G.R. No. L-23545. November 07, 1979
BENITO SICHANGCO, FOR AND IN BEHALF OF HIS MINOR CHILDREN, SI BENG, SI SON AND SI LUNA, PETITIONER-APPELLEE, VS. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION, RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.
MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner herein, Sy Te, whose
name was changed to Benito Sichangco with judicial
approval, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a Filipino citizen by
birth in an order dated February 19, 1960 (CEB No. 3187-R) [pars. 2, 3 and 4,
Petition, p. 1, rec.; Exhs. C, 8,
pp. 52, 77, rec.]. Said
petitioner is married to Cheng Yok Ha. Three sons were born in China
allegedly out of their marriage, namely, Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna, and were still minors at the time of the filing on
November 20, 1962 with the
trial court of the petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction.
On August 28, 1961,
these minors, duly provided with certificates of registration
and identity issued by the Philippine Consulate at Hongkong,
properly documented, arrived in the Philippines
and sought admission, claiming to be the children of petitioner Benito Sichangco. An
investigation was conducted by the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 of the Bureau
of Immigration. After hearing, the said
Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 rendered a decision on September 11, 1961 (Exh.
C) admitting these minors into the Philippines
as citizens thereof, being the children of the petitioner herein, who is a
Filipino (photostatic copy of said decision was
attached to the petition as Annex B).
Subsequently, the said decision was submitted to the then members of
the Board of Commissioners, composed of Deputy Commissioner Felix Talabis, who “noted” the decision on September 21, 1961; Deputy
Commissioner Francisco de la Rosa, who “noted” the decision on September 28, 1961; and Acting
Commissioner Pio S. Noche,
who “noted” the decision on October
3, 1961.
On October 3, 1961, the minor children of petitioner Benito Sichangco were issued by the Bureau of Immigration
Identification Certificates Nos. 16632 (for Si Beng), 16636 (for Si Son) and
16637 (for Si Luna), photostatic
copies of which are attached to the petition as Annexes C, D and E.
On January 24, 1962, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno issued Memorandum Order No. 9, wherein he found
“that for the past several years, the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases
coming before it,” for which reason he set aside “all decisions
purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from,
or on review motu proprio
of, decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry,” and directed the Board of
Commissioners “to review in accordance with Section 27(b) of Commonwealth
Act No. 613, as amended, all decisions of the Boards of Special Inquiry
admitting entry of aliens into this country and give preference to all cases
where entry has been permitted on the ground that the entrant is a citizen of
the Philippines, following the principle laid down in Section 30 of
Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, that ‘the burden of proof shall be upon
such alien to establish that he is not subject to exclusion’ x x.”
Pursuant to Memorandum Order No. 9, a committee composed of Legal
Officer Gavino M. Yaptiangco,
Jr., and Immigration Officers Lamberto Almeda and Benjamin de Mesa examined the pretended right of
the said minors as alleged children of petitioner to admission, and thereafter
forwarded its findings to the Commissioner of Immigration (pp. 12-14, Appellant’s Brief), recommending the
exclusion of said minors, the revocation of the order declaring Sy Te or Benito Sichangco a
Filipino citizen, and the filing of deportation proceedings against him.
More than a year after the issuance on October 3, 1961 of their identification certificates, the
minors herein received, by ordinary mail, on October 26, 1962, a letter from
the respondent Board of Commissioners composed of Acting Commissioner Martiniano P. Vivo, Deputy Commissioners Virgilio Gaston and Marcial Rañola (now deceased), containing its decision dated
September 4, 1962 (Exh. E), which reversed the
decision rendered by the previous Board of Commissioners, dated September 11, 1961 (Exh. C) and ordered the said
minors’ exclusion from the Philippines.
Hence, petitioner Benito Sichangco, in
behalf of the minors Si Beng,
Si Son and Si Luna, filed a
petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction on November 20, 1962 before the Court of First
Instance of Manila, to annul the decision of the Board of Commissioners of
Immigration excluding the above-named minors from the Philippines
(Exh. E).
On November 20, 1962, the same date as the filing of the
petition, the trial court issued ex parte a writ of preliminary
injunction upon the filing of a bond in the sum of P3,000.00 by petitioner,
restraining the petitioner from enforcing or executing its decision or
otherwise excluding and/or deporting the above-named minors from the
Philippines. Said writ was effectively
served on the respondent on November
26, 1962.
After trial by the court a quo, a decision was
entered on August 25, 1964, declaring the decision of the respondent Board of
Commissioners dated September 4, 1962, reversing the decision of the previous
Board of Commissioners dated September 11, 1961, to have been rendered on
October 26, 1962, more than a year from the first decision, and therefore
illegal and null and void, and the injunction earlier issued was made
permanent, with costs against respondent Board.
Hence,
this appeal by the respondent Board.
