POLICARPIO CASTRO AND NATALIA DY CASTRO, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ENRIQUE A. AGANA, SR., JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL, PASAY CITY, AND VIMAR…

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of prelimi­nary injunction, the
petitioners-spouses Policarpio Castro and Natalia Dy Castro seek to set
aside as having been issued with grave abuse of discre­tion amounting to lack
of or in excess of jurisdiction the Court of Appeals’ decision of June 3, 1977
and the resolution of September 1, 1977 in CA-G.R.
No. SP-06276, denying a petition for certiorari and mandamus on
the ground that the respondent court of first instance did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it refused to give due course to an appeal filed out
of time.

On May 10, 1976, private respondent Vimarco
Incorporated filed a complaint against the petitioners for a sum of money
with damages with a petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment.  The complaint alleged, among others, that on
March 25 and 27, 1976, the petitioners, through deceit and misrepresentation
obtained from the private respon­dent two (2) separate amounts of P200,000.00
and P50,000.00, respectively, for the purpose of purchasing rescada
copra which the petitioners jointly undertook to deliver on April 4 and 10,
1976 at the bodega of Cheng Ban Yek Company located
at San Juan, Rizal or at any other place designated
by the private respondent’s representative; that the petitioners were able to deliver P23,299.28 worth of copra only, thereby leaving a balance of P226,700.72 which the petitioners have failed and refused to
deliver after misappropriating the money entrusted to them for that purpose;
that due to said unjustified and malicious refusal by the petitioners to
deliver the full quan­tity of copra agreed upon or to return the amount of
P226,700.72, the private respondent was not able to comply with its contract
with Cheng Ban Yek Company for the delivery of 275,000 kilos of copra thereby failing to realize a
profit in the amount of P20,000.00 from the transaction in question and; that
the petitioners should be made to pay exemplary damages in an amount to be
determined by the trial court and 25% of the amount due under the two contracts
as attorney’s fees.

On May 28,
1976, the respondent
judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City, issued an ex–parte
order granting the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment.

On June 25,
1976, the
petitioners filed a motion to dissolve the aforesaid writ.  The private respon­dent filed its opposition
thereto.

On July 19,
1976, the
petitioners filed their answer with counterclaim.

On September
29, 1976, the
private respondent filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings in view of the
petitioners’ alleged admission of the material allegations of the
complaint.  The petitioners filed their
opposition thereto and a counter-motion to admit their amended answer.

On October
13, 1976, the
respondent Court of First Instance issued an order granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings in a decision with the following dispositive
portion:

“WHEREFORE, the opposition to the motion for judgment on the
pleadings and counter motion to admit amended answer with counterclaim filed by
the defendants is hereby denied for lack of merit and judgment on the pleadings
is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants
sentencing the latter to pay the former the sum of P208,700.72 which is the
difference after deduct­ing the partial payments in the total sum of P41,299.28
of the original indebtedness of the defendants in the amount of P250,000.00
with interest at the legal rate of 12% from May 19, 1976 until the same is
fully paid, plus attorney’s fees in the sum equivalent to 25% of the principal
amount pursuant to the provisions of the written con­tracts, Annexes A and B of
the complaint, and the costs of this suit.”

Without filing a motion
for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision, the
petitioners, on November 26, 1976, filed their notice of appeal, appeal bond,
and record on appeal.  On December 17,
1976, the Court of First Instance denied the appeal on the ground that the same
was not perfected within the reglementary period
because, as per certifica­tion issued by the Postmaster of Quezon
Capitol, Quezon Province, and the corresponding
return card, Registered Letter No. 7184 addressed to Edmundo
T. Zepeda, Lucena City (counsel for the petitioners),
a copy of the decision was received by a certain Ruby Arriola,
office clerk of Attorney Zepeda on October 26, 1976 at 4:50 p.m.

