G.R. No. L-32599. June 29, 1979
EDGARDO E. MENDOZA, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ABUNDIO Z. ARRIETA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH VIII, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, FELINO TIMBOL, AND RODOLFO SALAZAR, RESPONDENTS.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Petitioner, Edgardo Mendoza, seeks a review on Certiorari
of the Orders of respondent Judge in Civil Case No. 80803 dismissing his
Complaint for Damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Felino
Timbol and Rodolfo Salazar.
The facts which spawned the present controversy may be summarized
as follows:
On October 22, 1969, at about 4:00 ‘o’clock in the afternoon, a
three-way vehicular accident occurred along Mac-Arthur Highway, Marilao,
Bulacan, involving a Mercedes Benz owned and driven by petitioner; a private
jeep owned and driven by respondent Rodolfo Salazar; and a gravel and sand truck owned by respondent Felino
Timbol and driven by Freddie Montoya. As
a consequence of said mishap, two separate Informations for Reckless Imprudence
Causing Damage to Property were filed against Rodolfo Salazar and Freddie
Montoya with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. The case against truck-driver Montoya,
docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-227, was for causing damage to the jeep owned
by Salazar, in the amount of P1,604.00, by hitting it at the right rear portion
thereby causing said jeep to hit and bump an oncoming car, which happened to be
petitioner’s Mercedes Benz. The case
against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, docketed as Criminal Case No. SM-228, was
for causing damage to the Mercedes Benz of petitioner in the amount of
P8,890.00.
At the joint trial of the above cases, petitioner testified that
jeep-owner-driver Salazar overtook the truck driven by Montoya, swerved to the
left going towards the poblacion of Marilao, and hit his car which was bound
for Manila. Petitioner further
testified that before the impact, Salazar had jumped from the jeep and that he
was not aware that Salazar’s jeep was bumped from behind by the truck driven by
Montoya. Petitioner’s version of the
accident was adopted by truck-driver Montoya.
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar, on the other hand, tried to show that, after
overtaking the truck driven by Montoya, he flashed a signal indicating his
intention to turn left towards the poblacion of Marilao but was stopped at the
intersection by a policeman who was directing traffic; that while he was at a
stop position, his jeep was bumped at the rear by the truck driven by Montoya
causing him to be thrown out of the jeep, which then swerved to the left and
hit petitioner’s car, which was coming from the opposite direction.
On July 31, 1970, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch
V, Sta. Maria, rendered judgment, stating in its decretal portion:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused
Freddie Montoya GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of damage to
property thru reckless imprudence in Crim. Case No. SM-227, and hereby
sentences him to pay a fine of P972.50 and to indemnify Rodolfo Salazar in the
same amount of P972.50 as actual damages, with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency, both as to fine and indemnity, with costs.
“Accused Rodolfo Salazar is hereby ACQUITTED from the offense
charged in Crim. Case No. SM-228, with costs de officio, and his bond is
ordered cancelled.
“SO ORDERED.”[1]
Thus, the trial Court absolved jeep-owner-driver Salazar of any
liability, civil and criminal, in view of its findings that the collision
between Salazar’s jeep and petitioner’s car was the result of the former having
been bumped from behind by the truck driven by Montoya. Neither was petitioner awarded damages as he
was not a complainant against truck-driver Montoya but only against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar.
On August 22, 1970, or after the termination of the criminal
cases, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 80803 with the Court of First Instance
of Manila against respondents jeep-owner-driver Salazar and Felino Timbol, the
latter being the owner of the gravel and sand truck driven by Montoya, for
indemnification for the damages sustained by his car as a result of the
collision involving their vehicles.
Jeep-owner-driver Salazar and truck-owner Timbol were joined as defendants, either in the alternative or in
solidum, allegedly for the reason that petitioner was uncertain as to
whether he was entitled to relief against both or only one of them.
On September 9, 1970, truck-owner Timbol filed a Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 80803 on the grounds that the Complaint is barred by a
prior judgment in the criminal cases and that it fails to state a cause of
action. An Opposition thereto was filed
by petitioner.
In an Order dated September 12, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed
the Complaint against truck-owner Timbol for reasons stated in the
aforementioned Motion to Dismiss. On
September 30, 1970, petitioner sought before
this Court the review of that dismissal, to which petition we gave due
course.