The Board of Commissioners of Immigration was, and still is,
under the supervision and control of the Department of Justice (see Republic Act
No. 997; Art. V, Part XXI, Reorganization of the Executive Branch of the
National Government, February, 1972). By
virtue of his power of control, the Secretary of Justice can modify, nullify or
set aside the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry on September 11, 1961,
as well as the act of “noting” of the said decision by the then
members of the Board of Commissioners, namely, Deputy Commissioner Felix Talabis on September 21, 1961, Deputy Commissioner
Francisco de la Rosa on September 28, 1961, and Acting Commissioner Pio S. Noche on October 3, 1961
[Sec. 79(c), Rev. Adm. Code; Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 146-8; Hebron vs. Reyes, 104 Phil.
175, 187-9; Province of Pangasinan vs. Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, L-27861, Oct. 31, 1969, 30 SCRA 134].
The Department Head can even directly exercise the powers of the
chief of the bureau or office under him
pursuant to Section 37, Act No. 4007, which provides:
“The provisions of the existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding, whenever a specific power, authority, duty, function, or
activity is entrusted to a chief of bureau, office, division or service, the
same shall be understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who
shall have authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, or to review, modify
or revoke any decision or action of said chief of bureau, office, division, or
service.” (Cited in Mondano
vs. Silvosa, supra, p. 148).
Hence, then Secretary of Justice Jose W. Diokno
validly issued on January 24, 1962, Memorandum Order No. 9, setting aside all
decisions purporting to have been rendered by the Board of Commissioners (see Arocha vs. Vivo, L-24844, Oct. 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 532,
540-541). This principle suffices to
dispose of this petition.
Moreover, the individual action of the members of the previous
Board of Commissioners in “noting” the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry on different dates was not a valid decision of affirmance by the said Board of Commissioners in the
exercise of its power of review motu proprio under Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
613, as amended, otherwise known as the Immigration Act of 1940.
Section 27(b) of the Immigration Act reads:
“(b) A board of special inquiry shall have
authority [1] to determine
whether an alien seeking to enter or land in the Philippines shall be allowed
to enter or land or shall be excluded, and [2] to make its findings and recommendations in all the cases
provided for in section twenty-nine of this Act wherein the Commissioner of
Immigration may admit an alien who is otherwise inadmissible. For this purpose, the board or any member thereof, may administer oaths and take evidence
and in case of necessity may issue subpoena and/or subpoena duces
tecum.
The hearing of all cases brought before a board of special inquiry
shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration. The
decision of any two members of the board shall prevail and shall be final
unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter stated,
or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners
after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year
from the promulgation of said decision.
At the conclusion of the hearing of any case, the board of special
inquiry shall at once proceed to deliberate and decide on the merits
thereof. The decision shall be
promulgated, and the findings and recommendation, in proper cases, submitted
not later than two days from the date of the deliberation. Should the board of special inquiry need more
time to make a written decision of findings and recommendation in view of the
nature of the case, the chairman thereof shall report the case to the
Commissioner of Immigration who may grant an extension of time if he considers
it necessary” (underscoring supplied).
Respondent-appellant correctly stated that the word
“noted” simply meant that the members of the Board of Commissioners
had taken cognizance of the existence of the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry No. 1, dated September 11, 1961; that a mere notation does not
constitute an exercise of its powers of
review, motu proprio
pursuant to Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended; and
that a decision of the Board of Commissioners, requires a judicious review and
deliberation by said Board as a body, of the proceedings, the evidence and the
law involved, the formulation of findings of facts and conclusion of law.
In a case having a similar factual situation entitled Arocha vs. Vivo (L-24844,
Oct. 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 532,
540-541), in dismissing a similar contention by appellee
therein as untenable, this Court cited three reasons that negate appellee’s contention, the first two of which can apply in
the instant case. The Court said thus:
“First, even disregarding the ambiguity of the term ‘Noted,’
the former Immigration Commissioners appeared to have acted individually in
this particular instance and not as a Board.
It is shown by the different dates affixed to their signatures that they
did not actually meet to discuss and vote on the case. This was officially made of record by the Secretary of Justice in his
Memorandum Order No. 9, on January 24, 1962, wherein he
stated: ‘that for the past several
years, the Board of Commissioners of Immigration has not met collectively
to discuss and deliberate in the cases coming before it x x.’
“Individual action by members of a board plainly renders
nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a Board. The Legislature organized the Board of
Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and
in order that their views and ideas
should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion (See Ryan vs. Humphrise, LRA 1915F 1047).
This process is of the essence of a board’s action, save where otherwise
provided by law and the salutary effects of the rule would be lost were the
members to act individually, without benefit of discussion. (Underscoring supplied).
‘The powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be
exercised by the individual members separately.
Their acts are official only when done by the members convened in
session, upon a concurrence of at least a majority and with at least a quorum
present.’ (42 Am. Jur. 389, sec.
74).
