MARCIANA BUENAVENTURA, COMPLAINANT, VS. HON. MARIANO V. BENEDICTO, RESPONDENT.

 On January 9, 1969, Marciana Buenaventura (hereinafter referred to as the
complainant), the offended party in a criminal prosecutions^[1]
for forcible abduction with rape, and likewise the plaintiff in a civil action^[2]
for annulment of marriage, filed with this Court a complaint against the
Honorable Mariano V. Benedicto (hereinafter referred
to as the respondent judge) in whose sala both the
aforementioned cases fell, seeking his removal from office on the basis of
verified charges.

Imputed to the respondent judge are: (1) serious misconduct in
relation to the criminal and civil cases; (2) immorality in connection with
both cases; (3) gross inefficiency and incom­petence in relation to the
criminal action; and (4) knowingly ren­dering an unjust judgment in the
criminal case.

The factual incidents preceding the complainant’s administrative
action against the respondent judge are not complicated.

On September 13, 1967, the Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Eci­ja, upon a complaint^[3]
filed by a sister of the complainant and after conducting the preliminary
investigation required by law, charged Raymundo
Mariano and four others with the crime of forcible abduction with rape
committed on the person of the complainant the court, with the respondent judge
presiding, heard the case on the merits.

On October 21, 1967,
the complainant filed an action against Mariano for annulment of marriage; this
action was docketed in the same court presided by the respondent judge.

On November 11, 1968,
the respondent judge rendered judgment in the criminal case, acquitting the
defendants for failure the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.

On January 15, 1969,
the complainant filed a petition this Court, seeking to inhibit the respondent
judge from hearing the civil case still pending before the latter’s sala.  This petition
was denied in a resolution dated January
29, 1969.

Returning to the case at bar, on February 8, 1969, the res­pondent
judge filed his answer, denying the charges imputed to him by the complainant
and alleging lack of factual or legal basis of the administrative
complaint.  By a resolution dated
February 1969, this Court referred and assigned the administrative case the
Honorable Carmelino Alvendia
of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.

Subsequently, on May 6, 1969, this Court, acting upon the
complainant’s motion for reconsideration of this Court’s resolution dated
January 29, 1969 denying the said complainant’s petition seeking to inhibit the
respondent judge from taking further action on the civil case, expressed the view
of the propriety of the said respondent judge desisting from hearing the civil
action to be subserve the ends of justice.  In compliance with the aforesaid resolution,
the respondent judge, on May 14, 1969,
issued an order inhibiting himself from hearing the civil case and from further
proceedings in the criminal action against another defendant not tried with the
others.

On December 19, 1969,
after proceedings and investigation duly conducted on the administrative
complaint, the Honorable Justice Alvendia submitted
his report wherein he states that the complainant failed to prove the charges
against the respondent judge, with four exceptions, to wit:

1.     
The respondent judge allowed his
clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon,
to promulgate decisions in criminal cases, in violation of the provisions of
section 6 of Rule 120^[4]
of the Rules of Court;

2.     
The respondent judge formed a
committee to solicit contributions and/or donations of steel filing cabinets,
electric fans, and other office equipment from private parties for his court in
contravention of the spirit of section 24^[5]
of the Canons of Judicial Ethics;

3.     
The respondent judge, considering
that the civil case for annulment of marriage filed by the complainant against
one of the defendants in the criminal action remained pending before his sala, imprudently received the said complainant in his
chambers prior to the promulgation of his decision in the criminal action; and

4.     
The respondent judge failed to
resolve a motion filed by the prosecution for the suspension of the hearing of
the criminal case until after trial and resolution of the civil case (on the
ground that the latter raised a prejudicial question), in violation of the
provisions of section 5, Republic Act 296, as amended.^[6]

1. Anent the first recusation of serious
misconduct, the Honorable Justice, Alvendia found
only one among the acts alleged by the complainant as constituting the charge
proved and, there­fore, demanding attention by this Court – that the respondent
judge allowed his clerk-messenger, Isauro Tuazon, to promulgate decision in criminal cases.  In this connection, the investigator also
found that Tuazon, on those occasions when the deputy
clerk of court delegated to him the promulgation of the respondent judge’
decisions in criminal actions, promulgated only decisions of ac­quittal.

