PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE VS. TIU UA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

Tiu Ua was accused before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasay Branch)
of the offense of profiteering in an information of the following tenor:

“That on or about the 1st day of November, 1950, in Pasay City, Philippines,
the above named accused, Tiu Ua, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously violate the provisions of Republic Act No. 509 by selling a can of
powdered Klim milk for P2.20, to Eusebio Perez, when the ceiling price for that
commodity was P1.80 only.”

After trial the accused was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of
P5,000, or, in case of insolvency, to suffer the corresponding subsidiary
imprisonment, and to pay the costs. In addition to this penalty the trial court
declared that the accused, being an alien, “shall be, upon final conviction,
subject to immediate deportation without the necessity of any further
proceedings on the part of the Deportation Board.”

Upon appeal the case was forwarded to the Court of Appeals but the latter
certified it to this court on the ground that the appellant raises the question
of the constitutionality of the statute under which he was convicted.

The appellant, in his brief, makes the following assignments of errors:

“I. The trial court erred in not holding that the present case is one of
entrapment the prosecution of which should not have been sustained on grounds of
public policy, and that it was not established beyond reasonable doubt by
credible evidence, and consequently, erred in not acquitting the accused.

“II. The trial court erred in imposing a penalty wholly disproportionate to
the offense, and therefore unconstitutional as cruel and unusual and shocking to
the conscience.

“III. The trial court erred in not declaring Republic Act No. 509
unconstitutional in so far as it imposes penalties wholly disproportionate to
the offenses sought to be punished, and consequently violative of the due
process and equal protection clauses and of the prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishments in the Constitution.”

The facts established by the evidence may be briefly stated as follows: At
about 7:00 o’clock in the morning of November 1, 1950, one Mrs. Villa ordered
her houseboy Eusebio Perez to buy powdered milk known as Klim milk at the store
of the accused Tiu Ua, on F. B. Harrison Street, Pasay City. Mrs. Villa told the
houseboy that the price was PI.80 per can. The defendant informed the houseboy
at the store the price was P2.20. The boy tried to have it reduced to PI.80 but
the accused refused, insisting on the price of P2.20. Eusebio returned home and
told Mrs. Villa about it. Mrs. Villa awakened her son Francisco Villa and
advised him of what had occurred. Francisco who happened to be an employee of
the National Bureau of Investigation, went to his office and reported the matter
to the Price Enforcement Unit. Francisco, accompanied by Efrain Verano and
Felipe Guatno, agents of the prisco, came back home. There Eusebio related the
incident to the agents. Then Francisco gave to the houseboy a five-peso bill
telling him to buy milk in the same store. At about 11:20 in the same morning
Eusebio returned to the store leaving the two prisco agents in the house of the
Villa family. After sometime the houseboy came back with a can of Klim milk and
with the amount of P2.80 as change, telling the agents that the accused had
charged him P2.20 for the can of Klim milk. Francisco and the two agents went to
the store of the accused at 320 F. B. Harrison Street, Pasay City, and there
asked the accused if he had sold one can of Klim milk for P2.20 to Eusebio. The
accused answered in the afirmative. The accused then signed the investigation
slip, exhibit “B.” The prisco agents brought the accused to their office where
he was photographed and fingerprinted.

The appellant contents that there has been an entrapment and, consequently,
he should be acquitted.

It has been decided in several cases by this court that entrapment is not
prohibited as contrary to public policy. It is instigation which has been deemed
contrary to public policy and held illegal (People vs. Galicia, 40 Off.
Gaz. No. 23,4476, 4478).

Furthermore, in the present case it would be hard to conclude that there was
even entrapment, because the accused had already charged the sum of P2.20 and
the prisco agents only tried to verify the illegal act of the accused.

In the second assignment of error the appellant maintains that the punishment
imposed by the trial court is unconstitutional as being cruel and unusual and
shocking to the conscience.

With regard to the fine, it should be considered that Congress thought it
necessary to repress profiteering with a heavy fine so that dealers would not
take advantage of the critical condition of the country to make unusual profits.
It is true that in specific individual cases the profit made is small but when
it is remembered that these individual transactions are numerous and make a
great total and affect the poor people in general, it can be easily seen that
the raise in the price above that authorized by law, causes a great hardship to
the country. The courts cannot interfere with the discretion of the legislative
body in enforcing a public policy unless there has been a clear violation of the
Constitution.

In the case of People us. Pablo de la Cruz, (92 Phil., 906) this court
discussed the constitutionality of similar penalties with regard to
profiteering, but exercising the discretion vested in the courts by the statute
in question, reduced the penalty to six months and the fine to P2,000. This
policy was followed in the subsequent case of People vs. Chu Chi, (92
Phil., 977). In the present case we reduce the fine to P2,000.00.

With reference to the deportation of the accused who is an alien, it should
be noted that the trial court stated that Tiu Ua, being an alien, shall be, upon
final conviction, subject to immediate deportation without the necessity of any
further proceedings on the part of the Deportation Board.

It should be noted that the trial court did not impose deportation but simply
stated that the defendant was subject to it. Actual deportation, therefore, is
for the proper administrative authorities to decide, considering the
circumstances of the case.

With the above modification, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all
other respects, without pronuncement as to costs. It is so ordered.

Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes; A., Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion, and Reyes, J.B.L., JJ., concur.

Judgment affirmed with modification.