G.R. Nos. L-24373-74. November 28, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. MANUEL MARQUEZ, TOMAS NAVASCA, ANDRES ALCONTIN, ROGELIO ALCONTIN AND FLORENCIO GERALDEZ, DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
PER CURIAM:
Criminal cases 7050 (L-24373) and 7054 (L-24374) of the Davao Court of First Instance involve separate and distinct
offenses imputed to the same five defendants-appellants, namely Manuel
Marquez, Tomas Navasca, Andres Alcontin,
Rogelio Alcontin and Florencio
Geraldez. The
first is a prosecution for “robbery in band with homicide” committed
on May 14, 1961, in the municipality
of Matanao,
Davao. The second is for the crime of “robbery
in band with multiple rape” committed about a month earlier, April 15, 1961 to be precise, in Bansalan, another municipality of the same province.
In a single decision rendered by the Davao court, after a simultaneous
trial, all of the defendants were found guilty on all counts and accordingly
sentenced, thus:
“WHEREFORE, in Crim. Case No. 7050,
the Court hereby sentences each and everyone of the accused to life
imprisonment (reclusion perpetua); to indemnify
jointly and severally the heir of the deceased in the sum of P6,000.00; and
Regina Butay, in the sum of P1,000.00, the value of
the properties robbed; without, however, subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency; and to pay the costs.
“In Crim. Case No. 7054, the Court
hereby sentences each and everyone of the accused Manuel Marquez, Rogelio Alcontin, Andres Alcontin and Florencio Geraldez, to suffer an
indeterminate imprisonment of not less than TEN (10) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as minimum and not more than
TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify
jointly and severally Laureano Bandala
in the sum of P599.50, the value of the properties robbed, without, however,
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
“Crediting in his favor the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary plea of guilty, the Court hereby sentences the accused Tomas Navasca to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of not less
than EIGHT (8) YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision
mayor as minimum and not more than FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS
AND ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal as maximum; to indemnify
jointly and severally with his co-accused Laureano Bandala in the sum of P599.50 without, however, subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the proportionate costs.
“Pursuant to Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code the maximum
period of penalty of each and everyone of the accused in these two cases shall
not exceed forty (40) years.”
The appeal in both cases, taken by all the defendants directly
to the Court of Appeals, perforce thrust upon the said tribunal a novel and
intriguing problem. Whereas in criminal
case 7050, the sentence imposed was life imprisonment, in the other, criminal
case 7054, it was reclusion temporal. The first case is indisputably within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court, while the second, where
questions of law and fact are raised and the penalties meted out are lower than
life imprisonment, is reviewable initially by the
Court of Appeals.[1]
While the Court of Appeals admits that the two cases involve distinct
offenses committed in two different municipalities with an interval of one
month in point of time, it nevertheless declined to recognize a case of split
appellate jurisdiction and consequently refused to pass upon criminal case
7054, although it clearly had the duty and the power to do so.
It appears that the Court of Appeals, in abdicating its appellate
jurisdiction, was persuaded by several factors.
First, a single consolidated expediente
has been accumulated from the hearings simultaneously conducted of the two
offenses to the extent that the record cannot in any way be divided without
impairing its comprehensiveness for either case. Second, a single body of proof intended to
sustain defenses common to both offenses was offered by the defendants. And third, identical errors were assigned on
appeal. The Court of Appeals would
therefore have only one appellate court review the single decision in these two
cases in order to avoid possible conflict in the final findings of two
appellate tribunals on the common factual aspects. The step suggested would, it is urged,
obliterate duplication of judicial review and facilitate disposal of related
cases.
On the basis of the reasons so advanced, the Court of Appeals
opted to certify the two cases to us for review, correctly recognizing that
criminal case 7050 for robbery in band with homicide falls within the
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court.
While few can entertain a brief against the practical advantages
of the single consolidated review suggested by the Court of Appeals, we cannot marshall any legal justification therefor without directly infringing upon the
jurisdictional boundaries so clearly delineated by our statutes.
Inescapably can be seen that the penalty of reclusion perpetua meted out to the defendants in criminal
case 7050 for robbery in band with homicide brought the case, on appeal,
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court. Section 17, par. (4), Judiciary Act of 1948,
as amended, reads –
“The Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal, certiorari or writ of
error, as the law or rules of court may provide, final judgments and decrees of
inferior courts as herein provided, in —
“(4) All criminal cases involving offenses for which the
penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment; and those involving other
offenses which, although not so punished, arose out of the same occurrence or
which may have been committed by the accused on the same occasion, as that
giving rise to the more serious offense, regardless of whether the accused are
charged as principals, accomplices, or accessories, or whether they have been
tried jointly or separately.”
