JOSE GUTIERREZ AND ADELAIDA GUTIERREZ, PETITIONERS, VS. ARMANDO CANTADA, CARMELITA C. CANTADA, HON. SANTIAGO O. TAÑADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE, RIZAL BRANCH XX…

The obstacle to the reversal of a decision of respondent Judge
Santiago O. Tañada dismissing an ejectment
suit against private respondents^[1]
in this petition for certiorari by way of review comes from police power
legislation, the first Republic Act No. 6539 and thereafter Presidential Decree
No. 20.  They had a common objective to
remedy the plight of the lessees, Presidential Decree No. 20, moreover, having
a constitutional sanction in that it is specifically referred to in the
fundamental law as part of “the law of the land.”^[2]
Under the former statute, actions for ejectment were
“suspended from two years from the effectivity”
thereof.^[3]
It took effect on July 14, 1971.  The complaint for ejectment
in this litigation was filed on April
22, 1972.  Such a period was
made indefinite by Presidential Decree No. 20 thus: “Except when the lease
is for a definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or
land on which another’s dwelling is located shall be suspended until otherwise
provided; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of the
Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with the
provisions of this Act, shall apply.”^[4]
Under paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil Code, one of the grounds for
judicially ejecting the lessee is the expiration of the period fixed for the
duration of the lease.^[5]

Petitioners in this proceeding were the plaintiffs in Civil Case
No. 8805 for ejectment filed with the City
Court of Caloocan City
on April 27, 1972, against
a certain Benjamin Leyva.  With leave of court, and within the reglementary period, respondent spouses filed on May 2, 1972 an answer in intervention
to the complaint.  In such pleading, they
admitted that plaintiffs, now petitioners, are the owners of the land on which
their house is built, including as an affirmative defense the fact that their
life savings were spent for the purchase of that house, a transaction entered
into only because they were given the assurance by petitioners as lessors that they would be allowed to remain for a
substantial number of years.  After trial
duly had in the City Court
of Caloocan
City, a decision in said ejectment action, in favor of the petitioners and against
respondent spouses was promul­gated on September
21, 1972.  Respondent spouses
on the same day appealed to the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Caloocan City Branch XXXIII, presided over by
respondent Judge.  On February 14, 1973, respondent Judge
rendered a decision on the case, reversing the City
Court of Caloocan City,
Branch II, dismissing the complaint for ejectment.

In such decision, respondent Judge stated the following:
“From the evidence thus adduced, it is unmistakably clear that this case
comes under the coverage of the rental law of 1971, Republic Act No. 6359.  Here, the rental stipulated is only for
P30.00 or P40.00 a month for the occupancy of defendant-intervenor
on plaintiffs’ property.  The residential
house of said intervenor is involved.  There is an agreement as to use of the
premises between the plaintiffs and the defendants-intervenors.  It cannot be claimed that the plaintiffs were
not informed nor that did they know about the occupancy of the intervenors on their property or intervenors‘
having purchased the house of their (plaintiffs’) own collector.  It is hard to believe that they did not know
until after almost one and a half years from the purchase of the house that it
is intervenor Armando Cantada,
and not anymore Benjamin Leyva nor Jose Chaingan, who is actually paying rentals therefor.  After all,
a house with a value of P8,000.00 could not just be ignored, and more, no
person would just part with P8,000.00 for a house standing on another’s
property without the assurance or at least the knowledge of the latter.”^[6]

Respondent Judge also pointed out: “There is nothing in the
complaint insinuating, or in the evidence which shows that the grounds for ejectment as enumerated in Article 1673 are present.  In fact, the evidence shows that intervenors are up-to-date in their payment of their
monthly rentals, at least before the filing of the complaint.  There is no question, either, that the
property leased from plaintiffs is used for the intervenors
for residential purposes, as was tacitly agreed upon by the parties, or at
least permitted by the plaintiffs.  The
only ground, therefore, apparently available to the plaintiffs to justify their
action is the fact that the duration of the lease as fixed by Article 1687 has
already expired, or expires each month and may be terminated at the end of said
month.  But this is excepted as ground
for ejectment by Section 4 of Republic Act No.
6359.  Under said section, the prevision
of the first paragraph of Article 1673 is suspended when the period of the
lease has not been agreed upon but has been only fixed in accordance with
Article 1687 and said period has expired. 
The period of the suspension of said provision is for 2 years from July 14, 1971, the date of the effectivity of the Act. 
This action was filed on April
27, 1972, well within the period of the suspension of the provision
authorizing ejectment by judicial action.”^[7]
After a motion for reconsideration failed, this petition for certiorari was
filed.  It should be noted that in the
opposition to such motion, Presidential Decree No. 20 which suspended court
actions for ejectment for leases covered by the same
was relied upon by private respondents.^[8]

As noted at the outset, the reliance of the decision sought to be
reviewed was on the previous statute and subsequently Presidential Decree No.
20, both police power legislation intended to remedy the situation of the
lessees.  Hence the weakness of this
petition.  We find for private
respondents.