On January 30, 1971, upon motion of jeep-owner-driver Salazar,
respondent Judge also dismissed the case as
against the former. Respondent
Judge reasoned out that “while it is
true that an independent civil action for liability under Article 2177
of the Civil Code could be prosecuted independently of the criminal action for
the offense from which it arose, the New Rules of Court, which took effect on
January 1, 1964, requires an express reservation of the civil action to be made
in the criminal action; otherwise, the same would be barred pursuant to Section
2, Rule 111 x x x.”[2] Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
thereof was denied in the Order
dated February 23, 1971, with respondent Judge suggesting that the issue be
raised to a higher Court “for a more decisive interpretation of the
rule.”[3]
On March 25, 1971, petitioner then filed a Supplemental Petition
before us, also to review the last two mentioned Orders, to which we required
jeep-owner-driver Salazar to file an Answer.
The Complaint against
truck-owner Timbol
We shall first discuss the validity of the Order, dated September
12, 1970, dismissing petitioner’s Complaint against truck-owner Timbol.
In dismissing the Complaint against the truck-owner, respondent
Judge sustained Timbol’s allegations that the civil suit is barred by the prior
joint judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. SM-227 and SM-228, wherein no reservation
to file a separate civil case was made by petitioner and where the latter
actively participated in the trial and tried to prove damages against jeep
driver Salazar only; and that the Complaint does not state a cause of action
against truck-owner Timbol inasmuch as petitioner prosecuted jeep-owner-driver
Salazar as the one solely responsible for the damage suffered by his car.
Well-settled is the rule that for a prior judgment to constitute
a bar to a subsequent case, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be a final judgment; (2) it must
have been rendered by a Court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
over the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must
be, between the first and second actions, identity of parties, identity of
subject matter and identity of cause of action.
It is conceded that the first three requisites of res judicata
are present. However, we agree with
petitioner that there is no identity of cause of action between Criminal Case
No. SM-227 and Civil Case No. 80803.
Obvious is the fact that in said criminal case truck driver Montoya was
not prosecuted for damage to petitioner’s car but for damage to the jeep. Neither was truck-owner Timbol a party in
said case. In fact as the trial Court
had put it “the owner of the Mercedes Benz cannot recover any damages
from the accused Freddie Montoya, he (Mendoza) being a complainant only against
Rodolfo Salazar in Criminal Case No. SM-228.”[4]
And more importantly, in the criminal cases, the cause of action was the
enforcement of the civil liability arising from criminal negligence under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas Civil Case No. 80803 is based on
quasi-delict under Article 2180, in relation to Article 2176 of the
Civil Code. As held in Barredo vs.
Garcia, et al:[5]
“The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate
individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil
Code. Specifically they show that there
is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or
a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910
of the Civil Code. Still more concretely,
the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer
in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under
article 1903 of the Civil Code.”
That petitioner’s cause of action against Timbol in the civil
case is based on quasi-delict is evident from the recitals in the complaint, to
wit: that while petitioner was driving
his car along MacArthur Highway at Marilao, Bulacan, a jeep owned and driven by Salazar suddenly swerved to his
(petitioner’s) lane and collided with his car; that the sudden swerving of
Salazar’s jeep was caused either by the negligence and lack of skill of Freddie
Montoya, Timbol’s employee, who was then driving a gravel and sand truck in the same direction as SaLazar’s
jeep; and that as a consequence of the collision, petitioner’s car suffered
extensive damage amounting to P12,
248.20 and that he likewise incurred actual and moral damages,
litigation expenses and attorney’s fees.
Clearly, therefore, the two factors that a cause of action must consist
of, namely: (1) plaintiff’s primary
right, i.e., that he is the owner of a Mercedes Benz , and (2) defendant’s delict
or wrongful act or omission which violated plaintiff’s primary right, i.e., the
negligence or lack of skill either of jeep-owner Salazar or of Timbol’s employee, Montoya, in
driving the truck, causing Salazar’s jeep to swerve and collide with petitioner’s
car, were alleged in the Complaint.[6]
Consequently, petitioner’s cause of action being based on quasi-delict,
respondent Judge committed reversible error when he dismissed the civil suit
against the truck-owner, as said case may proceed independently of the criminal
proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
“Art. 31. When the
civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission
complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.”
But it is truck-owner Timbol’s submission (as well as that of jeep-owner-driver Salazar)
that petitioner’s failure to make a reservation in the criminal action of his right
to file an independent civil action bars the institution of such separate civil
action, invoking section 2, rule 111, Rules of Court, which says:
“Section 2. –
Independent civil action. – In the cases
provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from
the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is
reserved as required in the preceding section.
Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal
prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.”
Interpreting the above provision, this Court, in Garcia vs.
Florido,[7]
said:
“As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act
causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from crime or create an
action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the criminal
law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always
had its own foundation and individuality.
Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31,
the civil action based upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the
criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and regardless of the result of the
latter. Hence, ‘the proviso in Section 2
of Rule 111 with reference to x x x Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is
contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were
drafted x x x and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule
stated in what is now Section 1 of Rule 111.
