REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. ENRIQUE MAGLANOC, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF QUEZON AND TIU SAN ALIAS ANGEL GOMEZ, RESPONDENTS.

After appropriate proceedings, the Court
of First Instance of Quezon rendered a decision on 13 July 1950 authorizing Tiu
San’s naturalization as a Filipino citizen. Upon the lapse of the 2-year
probationary period, or, on July 24, 1952, he petitioned the same court, under
Republic Act No. 530, to be allowed to take the oath of allegiance as a citizen
of the Republic. On June 3, 1953, however, the petition was denied since at the
hearing thereon, it was found that in the intervening probationary period, Tiu
San alias Angel Gomez, had been convicted of a violation of Municipal
Ordinance No. 14, Series of 1946 of Lucena, Quezon, and for which he was fined
P50.00.

Subsequently, Tiu San appealed to this Court the order which denied his oath
taking. On April 20, 1955, this Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
order of denial (G.R. No. L-7301).

Some three years later, or, on January 27, 1958, Tiu San alias Gomez
filed another petition with the Court of First Instance of Quezon praying for
the issuance in his favor of the corresponding certificate of naturalization
after due hearing pursuant to Republic Act No. 530. As a ground therefor, he
alleged that on December 23, 1957, he was granted absolute and unconditional
pardon by the President of the Philippines for his conviction of the aforestated
municipal ordinance of Lucena, Quezon. The trial court, however, after the
pleadings in support of and in opposition to the new petition had been filed by
the respective parties the Provincial Fiscal and Solicitor General on one hand
and the herein respondent Tiu San on the other in an order dated February 5,
1958, denied once more herein respondent’s oath-taking. Besides, a motion for a
reconsideration of this order was likewise denied in an order dated March 13,
1958.

About 9 montlis later—January 30, 1959—respondent Tiu San filed another
petition to take his oath of allegiance, which, naturally, was opposed anew by
the Government. For one reason or another, this last petition remained
unresolved by the trial court for over a year so that oh February 22, 1960,
respondent Tiu San petitioned the said lower, court to set a date for the
hearing of his aforecited petition dated January 30, 1959. Upon this latest
pleading, herein respondent Judge Enrique Maglanoc issued an order setting a
date for the hearing of the latter’s petition.

Thus, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary
injunction.

The Government maintains that respondent Tiu San’s last petition for the
issuance of a certificate of naturalization, after similar petitions have been
denied by the lower court and affirmed by the Supreme Court, amounts to, and is
in effect a petition for relief from judgment or order under Rule 38 of the
Rules of Court. Consequently, it should not be made to prosper for the reason
that the legal period within which the same may be filed has long elapsed.

On the other hand, Tiu San disavows the charge that he seeks to be relieved
from the previous orders denying the issuance of a certificate of naturalization
in his favor. He maintains that the original decision of July 13, 1950 of the
trial court admitting him as a citizen of the Philippines, the dispositive
portion of which reads of follows:

“In View Whereof, let the proper naturalization certificate he issued in his
favor and the registration of the same in the proper civil register as required
by Sec. 10 of Act 375 upon qualifying himself by taking the required oath of
office, once this decision becomes final and executory.”

is still executory. He vigorously asserts that the same petition to be
allowed to qualify for Filipino citizenship is merely “a sequence to the
aforesaid decision” of the lower court admitting him a citizen of the
Philippines. Furthermore, he alleged that “there is no law, nor does R.A. 530
limit the period of time after 2 years to file a petition for the issuance of a
naturalization certificate in conjunction with the basic decision; nor is there
any limitation on the number of petitions to be filed, especially so when the
ground for the denial in the previous petitions exists no longer.”

The arguments of the parties herein, in the final analysis, result from the
only issue of this case, which is, We hold, as follows:

What is the effect of the previous denials of Tiu San’s petition for the
issuance of a certificate of naturalization upon the basic decision granting him
Filipino citizenship?

We find for the Government.

In the case of Tiu San, alias Angel Gomez vs. Republic of the
Philippines, 96 Phil., 817, promulgated April 20, 1955, this Court has already
ruled that when the petitioner, herein respondent, violated Lucena Municipal
Ordinance No. 41, series of 1946, for which he was convicted on April 25, 1952,
he became barred from securing the corresponding certificate of naturalization
despite the decision granting his petition for naturalization, thus in fact
nullifying the basic decision. In other words, as of the time that the order
denying the issuance of a certificate of naturalization became final, that
particular naturalization proceeding ended and terminated. And still more
recently, in the case of Isasi y Larrabide vs. Republic of the Philippines, 101
Phil., 405, We have likewise laid down the rule that the failure of an applicant
for naturalization to pass the 2-year probationary period results in the loss of
whatever rights he may have acquired under the decision authorizing his
naturalization inasmuch as the same decision is rendered nullified. Furthermore,
in the same case, We held that the case cannot be revived and declared to be
still valid and executory.

It is of no moment whether an absolute and unconditional pardon has been
granted to the herein respondent Tiu San. Whatever be its nature, whether it
removes the moral stain of the conviction or not, the fact still remains that it
was granted subsequent to the denial of his first petition for the issuance of a
certificate of naturalization. It is well settled that a pardon has no
retrospective operation (67 C.J.S. Section 11, page 578). It can have no effect
upon judicial proceedings already terminated.

Respondent Tiu San also filed an amended answer to the instant petition and
claims that the failure of the State to file a motion for reconsideration with
the lower court renders this same petition fatally defective.

A, a general rule, a writ of prohibition will not be issued to an inferior
court unless the attention of the court whose proceedings is sought to be
arrested has been called to the alleged lack or excess of jurisdiction. However,
a number of exceptions to that rule are judicially recognized. Thus, the
aforecited rule has been held inapplicable to ex-parte proceedings; or to
proceedings in which the applicant for the writ had no opportunity to object; or
where it is apparent that an objection to the lower court would have been
unavailing and futile, or would result in unnecessary or hurtful delay; or where
to make objection in the inferior court would be to destroy its very purpose; or
where a want of jurisdiction is apparent on the face of the record (50 C.J.S.,
697-698, cited in III Francisco, Rules of Court, p. 170-171.)

In view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered annulling the order
of the herein respondent Judge setting the date for the hearing of the petition
dated Jan. 30, 1959, and, enjoining him or his successor to refrain from acting
further on the matter, With costs against respondent Tiu San.

Bengzon, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes,
J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, and Makalintal, JJ., concur.