CATALINA ALBERCA Y BUSTILLO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT VS. THE SUPERINTENDENT OF THE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION FOR WOMEN, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

This case is before us on appeal (in forma pauperis) from
tile decision of the Court of First Instance of (Branch VI, Pasig),
dismissing the petition for habeas corpus filed by appellant.

Appellant was charged with the offense of theft before the Municipal
Court of Manila. ‘The information was filed at 2:15 in the afternoon of
April 8, 1957, alleging that the crime had been committed the previous
day, April 7. The object stolen was a mechanical.jack valued at P120.00
and belonging to one Vicente Lim. The information likewise charged that
the accused was a habitual delinquent, having been previously convicted
five times of the crime of theft by virtue of final judgments rendered
by competent courts within a period of ten years from the date of her
release or last conviction. The dates the various offenses were
committed, the dates of the corresponding judgments, the penalties
imposed and the dates of her release were all recited in the
information. At 10 :00 o’clock in the evening of April 8, 1957
appellant was arraigned and upon her plea of guilty was sentenced to 6
months and 1 day of prision correcional and to an additional penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor for being a habitual delinquent. Thereupon she started serving sentence. On February 9, 1960 she filed the instant petition.

Appellant contends that her constitutional right to due process had
been violated because (1) she was not given sufficient time to prepare
for her defense; and (2) she was not represented by counsel.

Concerning the first ground, appellant relies on section 7 of Rule
114, to the effect that the defendant in a criminal case is entitled
to at least two days to prepare for trial, and states that less than 48
hours had elapsed between the time of her arrest and the time she was
arraigned and received the pronouncement of sentence. The rule,
however, does not apply, for it refers only to a case where the
defendant enters a plea of not guilty. A plea of guilty dispenses with
the necessity of trial, and hence of such time as may be required to
prepare for the defense.

As to the second ground, the presumption is that official duty has
been regularly performed, and in appellant’s case, that she was duly
informed of her right to secure the services of counsel. There is
nothing in the record before us to rebut this presumption. The right to
counsel may be waived, as by a plea of guilty voluntarily given. It is
not pretended here that the information was not duly read to appellant
upon arraignment; nor is there any denial that she had committed the
crime charged as well as the five other offenses of which she had been
previously convicted and on which the allegation of habitual
delinquency was based.

The case of Johnson vs. Zerbst (304 U.S. 458-469) cited by appellant
is not in point. In that case the petitioner was accused of uttering
and passing counterfeit currency. He pleaded not guilty and entered
into trial. He requested the District Attorney that a counsel be
appointed for him but the request was refused on a statutory ground,
and when remanded to jail he was not permitted by the jailer to call
for or contact a lawyer to handle the defense. The District Court did
not find that petitioner had waived his constitutional right of
counsel. Under the circumstances, the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals held that there was a violation of due process  correctible by
habeas corpus. In the case at bar not only did appellant enter a plea
of guilty, but there is no showing that she requested the services of
counsel or that she was not informed of her right to secure one during”
the arraignment.

In the case of Talavera vs. The Superintendent and Warden
of the Correctional Institution for Women, 67 Phil., 539, a petition
for habeas corpus was filed on the ground, among others, that the
petitioner had not been given the opportunity to utilize the services
of a lawyer. The petition was dismissed both in the first instance and
on appeal in spite of proof that she had not been informed of such
right before arraignment. This Court stated that the denial thereof did
not void the whole proceeding, being only an error of law, the remedy
to correct which was by appeal from the decision and not by petition
for habeas corpus.

The judgment appealed from is affirmed, without costs.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.