Tuazon, the report reveals, even
testified during the investigatory proceedings that the deputy clerk of court
entrusted to him the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case involved
herein.  This testimony remains unrebutted on record. 
Furthermore, the investigator found that Tuazon,
in this particular instance, “went to the extent of assuming the
prerogative of postponing the promulgation of the decision which, according to
the evidence, was not even delegated by the respondent judge to the deputy
clerk of court.”

All these indicate laxity on the part of the respondent judgment
in the supervision of his employees, states the investigator.  Continuing, he says that this practice
contravenes the provisions of section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court and
may lead to incident “liable to involve, rightly or wrongly, the integrity
of the Court and/or undermine the people’s faith in the judiciary.”

In reply, the respondent judge asserts that the documen­tary and
testimonial evidence show that he entrusted his decision to Tuazon
for delivery to the clerk of court and not for promulgation by the said
clerk-messenger.  With regard to the
decision in the criminal action involved herein, he explains that he placed the
same in an envelope and sealed it before entrusting it to Tua­zon
for delivery to the clerk of court and that he ordered the pro­mulgation of the
said decision by the clerk of court.  If Tuazon himself read the dispositive
portion of the decision, then he did so upon the instructions of the clerk of
court and not upon his authorization, the respondent judge adds.

Section 67 of Republic Act 296, as amended, provides two grounds
for the removal of judges: serious misconduct and ineffi­ciency.  The complainant seeks the removal of the
respondent judge on the first ground and enumerates a number of facts al­legedly
constituting the imputed charge of serious misconduct, five of which acts the
Honorable Justice Alvendia found unsupported by
evidence.  The remaining one – that the
respondent judge sanctioned the practice of his deputy clerk of court of
delegating to the clerk-messenger the promulgation of decisions of acquittal in
criminal cases – fails to fit into the accepted definition of se­rious
misconduct. “Serious” means “important, weighty, momentous and
not trifling,”^[7]
and ”misconduct” refers to “a trans­gression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross
negligence by the public officer.”^[8]
Misconduct” also implies “a wrongful intention and not a mere error of
judgment.”^[9]

In the face of the denial by the respondent judge that he
authorized Tuazon to promulgate his decisions plus
his explana­tion why the act complained of created the false impression that he
tolerated the practice of allowing the clerk-messenger to promulgate his
decisions, we have no solid support to hold that the said respondent judge
either acted in wanton disregard of or in­tended to violate the provisions of
section 6 of Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. 
We find no reliable evidence on record to demons­trate that the act
complained of was influenced by malice or in­duced by an intention to violate
the law or spurred by a desire to debase the integrity of the court.

Nevertheless, on this count, although the act charged does not
constitute serious misconduct on the part of the respondent judge as to warrant
the severe administrative penalty of re­moval from the Bench, we believe that
this act manifests the in­souciance of the respondent judge in the supervision
of the atten­dants of the court who aid him in the performance of his judicial
functions.  Assuming as true that the
clerk-messenger read the dispositive portion of the
decision in the criminal case involved herein upon order of the clerk of court,
the respondent judge should have, upon notice and knowledge thereof, called the
at­tention of the clerk of court and taken appropriate disciplinary measures
against those who committed the disservice, instilling in them the sense of
propriety and probity required of those who assist in the performance of
judicial functions.

We find the inclination of the respondent judge to leniency in
the administrative supervision of his employees an undesira­ble trait.  Oftentimes, such leniency provides the court
employees the opportunity to commit minor transgressions of the laws and slight
breaches of official duty ultimately leading to vicious del­inquencies.  The respondent judge should constantly keep a
watch­ful eye on the conduct of his employees. 
He should realize that big fires start small. His constant scrutiny of
the behavior of his employees would deter any abuse on the part of the latter
in the exercise of their duties.  Then,
his subordinates would know that any misdemeanor will not remain unchecked.  The slightest sem-blance
of impropriety on the part of the employees of the court in the performance of
their official duties stirs ripples of public suspicion and public distrust of
the judicial administrators.  The
slightest breach of duty by and the slightest irregularity in the conduct of
court officers and employees detract from the dignity of the courts and erode
the faith of the people in the judiciary.

