THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. ARMANDO ESTERO Y BASCO, ET. AL., DEFENDANTS, ARMANDO ESTERO Y BASCO, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

Appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City (Branch IV), interposed by Armando Estero y Basco, imposing upon him the
penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of murder, and to pay
P12,000.00 as indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, Gregorio Dira, and costs.

The following facts, quoted from Appellee’s Brief, appear to have
been duly established by the evidence of the prosecution:

“On March 27, 1969, between
8:00 to 9:00 o’clock in the evening, Antonio
Villanueva, Boy Pengson, Gregorio Dira and one Gary were at Daling’s Restaurant
at the corner of Timog and De los Santos Avenue, Quezon City (pp. 8­-9, 13 tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  They were seated at the table and eating
inside the restaurant (p. 9, tsn,
Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  Gregorio Dira then stood up and repaired
outside through the door to spit (p. 8, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  While
outside, he was suddenly hit and stabbed in the belly by Armando Estero with a
weapon which looked like an icepick (pp. 7-8, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  Antonio Villanueva who was 12 to 15 meters
away from the stabbing scene, and which was well-lighted by the electric light
of the Daling’s Restaurant, rushed to the two protagonists to pacify them (pp.
13-15, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  When Armando Estero who was then in company
with four others tried to stab him too, he withdrew and ran away (p. 15, tsn,
Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).

“The police arrived after the incident and since the assailant
and his companions were no longer there, Antonio Villanueva informed them that
it was Armando Estero who stabbed Gregorio Dira, and that he had four
companions at the time (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  Antonio Villanueva called for a taxi and
brought the victim Gregorio Dira to the Labor Hospital (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 28,
1969, Naval); the policemen on the other hand went after the assailant and his
compan­ions (p. 9, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval). 
While Gregorio Dira was being attended to at the Labor Hospital, Antonio
Villanueva left to inform the sister and brothers of Gregorio Dira as to what
happened (p. 10, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval). 
Later, he brought them to the hospital where Gregorio Dira was in a
serious condition (pp. 9-10, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval).  Upon advice of the medical staff of the San Lazaro
Hospital, Gregorio Dira was brought to the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital (pp.
11-12, tsn, Aug. 28, 1969, Naval). 
Despite medical attendance, however, Gregorio Dira expired on March 29,
1969 at 6:30 p.m. by reason of the stab wounds he sustained (Exh.
“E”, p. 5, rec. of Exhibits).

“After a month, the Quezon City police were finally able to
arrest Armando Estero and Ernesto Flores, Jr. as suspects (p. 2, tsn, Aug. 13,
1969, Naval).  Pat. Pastor Sta. Maria
took down the written statements of these persons in connection with the death
of Gregorio Dira (Exhs. “C” and “D”, pp. 4 & 5, rec.),
as well as the statements of Antonio Pengson and Antonio Villanueva (Exhs.
“A” and “B”, pp. 1-3, rec.).

“Pat. Pastor Sta. Maria on the witness stand categorically
declared that Exhibit “C” was given by accused Armando Estero without
force and intimidation employed upon his per­son, and that the same was written
in Tagalog after being assured by Armando Estero that he was conversant in
Tagalog (pp. 3-4, tsn, Aug. 13, 1969, Naval). 
In his statement, Armando Estero admitted that he was inside Daling’s
Restaurant in Quezon City on the night of March 27, 1969; that when he was
eating a person approached him asking money to buy liquor and because he had no
money he did not give the person any; that when he was leaving the restaurant,
the person who asked money from him and whose name he does not know followed
him and boxed him until he fell; that because of this, he brought out his
icepick and stabbed the person who was asking money from him; and that when
another person tried to attack him, he also stabbed the former (Exhs.
“C” and “C-1” pp. 3-4, tsn, Aug. 13, 1969, Naval).”

The inculpatory facts as above
narrated were estab­lished by the testimony of state witness Antonio Villanueva,
finding support and corroboration in appellant’s own state­ment (Exh. C) taken
down after his arrest by Pat. Pastor Sta. Maria, admitting having stabbed the
deceased, which thereby destroyed completely appellant’s eleventh-hour defense
of alibi.

In his present appeal, appellant, of necessity, finds no other
recourse than to try to impugn the credibility of witness, Antonio Villanueva,
and claim involuntariness of his extra-judicial confession (Exh. E) by alleging
violence or maltreatment employed upon him, and to insist on the veracity of
his alibi.

1.     
 In trying
to impress lack of credibility on the testimony of Antonio Villanueva,
appellant would go as far as to suggest this eye-witness of the prosecution was
not present during the stabbing incident. 
He attempts to accom­plish this feat with the usual means of showing
what he claims to be contradictions and inconsistencies in the as­sailed
testimony, and bias or partiality on the part of the witness himself.  Thus, appellant cites the statement of Antonio
Villanueva (Exh. B) in which he declared that he saw Gregorio Dira stabbed by
two men, which allegedly conflicts with the witness’ testimony in court that he
saw Gregorio Dira already down, and that when he tried to pacify appellant, the
latter tried to stab him, forcing him to run away.

