said decision was
already final and executory.

Meanwhile, or on April 8, 1958, the defendants had filed a verified
motion for new trial, supported by an affidavit of merit, stating, inter alia,
that, on February 26, 1958, counsel for the employees had received, in
the City of Cebu, the notice of the hearing scheduled for March 3;
that, considering that his clients and their witnesses were in San
Carlos, Negros Occidental, it was next to impossible for him to contact
and then bring them to Bacolod City, for the hearing on March 3, 1958;
that four (4) days before March 3, 1958, said counsel had forwarded, via
the Philippine Air Lines, as per Airways Bill No. P-072597, dated
February 27, 1958, a motion for postponement, which was not acted upon,
it having been received by the clerk of court on March 3, at 10:00
a.m., after the case had been “disposed of at 8:45 o’clock in the
morning; that the failure of said counsel to appear at the hearing on
said date was due to mistake or excusable negligence, which ordinary
prudence could not have guarded against; and that the decision, copy of
which was received by said counsel on March 29, 1958, is not supported
by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law, for (1) it held that the
employees had “ceased to be employees” of the company, although the
partial stipulation of facts merely stated that they had “ceased to
work”, (2) it interferes with the right of the employees to strike, and
(3) respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the case in view of the
provisions of the Industrial Peace Act.

Subsequently, or on April 12, 1958, the company moved that said
order of April 10, 1958, be rectified by basing the same upon section
2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, not upon the alleged finality of the
decision, which was not as yet a fact. Indeed, invoking this ground,
the employees moved, on April 25, 1958, for the lifting of said order
of April 10, 1958. By two (2) orders dated May 10, 1958, respondent
Judge amended its order of April 10, as prayed for by the company, and
denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial. Copies of these orders
were allegedly received, on May 24, 1958, by the employees, who, on May
26, 1958, sought a reconsideration of the order denying the new trial,
for the reason, among others, that on April 30, 1958, the Court of
Industrial Relations had rendered, in the unfair labor practice case, a
decision finding the company guilty of such practice and ordering it to
“immediately reinstate” the employees to their “former positions under
the same terms and conditions existing before the strike” and “to pay
their back wages from April 27, 1956, when they offered to return to
work * * *.” This motion was denied by an order dated June 7, 1958,
copy of which was received by the employees on June 16, 1958.
Meanwhile, or on May 14, 1958, the clerk of court had issued a writ of
execution, which was followed, on June 9, 1958, by an alias
writ of execution, in compliance with which the provincial sheriff of
Negros Occidental was about to eject the employees from the houses
respectively occupied by them, despite the fact that he had been
advised of the notice filed by them with the lower court of their
intention to petition the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari with
preliminary injunction. Hence, the present case was instituted on June
25, 1958, against respondent Judge, the Provincial Sheriff of Negros
Occidental, and the company.

Respondents allege in their answer, dated July 22, 1958, that the
decision in the ejectment case is already final and executory, no
appeal therefrom having been taken within the reglementary period,
although they could have done so; that inasmuch as the employees could
have appealed from said decision, the writ of certiorari herein sought
may not be availed of by them; that the reasons adduced in support of
their motions for new trial and reconsideration in the ejectment case
are not sufficient to warrant said reliefs; that the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations finding the company guilty of unfair
labor practices is not as yet final, it being still under review by the
Court of Industrial Relations sitting en banc; that said
decision cannot override the decision in the ejectment case, which is
already final and executory; and that the employees have already been
ejected from their respective houses, pursuant to the decision of
respondent Judge, and the writ of execution aforementioned, so that
there is nothing else to be enjoined from respondents herein.

With respect to the last defense, suffice it to note that the
auxiliary writ prayed for by the employees and issued by this Court was
not an ordinary writ of preliminary injunction, but a writ of mandatory
preliminary injunction “to immediately reinstate” said employees in
“the possession of the houses from which they were ejected” in
consequence of the proceedings in the aforementioned ejectment case.

As regards the possibility of appealing from the decision and the
orders complained of to correct such errors as may have been committed
therein, it should be noted that the respondent sheriff was threatening
to oust the employees from their respective dwellings, when they filed
notice of their intention to apply for a writ of certiorari to annul
said decision and orders. What is more, when the petition for such writ
was filed with this Court, the employees had already been ejected from
the houses occupied by them. In these circumstances, an appeal would
not have afforded them a relief sufficiently adequate to remedy their
extremely precarious condition.