 2. Count two surfaced only
in the course of the investiga­tion conducted by the Honorable Justice Alvendia.  The
complainant bases the second challenge on the ground that the respondent judge,
using his official position and power, formed a committee to solicit
contributions and donations of office equipment for his court from private
parties, in contravention of the provisions of section 24 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics.  The respondent judge
vigorously refutes this, denying that he participated, directly or indirectly,
in the fund-raising or in the solicitation of donations.

In his proffered explanation, the respondent judge states that
when he assumed office in Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, he found the court
premises in a deplo­rable “state of disarray” – most of the records
laid out or placed on the floor, and the rest kept inside unlocked
cabinets.  He also found no available law
books at hand.  Clerk and employees of
the court shared and occupied one table. 
Twice, the respondent judge tried to obtain financial assistance for the
improvement of the court premises – first, from the provincial treasurer, then,
from the Department of Justice – but he received none.  Then, the presidents of the bar associations
of Nueva Ecija and other
practicing lawyers of the province approached him and offered suggestions.  Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a
committee to raise funds and solicit donations. 
The respondent judge merely appointed the members of the committee and
offered suggestions, Thereafter the lawyers decided to create a committee to
raise funds and solicit donations. The respondent judge merely appointed the members
of the committee.

The committee according to the respondent judge, con­ducted the
campaign with the knowledge, if not with the tacit ap­proval, of the Department
of Justice.  In fact, at the end of the
campaign, certificates of appreciation were given to those who assisted the
committee and contributed to the success of the undertaking which bore the
official notation of the Judicial Superintendent of the Department of Justice.
Eventually, the commit­tee turned over the books and office equipment to the
District Judge through the clerk of court, who, in turn, officially turned them
over to the provincial government as to form part of the property of the
province.

A careful reading of section 24 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
shows that the said section dwells mainly on the prohibi­tion against the use
by a judge of his official power and prestige to persuade others to participate
or contribute to the success of business promotions or campaigns for
charity.  Briefly, section 24
requires a judge to refrain from private business ventures or charitable
enterprises so as not to give occasion for any sus­picion that he utilizes
the power of his office or the influence of his name for the success of such
undertakings or to give rise to any situation wherein his personal interest
might conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.  Section 24 thus appropriately and accurately
applied, the act of the respondent judge in appointing the members of the
campaign committee does not fall within its contemplation.  To hold otherwise would coun­tenance an
interpretation unduly strained.

Be that as it may, we can not simply ignore the act of the
respondent judge and state that we find nothing objectionable at all in this
conduct.  True, his well-intentioned
desire to pro­vide the court premises with the necessary equipment motivated
him to accept the suggestion of the lawyers of Nueva Ecija and, then, to appoint the members of the committee
for the campaign.  However, for reasons
of extreme probity and delicacy, he should have declined to assume the
appointing prerogative to avoid the slightest hint of involvement, personal or
official, in the cam­paign.

To our mind, although the act of the respondent judge in taking part
in the appointment of the members of the campaign committee constitutes no
serious breach of judicial ethics, such act nevertheless could engender several
misinterpretations like­ly to cause doubt that he enjoys no more than normal
social re­lations with those whom he appointed to the campaign group.  The respondent judge should have avoided any
act giving rise to any suggestion calculated to impair the image of
impartiality and independence of the courts.

We, however, find it disenchanting that the respondent judge had
to turn to the private sector for the essential needs of his court when the obligation
is the Government’s to provide him the necessities required by the complexity
of court work. Circumstances compelled the respondent judge to do so.  The Govern­ment paid no heed to his perfervid
pleas for financial assistance in the acquisition of the equipment necessary
for the efficient and pro­ductive business of the court.  The Government gave him no sup­port.  We, therefore, find no cogent reason to blame
the respon­dent judge in accepting the help offered by the lawyers in Nueva Ecija to provide the court
with facilities of great utility to the convenient dispatch of court work.

3. On the third charge, the complainant assails as impru­dent the
conduct of the respondent judge of receiving her in his private chambers and of
allegedly discussing with her the merits the criminal action, considering that
at that time the civil case filed by the complainant still remained unresolved
before his sala.  The respondent judge admits that he met with
the complainant when the latter requested an audience with him but disclaims
that he discussed the criminal case with her. 
In fact, the respondent judge alleges that when the complainant tried to
start a discussion on the merits of the criminal case, he told her to refer to
his decision on the said case which he ordered promul­gated earlier that day.^[10] The respondent judge further claims that it
is his practice not to allow any of the parties to confer with him on any case
pending before his sala without the presence of the
other party.