‘Where the action needed is not of the individuals composing a
board but of the official body, the members must be together and act in their
official capacity, and the action should appear on the records of the board.’ (Penn. R. Co. vs. Montgomery Co. Pass. R. Co., 167 P 2d 62, 27 LRA
766).
‘Where a duty is entrusted to a board, composed of different
individuals, that board can act officially only as such, in convened session,
with the members, or a quorum thereof, present.’ (State vs. Kelly, 21 ALR 156).
“Secondly, in consonance with the foregoing principles, the
aforementioned Memorandum Order of the Secretary of Justice, issued in the
exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Department Head (Adm.
Code, Sec. 79[c]), expressly
declares that —
“‘x x the public interest so
requiring, it is hereby ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered
by the Board of Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu
propio of decisions of the Board of Special
Inquiry, are set aside.’
and this
nullification included the alleged 1961 decision which the appellee
now invokes and upon which he relies.”
Hence, there was no decision rendered by the previous Board of
Commissioners dated September 11, 1961 that could have been reversed by the
respondent Board of Commissioners, as found by the trial court.
To the same effect is the
ruling of the court in the fairly recent case of Commissioner of Immigration
vs. Garcia (L-28082, June 28, 1974, 57 SCRA 603, 613). The Court stated thus:
“The decisive issue is whether the ruling of the Board of
Commissioners, as strengthened by Antonio Caoile’s
testimony, should prevail over the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
which was ‘noted’ by Deputy Commissioner De la Rosa and Talabis
but disapproved by Commissioner Galang. The first Board of Commissioners did not meet
collectively to discuss and deliberate on the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, its action was set aside by Memorandum Order No. 9
of the Secretary of Justice. Individual
action by the members of the Board of Commissioners renders nugatory the
purpose of its constitution as a board (Arocha vs. Vivo, supra).”
In the same case, the Court had occasion to clarify statements
made by it in the earlier case of Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez
(L-22696, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 184), which had been heavily relied upon by the
lower court in its decision. Whatever
was declared by the lower court, relying on the statements of the Supreme Court
in the latter case, has been watered down by the decision in the case of
Commissioner of Immigration vs. Garcia, supra, considering that the two
cases arose from the same facts.
Relevant portions of the Garcia case are hereinbelow
quoted:
“One ground relied upon by the Court of Appeals in granting the
petition for habeas corpus is the pronouncement of this Court in
the 1964 bail incident (Commissioner of Immigration vs. Fernandez, supra). It was intimated in that case that it was
improper for the new Board of Commissioners to have set aside the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry after the two Deputy Commissioners had ‘noted’
that decision and, thereby, affirmed it.
“What this Court said in the bail incident regarding the
finality of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was an obiter dictum. The ratio decidendi
of the decision in the bail incident, which was a certiorari and
prohibition case, was that the Court of Appeals did not abuse, much less
gravely abuse its discretion” in granting bail to Teban
Caoile. Hence,
certiorari did not lie.
“The finality of the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
was not the primary issue in the bail incident.
It was the Court of Appeals that was called upon to rule first on that
issue in the light of the evidence presented in the trial court. That issue was not foreclosed by the decision in the bail
incident.”
Section 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, states
that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry “shall prevail and shall
be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners as hereafter
stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the Board of Commissioners
after a review by it, motu proprio
of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said
decision.” Otherwise stated, within a period of one year from
promulgation, the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry can be reversed by
the Board of Commissioners acting motu proprio on review, in the absence of an appeal. Absent a reversal, the decision of the Board
of Special Inquiry prevails and becomes final after the lapse of one year from
its promulgation.
The respondent Board of Commissioners rendered on September 4, 1962 its decision
reversing that of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 dated September 11, 1961, well within the one-year
period required by law. The lower
court’s declaration that the respondent Board of Commissioners’ decision was antedated, stems from a wrong appreciation of the facts.
As urged by respondent Board of Commissioners, the trial court erred
in finding that the decision of the respondent Board of Commissioners dated September 4, 1962 was not rendered on
that date, but only on October 26,
1962, the date of mailing of said decision. Respondent correctly pointed out that the
petitioner himself introduced in evidence a copy of the decision of the Board
of Commissioners which was dated September
4, 1962. The law presumes
that official duty has been regularly performed; that a writing is truly dated
(Sec. 5[m], [u], Rule 131, Rules
of Court). No contrary evidence was
adduced by petitioner indicating another date of rendition of the decision of
the Board of Commissioners. Hence, the
presumptions are not rebutted (pp. 45-46, appellant’s brief).
It is true that the copy of the decision of the Board of
Commissioners dated September 4, 1962
was sent by mail to the petitioner’s minor children herein only on October 26, 1962, and received by
the said minors on the same date. This
fact, however, does not work to vitiate said decision. All that the Immigration Law requires is that
the decision of reversal of the Board of Commissioners be promulgated within
one year from the rendition of the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry. Notice of said decision of reversal
may be sent even after the one-year period has elapsed. In the case of Neria
vs. Commissioner of Immigration (L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 807, citing Arocha vs. Vivo, supra), the Supreme Court ruled
that “the operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the
resolution (of exclusion) was noted and adopted by them as a Board,
regardless of the date when the decision in extenso
was prepared, written and signed,” and with more reason, as in this case,
regardless of the date when such decision is mailed, “because the decision
in extenso must relate back to the day the
resolution to exclude was actually adopted.
