G.R. No. L-30423. November 07, 1979
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAMIRO ALEGRE Y CERDONCILLO, MARIO COMAYAS Y CUDILLAN, MELECIO CUDILLAN Y ARCILLAS, AND JESUS MEDALLA Y CUDILLAN, DEFENDAN…
ANTONIO, J.:
This is an automatic review of a decision of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Seventh judicial District, Branch
VII, Pasay City, finding all the accused, namely,
Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo,
Mario Comayas y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan, guilty of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
sentencing them as follows:
“WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Melecio
Cudillan, Jesus Medalla,
Ramiro Alegre, and Mario Comayas
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, committed with four
(4) aggravating circumstances, not offset by any mitigating circumstance, and
hereby sentences all of them to suffer the penalty of death, to be carried out
pursuant to the applicable provisions of law, to indemnify jointly and
severally, the heirs of Adelina Sajo
in the amount of P350,000.00, representing the value of the pieces of jewelry unrecovered, to pay jointly and severally also the heirs
of Adelina Sajo the amount
of P12,000,00, and to pay the costs.
“With or without appeal, let this case be elevated to the Supreme
Court for review, pursuant to law.”
During the pendency of this appeal, Melecio Cudillan died on arrival
at the New Bilibid Prison
Hospital on August 16, 1970, and the case as against the said
accused, insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, was dismissed on August 29, 1974. This decision, therefore, is limited to
appellants Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas
and Jesus Medalla.
This case arose from the death of Adelina
Sajo y Maravilla, spinster,
57 years old, whose body was
found in her bathroom inside her house at the Maravilla
compound, Ignacio Street, Pasay City, in the early morning
of July 26, 1966. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of
asphyxia by manual strangulation, and the time of her death was placed between
eighteen to twenty-two hours before 12:30 p.m.
of July 26, 1966.
Her bedroom was in “shambles”, evidently indicating
that it was ransacked. The drawers and
several cabinets were open, and some personal garments, handbags and papers
were scattered on the floor. No witness
saw the commission of the crime. Appellant
Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in
one of the rented rooms on the ground floor of the victim’s house, was taken to
the Pasay City
police headquarters for investigation in connection with the case, but was
later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the
crime.
During the latter part of July, 1966, Melecio
Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City,
Leyte, in the act of pawning a
bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of
the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the killing and
robbery of Adelina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession
before the police authorities of Tacloban
City on July 29, 1966 (Exhibits “F”,
“F-1” and “F-2”). In
this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio
Cudillan implicated a certain “Esok” of Villalon, Calubian, Leyte;
Jesus Medalla, of Villahermosa, Calubian,
Leyte; Mario Cudillan, also of Villahermosa,
Calubian, Leyte;
one “Danny” Fernandez, of Balaquid, Cabucgayan, Biliran
Subprovince;
and one “Rammy“, another Leyteño. When
brought to Metro Manila and while he was inside the Pasay
City police headquarters, Melecio Cudillan again executed an extrajudicial confession
(Exhibits “A”, “A-I” to “A-6”) on July 31,
1966. This was sworn to before the
Assistant City Fiscal of Pasay City on August 1, 1966. In this second statement, he narrated in
detail the participation in the commission of the crime of Jesus Medalla, “Celso”
Fernandez, “Rami” and
“Mario”. According to said
statement, the declarant went near the cell within the Office of the
Investigation Section, Secret Service Division, and identified Ramiro Alegre, Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas as the persons he referred to as Jesus Medalla, “Rami” and “Mario” in his declaration. On the basis of the afore-mentioned
extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, an Information for Robbery with Homicide was
filed by the Special Counsel of Pasay
City against Celso
Fernandez,alias
“Esok“, Jesus Medalla
y Cudillan, Ramiro Alegre y
Cerdoncillo, Mario Comayas
y Cudillan, Melecio Cudillan y Arcillas, and one “John
Doe”.
When arraigned on August
10, 1966, Mario Comayas, Melecio Cudillan, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered
a plea of not guilty. The prosecution
presented nine (9) witnesses. None of
them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts contained in the decision
under review was based principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions
of Melecio Cudillan. Thus, the details of the planning and the
execution of the crime were taken from the “Pasay
Sworn Statement” (Exhibits “A”, “A-1” to
“A-6”). The only evidence,
therefore, presented by the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellants are
the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo.
The testimony of Sgt. Mariano Isla of the Pasay City
police is to the effect that when he was investigating Melecio
Cudillan, the latter pointed to Ramiro Alegre, Mario Comayas and Jesus Medalla as his companions in the commission of the crime.