In the case at bar, he admits that he made an exception and
agreed to receive the complainant, then accompanied by her sister,
sister-in-law, a court employee and a court helper, in his chambers.  He states that he wanted to soften, as much
as pos­sible, the impact of her defeat in the criminal case. Moreover, he
sought to find out whether the complainant contemplated withdrawing the civil
action or was determined on continuing the same.

We take note of the laudable practice of the respondent judge of
not discussing with the interested parties any case pend­ing before him.  We also take note of the fact that the
respondent judge, in making an exception re the case at hand, agreed to meet with
the complainant in his chambers only upon the latter’s re­quest and
insistence.  Although we are inclined to
believe that the respondent judge received the complainant in his chambers not
to discuss the merits of the criminal case but to assuage whatever emotional
ache and distress she felt as a result of the decision of acquittal in the
criminal action and to find out what course of ac­tion she contemplated to take
on the civil case in view of the turn of events, we nonetheless feel that the
respondent judge should have precluded any mention whatsoever of the civil
action for the same was then pending before his sala.  This conduct of the judge indicates lack of
reasonable discretion.  Such conduct,
too, more often than not, party-litigants misconstrue as personally motivat­ed.  Many the inferences are, that may be drawn by
suspecting minds from acts of judges over-zealously accommodating to in­terested
parties.

On the other hand, we believe that the complainant was not
entirely without fault.  For reasons We
do not know, for reasons we can not surmise, she endeavored with utmost
persistence to see the respondent judge in his private chambers not only once
but twice.

We might add here, an passant, that the
complainant, in her administrative complaint, also imputed to the respondent
judge acts of immorality allegedly committed when the said respondent judge met
with her again in his private room.  She
claimed that the respondent judge tried to grab her breasts on the pretext of
looking for contusions.  This charge the
Honorable Justice Alvendia discounted as incredible –
without any factual basis.  For on that
alleged occasion, the respondent judge felt weak and weary to receive visitors
so much so that he refused to see another caller, municipal judge Sergio Denoga of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija.  At that time, too, the respondent judge’s
wife was in his chambers, at­tending to his needs.  Furthermore, the complainant’s own wit­ness,
the court stenographer, whom she claimed brought her to the respondent judge’s
chambers, denied having done so.  All
these compelled the investigator to disbelieve the charge of im­morality
against the respondent judge.

4. The fourth and final charge relates to the respondent judge’s
alleged failure to resolve a motion filed by the prosecu­tion to suspend the
hearing of the criminal case until after final disposition of the civil action
for annulment of marriage.  In his
explanation, the respondent judge states that when the prosecu­tion raised the
possibility of the existence of a prejudicial ques­tion and asked for the
suspension of the proceedings, he suggest­ed it would be better for him to
continue hearing both the crimi­nal and civil cases.  In effect, the respondent judge alleges, such
ruling constituted a denial of the motion for suspension.  In fact, he continues, the prosecution
construed the same as a denial of the motion for suspension and the fiscal
neither raised the ques­tion again in the subsequent hearings on the criminal
action nor made any reference thereto
in his memorandum.

The record reveals that the respondent judge made an earnest
effort to act on the motion for suspension of the hearings on the criminal
action.  In his honest belief that the
civil case posed no prejudicial barrier, he decided to continue hearing the
criminal case.  The only error, if error
it may be called, the respondent judge committed consisted of not denying the
motion for suspension in clear and categorical terms so as not to leave any
room for misinterpretation and controversy. 
The respondent judge should have made a formal ruling on the motion to
enable the parties to know the reason or ground for such ruling and to provide
the party aggrieved by the action on them motion sufficient opportunity to
avail of the necessary action for relief from the ruling.

In the case at bar, however, if the respondent judge real­ly
failed to act on the motion as the complainant points out, then, the subsequent
hearings on the criminal case afforded the prose­cution all the opportunity to
ask the respondent judge to make a definitive ruling on the matter.  Yet, the prosecution proceeded to the
termination of the trial, filed its memorandum, and sub­mitted the case for
decision without any further mention of the question.