Necessarily, the extended opinion had to be posterior to the day when
the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of
Special Inquiry. The Secretary’s
certificate shows that the Board of Immigration Commissioners acted upon not
less than eight Immigration cases (including that of the Gatchalians)
on July 6, 1962; and it was of course impracticable to prepare and sign fully
reasoned decisions in all these cases.”
The Supreme Court, in many cases, had issued brief resolutions or
decisions with the additional reservation to prepare an extended resolution or
decision by employing the phrase “without prejudice to an extended
opinion.”
In the most recent case of Go Yu Tak Wai vs. Vivo, et al. (L-22257, May 25, 1977, 77 SCRA 55, 59-61, WE reiterated:
“Issue. – The legal question in this appeal is
whether, for purposes of section 27(b) of the Immigration Law, a resolution of
the Commissioners which reversed the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry
and which was adopted within one year from the promulgation of the said
decision is sufficient or whether it is necessary that the Commissioners’
written decision in amplification of the resolution of reversal or containing
their findings, be promulgated within the said one-year period. That question is not new.
“Ruling. – This Court had already held that ‘the
operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when the resolution of
exclusion was voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the Board of
Special Inquiry’ (Arocha vs. Vivo, L-24844, and Vivo
vs. Arca, L-24853, both decided on October 26, 1967,
and reported in 21 SCRA 532, 538, per Justice J.B.L. Reyes; Neria
vs. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 806, 815; Go Oh
vs. Vivo, L-24898, March 31, 1971, 28 SCRA 228, 238).
“Consequently, the Commissioners were justified in using March 11, 1963 as the date of their
written decision although it was
actually prepared or drafted on August
13, 1963 and was mailed to Go Yu Tak Wai on August 27,
1963 (Exh. H-3). The decision (Exh. A or H) related back to the date when the
Commissioners deliberated on the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and
voted or resolved to reverse it or to exclude Go Yu Tak
Wai.
“Section 27(b) specifies that as a rule the decision of the
Board of Special Inquiry ‘shall be promulgated and the findings and
recommendations, in proper cases, submitted not later than two days from the
date of the deliberation.’ The absence of such a requirement with respect to
the decision of the Board of Commissioners supports the view that such
decision need not be promulgated within the one-year period. It suffices that the Commissioners should
review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry and deliberate upon it
within one year from the promulgation of the Board of Special Inquiry’s
decision and that the minutes of their deliberation should reflect the action
which they took within the said statutory period.
“Moreover, as noted by the Solicitor General, section 27(c)
expressly requires that the decision of the Commissioners in case of an
appeal from the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry, excluding an alien,
should ‘be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the
time the case is submitted for decision.’ In contrast, no such requirement is
provided for in section 27(b) with respect to the Commissioner’s decision in
case they motu proprio
review the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry.
“The trial court erred in holding that under section 27(b) a
written decision should be signed and promulgated by the Commissioners within
one year from the promulgation of the decision of the Board of Special
Inquiry.”
In a long string of cases, the Supreme Court has consistently
adhered to the rule that decisions of administrative officers are not to be
disturbed by the courts except when the former have acted without or in excess
of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Thus, in the case of Deluao
vs. Casteel (L-21906, Dec. 24, 1968, 26 SCRA 475, 496, citing Pajo vs. Ago, et al., L-15414, June 30, 1960) and Ganitano vs. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, et al. (L-21167, March 31, 1966), the Supreme Court held that:
“x x It is a well-recognized principle
that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be interfered
with by the courts (Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy,
G.R. No. L-5750, April 20, 1953). In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of
the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with respect to acts
involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. (54 Am. Jur.
558-559) Findings of fact by an administrative board or official, following a
hearing, are binding upon the courts and will not be disturbed except where the
board or official has gone beyond his statutory authority, exercised
unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion.” (See also Singh
vs. Board of Commissioners, L-11015, Feb. 25, 1961).
It was therefore incumbent upon the
petitioner herein to show that the respondent Board of Commissioners had acted
without or in excess of their jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion. Petitioner failed to do
so. On the other hand, respondent Board
has fully elucidated the factual basis of the decision of reversal dated September 4, 1962. Respondent Board showed that the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry warranted a reversal for being evidently
erroneous (see appellant’s brief, pp. 40-44).
The respondent Board of Commissioners likewise insists with
reason that the trial court erred in making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction restraining the respondent from “enforcing or executing its
decision . . or otherwise
excluding and/or deporting the minors Si Beng, Si Son and Si Luna from the Philippines.”