The proviso, which is procedural, may also be regarded as an
unauthorized amendment of substantive law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil
Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso.’ x x x
x “.
In his concurring opinion in the above case, Mr. Justice Antonio
Barredo further observed that inasmuch as Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil
Code create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action
arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code, no
reservation, therefore, need be made in the criminal case; that Section 2 of
Rule 111 is inoperative, “it being substantive in character and is not within
the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate; and even if it were not
substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with
Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of
1940.”
We declare, therefore, that in so far as truck-owner Timbol is
concerned, Civil Case No. 80803 is not barred by the fact that petitioner
failed to reserve, in the criminal action, his right to file an independent
civil action based on quasi-delict.
The suit against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar
The case as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar, who was acquitted
in Criminal Case No. SM-228, presents a different picture altogether.
At the outset it should be clarified that inasmuch as civil
liability coexists with criminal responsibility in negligence cases, the
offended party has the option between an action for enforcement of civil
liability based on culpa criminal under Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, and an action for recovery of damages based on culpa
aquiliana under Article 2177 of the Civil Code. The action for enforcement of civil liability
based on culpa criminal under section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules
of Court is deemed simultaneously instituted with the criminal action,
unless expressly waived or reserved for separate application by the offended
party.[8]
The circumstances attendant to the criminal case yields the
conclusion that petitioner had opted to base his cause of action against
jeep-owner-driver Salazar on culpa criminal and not on culpa
aquiliana, as evidenced by his active participation and intervention in
the prosecution of the criminal suit against said Salazar. The latter’s civil liability continued to be
involved in the criminal action until its termination. Such being the case, there was no need for
petitioner to have reserved his right to file a separate civil action as his action for civil liability was
deemed impliedly instituted in Criminal Case No. SM-228.
Neither would an independent civil action lie. Noteworthy is the basis of the acquittal of
jeep-owner-driver Salazar in the criminal case, expounded by the trial Court in
this wise:
“In view of what has been proven and established during the
trial, accused Freddie Montoya would be held liable for having bumped and hit
the rear portion of the jeep driven by the accused Rodolfo Salazar.
“Considering that the collision between the jeep driven by
Rodolfo Salazar and the car owned and driven by Edgardo Mendoza was the result
of the hitting on the rear of the jeep by the truck driven by Freddie Montoya,
this Court believes that accused Rodolfo Salazar cannot be held liable for the
damages sustained by Edgardo Mendoza’s car.”[9]
Crystal clear is the trial Court’s pronouncement that under the
facts of the case, jeep-owner-driver Salazar cannot be held liable for the
damages sustained by petitioner’s car.
In other words, “the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist.” Accordingly, inasmuch as petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar
is ex–delictu, founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
the civil action must be held to have been extinguished consonance with Section
3(c), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court[10]
which provides:
“Sec. 3. Other civil
actions arising from offenses. – In all
cases not included in the preceding section the following rules shall be
observed:
x x x
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it
extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a
final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not
exist. x x x “
And even if petitioner’s cause of action as against jeep-owner-driver Salazar were not ex–delictu,
the end result would be the same, it being clear from the judgment in the
criminal case that Salazar’s acquittal
was not based upon reasonable doubt, consequently, a civil action for damages
can no longer be instituted. This is
explicitly provided for in Article 29 of the Civil Code quoted hereunder:
“Art. 29. When the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the
same act or omission may be
instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence. x x x
“If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon
reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare.
In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred
from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that
ground.”
In so far as the suit against jeep-owner-driver Salazar is concerned,
therefore, we sustain respondent Judge’s Order dated January 30, 1971
dismissing the complaint, albeit on different grounds.
WHEREFORE, 1) the Order dated September 12, 1970
dismissing Civil Case No. 80803 against private respondent Felino Timbol is set
aside, and respondent Judge, or his successor, hereby ordered to proceed with
the hearing on the merits; 2) but the Orders dated January 30, 1971 and
February 23, 1971 dismissing the Complaint in Civil Case No. 80803 against
respondent Rodolfo Salazar are hereby upheld.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De Castro, JJ., concur.
[1]
p. 26, Rollo
[2]
pp. 147-149, ibid.
[3]
pp. 138-139, ibid.
[4]
Decision, p. 26, ibid.
[5]
73 Phil. 607, 620 (1942)
[6]
Racoma vs. Fortich, 39 SCRA 521 (1971)
[7]
52 SCRA 420 (1973)
[8]
Padua vs. Robles, 66 SCRA 485 (1975)
[9]
pp. 25-26, Rollo
[10]
Elcano vs. Hill 77 SCRA 98 (1977)