SOFIA L. ENRIQUEZ, PETITIONER, VS. WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION AND PHILIP­PINE GLOVES COMPANY, RESPONDENTS.

Petition for review on certiorari of the January 8, 1976 decision
of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, filed by petitioner in forma pauperis.

On March 21, 1975, petitioner filed a claim for compensation with
the Department of Labor, Regional Office No. IV for kidney ailment
(nephrectomy, right kidney), claiming that the date of illness was June 16,
1965 and that she stopped working by reason thereof sometime in 1973 (p. 51,
WCC rec.).  It appears that by reason of
her illness, she underwent surgery for the removal of her infected right kidney
(nephrectomy).

On October 30, 1975, the Acting Referee rendered a decision
ordering respondent employer to pay petitioner the amount of Three Thousand
Four Hundred Eleven Pesos and Twenty Centavos (P3,411.20) as compensation
benefits under Section 18 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended.  The said award was based on the following
findings of the Acting Referee:

“Record and evidence disclose that sometime in 1960, the
herein claimant, SOFIA L. ENRIQUEZ, started working with the PHILIPPINE GLOVES
COMPANY, as Seamstress, working 8 hours a day for seven days a week.  In the course of her employment, particularly
in June, 1965, she became gravely ill and was confined at V. Luna General
Hospital.  Upon examination by Dr. Romeo
B. Atienza, she was found to be afflicted with kidney Pyonephrosis and for
which she underwent surgery for the removal of said infected kidney.

“Premised on the foregoing environmental facts, claimant now
seeks to recover sickness benefits under the Workmen’s Com­pensation Act.  Respondent controverted claimant’s right to
compen­sation on the ground that the alleged illness is not service-connected.

“After a careful examination of the records, we are convinced
that the claimant has made out a good case. 
Claimant was in good health when she
started her employment.  In the
course thereof, she was afflicted with kidney trouble.  We are inclined to believe that said ailment
resulted from the nature of her employment and was aggravated by the same. 
This theory is confirmed by Dr. Santos Tomacruz in the physician’s
report executed by him.  Moreover, the
law and jurisprudence presume causation or aggravation.  As held:

‘The precise medical causation of the illness is not significant,
as long as the illness supervened in the course of employment.  The presumption of causation and aggravation
then applies.  x x x The burden to
overthrow the pre­sumption and to disconnect, by substantial evidence, the
injury or sickness from employment, is laid by the statute at the door of the
employer.  x x x (Lourdes vda. de
Magalona vs. WCC, et al., G.R. No. L-21849, Dec. 11, 1967).’

“Respondent failed to present substantial evidence to
overthrow this presumption, warranting an award of compensation.

“Under Section 18 of the Act, claimant is entitled to 50% of
her average weekly wage for the number of weeks specified therein she having
suffered 50% NSD per find­ings by our Medical Rating Officer.  Her average weekly wage P67.90 and 50% of
which is P32.80 for 104 weeks, claimant is entitled to P3,411.20.”

Thereafter, respondent employer sought reconsideration of the
Award; but the same was denied on November 28, 1975 for lack of merit.  However, pursuant to Section 4, Rule 19 of
the Rules of the Workmen’s Compensation Commission, the entire records of the
case were elevated to the Commission for review.

On January 8, 1976, the respondent Commission, although affirming
the basic factual foundation of the compensation claim, thus:

“The records of this case dis­close that claimant was employed
by the respondent as a seamstress with a daily wage of P9.70, work­ing 8 hours
(a day) for seven (7) days a week.  On
June 16, 1965 [she] suffered from a kidney ail­ment diagnosed as ‘Calculus
Pyone­phrosis Rt. Kidney’ and a nephrec­tomy was performed.  She was confined at the V. Luna General
Hospital for 24 days only and continued working thereafter.  On March 21, 1975 she filed a claim for
disability compensation against respondent for her illness on June 16, 1965 and
by reason of which she allegedly stopped work­ing on September 11, 1973.”,