It is well settled that writs of prohibition should be allowed only upon a
showing of lack or excess of jurisdiction or of authority or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of a tribunal, corporation, board or person exercising
function judicial or ministerial, and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law (Section 2, Rule 65,
New Rules of Court). The reason for the aforestated rule has been stated in the case of Solidum vs. Hernandez (L-16570, Feb. 28, 1963, 7 SCRA 320,
325) wherein the Supreme Court declared that:
“x x x In
the exercise of discretion, inferior tribunals, corporations, boards or
persons should be allowed some latitude of independence, a freedom of movement
and judgment consistent with the trust reposed on them by law or regulation to
mediate over specific disputes. If every act or ruling of them were to be
subjected to the scrutiny and re-examination of a superior tribunal,
and, in every instance must be reconciled with the views of the reviewing body,
then the administration of justice will greatly be hampered. The discretion of lower tribunals will then
be but a word, not a reality.
“Thus, We have always adhered to the standard that for grave
abuse of discretion to prosper as a ground for prohibition, it must be
first demonstrated that there was such a capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad
Santos v. Province of Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Bibby de Padilla v. Horilleno,
60 Phil. 511; Alafriz v. Nable,
72 Phil. 278). Similarly, We have ruled that there is ‘excess of jurisdiction’ where
the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or acted without any
statutory authority (Leung Ben v. O’Brien, 38 Phil. 182; Salvador Campos y Cia v. Del Rosario, 41 Phil. 45). In other words, prohibition ought to be
issued only after the reviewing tribunal shall have convinced itself that the
lower court has exercised its power ‘in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to
act in contemplation of law (Tavera-Luna, Inc. v. Nable, 67 Phil. 340).”
The same rule was restated in the case of
Delfin vs. CA (L-21022, Feb. 27, 1965, 13 SCRA 366).
Moreover, the extraordinary remedy of prohibition cannot be
resorted to where the petitioner, as in this case, has an adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law by way of appeal in due time (see Solidum vs. Hernandez,
and Delfin vs. CA, supra). As aptly ruled in the case of De Bisschop vs. Galang (L-18365, May 31, 1963, 8 SCRA 244, 248-9):
“x x Prohibition is not favored by
the Courts. The writ should issue with
caution, and only in cases of extreme necessity — which condition does not
obtain in this case. Moreover, it will
issue only if there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy (Section 2,
Rule 67, Rules of Court). This Court has already ruled that ‘the use of
habeas corpus to test the legality of
aliens’ confinement and proposed
expulsion from the Philippines is now a settled practice’ (Lao Tang Bun v. Fabre, 81 Phil. 682, 683).
This is because habeas corpus, aside from being thorough and complete,
affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind, and under all
circumstances. It reaches the facts
affecting jurisdiction, or want of power, by the most direct method, and at
once releases the applicant from restraint when it is shown to be unauthorized
(cf. People ex rel. Livingston v. Wyatt, 186 N.Y.
383; 79 N.E. 330). And it has already
been held by a long line of American decisions that the existence of this
adequate remedy by habeas corpus will bar the issuance of a writ of prohibition.”
Anent the costs taxed against the respondent Board of
Commissioners, since the latter is a government agency in the Philippines,
sued in its official capacity, it is the
Philippine Government itself that was in effect sued. Consequently, Section 1, Rule 142, of the New
Rules of Court apply. Said rule states in part: “No costs shall be allowed against the
Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law.” No
such law exists. Hence, it was erroneous
for the trial court to have taxed costs against the respondent Board of
Commissioners of Immigration.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM SHOULD BE, AS IT IS
HEREBY, REVERSED, WITH COSTS AGAINST PETITIONER-APPELLEE.
Fernando, C.J., Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro, and Melencio-Herrera,
JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo and
Antonio, JJ., concurs
in the dissent of J. Teehankee.
Abad Santos, J., in the result.
6 pt
6 pt
0
3
SEPARATE DISSENTING
OPINION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The established facts in the record are as follows:
The three minor children born in China of the marriage of Benito
Sichangco, a Filipino citizen, and his wife, arrived in the Philippines on
August 28, 1961. Duly provided with
certificates of registration and identity issued by the Philippine Consulate at
Hongkong, properly documented, they sought admission as petitioner’s children.
After the corresponding investigation and hearing, the Board of
Special Inquiry rendered its decision on September 11, 1961 admitting
the minors into the Philippines as citizens thereof, being the children of petitioner. On or about October 26, 1962, the
minors received by ordinary mail a letter from respondent Board of Commissioners
enclosing copy of its motu proprio decision dated September
4, 1962 reversing the September 11, 1961 decision of admission of the Board
of Special Inquiry as confirmed by the previous Board of Commissioners, and
instead ordering their exclusion from the Philippines.
Upon a petition for prohibition by petitioner on behalf of his
three minor children and after trial, the lower court rendered its judgment of
August 11, 1964, finding that respondent Board’s adverse decision dated
September 4, 1962 “was rendered on October 26, 1962 which was more
than one year from the first decision. Consequently, it is declared illegal, null and void.”
