PHILIPPINE MARINE OFFICERS’ GUILD, PETITIONER, VS. COMPAÑIA MARITIMA, PHILIPPINE STEAM NAVIGATION CO., MADRIGAL SHIPPING CO., CIR ASSOCIATE JUDGES ARSENIO MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR VIL…

Petitioner moves for reconsideration of the portion of our
decision of March 19, 1968
which affirmed the decision dated. December 23, 1961 and the resolution en
banc dated May 18, 1962 of the Court of Industrial Rela­tions denying
the claim of its members for the payment of back wages by respondents
Philippine Steam Navigation Company and Madrigal Shipping Company.

In effect, the following
grounds are relied upon by petitioner in its motion for reconsideration, to
wit:

(1)                
That as a consequence
of the failure of the respondents PHILSTEAM and MADRIGAL to reinstate the strikers at the time that they unconditionally offered to return to work, they
acquired the status of illegally dis­missed or locked-out employees;

(2)                
That all conditions required by
this Court to entitle strikers to back pay have been complied with;

(3)                
That the issuance by this Court of
the injunction order enjoining enforcement of the return-to-work order of the
CIR is not sufficient justifica­tion for denying the claim for back wages;

(4)                
That
respondents PHILSTEAM and MADRIGAL and not members of peti­tioner should be the
ones to suffer for their acts of omission and com­mission.

In connection with the first ground, petitioner argues that
taking into consideration (1) that the strike was legal; (2) that the
return-to-work order and other implementing orders and resolutions of the CIR
were valid and lawful; (3) that the strikers were entitled to reinstatement as
a matter of right; and (4) that the strikers not only manifested their
willingness to abide by the CIR back-to-work order but also actually offered
unconditionally to return and even sought the aid of competent authorities to
effect such a return – the conclusion is inescapable that the strikers were entitled
to reinstatement as of the date they unconditionally offered to return to work,
and when they were refused reinstatement they acquired the status of illegally
dismissed or locked-out employees.  As
such, petitioner contends, the strikers are entitled not only to reinstatement
but also to back wages from the time they
unconditionally offered to return to work in obedience to the CIR resolution.

The petitioner cannot be sustained.  In the first place, it cannot be said that
the return-to-work order and other implementing orders and resolutions of the
CIR were valid and lawful, for if they were so, this Court would not have
enjoined the enforcement of such orders and reso­lutions.  Considering that the offer to return to work
was predicated upon the CIR order and that the enforcement of said order was
permanently enjoined by this Court, the strikers cannot claim that they were
entitled to reinstate­ment as of the date they offered to return to work.  Fur­thermore, the CIR found that “none
of the companies had discriminately rejected their (strikers’) application for
reemployment”.  Such finding is
conclusive upon this Court, the same being supported by substantial evidence.

With respect to the second ground, petitioner insists that all
conditions required by this Court to en­title strikers to back pay have been
complied with, to wit: (1) the legality of the strike against PHILSTEAM and
MADRIGAL was already adjudged with finality; (2) there was an unconditional
offer to return to work when the strikers manifested their willingness to abide
by the CIR back-to-work order and even sought the aid of com­petent authorities
to effect their return; and (3) the strikers were refused reinstatement, the
most eloquent proof of which is the fact that they have not been re­admitted to
their former positions as of the date of the motion for reconsideration.  Again, the finding of the CIR that “none
of the companies had discriminately rejected their (strikers’) application for
reemployment” militates against petitioner on this particular ground.
Moreover, as already stated, the offer of the strikers to return was made in
compliance with the return-to-work order of the CIR but its enforcement was
permanently enjoined by this Court. 
There is no showing that the strikers renewed their offer after this
Court issued its injunctive order.  It is
true that PMOG re-offered its members to return to work in its Manifestation
dated February 27, 1962,
but then it was made pursuant to the decision of the Trial Court which was not yet final in view of the
motions for recon­sideration filed by the COMPANIES and by PMOG.

In support of the third ground relied upon, peti­tioner alleges inter alia: (1) that there are
indications that this Court in issuing the permanent injunction was impressed
by the contention of the respondent COMPANIES that the CIR had no right and
authority to issue the return-­to-work order, which contention was allegedly
rejected in Feati University vs. Bautista (G. R. Nos.
L-21278, 21462 & 21500,
December 27, 1966); (2) that from the tenor and import of the last paragraph of
this Court’s resolution of March 25, 1955, the injunction was without prejudice
to whatever might be the ultimate decision in the cases filed in the CIR; and
(3) that the parties who sought the injunc­tion made this Court understand that
the strikers could be entitled to back wages should the right to reinstatement
be upheld.