nevertheless, reversed the award
reasoning that – –

“x x While there is evidence to show that claimant was
operated on for the removal of her right kidney in June, 1965 there is no
showing that she was incapacitated for labor by reason thereof.  On the contrary she continued working until
she was terminated by the respondent for abandonment of her work.  Claimant alleged that she was separated by
the respondent by reason of her ailment on September 11, 1973.  However, she failed to establish her alleged
incapacity for work by proof of medical treatment.  The Physician’s report which she offered in
evidence is for her treatment by Dr. Santos Tomacruz on March 1, 1975 which is
almost two (2) years from the time she stopped working and is inadmissible in
evidence.  For, grant­ing that she was
sick on March 1, 1975, the same is no longer traceable to her former
employment.  Since there is no showing
that claimant was disabled for labor prior to or at the time of her separation
from her employment, the Acting Referee below committed a reversible error in
granting dis­ability benefits to claimant.”

Hence, this petition, which WE subsequently treated as a special
civil action.

WE reverse.

Respondent Commission’s peremptory reversal of the Acting
Referee’s Award constitutes a grave abuse of discretion as it is patently
contrary to and in clear disregard of the prevailing jurisprudence on Workmen’s
Compensation and of the evidence on record.

1. There is no dispute that petitioner’s claim for compensation is
anchored on her kidney ailment which supervened in the course of her employment
with respondent employer or in June, 1965 (pp. 32, 51, 53, 58-61, WCC
rec.); that, as shown by petitioner’s clinical records, said kidney ailment
necessitated her confinement, at the V. Luna Medical Center, Quezon City on June
16, 1965 and her subsequent surgery (nephrectomy) at the same hospital on June
24, 1965, for the removal of her infected right kidney; that said surgery
incapacitated her from work for twenty-four days; that thereafter, petitioner
was able to resume her work with respondent employer; and that subsequently, or
sometime in 1973, the exact date of which is not clear from the records,
petitioner stopped working.

2. Prescinding from the above undisputed facts, it is clear, as
correctly held by the Acting Referee, that petitioner enjoys the presumption of
compensability which arises when, as in this case, the illness, basis of the
compensation claim, supervened in the course of employment.  Consequently, contrary to the reversal order
of respondent Commission, there was no need for petitioner to establish by
evidence her disability by reason of her illness — as long as the presumption
is not destroyed by respondent employer. 
For as We enunciated in Paraiso vs. Castelo-Sotto (85 SCRA 419 [1978]),
citing Cañonero vs. WCC (81 SCRA 712, 717­-718 [1978]) and Santos vs. WCC (75
SCRA 365 [1977]), the respondent Commission in going against the doctrine of
presumption of compensability “proceeds from the wrong premise that, under
the obtaining facts, the (claimant) has still the burden, to show by substan­tial
evidence that she was incapacitated from labor by reason of her illnesses.  WE have ruled that that is a patent
distortion of the burden of proof applicable to cases where, as in this case,
the presumption of compensability had already set in.  Because once an illness, subject matter of a
compensation claim, is shown to have supervened in the course of employment, as
is the situation here, there arises in favor of the claimant the rebuttable
presumption that the said ill­ness either arose out of, or at least was
aggravated by, the nature of claimant’s employment; and that consequently, the
burden to show by substantial evidence the contrary lies with the
employer.  And the ultimate result of
that principle is that the presumption rebuttable in its inception
becomes conclusive upon the failure of the respondent employer to
destroy the same” (recently reaffirmed on May 28, 1979 in De Guzman vs.
WCC, G.R. No. L-43532; Vda. de Isanan vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-42633;
Rombaoa vs. WCC, G.R.  No. L-43405;
and Narvades vs. WCC, G.R. No. L-42554 decided jointly with 11 other
cases, per Justice Teehankee).  In
the instant case, the records show that respondent employer failed to destroy
that presumption.