From the apparent conflict as thus shown, appellant would now
claim that there was no “certitude and clarity” as to who actually
stabbed the deceased.  This is far from
the truth, as may readily be gleaned from the testimony of Antonio Villanueva,
in which his statement (Exhibit B), that he saw Gregorio Dira stabbed by two
men, was clarified in that he saw Gregorio Dira already down.  From the circumstance that appellant also
tried to stab the witness when the latter went to pacify him (appellant), the
witness felt so certain in his knowledge that it was appellant who stabbed the
victim, for him to feel sure and correct in saying that he saw the deceased
stabbed by appellant, although not per­haps at the very moment that the
instrument was moving to­wards the victim’s body which act should take even
less than a split second to do.  Clearly,
the seeming discrepancy as pointed out is far from sufficient to render the
witness’ testimony untruthful, much less incredible.  The important fact common in the two
supposedly conflicting statements is that appellant stabbed the deceased, and
whatever inconsis­tencies there are, same relate to inconsequential details
that do not affect credibility (People vs. Verzo, 65 SCRA 324).

Further attempt of appellant to discredit Antonio Villanueva
consists in branding as preposterous the latter’s testimony that he
“pointed” to Armando and company when policemen arrived, since
appellant and company had already left. 
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the rational
interpretation of the cited testimony is that Antonio Villanueva named or
mentioned appellant and company as the culprits to the policemen that
arrived after appel­lant and his companion had gone.  The word “pointed” was apparently
the literal translation given by the interpreter for the Tagalog word
“itinuro” which the witness, testifying in the dialect, must have
used in identifying appellant as the knife-wielder not in “pointing”
at the appellant to the policemen who arrived.

Similarly, appellant attempts also to discredit the witness,
Antonio Villanueva, by citing an alleged incon­sistency in his testimony that
he was facing the wall, with what he later said that he could see what happened because he was not exactly
facing the wall.  Again, the real import
of the witness’ testimony is that in their seating arrange­ment over the dining
table, Villanueva’s face was towards the wall, but certainly his eyes were not
nailed towards the wall as not to be able to turn around his head and see at
other directions, such as the place of the stabbing.

Even more unavailing is appellant’s trying to make so much of the
witness’ statement that it could have been five minutes from the time Gregorio
Dira stood up from the dining table to the time he was stabbed
outside the restaurant, but that upon actual demonstration in open court, the
time-lapse was estimated as only five seconds. 
It is clear that the witness’ estimate of five minutes was faulty, compared
to his actual demonstration of the time-lapse in court, which would be
considered as the more accurate and reliable, and not in the least affecting
adversely his credibility.  The same
thing may be said of what appellant would consider as another contradiction in
the witness’ statement in Exhibit “B” that he was watching pinball
when Gregorio Dira was stabbed, compared to his testimony in court that he was
eating when the victim was stabbed. 
There is nothing impos­sible for the witness to be eating and watching
the pinball at the same time.

The contradictions pointed to as such by appellant would thus
appear to be more apparent than real, and they refer to inconsequential details
that do not impair credibility (People vs. Pacala, 58 SCRA 370, 378).  What is more, the finding of credibility of
witnesses by the trial court, as when in this case, the testimony of the state
eye­witness, Antonio Villanueva, was given full faith and cre­dence by the
trial court, is entitled to
great weight and respect, not only by reason of its having had the opportunity
to hear and observe the witness testify in court (People vs. Payao, 68 SCRA 70;
People vs. Tatlonghari, 27 SCRA 726; People vs. Resayaga, 54 SCRA 350, 360),
but no motive was shown why the lone witness for the prosecution should be
induced to testify falsely against appellant who stood charged with the grave
offense of murder, knowing that his testimony, if false, could unjustly send
appellant behind bars for life, if not to the execution chamber.

2. We find also appellant’s police statement (Exhibit
“C”) confirmatory of the testimony of Antonio
Villanueva.  His claim of maltreatment to
which he had allegedly been
subjected to during the interrogation to force him to sign said statement under
oath is not easily
believed.  The ex­culpatory tone of the statement and the abundance of
details it contained which
appellant alone could have furnished are indicia of
voluntariness which make the statement perfectly admissible (People v. Tomas
Navasca, et. al., No. L-28107, March 15, 1977, 76 SCRA 71.  People v. Enrique Paras and Felicisimo de
Jesus, No. L-23111, March 29, 1974, 56 SCRA 248. People v. Ventura, No.
L-32716, Dec. 1, 1977, 1 Philajur 292. People v. Ty Sui Wong, et. el., No.
L-32529, May 2, 1978, 83 SCRA 125.) Corroborated with proof of corpus delicti,
the statement would suffice to support conviction.  More than this, there is the eye-witness tes­timony
of a credible witness, Antonio Villanueva.

However, as observed by the Solicitor General, the contention of
appellant that, if at all he deserves convic­tion, it should be only for
homicide not murder, is well-founded. 
The state evidence on the relative positions of the appellant and the
victim, according to the testimony of Antonio Villanueva, shows that they were face
to face.  The suddenness of the attack
which was the basis of the trial court’s appreciation of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery is negated by the statement of appellant given to
Patrolman Sta. Maria that the stabbing of the de­ceased was preceded by the
latter’s act of drawing a stab­bing instrument (panaksak) before appellant
himself drew his own and stabbed the deceased. 
This statement (Exhibit “C”), presented as it was as evidence
by the prosecution must have to be taken as true despite appellant’s repudia­tion
thereof, and therefore should work against the prosecu­tion, and in favor of
the appellant, at least in this particular instance relative to the supposed
existence of treachery to qualify the killing to murder.

WHEREFORE, the guilt of the appellant having been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, but modified
as to the crime committed which is that of simple homicide as submitted
by the Solicitor General, and not mur­der as found by the trial court.  Accordingly, the penalty is reduced from reclusion
perpetua to an indeterminate penalty of from (8) years (1) day of prision mayor as minimum, to (14) years, (8) months
and (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum.  So modified, the judgment appealed from is
affirmed in all other respects.  Costs
against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.