The lower court, appraising the evidence, found that respondent
Board’s adverse decision dated September 4, 1962 “was ante-dated,
based on the ground that had that decision been rendered on September 4, 1962,
the copy to the petitioner should have been mailed immediately
thereafter. But since the copy of such
decision was only mailed on October 26,
1962, as shown by Exhibit E-2, which was not contested or denied by the
respondents, strong presumption exists in favor of the petitioner that such
decision was rendered not on September 4, 1962, but only on October 26,
1962. At any rate, it is not the date
of the decision that counts but the date when copy was officially recorded
and copy furnished the party.”
The lower court further
cited several instances where respondend board had ante-dated its
adverse decisions of reversal so as to make it appear that they were rendered
and promulgated within the jurisdictional one-year period, thus: “The Court also takes judicial notice
that the decisions of the same Commissioners of Immigration had been ante-dated
in the case which was tried before this Court (Civil Case No. 54882, entitled Go
Yu Tak Wai vs. Hon. Martiniano Vivo), which is now elevated to the higher
court, because in that case it was found out that the decision was ante-dated
as proven by the fact that it was officially filed on record much later
than the date of such decision. This
incident also happened in the case of Chua Kian @ Chua Quian vs. Martiniano
Vivo, et al., Civil Case No. 51870, decided by Hon. Francisco Arca, Branch
I of this Court, a certified copy of which was presented as Exhibit F, where it
was found by the Honorable Judge that the decision of the said Commissioner of
Immigration was ante-dated. Again in the case of Commissioner of Immigration vs. Hon. F.
Fernandez, et al., G. R. No. L-22696, decided by Honorable Justice Jose Ma.
Paredes on May 29, 1964, the same incident happened. The decision of the Commissioner of Immigration was found by
the Honorable Supreme Court that it was also ante-dated. The pertinent part of the Supreme Court
decision is quoted as follows:
‘The actuation of the new Board of Commissioners in reviewing a
decision already passed upon by its predecessor Board, may breed chaos in the
Bureau of Immigration. If sanctioned,
without any legal and plausible grounds, it may lead to an insecurity of status already established by a previous Board. If by a whimsical stroke of fate, two or
three Boards of Commissioners are constituted within the span of one year, and each wanted to exercise the right to
review already deliberated and decided cases, where will persons similarly situated,
as Teban Caoili, be? Let us
ponder. An arbitrary, abusive and
indiscriminate exercise of the right to review, even if granted by
law, will obliterate the right of an
individual to due process — a destructive blow to the rule of law.’
(Decision of the Hon. Supreme Court, May 29, 1964).”
I. The fundamental
issue at bar is one of fact assuming that this Court could review the
findings of fact of the trial court in this appeal directly from the trial
court, viz, whether the trial court correctly found on the basis of the
evidence that respondent board’s adverse decision was ante-dated as of
September 4, 1962 so as to make it appear that it was rendered within the
one-year jurisdictional period which lapsed on September 11, 1962 and at the
very least that respondent board failed to establish that it did act within
said one-year period on the one hand or whether on the other hand, as
stated in the opinion of my esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar,
“(T)he lower court’s declaration … stems from a wrong appreciation of
the facts.” (at page 9).
The issue is decisive, because as likewise stated by Mr. Justice
Makasiar in his opinion (at page 9): “(S)ection 27(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 613, as amended, states
that the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry ‘shall prevail and
shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the Board of Commissioners
as hereafter stated, or, in the absence of an appeal, unless reversed by the
Board of Commissioners after a review by it, motu proprio of the entire
proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said
decision.’ Otherwise stated, within a period of one year from promulgation,
the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry can be reversed by the Board of
Commissioners acting motu proprio on review, in the absence of an
appeal. Absent a reversal, the
decision of the Board of Special Inquiry prevails and becomes final
after the lapse of one year from its promulgation.”
(emphasis supplied).
The trial court’s finding of fact is fully supported by the
evidence of record. As correctly found
by the trial court, no evidence whatever was presented by respondent
board to show that it had ever voted or taken action on September 4, 1962
and that such action was duly recorded and entered in the minutes of
the proceedings on said date within the one-year mandatory period, which was to
form the basis of its written decision backdated September 4, 1962 which was
sent by ordinary mail together with a letter signed by Pio S. Noche, secretary,
dated September 4, 1962, much later only on October 26, 1962, Exhibit
E-1, and the envelope marked Exhibit E-2, which shows that such letter was mailed
only on October 26, 1962. October
26, 1962 was in fact 45 days after the lapse of the jurisdictional
one-year period on September 11, 1962 and the notoriety of the practice
in government offices and agencies of ante-dating their communications and
actions is only too well known.