According to him, said appellants “just stared at him (Melecio Cudillan) and said
nothing.”
“Q. In what particular place in the Police Department did you have to confront the accused Melecio Cudillan with the other
suspects?
A. In the office of the Secret
Service Division.
Q. When
you said there was a confrontation between the accused Melecio
Cudillan and other suspects whom do you refer to as
other suspects?
A. Jesus Medalla, Celso Fernandez, Rosario Dejere
and Mario. There was another
person Eduardo Comayas. He was also one of those suspects but Melecio Cudillan failed to point to him as his companion.
Q. Who
were those persons or suspects pointed to by Melecio Cudillan in the Police Department of Pasay
City as his companions?
A. To
Jesus Medalla, Ramiro Alegre
and Mario Comayas.
Q. When
Melecio Cudillan pointed to
these persons what did these three persons do?
A. They
just stared at him and said nothing.” (t.s.n., pp. 15-16, Hearing of October 28, 1966.)
According to the trial court, had the
appellants “really been innocent (they) should have protested vigorously
and not merely kept their silence.”
Hernando Carillo, a detention prisoner
in the Pasay
City jail, declared that the three
(3) appellants admitted to him that they took part in the robbery and homicide
committed in the residence of the deceased, viz.:
“ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Do
you know the other accused Ramiro Alegre?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. If
he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness points to the
fellow in the second row, fourth from the left who, upon being asked, gave his
name as Ramiro Alegre.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did
you have any occasion to talk to Ramiro Alegre?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Where?
A. In
the city jail because our cells are also near each other.
Q. And
what did you and Ramiro Alegre talk about?
A. Concerning
his case and he told me that he has also participated in the commission of the
killing of Adelina Sajo.
Q. By
the way, when did you talk with Ramiro Alegre, more
or less?
A. About
the middle of June.
Q. And
what else did Ramiro Alegre tell you, if any?
A. That
he was also inside the room when they killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. Now,
regarding that conversation you had with the accused Jesus Medalla,
when did that take place, more or less?
A. About
that month also of June, about the middle of June.
Q. What
year?
A. 1967.
Q. Do
you know the other accused Mario Comayas?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. Why
do you know him?
A. He
is also one of the prisoners and our cells are near each other.
Q. If
he is inside the courtroom, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness
indicating to the fellow who gave his name as Mario Comayas.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Did
you have any occasion to talk with the accused
Mario Comayas?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. When
was that, more or less?
A. In
the month of June, about the middle part also of June.
Q. And
what did you talk about?
A. Regarding
this case of Adelina Sajo
and he admitted to me that he was one of those who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.
Q. I
see! And what else did he tell you, if
any?
A. That
while the killing was being perpetrated upstairs he was told to guard by the
door.
Q. How
about the other accused Melecio Cudillan,
do you know him?
A. Yes,
sir.
Q. If
he is in court, will you please point him out?
INTERPRETER:
Witness
pointing to the accused who gave his name as Melecio Cudillan.
ATTY. DEPASUCAT:
Q. Why
do you know Melecio Cudillan?
A. Because
he is with me in one cell.
Q. Were
you able also to talk with Melecio Cudillan?
A. Most
of the time because we used to talk about our case.
Q. When
have you talked with Melecio Cudillan,
more or less?
A. Three
days after my confinement and subsequently thereafter up to about the first
week of June, 1967.
Q. And
what did the accused Melecio Cudillan
tell you about his case?
ATTY. RAMIREZ:
Objection,
Your Honor, leading.
COURT:
Witness may answer,
there is already a basis. That they were
the ones who planned and killed Adelina Sajo.” (t.s.n.,
pp. 286-289, Hearing of July 21, 1967.)
However, during the trial, Melecio Cudillan repudiated both
the Tacloban
City and Pasay City
sworn statements as the product of compulsion and duress. He claimed that he was not assisted by
counsel when he was investigated by the police.
Appellants Jesus Medalla and Mario Comayas denied any involvement in the crime. They testified that at the time of the
incident in question, they were attending the internment of the deceased child
of Ciriaco Abobote. According to Jesus Medalla,
he and his companions left the Maravilla compound at 10:00 o’clock in the morning of July 25, 1966 to attend the
internment. They left the cemetery at
about 5:00 o’clock in the afternoon
and proceeded directly to his house at Leveriza Street where he
stayed the whole night. Mario Comayas confirmed that he and Jesus Medalla
were at the house of Ciriaco Abobote
in the morning of July 25, 1966,
until after 5:00 o’clock in the
afternoon when he returned to the
bakery where he was employed to resume his work.