On January
20, 1977, the
petitioners filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus with prelimi­nary
injunction with the Court of Appeals alleging that the lower court gravely
abused its discretion in denying their appeal because it was on October 27, and
not October 26, 1976 as ruled by the trial court, when the defendants received the notice
of the decision.

On June 3,
1977, the Court of
Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition holding that the
petitioners’ appeal was filed one day late and, therefore, the court a quo
could not be said to have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same.

Reconsideration of the decision was sought by the petitioners but
the Court of Appeals denied the motion.

Hence,
this petition for certiorari and mandamus.

The only issue raised is whether or not the Court of Appeals
issued its decision with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction when it denied a petition for certiorari and mandamus
filed by the petitioners.

As a general rule, our policy in this Court towards invocation of
the right to appeal has been one of liberality. 
(Delas Alas v. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 201).

As a matter of fact, the instant petition itself was denied on December 9, 1977
for having been filed late and for late payment of legal fees.  The last day for filing the petition and
paying the fees was September 28, 1977.  The petition was filed and the fees paid only on December 5, 1977. 
Nevertheless, this Court reconsidered the resolution and eventually gave
due course to the petition upon pleas that justice would thereby be served.

An appeal is an essential
part of our judicial system.  We have advised the courts to proceed
with caution so as not to deprive
a party of the right to appeal
(National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, 97 SCRA 138) and ins­tructed
that every party-litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the
proper and just dis­position of his cause, freed from the constraints of
technicalities (A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
590).

The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very
rigid and technical sense.  The rules of
procedure are used only to help secure not override substantial justice.  (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 120). 
Therefore, we ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals (83 SCRA 453) that a six-day delay in the perfection of the
appeal does not warrant its
dismissal.  And again in Ramos
v. Bagasao (96
SCRA 395), this Court held that the delay of four (4)
days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension of time to file a
record on appeal can be excused on the basis of equity.

Where the interests of justice would not be served by a policy of
liberality, however, we cannot cite a lower court as having acted with grave
abuse of discretion simply because it has correctly but strictly applied the
rules.  In the instant case, the decision
of the respondent court is supported by the records.  A remand for further proceedings, therefore,
would only result in needless delays – a
few more years perhaps of
a tortuous journey through new
proceedings in the trial court, an intermediate appeal, and another resort to
this Court through a petition for review to finally achieve the same result which is an order to pay
an admitted indebtedness.

The complaint filed by
the private respondent stated that the petitioners secured two separate amounts
of P200,000.00 and P50,000.00 to buy rescada copra for delivery to Cheng Ban Yek
Company but after delivering only P23,299.28 worth of copra, misappropriated
the rest of the money given to them.

The answer of the petitioners admitted the receipt of the amounts alleged in the complaint but
denied that they were received through fraud and misrepresentation.  The couple admitted that they were indebted
in the amount of P200,000.00 to Mr. Victor Tiu Laurel, that the debt was subject to liquidation
through monthly installments of P2,000.00 each and that they had already paid
nine installments.  The petitioners also
questioned March 26, 1976
as the date of receipt, saying they did not receive the money on that date.

The petitioners likewise admitted the second indebtedness of P50,000.00 in their answer. 
They averred, however, that the real contract between them executed on
the same date was a loan for
copra to be delivered to Vimarco, Inc., that it expressly states the date of
execution and date of expiration, the amount of copra to be delivered, as well
as the agreed price thereof and that the document was signed by the
representatives of the plaintiff and of the defendant.

The petitioners averred in their answer that they had been
transacting business for several years without any conflict or disagreement
through the founder and actual manager, Mr. Victor Tiu
Laurel and that in practice, deliveries of copra were made and accepted even
after the lapse of the agreed period.  In
connection with the petition for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary attachment and the motion to dissolve the writ
which had been issued, the parties also submitted various documents and other
evidences.

As earlier stated, private respondent Vimarco,
Inc. filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings on September 29, 1976.  Acting upon this
motion and the opposition thereto, the trial court rendered the deci­sion which
was later appealed to the Court
of Appeals but one day late.

