RODRIGO ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLEES, VS. SOCORRO A. RAMOS, ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

Direct appeal on points of law from a decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal in its. Civil Case No. Q-4232.

The record is to the effect that on 24 November, 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and
the spouses Urbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by
a notarial deed of even date, eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago,
Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their corresponding certificates of title,
for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down,
P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine
National Bank, and agreed to satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety
(90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendee Socorro A. Ramos, in the same
deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. By way of
additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children,
Enrique, Antonio, Milagros and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor
child Angelita Ramos, executed another mortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta
Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor’s failure to comply with some conditions of
the mortgage, this action for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the
vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29 April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos
moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously had filed action
against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the
recovery of P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down-payment on the price of
the mortgaged lands: that at the time this first suit was filed, the mortgage
debt was already accrued and demandable; that plaintiffs were, therefore, guilty
of splitting a single cause of action, and under section 4 of Rule 2 of the
Rules of Court, the filing of the first action for P2,500.00 was a defense that
could be pleaded in abatement of the second suit. Upon opposition by the
plaintiffs, the Court of First Instance of Quezon City denied the motion to
dismiss; but defendant Ramos repleaded the averments as a special defense in her
answer. After trial, on 16 December 1959, the Court of First Instance of Quezon
City rendered judgment against defendant Ramos; ordered her to pay P96,000.00,
with 12% interest from 24 February 1959 until payment, 10% of the amount due as
attorneys’ fees, and the costs of the suit; and further decreed the foreclosure
sale of the mortgaged properties in case of non-payment within ninety (90)
days.

Socorro Ramos appealed directly to this Court, and here insists that the
action should be dismissed on account of the alleged splitting of appellee’s
cause of action, and that the obligation not having fixed a period, although one
was intended, the court below should have set first a date of maturity before
ordering payment or foreclosure.

We find no merit in the appeal.

An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of
First Instance of Manila shows that it was based on appellants’ having
unlawfully stopped payment of the check for P2,500 she had issued in favor of
appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-payment of the
balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was,
therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage
was constituted on lands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask
for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. The two causes of action being
different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

On the second assignment of error: the stipulation in the mortgage contract
that the obligation for P96,000.00 was to be

“without interest, payable within ninety (90) days from this date, provided
that in case of default it shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per
annum”.

clearly fixes a date of maturity, the stipulated twelve percent in case of
default being nothing more than a penalty, designed to induce the debtor to pay
on or before the expiration of the ninety (90) days. Hence, there was no call
upon the court to set another due date.

Finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is affirmed, with
costs against appellants.

Bengzon C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion., Barrerra,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala, and Makalinlal, JJ., concur.