Appellant Ramiro Alegre did not testify
but presented three (3) witnesses to support his defense. Thus, Urbano
Villanueva testified that he was a sub-contractor of Jose Inton
for the welding project of David M. Consunji at the
Sheraton Hotel construction; that Ramiro Alegre began
working at the construction as a welder on July 13, 1966, and that from 7:00
o’clock in the morning to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon, Alegre
worked in the project and that he knew this because he is the foreman and
timekeeper in the project. He identified
the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit
“1”). Rodolfo Villanueva and
Romeo Origenes testified that from 7:00 o’clock in the morning up to 4:00 o’clock in the afternoon of July 25, 1966, appellant Ramiro Alegre was at the Sheraton Hotel construction at Roxas Boulevard. Their testimony
is confirmed by the Time Record of Ramiro Alegre (Exhibit “1”) which contained the number of hours he
actually worked at the Sheraton Hotel construction project.
Appellants now contend that the lower court erred in utilizing
the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan (now deceased)
as evidence against herein appellants; in concluding from the alleged
“silence” of appellants when allegedly pointed to by Melecio Cudillan as “his
companions” in the commission, of the crime, an admission of guilt; and in giving undue weight and
credence to the testimony of an inmate of the Pasay
City jail that appellants admitted to him their participation in the crime.
I
The extrajudicial confessions of Melecio
Cudillan (Exhibits “A”, “A-1” to
“A-6” and “F”, “F-1” and “F-2”), on the
basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how Melecio
Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be
used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under
the principle of ‘”res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet“,[1]
there being no independent evidence of conspiracy.[2]
As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although
deliberately made, is not admissible and does not have probative value against
his co-accused. It is merely hearsay
evidence as far as the other accused are concerned.[3]
While there are recognized exceptions
to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not
bring it within the purview of such exceptions.
The only evidence, therefore, linking the appellants to the crime would
be their purported tacit admissions and/or failure to deny their implications
of the crime made by Melecio Cudillan,
and/or their purported verbal confessions to Hernando Carillo,
an inmate of the Pasay City jail.
II
The next question to be resolved is whether or not the silence of
appellants while under police custody, in the face of statements of Melecio
Cudillan implicating them as his companions in the commission of the crime,
could be considered as tacit admission on their part of their participation
therein.
The settled rule is that the silence of an accused in criminal
cases, meaning his failure or refusal to testify, may
not be taken as evidence against him,[4]
and that he may refuse to answer an incriminating question.[5]
It has also been held that while an accused is under custody, his silence may
not be taken as evidence against him as he has a right to remain silent; his
silence when in custody may not be used as evidence against him, otherwise,
his right of silence would be illusory.[6]
The leading case of Miranda v. Arizona[7]
held that the prosecution may not use at trial the fact that an individual stood mute, or claimed his privilege
against self-incrimination, in the face of an accusation made at a police
custodial interrogation. Prior to Miranda, it was the
view of many authorities that a man to whom a statement implicating him in a crime
is directed may fail to reply if he is in custody under a charge of the
commission of that crime, not because he acquiesces in the truth of the
statement, but because he stands on his constitutional right to remain silent,
as being the safest course for him to pursue and the best way out of his predicament.[8]
Other courts have held that the circumstance that one is under arrest by itself
does not render the evidence inadmissible, and that an accusation of a crime
calls for a reply even from a person
under arrest or in the custody of an officer, where the circumstances
surrounding him indicate that he is free to answer if he chooses.[9]
We hold that the better rule is that the silence of an accused
under custody, or his failure to deny statements by another implicating him in
a crime, especially when such accused is neither asked to comment or reply to
such implications or accusations, cannot be considered as a tacit confession of
his participation in the commission of the crime. Such an inference of acquiescence drawn from
his silence or failure to deny the statement would appear incompatible with
the right of an accused against self-incrimination.
The right or privilege of a person accused of a crime against
self-incrimination is a fundamental right.
It is a personal right of great importance and is given absolutely and unequivocably. The
privilege against self-incrimination is an important development in man’s
struggle for liberty it reflects man’s fundamental values and his most noble
of aspirations, the unwillingness of civilized men to subject those suspected
of crime to the cruel trilemma of self-accusation,
perjury or contempt; the fear that self-incriminating statements may be
obtained by inhumane treatment and abuses, and the respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual “to a private enclave where he may lead a private
life.”[10]
In the words of Chavez
v. Court of Appeals:[11]
“* * * this right is ‘not merely a formal technical rule the
enforcement of which is left to the discretion of the court’; it is mandatory;
it secures to a defendant a valuable and substantive right; it is fundamental
to our scheme of justice. * * *.