The decision of the court of first instance states:

“Upon a further perusal of the record, the Court finds it
undisputed that the defendants-spouses received from, and are indebted to, the
plain­tiff in the sums of P200,000.00 and P50,000.00,
respectively, for which the defendants, in their answer, ad­mitted being liable
to the plaintiff although they claim they have already made partial payments to
the latter, i.e. P18,000.00 of the P200,000.00 and P23,299.28 of the
P50,000.00.  The partial payments made by the defen­dants to
the plaintiff is a clear proof by itself that the monetary obligations
by the former to the lat­ter under Annexes A and B of the complaint are already
due and demand­able.  Granting, arguendo, that the real agreement between the parties with
respect to the P50,000.00 is that which is covered by
Annex 1 of the answer and not Annex B of the complaint, none­theless, it
appears that even under the document marked as Annex 1 of the answer, the
defendants were already liable to the plaintiff as of April 13, 1976 at which
date they were already in mora.  And on the
matter of the P200,000.00, granting again, for the sake of arguments, the claim
of the defendants that they did not receive the said amount from the plaintiff
on March 26, 1976 as per Annex A of the complaint to be true, the fact remains,
as admitted by the defendants in their answer, that at one time or another they
received the said amount from the plaintiff for which, equity and law demand,
they should restitute to the plaintiff now that it has already become due and
demandable.  Moreover, it is seriously
doubted whether the defendants can question the genuineness and due execution
of the document marked as Annex A of the complaint in view of their failure to make a specific denial thereof under oath
as required by the rules.

“From the foregoing, its quite clear that the plaintiff is entitled to a judgment
on the pleadings considering that the answer of the defendants fails to tender
an issue and/or otherwise admits the material allegation of the complaint.  That the defendants have made partial
payments of their obligation and are, thereof, entitled to be credited therefor is a matter which is not so material as to
necessitate the tedious process of going into trial.  Suffice it to state that from the records,
the plaintiff has not disputed said partial payments allegedly made to it by
the defendants such that the same may be conceded in favor of the latter.”

xxxx               xxxx                 xxxx

In resolving the special
civil action for certiorari and mandamus, the Court of Appeals
limited itself to the question of whether or not the petitioners perfected
their appeal on time.  It ruled inter alia:

xxxx               xxxx                 xxxx

Decisive here is the question of whether petitioners perfected
their appeal on time.  For if not, the
other points raised – whether the court committed a grave abuse of discretion
in issuing the writ of attachment and refusing to act on petitioners’ motion to
dissolve the same – become, so to speak, so much, ‘water under the bridge’.  In support of his allegation that his law
office received the copy of the decision on October 27, 1976, not on October
26th, petitioners’ counsel submitted an affidavit of his office-clerk, Ruby Ariola, wherein the latter states that he received the
registered mail containing the copy of the decision on that date, October 27,
1976.  And in apparent attempt to bolster
Ariola’s claim, he (counsel) called the court’s
attention to the Record Book of the Postmaster of Lucena
City (Annex ‘AA’; Petition; Annex ‘B’, Answer to the Petition) observing that
from the naked eye ‘the number ‘6’ appears to be not only re-written but
also heavily indented and appear­ing to cover ‘the number ‘7’, the top portion
of which can still be seen.’ He, therefore, deduces or suspects that there was some tampering with the
date.  By whom, he did not say but it is
apparent that he means the Postmaster or one of the latter’s employees.  But this is pure specula­tion or conjectures;
in fact, he failed to present a single piece of concrete or solid evidence in
support of his suspicion.  Ariola’s affidavit is, of course, of no account being
self-serving.  Anyway, anent the
particular point, the Postmaster, on December
7, 1976, issued the following Certification (Annex ‘A’, Answer to the Petition):

“‘TO WHOM IT MAY
CONCERN:

“Our record shows that Registered Letter No. 7184 addressed to
Atty. EDMUNDO ZEPEDA, Lucena City
from CFI, Branch 28, Pasay City
was deli­vered to his authorized repre­sentative RUBY ARIOLA
on October 26, 1976 at 4:50 p.m.

