G. R. No. L-17749. January 31, 1964
VICENTE TAMAYO, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. SAN MIGUEL BREWERY, INC., DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.
REGALA, J.:
Court of First Instance of Manila, dismissing plaintiff-appellant’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 38813 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
Plaintiff-appellant was an employee of the San Miguel Brewery, Inc.
from April 26, 1954 until! July 3, 1958 on which latter date he was
dismissed on the ground that he had been found guilty of tampering with
the drying process control of the yeast plant of the company. Alleging
that his dismissal was without cause, no evidence having been presented
in an investigation to prove his guilt, plaintiff-appellant filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He prayed that he
be reinstated, that he be awarded the sum of P5,000 as moral damages
for mental anguish suffered as a result of his dismissal and that he be
paid the sum of P1,000 by way of attorney’s fees.
Defendant-appellee filed an answer in due time, denying the charge
of the plaintiff-appellant and alleging that it had dismissed
plaintiff-appellant for tampering with the drying process control which
caused it damage. Defendant-appellee also contended that
plaintiff-appellant had no cause of action since lie had not resorted
to the grievance procedure of the collective bargaining agreement and
that the Court of First Instance of Manila did not have jurisdiction
over the case.
On July 11, 1959, the lower court, on motion of defendant-appellee,
dismissed the complaint on the ground that the same did not state a
cause of action and that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action.
On July 27, 1959, plaintiff-appellant, through counsel, filed a
motion for reconsideration and for leave to amend his complaint so as
to assert that, under the amended collective bargaining agreement and
the company’s rules and regulations, he “may not be dismissed by defendant except for just and valid cause” so that his dismissal on July 3, 1958 was in violation of these provisions.
On the other hand, defendant-appellee opposed the motion on the
ground that the complaint having been dismissed for failure to state a
cause of action and for lack of jurisdiction, its subsequent amendment
so as to cure the jurisdictional defect could not be allowed.
The lower court, however, admitted the amended complaint. And so
defendant-appellee filed a motion for reconsideration and when this
motion was denied, defendant-appellee filed its answer and later its
amended answer to amended complaint. In its amended answer, defendant
raised again the question of jurisdiction.
After due hearing, the trial court rendered a decision, dated August
18, 1960, dismissing the amended complaint on the ground that it had no
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. In an order dated
September 29, 1960, the trial court denied plaintiff-appellants motion
for reconsideration. Hence, this appeal, plaintiff-appellant contending
that this case does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as the lower court held, because it does not
involve a charge of unfair labor practice, or a claim under the Minimum
Wage Law or the Eight-Hour Labor Law.
On the other hand, defendant-appellee maintains that the ease is
cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations in line with our ruling
in Price Stabilization Corporation vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., 108 Phil., 134. Defendant-appellee contends that
reinstatement may only be ordered in unfair labor practice cases under
Republic Act No. 875 which are within the jurisdiction of the Court of
Industrial Relations. For purposes of maintaining the decision of the
lower.court which dismissed the complaint, defendant-appellee also
argues that, after a complaint is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction,
the same cannot be amended so as to bring a case within the
jurisdiction of a court.
In the PRISCO case, we held that—
“* * * where the employer-employee relationship is
still existing or is sought to ‘be reestablished because of its
wrongful severance (as where the employee seeks reinstatement), the
Court of Industrial Relations has jurisdiction over all claims arising
out of, or in connection with the employment,, such as those related
to the Minimum Wage Law and the Eight-Hour Labor Law, After the
termination of the relationship and no reinstatement is sought, such
claims become mere money claims and come within, the jurisdiction of
the regular courts.”
A more recent definition of the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations is found in Campos, et al. vs. Manila Railroad Co., et al., G. R. No. L-179G5, May 25, 1962, in which We held:.
“We may, therefore, restate, for the benefit of the
bench and the bar, that in order that the Court of Industrial Relations
may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in the light of Republic
Act No. 875, the following circumstances must be present: (a) there
must exist between the parties an employer-employee relationship, or
claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy
must relate to a case certified by the President to the CIR as one
involving national interest or must have a bearing on an unfair labor
practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-Hour Labor, Law,
or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these
circumstances, the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under
the jurisdiction of the regular courts.” (Italics ours)
In this case, while plaintiff-appellant seeks his reinstatement, he
does not hint at any unfair labor practice as having been committed by
the defendant company against him. Neither is this a case certified by
the President to the Court of Industrial Relations as involving
national interest (Sec. 10, Republic Act No. 875) or a case arising
under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act No. 602) or the Eight-Hour
Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444, as amended). Consequently, it is
not cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
Indeed, We held very recently in a similar case that a mere claim
for reinstatement, unaccompanied by any allegation that the employee’s
dismissal was due to an unfair labor practice or that the case involves
a claim under the Minimum Wage Law or the Eight-Hour Labor Law does not
bring a case within the jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial
Relations. (Barranta vs. International Harvester of the
Philippines, G. R. No. L-18198, April 22, 1963; Araullo vs. Monte de
Piedad, et al., G. R. No. L-17840, April 23, 1953. See also Perez vs.
The Court of Industrial Relations, et al., G. R. No. L-18182, February
27, 1963.)
We now come to defendant-appellee’s claim that since the original
complaint was dismissed for failure to state a cause of action and for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the amendment of the same
so as to confer jurisdiction on the court is improper.
Recently, We ruled that a complaint .cannot be amended so as to
confer jurisdiction on the court in which it is filed, if the cause of
action originally set forth was not within the court’s jurisdiction.
(Campos Rueda Corp. vs. Hon. Judge Bautista, et al., G.R. No.
L-I8452, September 29, 1962). In this case, however, although the order
of July 11, 1959 stated that— .
“The Court hence concludes that plaintiff’s
complaint does not allege facts sufficient to constitute a valid cause
of action and the Court has no jurisdiction, of the subject mentioned
hereof.”
it is apparent that the ground for dismissal was the failure of the
complaint to state a cause of – action alone. Indeed, the amendment
introduced by the plaintiff-appellant consisted mainly of the
allegation that his dismissal was in violation of the collective
bargaining agreement and the rules and regulations of the company under
which plaintiff-appellant “may not be dismissed by defendant except for just and valid cause.”
Certainly, this amendment did not confer jurisdiction on the trial
court. The amendment merely corrected a defect in the allegation of
plaintiff-appellant’s cause of action, because as it then stood, the
original complaint stated no cause of action in the light of our ruling
in Gutierrez vs. Bachrach Motor Co., 105 Phil., 7; that—
“In the absence of something in the contract of
employment to fix a definite term of service, or other contract
provision to restrict the right of the employer to discharge, or some
statutory restriction upon the right, an employer may lawfully
discharge an employee if at what time he pleases and for what cause he
chooses, without thereby becoming liable to an action against him.”
We hold therefore that the trial court did not err in allowing plaintiff-appellant to amend its complaint so as to plead the
collective bargaining agreement.
Wherefore, the decision of August 18, 1960 and the order of
September 29, 1960 are hereby reversed and the Court of First Instance
of Manila is directed to decide this case on the basis of the evidence
submitted by the parties. No costs.
Bengzon, C. J., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.