CENTRAL TEXTILE MILLS, INC., PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND DANIEL CORPUZ, RESPONDENTS.

The security of tenure included in the constitutional pro­vision
on protection to labor under the present Constitution affords sufficient basis
for sustaining the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission
sought to be set aside in this petition for certiorari filed by the employer.^[1]
The allegation of arbitrariness and consequent lack of due process, whether in
its procedural or substantive aspect, by petitioner Central Textile Mills,
Inc., lacks basis, as pointed out clearly by Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza in his Comment con­sidered as the
Answer.^[2]
The dismissal of private respondent Daniel Corpuz
which was set aside by respondent Commission was premised on the failure to
substantiate the charge that he was guilty of theft.  As set forth in its Decision:  “The right to reinstatement, after
finding that the dismissal of an employee is illegal, becomes a must.  This is imperative, if only to give meaning
and fulfillment to the security of tenure clause in the Constitution of the Philippines.”^[3]
Why a petition of this character lacks merit was rendered even more evident by
the Comment of Solicitor General Mendoza that as no dismissal was even
contemplated had not management imputed theft to private respondent, an
accusation investigated and thereafter found without basis not only by two
Assistant Fiscals of Quezon City but also by
respondent Commission, it would be to render nugatory the security of tenure
provision if there were no reinstatement. 
That is to abide by the authoritative pronouncement in Philippine Air
Lines, Inc. v. Philippine Airlines Employees Association.^[4]

The petition must fail.

1.  The decision sought to
be set aside in its opening paragraph set forth the decisive fact as to the
failure to prove the allegation of theft. 
It considered such accusation “a bankrupt assertion in the light of
the recommendation of the investigating Assistant City Fiscal Amado Costales,” which was
for dismissing the unwarranted charge. 
That was the view of Assistant City Fiscal Amado
Costales of Quezon City in
the reinvestigation of such complaint. 
There was thus an affirmance of the same
conclusion by Assistant City Fiscal Nestor Batungbakal
of the same City.^[5]
Both the City Fiscal’s Office then and respondent
Commission are united in the view that no theft was committed.  The allegation of arbitrariness must,
therefore, fail.  The matter was duly and
carefully investigated.  The proof as to
the allegation of theft certainly did not suffice.  Under the circumstances, the imposition of a
penalty for an offense not committed is unwarranted.  On this point, there is pertinence to the
following excerpt from the Comment: 
“It is not also accurate for petitioner to say that the public
respondents simply relied on the findings of the City Fiscal of Quezon City.  They
did not.  The case at bar underwent
conciliation and then compulsory arbitration where evidence was adduced by both
parties.  After an adverse decision by
Labor Arbiter Daniel M. Lucas, Jr., petitioner appealed to the NLRC on both questions of fact and of law.  On November
29, 1978, the NLRC affirmed the decision
of the Labor Arbiter with modifications. 
Again, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied
by the NLRC en banc on November 24, 1978. 
All these show that the petitioner was given all the chance to present
its evidence and ventilate its arguments before the public respondents.”^[6]
There was then no violation of the due process clause, whether in its
procedural or substantive aspect. 
Moreover, the finding of fact thus arrived at by the conscientious
exercise of official function, that no theft could be imputed to private
respondent, is entitled to the fullest respect. 
So it has been reiterated time and time again.^[7]
We do so once more.

2.  The weakness of the
petition, to repeat, is thus indisputable. 
Petitioner, however, would try to impart a semblance of plausibility by
alleging that even on the assumption that no theft was committed, still there
was loss of confidence sufficient to cause his dismissal.  In the Philippine Air Lines decision referred
to, the accusation that theft was committed by the employee was likewise not
borne out by the evidence.  To justify a
dismissal, management relied on the allegation that there was breach of trust,
a ground analogous to loss of confidence. 
The Court of Industrial Relations did not agree.  Neither did this Court.  Reinstatement was ordered.  So it must be in this case.  Such a vague, all-encompassing pretext as
loss of confidence, if given the seal of approval by this Court, could easily
be utilized to reduce to a barren form of words the constitutional guarantee of
security of tenure.  Precisely, the
employee is afforded that protection so that his means of livelihood is not
placed at the mercy of management.  He is
just as much a participant in the industrial process.  He is entitled to be considered as such.  Constitutional provisions protecting labor
are in line with the predominant thinking all over the world safeguarding human
dignity.  It would then be to ignore not
only a mandate of the fundamental law but also a counsel of wisdom and fair
play to impart to the concept of loss of confidence such a latitudinarian
scope.  What matters the investigation
undergone by private respondent resulting in the affirmation of his innocence,
if thereafter management would just rely on an alleged loss of confidence?  The constitutional provision is not to be so
easily brushed aside.  If it were
otherwise, there would be failure, in the language of the Philippine Air Lines
opinion “to conform to the ideal of the New Society, the establishment of
which was so felicitously referred to by the First Lady as the Compassionate
Society.”^[8]

3.  There is no implication in
this opinion that under certain circumstances, loss of confidence could not
justify termination of the service. 
There may be cases where an employee of a managerial rank would be hard
put to avoid separation from the service on a showing that management no longer
possesses confidence in his ability to perform the task entrusted to him.  Even so, petitioner is not in a better
position.  The order of reinstatement
must stand.  Correctly, the Comment of
the Solicitor General pointed out that there was no evidence that private
respondent had that status.  Thus:  “The allegation that no dispute exists
as to the managerial status of private respondent is misleading.  The fact is the records of the case [do] not
show that petitioner submitted any evidence to support its conclusion.  There is no showing as to whether private
respondent, as overseer, can lay down management policies, or whether he can
hire, fire, demote or promote or whether he can effectively recommend the
foregoing courses of action.  Indeed up
to this stage, petitioner does not define the powers and duties of an overseer
in its company.”^[9]

WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari is dismissed.  The decision is immediately executory.  No costs.

Antonio, (Actg. Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos,
and Abad
Santos, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., on official leave.

^[1]
According to Article II, Section 9 of the Constitution:  “The State shall afford protection to
labor, promote full employment and equality in employment, ensure equal work
opportunities regardless of sex, race, or creed, and regulate the relations
between workers and employers.  The State
shall assure the rights of workers to self-organization, collective bargaining,
security of tenure, and just and humane conditions of work.  The State may provide for compulsory
arbitration.”

^[2]
He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato
S. Puno.

^[3]
Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, 3.  The decision was attached to the petition but
counsel for petitioner failed to mark it as an annex.

^[4]
L-24626, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 489.

^[5]
Cf. Ibid, 1-3.  Comment of Solicitor
General Mendoza, 1-5.

^[6]
Comment, 6-7.

^[7]
Cf. Antipolo Highway Lines v. Inciong, L-38532, June 27, 1975, 64 SCRA
441; Jacqueline Indus­tries v. National Labor Relations Commission,
L-37034, August 29, 1975, 66 SCRA 397; Federacion Obrera v. Noriel, L-41937, July 6, 1976, 72 SCRA
24; Kapisanan ng mga Manggagawa v. Noriel, L-45475, June 20, 1977, 77 SCRA
414; Monark International, Inc. v. Noriel, L-47570-71, May 11, 1978, 83 SCRA
114.

^[8]
57 SCRA 489, 496.

^[9]
Comment, 5-6.