“Issued and signed by me this 7th day of December, 1976, Lucena City.

(SGD.) EMILIO M. MATAYA

Postmaster

Quezon
Capitol, Quezon‘

“What is more, in the course of the oral hearing of the case
before this Court, petitioners admitted that they cannot conceive of any reason
or motive why the Postmaster of Lucena City would
attempt to tamper or alter their re­cords. 
In any event, we fully agree with the following comment of private
respondents in their Answer:

“‘Petitioners’ insinuation that there was tampering of the
date October 26, 1976 is not
only irresponsible and reckless but one characterized by malice and bad faith,
as it tends to cast aspersion on the integrity and reputation of the Postmaster
in Lucena City and his receiving clerk as well as of
counsel for respondent Vimarco, Inc.  Said insinuation of tampering is a desperate
effort on the part of counsel for Petitioners to gain one more day to preserve
their right to appeal, which had been lost through their own inexcusable
neglect.  That a copy of the decision dated
October 13, 1976 was received by Petitioners through their counsel on October
26, 1976 and not on October 27, 1976 as they would like this Court to believe,
is clearly shown by the following:

“a.   The certification of the Postmaster of Lucena City dated December 7, 1976 and hereto attached and
marked as Annex ‘A’ shows beyond doubt that Petitioners received through
counsel a copy of the decision of the Court dated October 13, 1976 on October
26, 1976.  Under Section 5 of Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court, there is a presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.

“b.   Even without said presumption, the Record
Book of the Office of the Postmaster in Lucena City,
indubitably indi­cates the different entries made therein which show that at 4:50
in the afternoon of October 26, 1976 the following papers were received by
their respective addressees or their agents:

“A xerox
copy of said leaf of the Record Book of the Office of the Postmaster of Lucena City is hereto attached and marked as Annex ‘B’
(This is Annex AA of the Petition).

“If it is true as claimed by Petitioners through counsel that
the date regarding the receipt of a copy of the decision under Regis­try
Receipt No. 7184 was tampered with in such a way that instead of appearing as
October 27, 1976 it was made to appear as October 26, 1976, how can Petitioners
account for the three (3) subsequent entries which were all dated October 26,
1976?  Even the last two (2) entries
reveal that the date was October 26,
1976 and definitely not October
27, 1976.

“c.   The Postmaster at Lucena City
will testify to the effect that interested parties pressed upon him to change
the date of receipt of the decision dated October 13, 1976 from October 26, 1976 to October 27, 1976 but the former, fully aware of the
criminal consequences of such an illegal act, stoutly refused to do so.

“With the above, it becomes crystal clear that Petitioners
through counsel have come to this Court with unclean hands and if for this
alone, they do not deserve to obtain relief
from the adverse effects of their own inexcusable neglect.’

“From the foregoing therefore, it is clear that petitioners’
appeal here was filed one day late, hence, the Court a quo could not be said to
have committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the same.”

xxx          
                      xxx                               xxx

For the petitioners to show that the Court of Appeals also acted with grave abuse of discretion
in not finding a grave abuse of
discretion in the acts of the trial court, there has to be a showing likewise
of substantial justice having been denied them. 
Non-compliance with the rules on the filing of an appeal can be condoned
only if the greater interests of
justice would thereby be served.  In the
instant case, a relaxing of the rules would result only in the continued
delayed payment of an admitted indebtedness already many years overdue.  The facts and equities of the case lean
strongly in favor of the private respondent.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and mandamus
is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.  The temporary restraining orders dated
January 27, 1978 and November 7, 1979 are SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, and Relova, JJ., concur.

Vasquez, J., on leave.