Upon the other hand, criminal case 7054 for robbery in band with
multiple rape, the maximum penalty therein imposed being reclusion temporal,
perforce falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals, as so directed by section 29 of the Act mentioned.
It would have been an entirely different situation had the
offense subject-matter of criminal case 7054 arisen out of the same occurrence
or been committed on the same occasion, as that which gave rise to the offense
subject-matter of criminal case 7050.
Were it so, then this Court would be bound to take cognizance of both
cases. But the stark undenied
and undeniable fact is that the two felonies are widely disparate in point of
time as well as locality.
We are not prepared to infuse, as the Court of Appeals did, a new
meaning to the provisions of the Judiciary Act because its mandates and terms
are specific and unmistakable. We cannot
widen the scope of our appellate jurisdiction on the basis of the fact that an
inferior court heard, wisely or not, two distinct and separate cases
simultaneously. Such procedure adopted
by the trial court cannot and did not result in the merger of the two
crimes. Rightly so, each case was
separately determined by the trial court, as each should be separately
reviewed on appeal. Appellate competence
is circumscribed by statute, and is not flux and ferment to be settled by the
exigencies of trial proceedings, much less by the physical composition of the expediente.
This Court therefore limits its review to criminal case 7050 for
robbery in band with homicide. Criminal
case 7054 will be remanded to the Court of Appeals for adjudication.
The information for robbery in band with homicide (criminal case
7050) was read to the accused Manuel Marquez, Tomas Navasca,
Andres Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin
and Florencio Geraldez at
their arraignment on January 17, 1962;
they pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, except Navasca
who, to the discomfiture of his counsels, admitted his guilt in open court.
Disturbed by this turn of events, the defendants’ common counsels
(Marquez was separately represented) moved for a reconsideration of the plea
because, according to them, Navasca had previously
agreed with counsels not to plead guilty to the charge. So, at the same hearing, the lower court
directed the re-arraignment of Navasca; the latter
unequivocally reiterated his confession of guilt.
Defense counsels did not, however, relent, nor did they abandon
their motion to have Navasca’s plea of guilty reconsidered. They asked the court to have Navasca examined by a competent psychiatrist to verify the
charge of his co-defendants and cellmates that he had become mentally deranged
while in prison. This request was
granted.
In the course of the proceedings, Dr. Manuel Celis
of the psychiatric ward of the Davao
General Hospital
was presented by the defendants to buttress their contention that Navasca was indeed suffering from mental aberration at the
time he entered his plea. The lower
court was, however, unconvinced. It
maintained the belief that Navasca correctly
understood the significance of the proceedings taken against him and adequately
appreciated the consequences of his plea.
The lower court thereafter rejected defense counsels’ insistent demand
that Navasca’s plea be changed from guilty to one of
not guilty.
This denial is here assigned as error, to support the contention
that Navasca was convicted without benefit of trial.
Before delving into the merits, we shall first dispose of this
assigned error.
If Navasca were indeed insane, as his counsels
represented him to be, the proper remedy was one of annulment of his plea and
suspension of his arraignment, and not a change of his plea from guilty to one
of not guilty. An insane accused cannot
comprehend the full import of either a plea of guilty or one of not
guilty. His commitment to a mental
asylum, until he recovers normalcy, is imperative.
As ordered by the lower court, Navasca
was examined by a competent psychiatrist.
Dr. Manuel Celis of the Davao General Hospital
found him to be suffering from “simple and hebephrenic schizophrenia”
– schizophrenic reaction of a mixed type.
The doctor noted in his report that –
“MENTAL CONDITION:
Patient was first presented to the clinic last March 2, 1962. On examination, he was dirty and unconcerned
about his personal grooming.
Nevertheless, his responses were spontaneous in a coherent arid relevant
manner. Dulling of the affect was quite
evident. Inside the jail, he saw a
strange vision of a girl several times, and called her by the name of ‘Muntinglupa‘.
Initial and succeeding examinations showed patient reiterating his
innocence about the crime attributed to him.
Likewise, in all examinations, he was consistently hallucinated in the
visual sphere. Impairment of insight
was also noted.
* *
*
“PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
Basing my finding on the foregoing examination, I believe that the
accused, TOMAS NAVASCA, is suffering from mental disorder called SCHIZOPHRENIC
REACTION.”
On the witness stand, the psychiatrist
confirmed, on direct examination, that Navasca was
not of sound mind.
The threshold question is therefore whether Navasca’s
mental state was of such character as to legally incapacitate him from entering
an efficacious negative or affirmative plea to the indictment when read to him.
Elaborating on his written report, Dr. Cells declared in court
that Navasca had the behavior of the withdrawn, was
quiet in his movements, retarded in his responses and somewhat preoccupied. Given, however, simple arithmetic tests, Navasca responded correctly although sluggishly. He is normal in a certain way, Dr. Celis said. His
responses to questions were spontaneous, coherent and relevant. The doctor further stated that the effect of
schizophrenic reaction on the capacity of a person to comprehend what is asked
him is merely superficial. He can and
would understand the meaning of every inquiry made and properly appreciate
proceedings taken against him.