At this point, we pause to make an observation. We have examined
the decision of the respondent judge in the criminal case involved herein; the
same prima facie appears to be correct.  This decision of sixty-six pages includes a
complete statement of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and by the
defense, a pains­taking analysis of the said evidence and of the applicable
law, and the reasons why he entertained reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the
accused.

Upon the foregoing dissertation, we find that the respondent
judge:

1.     
Has been remiss in the supervision
of his court emplo­yees by failing, upon learning that the deputy clerk of
court on three occasions had entrusted to the clerk-messenger the promul­gation
of decisions of acquittal, to take corrective action and to discipline the
erring court employees;

2.     
Had involved himself in a program
to furnish his court, ill-equipped at the time of his assumption of office as
presiding judge thereof, with the necessary facilities, by appointing the
members of the campaign committee which solicited donations and con­tributions;

3.      Failed to exercise requisite care and discretion by re­ceiving the
complainant in his private chambers, considering that the civil case for
annulment of marriage filed by the said complainant (against one of the accused
in the criminal action) was yet pending before his sala;
and

4.     
Failed to resolve in explicit
unmistakable terms the prosecution’s motion for suspension of the criminal
action based on the ground that the civil action for annulment of marriage cons­tituted
a prejudicial question.

All told, the respondent judge, to our mind, is not guilty of
serious misconduct or inefficiency.  We
nevertheless are of the considered view that the acts of commission as well as
of omis­sion properly imputable to him, while not warranting the imposi­tion of
any disciplinary sanction, clearly demonstrate the need for greater care,
prudence and discretion in his future actuations.

ACCORDINGLY, this Court admonishes the respondent
Judge Mariano V. Benedicto (a) to exercise close and
unremitting supervision over his Subordinates, and (b) at all times to adhere
to the full intendment of each and all of the Canons of Judicial Ethics.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.

^[1] Criminal
Case 420 entitled PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAYMUNDO MARIANO, ET AL.

^[2]
Civil Case 300 entitled MARCIANA BUENVENTURA v. RAY­MUNDO MARIANO.

^[3]
Amended on October 11, 1967

^[4]
Section 6, Rule 120, in part reads:

“Section 6.  Promulgation of judgment. – The judgment is
promulgated by reading the judgment or sentence in the presence of the
defendant and any judge of the court in which it was rendered.  The defendant must be personally present if
the conviction is for a grave offense; if for a light offense, the judgment may
be pronounced in the presence of his attorney or representative.  And when the judge is absent or outside of
the province or city, his presence is not necessary and the judgment maybe
promulgate or read to the defendant by the clerk of court.”

^[5]
“Section 24.  Business promotions
and solicitations for charity.  He
should avoid giving ground for any reasonable suspi­cion that he is utilizing
the power or prestige of his office to persuade or coerce others to patronize or
contribute, either to the success of private business ventures, or to
charitable enterprises.  He should,
therefore, not enter into such private business, or pursue such a course of
conduct, as would justify such suspicion, nor use the pow­er of his office or
the influence of his name to promote the business of others; he should not
solicit for charities, nor should he enter into any business relation which, in
the normal course of events reasonably to be expected, might bring his personal
interests into conflict with the impartial performance of his official duties.”

^[6]
“Sec. 5. Judge’s certificate as to work completed. – District
judges, judges of city courts, and municipal judges shall certify on their
application for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment,
or upon the payrolls upon which their salaries are paid, that all special
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases
which have been under submission for decision or determination for a period of
ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of
making the certificate, and no leave shall be granted no salary shall be paid
without such certifi­cate.’

^[7]
In re Impeachment of Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 214.

^[8] Ibid.

^[9] Ibid.

^[10]Parenthetically,
the respondent judge acted under the impres­sion that the complainant already
knew the nature of his decision in the criminal case because he ordered the pro­mulgation
of the said decision earlier that day. 
He later found out to his consternation that the same had not yet been
promulgated for, according to the investigator, the complainant herself, having
learned from the court stenographer the nature of the decision and fearing that
her sister, then with her, might collapse, persuaded the clerk-messenger of the
court not to promulgate the same.  In
truth, therefore, the complainant, when she met with the respondent judge,
already knew about the decision of ac­quittal because of the advance
information given her by the court stenographer.