FORTUNATO RECENTES, BENJAMIN DE GRACIA AND RAMONA MERCED, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, BRANCH I, PRESIDED BY HON. DIMALANES E. BUISSAN, AND C…

Petition to set aside several orders issued in Civil Case No.
2080 of the defunct Court of First Instance of Zamboanga
del Norte, namely the orders of June 13, 1974 (Annex L), July 5, 1974 (Annex
M), January 9, 1975 (Annex O), February 21, 1975 (Annex Q) and March 31, 1975
(Annex S) which are described below.

Concepcion V. Zosa filed a
complaint dated September 8, 1970, in the CFI of Zamboanga
del Sur (Civil Case No. 2080) against Fortunato Recentes, Benjamin de Gracia and Ramona Merced for accounting and payment of
money alleged to be due to her as their partner in Zamboanga
Ports Terminal and Arrastre Service.  The answer alleged that proper accounting and
payment had already been made.

Two years after issues had
been joined but the case still unterminated, Zosa asked the Court to appoint Ramona Merced as receiver
of the partnership.  She alleged that the
assets of the partnership were being squandered by mismanagement.  The court, thru Judge Onofre
Abalos, appointed Merced as receiver and she qualified.

Subsequently, Fortunato Recentes and Benjamin de Gracia
filed a motion to annul and dissolve
the receivership.  Reason given:  the partnership was no longer in existence
because its term of ten years expired in 1967.

Judge Rafael T. Mendoza, granted the motion. 
However, Judge Dimalanes B. Buissan who succeeded Judge Mendoza reconsidered the
latter’s action by reinstating the receivership in his order dated June 6,
1974.

In the order dated June 13,
1974 (Annex L),
Judge Buissan explained why he reinstated the
receivership:

“The order of Honorable Judge Mendoza terminating the
receivership appears to be premised on the fact that the partnership known as
the Zamboanga Ports Terminal and Arrastre
Service has automatically been dissolved after the termination of its ten-year
existence provided for in the partnership disregarding the fact that, after the
termination of the ten-year period from January 1967, the defendants Recentes and de Gracia and the
treasurer of the partnership never rendered an accounting for the purpose of
dissolving the partnership even up to the present, so that ordinarily the
partnership still continuously exists as usual. 
However, defendants de Gracia and Recentes formed another partnership known as the Zamboanga Ports Arrastre and
Stevedoring Service and continued the business that was conducted by the former
partnership.  This is shown by the fact
that the last partnership is doing business with the clientele of the old
partnership.  It should be noted also
that only plaintiff Concepcion Zosa
was not included in the so-called new partnership.

xxx                               xxx                            xxx

“The movant failed to consider the
fact that while the existence of the former partnership may have been already
terminated, its existence as such partnership with respect to its members and
third-parties who may have interest therein, is not terminated until the
officers who are defendants in this case, and who were charged by law to make
the necessary accounting and liquidation for the purpose of terminating the
previous partnership shall comply with the requisites
of the law.”

The order dated July 5,
1974 (Annex M), directed that:

“x x x the
management and operation of the partnership will remain with the officers of
said partnership and that Ramona Merced as receiver will only receive the net
profit of the partnership and to keep each income, account for them when
required by this court until such time as the same will be distributed to those
who may be entitled to it.”

The order dated January
9, 1975 (Annex O), reiterated the order dated July 5, 1974.

The order dated February
21, 1975 (Annex Q), directed the defendants and Ramona Merced, the
receiver, to submit an accounting of the partnership affairs under pain of
contempt.

And the order of March
31, 1975 (Annex S),
reiterated the previous orders.

The issue in this case is
simple:  Was there lack of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of the
questioned orders?  The answer is equally simple:  No.

Art. 1829 of the Civil Code stipulates:

“Art. 1829. 
On dissolution the partnership is not terminated, but continues
until the winding up of partnership affairs is completed.”

Obviously, all the questioned orders are intended to wind up the partnership affairs in an orderly manner
and to protect the interest of the plaintiff who is the private respondent in
this case.  The respondent judge not only
had jurisdiction to issue the orders, he also acted prudently in the premises.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby denied for lack of
merit.  Costs against
the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar, (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Guerrero, and Escolin,
JJ., concur.

De Castro, J., on sick leave.