* * * * * * * * *
“Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant’s own
lips and against his will an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as
resort to compulsory disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable
against him as a confession of the crime or the tendency of which is to prove
the commission of a crime.
Because, it is his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless
he chooses to take the witness stand – with undiluted, unfettered exercise of
his own free, genuine will.”
It must be stressed here that even under a regime of martial law,
the operations of our laws governing the rights of an accused person are not
open to doubt. Under the code for the
administration of detainees, all officers, civilian and military personnel are
sworn to uphold the rights of detainees. Among such fundamental rights are the right
against compulsory testimonial self-incrimination, the right, when under
investigation for the commission of an offense, to remain silent, to have
counsel, and to be informed of his rights; the right not to be subjected to
force, violence, threats, intimidation and degrading punishment or torture in
the course of one’s detention, and the safeguard that any confession obtained
in violation of the foregoing rights shall be inadmissible in evidence.[12] The 1973 Constitution gives explicit constitutional
sanction to the right to silence. Thus,
in Section 20 of Article IV of the Constitution, there is this categorical
mandate: “Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain
silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. Noforce, violence,
threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be
used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.”
This privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the
Constitution protects, therefore, the right of a person to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will, and to suffer no penalty for such silence.[13]
This aspect of the right has been comprehensively explained by then Associate
Justice Enrique M. Fernando, now Chief Justice, in Pascual
Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners,[14]
thus:
“The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to
silence. As far back as 1905, we had
occasion to declare: ‘The accused has a
perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a presumption
of his guilt.’ Only last year, in Chavez v. Court of Appeals, speaking through
Justice Sanchez, we reaffirmed the doctrine anew that it is the right of a defendant
‘to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand with undiluted,
unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.'”
Identifying the right of an accused to remain silent with right
to privacy, this Court, in Pascual, explained
that the privilege against self-incrimination “enables the citizen to
create a zone of privacy which government may not force to surrender to its
detriment.”
We hold, therefore, that it was error for the trial court to draw
from appellants’ silence while under police custody, in the face of the
incriminatory statements of Melecio Cudillan, the conclusion that the aforesaid appellants had
tacitly admitted their guilt. We hold,
further, that in view of the inadmissibility of the extrajudicial confessions
of Melecio Cudillan
implicating herein appellants, the remaining evidence against them, consisting
in the testimonies of Sgt. Mariano Isla and Hernando Carillo, is insufficient to sustain the judgment of
conviction. Indeed, it is inherently
improbable that herein appellants would have readily confessed their
participation in the commission of a heinous crime to a casual acquaintance in
a prison detention cell, considering that on the same occasion they strongly
denied any involvement in such crime before the police authorities.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and
appellants Ramiro Alegre y Cerdoncillo,
Mario Comayas y Cudillan
and Jesus Medalla y Cudillan
are hereby ACQUITTED of the crime with which they are charged. Their immediate release from detention is
ordered, unless they or any one of them is otherwise held for some other
lawful cause.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur
in the result. The evidence of the
prosecution is not sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
[1]
Section 25, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court.
[2]
Section 27, ibid.
[3]
People v. Bañez, L-26, Aug. 31, 1946, 77 Phil. 136; People v.
Oliva, L-6033-35, Sept. 30, 1954 (Unrep.), 95 Phil. 962; People v. Talledo, et al., L-1778,
Feb. 23, 1950, 85 Phil. 533; People v. Gerones L-6595, Oct.
29, 1954, (Unrep.), 96 Phil. 965.
[4]
Section 1(c), Rule
111, Revised Rules of Court.
[5]
Section 79, Rule 123, ibid.
[6]
People v. Tia
Fong alias Ah Sam, L-7615, March 14, 1956, 98 Phil. 609.
[7]
384 U.S. 436, 16 L. ed. 2d 694.
[8]
29 Am. Jur. 2d 694, at §640.
[9]
16 C.J. 633; People
v. Tia Fong, supra.
[10]
Justice Goldberg, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission New York, 378
U.S. 52; 84 S.C. 1594; 12 L. ed. 678, citing Ullman
v. Limited State and States v. Grunewlad.
[11]
L-29169, Aug. 19, 1968, 24 SCRA 663, 678-679.
[12]
Ferdinand E. Marcos, The Democratic Revolution.
[13]
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 12 L. ed. 653, 84 S.C. 1489.
[14]
L-25018, May 26, 1969, 28 SCRA 344, 349-350.