THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. JUAN FRANCISCO, ACCUSED WHOSE DEATH SENTENCE IS UNDER REVIEW.

This is a case of rape with murder.  In an information dated August 2, 1968 the
fiscal charged Juan Francisco with that offense.  It was alleged therein that on July 25, 1968
Fran­cisco had sexual intercourse with Josefa Abusejo, a nine-year-old girl, in
a coffee plantation located in Barrio Gutapol, Kibawe, Bukidnon and thereafter
he strangled and killed her (Criminal Case No. 1981).

At his arraignment on April 30, 1969, Francisco, assisted by a
counsel de oficio, pleaded guilty.  The trial court in its decision of June 7,
1969 sentenced him to death.  How­ever,
that judgment was set aside by this Court because Fran­cisco had made an
improvident plea.  The case was returned
to the trial court for re-arraignment with the directive that Francisco should
be made to understand the nature and gravity of the offense charged, the
penalty that might be imposed upon him and his rights under the law (Resolution
of June 29, 1972 in L-30763, 45 SCRA 451).

After Francisco’s new counsel de oficio had been given
plenty of time to study the case, he was re-arraigned.  At his second arraignment, he again pleaded
guilty after he was duly apprised of the nature and gravity of the accusation
against him.

The trial judge interrogated the accused.  Francisco said:  “I will just plead guilty because that
is the truth”.  In the course of
that interrogation, the accused admitted that he raped and strangled the
victim.  The prosecution presented its
evi­dence.  The accused and his counsel
manifested that they did not want to present any evidence.

The prosecution offered in evidence the extrajudicial confession
of the accused wherein he admitted that he had sexual intercourse with the
victim four times and that he boxed her and choked her to death.  The municipal judge, before whom the con­fession
was sworn to, testified as to its voluntariness.

The municipal health officer, who examined the victim’s body
about five hours after her death, certified that he found (1) complete
destruction of the hymen, blood around the vaginal orifice and a whitish fluid
inside the vaginal canal; (2) enlarged vaginal opening admitting more than one
index finger; (3) slight blackening on the posterior commissure with blood; (4)
contu­sions and bloodstains on her nose and mouth and a wound on her lower lip;
(5) contusions on the frontal part of the neck “with marked deepening on
both sides of the throat” and (6) contu­sions on the face and chest, with
slight deepening and softening of the costal cartilages.

The doctor certified that the cause of death was “asphyxia
due to choking of the throat” (Exh. B).

Francisco, a twenty-seven-year-old illiterate farmer, a native of
Barrio Mioquendo, Calbayog, Samar, went to Barrio Gutapol, Kibawe, Bukidnon and
worked as a helper in the truck of Lleboro Balangyao.

He declared that in the evening of July 24, 1968, after receiving
his wages, he and his friends had a drinking spree from nine o’clock to seven
o’clock in the morning of the following day. 
They drank several bottles of Tanduay rum.  After drink­ing, Francisco slept and woke up
at noontime with a hangover.

He went out at around three o’clock in the afternoon of July 25,
intending to go to the mountain.  On the
way, he saw Josefa Abusejo, a grade one schoolgirl (she was carrying a
book).  He held the girl and brought her
to the coffee plantation of his employer, Balangyao.  There he raped, boxed and strangled her.

In the evening of that day, July 25, the municipal health officer
and some Constabularymen, accompanied by Balangyao, repaired to the scene of
the crime.  They found the victim lying
on her back on the ground under a coffee tree, face up, arms spread, forming a
“U” shape, thighs exposed, legs parted, and her private parts partly
covered.

Near her body were a plastic hose, a water bottle, a buri hat, a
school bag and a white panty.  The hat
belonged to Francisco.  The plastic hose
belonged to his employer.  It was carried
by Francisco who had been asked to get gasoline.

The trial court convicted Francisco of rape with homi­cide,
sentenced him to death and ordered him to pay an indem­nity of six thousand
pesos to the heirs of Josefa Abusejo.

Counsel de oficio contends that the trial court
erred in ignoring the allegation of the accused that he was mauled by the
police.  That contention is devoid of
merit.  It is true that the accused
testified that he pleaded guilty because he was mauled by the police but a few
minutes later, when he was asked to clarify that testimony, he declared that he
was mauled because he committed the crime.

Any physical violence that was used against him was not intended
to make him confess, since he knew that he could not deny the crime.  It was the natural reaction of all decent men
to the iniquitousness of his crime.

The contention of counsel de oficio that the
accused was illegally arrested and that there was no preliminary inves­tigation
does not justify his acquittal.

Francisco was arrested by the inhabitants of the barrio and
brought to the police headquarters.  An
arrest may be made without warrant when an offense has in fact been committed,
and there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has
committed it.

The case was investigated by a Constabulary sergeant who took the
statements of Francisco, Remedios Abusejo (the victim’s mother), Regino Albios
(an eyewitness) and Balangyao, the employer of Francisco.

On the basis of those statements, all sworn to before the
municipal judge, the medical certificate, and the sketch of the scene of the
crime, the sergeant filed in the municipal court a verified complaint for
murder with rape.

The municipal judge testified that he read to Francisco his
statement before he asked the latter to swear to it.  He declared that he complied with the
requirement of Republic Act No. 3828 as to searching questions and answers
during the preliminary investigation.  He
issued the corresponding warrant of arrest. 
Francisco was committed to prison. 
He made a writ­ten waiver of the second stage of the preliminary
investigation.

Counsel de oficio also contends that the trial
court erred in not taking into account “material and conclusive evi­dence
that may prove the guilt of the accused beyond all reason­able
doubt”.  That is a vague
contention.  What counsel de oficio
meant was that the accused made an improvident plea of guilty and that the
trial court did not follow the guidelines laid down in U. S. vs. Jamad, 37
Phil. 305 as to the course of action to be taken in case the accused pleaded
guilty.

Counsel’s contention is refuted by the proceedings taken by the
lower court after the second arraignment. 
The accused was repeatedly advised as to the nature and gravity of the
complex offense imputed to him.  It is
true that the pro­secution did not present any eyewitness but that was not
neces­sary because his voluntary extrajudicial confession was corro­borated by
evidence of the corpus delicti.

The trial court recommended that executive clemency be extended
to the accused and that he be committed to a mental institution for
treatment.  That recommendation is not
supported by any medical opinion. 
Because of that recommendation, coun­sel de oficio
contends that the accused should not have been tried and convicted.

A reading of the testimony of the accused shows that he was sane
and was not suffering from any mental disease or defect.  He gave intelligent answers to the questions
of the trial court.  The fact that a
person does something abnormal or commits some aberration does not necessarily
mean that he is insane in the legal sense (U. S. vs. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88).

The trial court correctly convicted the accused of rape with homicide,
a special complex offense penalized by death in article 335 of the Revised
Penal Code.  The mitigating circum­stances
of plea of guilty and drunkenness do not affect the im­position of the death
penalty.  Death, as a single indivisible
penalty, is imposed regardless of any generic mitigating cir­cumstances that
may have attended the commission of the crime (Art. 63, Revised Penal Code).

We agree with the Solicitor General that, considering the facts
of this case, the trial court’s recommendation for executive clemency is not
justified.

WHEREFORE, the trial court’s judgment imposing the death
penalty is affirmed with the modification that the indem­nity should be
increased to twelve thousand pesos. 
Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr.,
Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Fernando, C.J., on leave.

Abad Santos and Santos,
JJ., no part.