What is worse, is that the printed certification dated
September 4, 1962 but issued on March 4, 1965 (bearing a date even
after the date of respondent board’s brief dated February 26, 1965 but
filed with this Court actually on March 16, 1965) purportedly to
be “sgd.” by Mr. Pio S. Noche, secretary of respondent board (who
previously as Acting Deputy Commissioner had confirmed the Board of
Special Inquiry’s decision of admission of September 11, 1961) and purporting
to show that respondent board had voted for exclusion on September 4, 1962 as a
prop for giving the decision the same date, notwithstanding that it was
promulgated by ordinary mail only on October 26, 1962, 45 days after the
lapse of the jurisdictional one-year period,
so as to invoke the Arocha ruling that “the decision in extenso
must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually
adopted” is NOT a part of the evidence of record. It was never presented as evidence to
the trial court (and it could not have been so presented, because it was
issued by Mr. Noche only on March 4, 1965, long after the trial and decision
of the court below). Said
certification of Mr. Noche was belatedly submitted only for the first
time in this Appeal as Annex 3 of respondent board’s brief (at page
68 thereof) in printed form, and without the actual signature of
Mr. Noche. Neither Mr. Noche nor
any member of respondent board was ever presented at the hearing,
much less to authenticate said certification which shows on its face that it
was issued only on March 4, 1965 during the pendency of this
appeal.
Verily petitioner-appellee has cause to complain in his brief
that “(I)f, as claimed by respondent Board, this document has existed
since September 4, 1962, why is it being presented for the first time
only in this appeal? No
explanation has been given as to why this important, not to say decisive
document has not been offered in evidence in the court below. Of course,
there is one explanation — and that is, that it did not exist at all prior to
the trial of this case, and the production of this document at this late stage
of this case, is but another brazen attempt to justify what the trial court
found to be ‘the practice of changing
or reversing decision after it has elapsed for one year’ and which
the trial judge described as ‘not only condemnable but also illegal
bordering on falsification.'”
Said purported certification has patently NO probative
value. It does not form
part of the record of the case. NO
authentic or signed copy was ever identified or submitted or admitted as an exhibit
or as part of the record at the trial. A plain, simple printed copy (without
signature nor authentication) and by its face issued only on March 4, 1965
long after the trial and decision below and during the appeal
proceedings in this Court was merely attached to appellant’s
brief as Annex “3” thereof. This is bogus evidence. And for the majority to
reverse the appealed decision on the basis of such legally non-existent
evidence is rank denial of substantive due process and a gross violation of the
cardinal rule that only matters duly submitted in evidence or of which the
courts may take judicial notice shall be considered in the determination of a
case.
For ready reference, the same, submitted as Annex 3 of respondent’s
brief, is herewith reproduced as is:
“ANNEX ‘3’
“Republic of
the Philippines
Department of
Justice
BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION
Manila
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS
“It is hereby certified that in the admission as PI citizens
case of Si Beng, et. al.
“Review Motu Proprio
“(I.C. Nos. 61-3165-WCA, No. to 61-3167-C s. 19 …) the Board of Commissioners voted
as follows:
“Commissioner Vivo . . . . . . . . . Exclude
Ass. Com. Gaston . . . . . . . . . . Exclude
Ass. Com. Rañola . . . . . . . . . . . Exclude
Manila, Sept. 4, 1962.
“Certified true copy:
“PIO S. NOCHE1
Secretary
“(Sgd.)2 PIO S. NOCHE
Secretary
“Mar. 4, 1965”
It is to be noted that (a) the supposed certification marked as1 does not even indicate that it was ever signed; and (b)
the prefix “(Sgd.)” marked above as2 is only
printed. The entire alleged document
was never identified nor submitted nor admitted in evidence. As indicated by1, the entire alleged document is not even certified.
Contrary, then, to the
majority decision’s bare pronouncement that the lower court’s decision
“stems from a wrong appreciation of the facts,” the facts of record
show that the lower court correctly ruled that there was nothing to show
that the decision of October 26, 1962 had in fact been voted on
and adopted on September 4, 1962 so as to be able to apply thereto the Arocha
ruling that “the operative date of the Commissioners’ action is that when
the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a Board,
regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared,
written and signed.”
II. The vital issue of law before the
Court is that the decision on a review motu proprio by respondent board
(whether for inclusion or exclusion) must be duly put in writing and promulgated
(with proper service whether personally or by registered mail, as in service
of final orders or judgments under Rule 12, section 7 [applying
suppletorily the Rules of Court], as required by substantive due process;
of Peo. vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764, 767) within the statutory one-year
period.
I had set forth this view in Go Yu Tak Twai vs. Vivo, 77
SCRA 55 (1977) which was concurred in by the late Mr. Chief Justice Castro and
Mr. Justice Antonio, with Mr. Justice Barredo filing a similar opinion. This case really does not constitute
authority for the majority decision’s ruling (as cited on pages 10-12 thereof)
for the Court was split six to four without reaching the required 8-vote
majority either way and the lower court’s decision declaring the board’s
decision in extenso as null and void for having been issued beyond the statutory one-year period was legally deemed affirmed.
