PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. TIU UA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Tiu Ua versus People of the Philippines

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Tiu Ua, a criminal prosecution for profiteering under Republic Act Number 509. The accused, an alien storekeeper in Pasay City, was charged with selling a can of Klim powdered milk above the ceiling price. The case matters for two reasons. First, it fixes the line between entrapment, which the law tolerates, and instigation, which the law condemns. Second, it shows how the courts treat a heavy statutory fine for profiteering and how far a trial court may go in speaking of the deportation of an alien convict.

Procedural History

Tiu Ua was charged before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay Branch, with violating Republic Act Number 509. After trial, the court found him guilty and sentenced him to pay a fine of 5,000 pesos, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, plus the costs. The trial court added that the accused, being an alien, would be subject to immediate deportation upon final conviction without further proceedings by the Deportation Board.

The case was appealed to the Court of Appeals. That court did not decide it on the merits but certified it to the Supreme Court, because the appellant raised the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted. The Supreme Court thus took the case on that constitutional question.

Facts

At about seven o'clock in the morning of the first of November, 1950, Mrs. Villa told her houseboy, Eusebio Perez, to buy a can of Klim powdered milk at the store of Tiu Ua on F. B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. She told him the price was 1.80 pesos per can. At the store, the accused told the houseboy that the price was 2.20 pesos. The boy tried to have it reduced to 1.80 pesos, but the accused refused and insisted on 2.20 pesos. Eusebio went home and reported this to Mrs. Villa.

Mrs. Villa woke her son Francisco Villa, who happened to be an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation. He went to his office and reported the matter to the Price Enforcement Unit. He returned home with two agents, Efrain Verano and Felipe Guatno. There the houseboy related the incident to them. Francisco gave the houseboy a five-peso bill and told him to buy milk from the same store.

At about twenty minutes past eleven in the same morning, Eusebio returned to the store, leaving the two agents at the Villa house. He came back with a can of Klim milk and 2.80 pesos in change, telling the agents that the accused had charged him 2.20 pesos. Francisco and the two agents then went to the store at 320 F. B. Harrison Street and asked the accused whether he had sold one can of Klim milk for 2.20 pesos to Eusebio. The accused answered in the affirmative and signed the investigation slip. The agents brought him to their office, where he was photographed and fingerprinted.

Issues

• Whether or not the case was one of entrapment, the prosecution of which should not have been sustained on grounds of public policy, and whether or not his guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt by credible evidence.
• Whether or not the penalty imposed by the trial court was wholly disproportionate to the offense and therefore unconstitutional as cruel and unusual and shocking to the conscience.
• Whether or not Republic Act Number 509 is unconstitutional insofar as it imposes penalties wholly disproportionate to the offenses sought to be punished, as violative of due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.

Applicable Provisions

Republic Act Number 509 is the statute under which the accused was charged and convicted, and the Court examines the fine it authorizes for profiteering. The information alleged that the accused:

did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously violate the provisions of Republic Act No. 509 by selling a can of powdered Klim milk for P2.20, to Eusebio Perez, when the ceiling price for that commodity was P1.80 only.

The Constitution supplies the standard against which the penalty is measured, forbidding cruel and unusual punishment and requiring due process and equal protection. The Court weighs the statutory fine against that standard.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there was no entrapment, and even if there were, it would not bar conviction. Entrapment is not prohibited as contrary to public policy. It is instigation that is deemed contrary to public policy and held illegal. Here the accused had already charged 2.20 pesos before the agents acted. The agents only tried to verify the illegal act of the accused. There was therefore not even entrapment.

On the second and third issues, the Court upheld the validity of the heavy fine. Congress thought it necessary to repress profiteering with a heavy fine so that dealers would not take advantage of the critical condition of the country to make unusual profits. The profit in a single transaction may be small, but these transactions are numerous, make a great total, and affect the poor people in general. The courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the legislative body in enforcing a public policy unless there is a clear violation of the Constitution. Following its earlier rulings in the De la Cruz and Chu Chi cases, however, the Court exercised the discretion vested in it by the statute and reduced the fine to 2,000 pesos.

On the deportation of the accused, the Court clarified that the trial court did not impose deportation. It simply stated that the defendant was subject to it. Actual deportation is for the proper administrative authorities to decide, considering the circumstances of the case.

Doctrine

Entrapment is not a defense; instigation is. The rule a Bar candidate must retain is that entrapment, where the offender is already engaged in the criminal design and the authorities merely afford him the opportunity to commit it, is not contrary to public policy. Instigation, where the authorities induce or incite the offender to commit the crime, is illegal. The distinction turns on who originated the criminal intent.

On penalties, the legislature has wide discretion in fixing fines to enforce public policy, and courts will not interfere absent a clear constitutional violation. Where the statute itself vests discretion in the courts, they may reduce a fine that is disproportionate in a particular case. Finally, a trial court's statement that an alien convict is subject to deportation is not itself a deportation order; actual deportation is for the administrative authorities to decide.

Disposition

The judgment of the trial court was affirmed with modification, reducing the fine to 2,000 pesos, without pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

Memorize the line: entrapment is not prohibited, instigation is illegal. Examiners use this case to test the entrapment and instigation distinction and the deference courts give to legislative discretion in fixing penalties for profiteering.