3. Moreover, the medical evidence of petitioner supports the
compensability of petitioner’s claim. 
The 1965 V. Luna clinical records of petitioner reveal as
aforestated that she was admitted on June 16, 1965 in the said hospital,
subjected on June 24, 1965 to nephrectomy surgery by her attending
physician, Dr. Romeo Atienza, MC and was discharged on July 9, 1965; that
initial diagnosis was “719-615-Calculus Rt. Kidney, 722-100.2 Pyonephrosis
(Rt. Kidney)” and the final diagnosis was “Calculus-Pyonephrosis
Right.” The 1975 Physician’s Report of Sickness or Accident signed
by Dr. Santos Tomacruz, P.C. Metrocom, Med-Dispensary, Quezon City (p. 53, WCC
rec.) contains a diagnostic finding of “Nephrectomy, Right Kidney”;
and in said report, the said attending physician stated that he first
administered treatment to petitioner on March 1, 1975; and opined that
said ailment disabled petitioner from labor and was caused by and the result of
her employment.  Under Section 49 of the
Workmen’s Compensation Act, as amended, the aforesaid physician’s report and
clinical records related to the compensation claim are, contrary to the
respondent Commission’s order, admissible evidence and may be used as proof of
the fact in dispute (Lorenzo vs. WCC, 2 PHILAJUR 425, 431; 81 SCRA 435, 439-440
[1978]; Romero vs. WCC, 77 SCRA 483, 488 [1977]).  Consequently, the conclusion of respondent
Commission in its disputed order of reversal that petitioner failed to prove
her disability, is baseless.

The fact that the said physician’s report was based on
petitioner’s treatment only on March 1, 1975 or more than one year after she
stopped work­ing, does not detract from its evidentiary value and weight
because, the physician’s diagnostic finding of “nephrectomy, right
kidney” contained therein was traced by said physician to petitioner’s 1965
kidney ailment and surgery (nephrectomy) [p. 53, WCC rec.].

Viewing the case and the evidence in their entirety, the natural
inference that readily flows therefrom is that petitioner’s 1965 kidney ailment
recurred in 1973 and/or the consequential loss in 1965 of her right kidney
(nephrectomy) sapped her strength little by little as she thereafter resumed
working as seamstress with respondent employer, which ultimately led to her
disability from labor.  Verily, the right
to compensation extends to disability due to disease supervening upon and
proximately and naturally resulting from a compensable injury (82 Am. Jur.
132).  Where the primary injury is shown
to have arisen in the course of employment, every natural consequence that
flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the
result of an independent intervening cause attri­butable to claimant’s own
negligence or misconduct (I Larson Workmen’s Compensation Law 3-279 [1972]).  Simply stated, all the medical consequences
and sequelae that flow from the primary injury are compensable (ibid.).  There is therefore no question that
petitioner is entitled to compensation benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, as amended.

4. On the other hand, respondent employer’s evidence does not
indubitably show its defense that petitioner was terminated from work by reason
of her abandonment.  In its answer (pp.
45-49, WCC rec.), respondent employer alleged that “x x claimant simply went
on an unauthorized absence sometime on the first week of September, 1973
without notice and for unknown reasons, hence, respondent assumed that claimant
herself simply abandoned her employment and for which reasons she was
considered terminated on September 7, 1973.” However, in the affidavit of
respondent employer’s manager (p. 42, WCC rec.) submitted in support of
respondent employer’s stand, it was stated that “she went on sick leave as
shown in our records on October 2, 1973 to October 21, 1973, then again on
November 18, 1973 to December 13, 1973 after which she never returned to work
and has completely abandoned her job x
x.”

Such, bare allegation of abandonment cannot prevail over the
documented stand of petitioner that she ceased working by reason of her
disability caused by her kidney ailment. 
Furthermore, the admission of the respondent employer that petitioner
went on sick leave on the aforesaid dates before she allegedly abandoned her
work, supports, as the same is more con­sistent with, the position of
petitioner that she stopped working by reason of her kidney ailment, than
respondent employer’s theory of abandonment.

WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE RESPONDENT COMMIS­SION IS
HEREBY SET ASIDE AND THE RESPONDENT EMPLOYER IS ORDERED:

1) TO PAY THE
PETITIONER THE SUM OF THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED ELEVEN AND 20/100 (P3,411.20)
PESOS AS COMPENSATION BENEFITS;

2) TO REIMBURSE
PETITIONER FOR HER MEDICAL EXPENSES DULY SUPPORTED BY PROPER RECEIPTS; AND

3) TO PAY THE
SUCCESSOR OF THE WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION COMMISSION THE SUM OF SIXTY-ONE
(P61.00) PESOS AS ADMINISTRATIVE FEE.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Fernandez, Guerrero, De
Castro, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.