I stressed therein that “(P)ublic policy and due process
buttress such a construction. Where
the alien has appealed from an adverse decision or a dissenting special inquiry
board member has appealed a favorable decision, the applicant for admission
knows as mandated by the law that a final decision must be handed down within
seven days from submittal of the appeal for decision. Where there has been no appeal and the Board
of Commissioners conducts a review motu proprio of which the applicant
is likely unaware, both public policy and due process demand that where no
adverse decision is promulgated within the statutory one-year period of
finality, the decision of the special inquiry board shall have become
final and beyond the Commissioners’ authority to reverse or set aside
thereafter. (Otherwise, such one-year
period would be an elastic rather than a fixed period and would have no
meaning, as in this case where the appellee would have been ordered excluded by
a decision of reversal promulgated five months after the lapse of the
one-year period.)”
I further submitted therein that “(S)uch a view is certainly
in consonance with the law’s policy of a definite date of fixed finality
of the special inquiry board’s decision — be it of inclusion or exclusion of
an alien — and to reduce to the minimum any opportunity or occasion for
anomalies and irregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens
and applicants for admission under the procedures for appeal or review motu
proprio established by the Act. In Neria
vs. Commissioner of Immigration,3 the Court
through the now Chief Justice4 precisely
noted a deliberate ante-dating by six days of the Board of
Commissioners’ action of reversal motu proprio of the special inquiry
board’s admission and declared the decision of reversal null and void,
ruling that ‘the said decision of the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and
the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such decision, are
therefore, as correctly found by the lower court, null and void, for ‘lack
of jurisdiction‘, since the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1
by that time had already become final.'”
Prescinding from the foregoing, what is vital and indispensable
then, under prevailing jurisprudence, specially where the Board of
Commissioners conducts motu proprio a review of the Special Inquiry
Board’s decision of admission within the concededly jurisdictional and
mandatory period of one year from promulgation of the Special Inquiry
Board’s decision is that the Commissioners’ adverse vote and action must be
within said one-year period and must be duly promulgated, i.e. recorded
and entered in the minutes of the proceedings (following the Arocha
ruling). Here, the record is NIL
insofar as any such action of the Commissioners is concerned. All that we have is their decision obviously
ante-dated to September 4, 1962 but nothing to show that they had in fact acted upon and voted in their motu
proprio review on September 4, 1962. To cite the impugned decision itself (which was sent out by
ordinary mail only 45 days on October 26, 1962) as proof of the very factum
probandum is to beg the question.
In Neria vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, supra, the Court through the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro stressed the necessity of such promulgation of
the boards’ actions, as indeed the Immigration Act stresses that such actions
and decisions must be promulgated, thus:
“According to the Solicitor General, the correct date of
promulgation is September 4, 1961, because under the Immigration Rules and
Regulations, the decision of a Board of Special Inquiry ‘shall be rendered in writing,’ and under section 27
(b), supra, the written decision ‘shall be promulgated‘; that the words ‘rendition’ (from ‘rendered’) and ‘promulgation’ (from
‘promulgated’) connote two separate and distinct acts required to be
accomplished by the Board of Special Inquiry, for rendition is the date when a
judge signs his decision and files it with the clerk of court, whereas promulgation
is the date when such decision is published, officially announced,
is made known to the public, or delivered to the clerk of
court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or to their
counsel; and that in this case,
rendition was accomplished on August 2, 1961 when the Board of Special Inquiry
No. 1 concluded its hearing on the petitioner’s case (I.C. 61-2312-C),
deliberated thereon, voted for his admission into the Philippines and rendered
its written decision, and promulgation was accomplished on September 4, 1961
when the petitioner was actually
notified of the decision, copy of which was received
by his counsel.
“No amount of hair-splitting in regard to the words ‘rendition’
and ‘promulgation’ would convey different meanings. This Court defined promulgation as ‘the delivery of the decision to the
Clerk of Court for filing and
publication‘. The word ‘promulgate’ was viewed by
the majority in People vs. Dinglasan (77 Phil. 764) as the entry made by
the clerk of a judgment or order in the book of entries of judgments made by
said clerk.
– – –
“As it was on
August 8, 1962 when the Board of Immigration Commissioners as a body
deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the Board of
Special Inquiry No. 1, the
review motu proprio was
effected 6 days beyond the one-year period fixed by section 27 (b), supra. The said decision of
the Board of Immigration Commissioners, and the warrant of exclusion issued on
the strength of such decision, are therefore, as correctly found by the lower
court, null and void, for ‘lack of jurisdiction,’ since the decision of
the Board of Special Inquiry No. 1 by that time had already become
‘final.'”
I vote, therefore, for affirmance of the appealed decision.
3 23 SCRA 806, 816-818 (May 27,
1968).
4 Reference is to the late Chief
Justice Fred Ruiz Castro.