The allegations of petitioner are devoid of factual basis.  This Court’s resolution of March 25, 1955, which declared the
preliminary injunction previously issued permanent
reads:

“In G. R. No. L-8802, Cebu Seamen’s Association Inc. vs. Modesto Castillo, et
al., G. R. No. 8808, Marine Officers’ Association vs. Court of Industrial Rela­tions,
and G. R. No. L-8712, Compañia Maritima,
et al. vs. Philippine Marine Officers’
Guild, the Court, after taking under advisement the motion to dissolve the
writs of preliminary injunction issued by this Court, and the opposition
thereto, RESOLVED, to deny the motion to dissolve, and to declare the injunction
permanent, con­sidering:

a)         
That the existence of the power of
the Court of Industrial Rela­tions to issue a back-to-work order under Section
10 of Republic Act 875 is not expressly granted, and is in fact dis­puted by
herein petitioners;

b)         
That the back-to-work order was
issued without hearing all the parties interested, particularly the Cebu Seamen’s Association Inc.;

c)         
That the retention of the members
of the petitioners’ Cebu Sea­men’s Association Inc.,
and Marine Officers Association will ultimately depend upon the right of the
members of the Philippine Marine Officers’ Guild to return to their jobs;

d)         
That the dismissal of the members
of the petitioner Unions pending the resolution of such right to return may
result in irreparable injury to them should the question be finally resolved
against the strikers;

e)         
That to coerce immediate re­employment
of the strikers and the displacement by them of the members of petitioning
unions may lead to ulterior friction, dispute and disruption of shipping
schedules, to the prejudice of the general interest.

“This resolution shall not be under­stood as in any way
preventing the Court of Industrial Relations from proceeding with the hearing
of these cases on the merits with a view to their prompt and final
determination.”

It is to be noted that in declaring the preliminary injunction
permanent this Court did not only consider the fact that the existence of the
power of the CIR to issue a back-to-work order under Section 10 of Republic Act
875 was not expressly granted but also other facts, some of which did not exist
in the Feati case.  In the instant case, the back-to-work order
was issued by the CIR without hearing all the parties concerned, particularly
the Cebu Seamen’s Associa­tion, Inc., while in the Feati case, the return-to-work order of March 30, 1963 was a confirmation of
an agreement between the University and the Faculty Club during a pre-hearing
con­ference on March 23, 1963.  In addition, the last consideration (e)
mentioned in the resolution did not exist in the Feati
case. Moreover, the resolution quoted above finally settled the issue in the
cases mentioned therein, namely, the legality of the CIR order sought to be
restrained.  It cannot be subject to
question now on the ground that the Court had been misled by the contentions of
the respondents COMPANIES.

The last paragraph of the resolution is clear and
unequivocal.  Nothing in the context
thereof can be taken to mean as enjoining the CIR from taking into account the
injunction issued by this Court in deciding the merits of the cases before
it.  It is but an authorization for the
CIR to proceed with the hearing of the cases on the merits with a view to their
prompt and final determination.

Regarding the allegation that this Court was made to understand
that the strikers could be entitled to back wages should the right to
reinstatement be upheld, the resolution itself belies it.  If there were such under­standing it would
have been incorporated in the said reso­lution. 
Also, it may be noted that the manifestations to that effect were not
made by respondents MADRIGAL and PHILSTEAM but by MOAP and MARITIMA; hence,
said manifesta­tions are not binding on respondents MADRIGAL AND PHILSTEAM.

Lastly, in denying the claim for back wages of the strikers, the
CIR considered not only the permanent injunction but also the events that
transpired from the time the case was certified by the President to the CIR on January 14, 1955 up to the time this
Court issued said injunction on March
25, 1955.

As to the fourth ground, petitioner contends that in view of the
erroneous stand of respondents regarding the legality of the strike and the
power and authority of the CIR to issue the return-to-work order, the strikers
were not only deprived of their jobs but also suffered con­siderable damage in
the form of salaries and wages which they failed to earn during the period they
were illegally deprived of their means of livelihood; that justice, equity and
the substantial merits of the case demand that the strikers should be compensated such damage; and that the two
respondents could have avoided incurring liability in the form of back wages by
reinstating the strikers after they unconditionally offered to return to work,
subject only to the reservation that they could be dismissed in the event that
the strike was declared illegal.

Petitioner’s arguments are untenable.  While the stand of respondents PHILSTEAM AND
MADRIGAL regarding the legality of the strike was adjudged erroneous, their
stand regarding the issuance of the return-to-work order of the CIR was
not.  As already pointed out, the
resolution of March 25, 1955 finally adjudicated the issue regarding the
validity and legality of the CIR back-to-work order when the preliminary
injunction was declared permanent, and the CIR, after considering the incidents
that took place from the time this case reached the said Court up to the time
this Court permanently enjoined the enforcement of the back-to­-work order,
said:

“It will thus be seen, that in the last analysis, the
Companies are not to blame for their failure to rehire the strikers after the
issuance of the Court’s back-to-work
order.  Consequently, although those
employees, except some Maritima strikers, should be
reinstated, inasmuch as none of the Companies had dis­criminatorily rejected
their application for reemployment, the Court finds, and so holds, that they
are not entitled to the back salaries claimed in their be­half.  This claim should be, as it is here­by
denied.”

Thus, under the particular circumstances
of this case, it would be unfair and unjust to require respondents MADRIGAL and
PHILSTEAM to pay the back wages of the strikers.

With this resolution on the merits of the motion for
reconsideration, we deem it no longer necessary to rule expressly on the Motion
to Dismiss Appeal filed by respondent MADRIGAL.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
denied.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, Dizon, Zaldivar, Ruiz Castro,
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo,
Villamor, and Makasiar, JJ., concur.