Needless to say, the decision of respondent Judge was not final and
executory when the case at bar was begun. Copy of said decision was
received by the employees on March 29, 1958, and ten (10) days later,
or on April 8, 1958, they filed a motion for new trial. Copy of the
order of May 10, 1958, denying the same, was received by the employees
on May 24, 1958, and two (2) days later, they filed a motion for
reconsideration, invoking the decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations. Copy of the order of June 7, 1958 denying such motion for
reconsideration was received by the employees on June 16, whereas this
case was commenced nine (9) days later, or on June 25, 1958. At that
time, only twenty-one (21) days had elapsed, therefore, of the
reglementary period to appeal from the aforementioned decision.

Upon the other hand, respondent Judge should have granted the motion
for new trial and the subsequent motion for reconsideration filed by
the employees and committed a grave abuse of discretion when he denied
both motions. To begin with, having received in Cebu on February 26,
1958, the notice of the hearing scheduled for March 3, 1958, in Bacolod
City, counsel for the employees had not had a reasonable opportunity to
confer with his clients and their witnesses in San Carlos, Negros
Occidental, where they reside, and then bring them to Bacolod City for
said hearing.

Secondly, there were sufficient allegations in the answer filed by
the employees to show that there was an issue on whether they remained
in the employment of the company or not; that this issue was intimately
related to, if not absolutely dependent upon, the effect, upon the
employer-employee relationship admittedly existing prior thereto
between the parties, of the strike called by the employees by reason of
unfair labor practices allegedly indulged in by the company; and that
this allegation could not be readily dismissed as fanciful and entirely
unfounded, inasmuch as a charge of the information for unfair labor
practice had actuality been filed against the company, and was then
pending decision, in the Court of Industrial Relations.

Respondent Judge should have realized that the power of the Court of
Industrial Relations to prevent unfair labor practices is “exclusive
and shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by an agreement, code,
law or otherwise” (Sec. 5 [a], Rep. Act No. 875); that in the exercise of such authority, the Court of Industrial Relations “shall have all the inherent power of a Court of Justice
provided in Rule One hundred twenty four of the rules of court” (Sec. 5
[e], Rep. Act No. 875), and the power to decide “all incidental
motions”, and “all other matters relative to such dispute” (Sec. 5 [d],
Rep. Act No. 875), as well as to “take such affirmative action as will
effectuate the policies” of the Industrial Peace Act, “including (but
not limited to) reinstatement of employees with or without backpay”;
that the Court of Industrial Relations had, accordingly, the
“exclusive” authority to determine whether or not the company was
guilty of unfair labor practices and whether the strike called by
reason thereof was justified or not, as well as whether the employees
who took part in the strike have lost their jobs in consequence thereof
or are entitled to retain such jobs, or if they have been dismissed, to
be reinstated, “with or without backpay”; and that, owing to the
“exclusive” nature of this authority of the Court of Industrial
Relations, its decision thereon, in proper cases, would be binding upon
the ordinary courts of justice and would prevail over the orders and
determinations of the latter on the same matter.

In other words, the main issue in the ejectment case—whether the
employees had lost that status in relation to the company—depended
mainly upon the outcome of the unfair labor practice case in the Court
of Industrial Relations. Hence, respondent Judge should
have—particularly after the rendition of the decision of said court,
finding the company guilty of the charge of unfair labor practice and
ordering the reinstatement pf the employees concerned, with backpay—not
only granted their motion for new trial and their subsequent motion for
reconsideration, but, also, deferred the disposition of the ejectment
case until after the decision in the unfair labor practice case shall
have become final and executory.

Again, apart from the circumstances that the lack of finality of
such decision in the unfair labor practice case— owing to the motion
for reconsideration then pending before the Court of Industrial
Relations sitting en banc—does not detract from its character as prima facie
proof of the merits of the claim of the employees, respondent Judge,
likewise, overlooked the fact that an appeal from said decision “shall
not stay” its effects and that “the person or persons named in the
Court order shall meanwhile obey said order” (Sec. 6, Rep. Act No.
875). In short, the Court of Industrial Relations may require
compliance with, or the execution of, the order of reinstatement
contained in its decision, even though the same is not as yet final and
executory.

Wherefore, the decision of respondent Judge dated March 3, 1958, and
his orders of April 10, May 10 and June 7, 1958, are hereby set aside,
with costs against respondent San Carlos Milling Company, Ltd. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.
Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.