1. On the facts as found by the lower court to which no objection
could be raised by petitioners as they brought the certiorari proceeding
directly to this Tribunal, the decision arrived at is free from the taint of
any infirmity.  When the ejectment suit was filed on April 22, 1972, Republic Act No. 6359 was in full force
and effect.  As noted earlier, for a
period of two years from July 14, 1971,
the right of the lessees to remain could not be disputed for as found by the
lower court the lease was not for a definite period.  Hence the reversal of the decision of the City
Court of Caloocan City
by respondent Judge in his decision of February
14, 1973.  As a matter of
fact, as of that date, Presidential Decree No. 20 was in full force and effect.
The suspension of actions for ejectment was for an
indefinite period.  Inasmuch as it is a
police power legislation, it was applicable to leases entered into prior to
that date.  The applicability thereof to
existing contracts cannot be denied.  From
Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. Public Service
Commission,^[9]
such a doctrine has been repeatedly adhered to by this Court.  As was held in Ongsiako
v. Gamboa,^[10]
decided in 1950, a police power measure being remedial in character covers
existing situations; otherwise, it would be self-defeating.  In Abe v. Foster Wheeler Corp.,^[11]
Justice Barrera, speaking for the Court, took note of the contention “that
as the contracts of employment Were entered into at a time when there was no
law granting the workers said right, the application as to them of the
subsequent enactment restoring the same right constitutes an impairment of
their contractual obligations.” Then he made clear why the Court was of a
contrary view as “the constitutional guaranty of non? impairment * *
* is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest
of public health, safety, morals and general welfare.”^[12]
So it must be in this case.

2. The futility of this petition is thus apparent.  A belated attempt by counsel for petitioners by
raising a constitutional question is equally unavailing.  He would have this Court declare that
Republic Act No. 6539 is violative of the equal
protection clause.  The imputation that a
police power measure of that character intended to remedy the deplorable
situation of lessees^[13]
suffers from such infirmity, is far from persuasive.  It cannot be stigmatized as class
legislation.  There was a clear need for
such a statute.  It was enacted to
promote the public interest and the general welfare.  The State is not compelled to stand idly by
while a considerable segment of its citizens suffers from economic
distress.  Only recently, in Agustin v. Edu,^[14]
reference was made to the “broad and expansive scope of police power”
citing Chief Justice Taney of the American Supreme Court in an 1847 decision as
“nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in every
sovereignty.”^[15]
Correctly was it characterized by Justice Malcolm as “that most essential,
insistent, and illimitable of powers.”^[16]
Moreover, there is a procedural objection to this last-ditch effort, the
well-settled rule being that the constitutional question should be raised at
the earliest opportunity.^[17]
Nor does this case falls within one of the exceptions mentioned in People v.
Vera.^[18]
Even if success could have attended this maneuver, still there is the
insuperable barrier posed by Presidential Decree No. 20 which was relied upon
in the objection of private respondents to the motion for reconsideration.  It was therefore within the cognizance of
respondent Judge, as it ought to have been all the while.  Petitioners apparently had nothing to say
about this Presidential Decree.  They
ought not to have been surprised at its being applied being a part “of the
law of the land.” To repeat, petitioner had failed to make out a case for
reversal.

3.  At any rate, as of April 10, 1979, a new Rent Control
Law, Batas Pambansa Blg. 25
was signed by the President and took effect immediately.  Petitioners, if falling within the terms
thereof, may avail themselves of the benefits of this new legislation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed.  Costs against petitioners.

Antonio, (Actg. Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and
Santos, JJ.,
concur.

Abad Santos, J., did not take part.

Barredo, J., on official leave.

^[1]
The private respondents are the lessees Armando Cantada
and Carmelita C. Cantada.

^[2]
Article XVII, Section 2, par. (2) of the Constitution, insofar as pertinent,
reads: “All proclamations, orders, decrees, instructions, and acts promulgated,
issued, or done by the incumbent President shall be part of the law of the
land, * * *.”

^[3]
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 6359 provides: “Except when the lease is for
definite period, the provisions of paragraph (1) of Article 1673 of the Civil
Code insofar as they refer to dwelling unit or land on which another’s dwelling
is located shall be suspended for two years from the effect­ivity
of this Act; but other provisions of the Civil Code and the Rules of Court of
the Philippines on lease contracts, insofar as they are not in conflict with
the provisions of this Act, shall apply.”

^[4] Ibid,
Section 4.

^[5]
Article 1673, par. 1 reads as follows: “The lessor
may judicially eject the lessee for any of the follow­ing causes:  (1) When the period agreed upon, or that
which is fixed for the duration of leases under articles 1682 and 1687, has
expired.”

^[6]
Petition, Annex F, 4-5.

^[7] Ibid,
6-7.

^[8]
Petition, Annex F, 4-5.

^[9]
70 Phil. 221 (1940).

^[10]
86 Phil. 50.

^[11]
110 Phil. 198.

^[12] Ibid,
203.  Cf. Philippine American Life
Insurance Co. v. Auditor General, L-19255, January 18, 1968, 22 SCRA 135.

^[13]
Cf. Block v. Hirsh, 256 US 135 (1921).

^[14]
L-49112, February 2, 1979.

^[15]
License Cases, 5 How. 504, 583 (1847).

^[16]
Smith, Bell and Co. v. Natividad, 40 Phil.
136, 147 (1919).

^[17] Cf.
Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. v. Del Rosario,
26 Phil. 192 (1913).

^[18]
65 Phil. 56 (1937).