We concur in the trial court’s conclusion that Navasca was legally sane and had the mental capacity
required in law to enter his plea at his arraignment. The over-all testimony of Dr. Celis sustains this position
And that is not all. The
rest of the defendants even utilized Navasca as their
own witness, and his testimony turned out to be intelligent and
responsive. This was the trial judge’s
own conclusion as he watched Navasca’s physical
expressions, heard him talk, and evaluated his behavior.[2]
In sum, we find no compelling reason to modify the findings of
the court a quo on this point.
We now address ourselves to the merits of the case.
From the prosecution’s evidence, more particularly the aggregate
testimony of Regina But-ay and Crisanta But-ay, emerge the grisly events of that hapless
afternoon.
On May 14, 1961, at about 6 o’clock in the afternoon, in New Visayas, municipality of Matanao,
province of Davao, a band of robbers, five all told,
each wielding a firearm (although the shape, make and caliber thereof are not
ascertainable from the relevant sketchy testimony on record), swooped down on
the house of Diosdado But-ay. Four of these men barged in through the front
door, and forthwith warned the occupants inside not to resist or shout, on pain
of physical harm. Regina But-ay, the
wife of Diosdado, nevertheless seized her four-year
old son and ran for the kitchen door but was there blocked by the fifth armed
robber.
Crisanta But-ay, another occupant of
the house, was hauled up to the second floor by a lean man whom she later
identified as the defendant Rogelio Alcontin. Arriving there, Crisanta
was ordered to lie on the floor, face down, but even as she did, she noted
that another member of the band, whom she described as having wide facial
features and later identified as the defendant Andres Alcontin,
was already ransacking a trunk owned by her aunt Regina. While Crisanta lay
on the floor, the defendant Rogelio Alcontin flicked
on the radio to loud volume.
In the meantime, Regina
was ordered upstairs by-the same member of the band who had earlier accosted
her at the kitchen door. This member,
then wearing maong attire, was recognized by Crisanta as the defendant Florencio
Geraldez who went up to the second floor with her
aunt.
At this juncture, successive shots were heard by the witnesses
coming from the direction of the kitchen.
Shortly thereafter another member of the band appeared on the second
floor demanding a fresh supply of bullets from his companions as he had spent
his on one occupant of the house who had resisted him.
This member was identified by Regina
and Crisanta as the defendant Manuel Marquez.
After seizing a large clothbag
containing coins of various denominations from one of the trunks in the house,
the defendant Andres Alcontin queried Regina for more
but the latter had only her wallet to show, then containing a measly one-peso
paper bill. Marquez who had meanwhile
arrived at the second floor of the house pressed Regina
for the rest of her money. The latter
then pointed to a bodega outside the house.
Andres Alcontin joined Marquez in
escorting Regina to the bodega,
and they went scurrying down the stairs.
Getting to the kitchen door, Regina
saw Nicolas Amaba, one of her companions in the
house, dead on the floor. According to
the doctor who conducted the autopsy, Amaba sustained
several gunshot wounds which resulted in massive internal hemorrhage leading to
shock and ultimately to death.
At this juncture, Marquez ordered Andres Alcontin
to turn up the body of Nicolas, as this was lying face down, remarking that he
had killed him.
Arriving at the bodega, Marquez asked Regina
where her husband was. The latter
answered that he had probably fled. And
seeing that there was no money to be had in the bodega, Marquez grabbed
a stool from somewhere and hit Regina
with it. With child in arms, she jumped
from the bodega and scampered away.
None of the defendants, however, pursued her.
All the robbers left together at about 7 o’clock in the evening, taking with them money and
valuables, including some pieces of jewelry, all of a total value assessed at
P856.
Quite obvious from the foregoing disquisition is the absence of
any mention of evidence to inculpate Tomas Navasca. By way of explanation, it must be stated that
Navasca’s plea of guilty, which the court unqualifiedly
accepted after a thoroughgoing inquiry into his mental state, was apparently
taken by the prosecution and by the court as conclusive of his inculpatory participation in the commission of the
offense. It might indeed have been much
more desirable that the integrated picture depicted by the prosecution included
details of Navasca’s participation, but we are of the
view that this omission does not at all detract from the intrinsic worth of the
narration of the occurrences made by the State witnesses
After a painstaking analysis and perceptive scrutiny of the
record in its entirety, we find and so declare that the identification made by
Crisanta But-ay and Regina But-ay of the accused
Manuel Marquez, Andres Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin and Florencio Geraldez, and their cumulative positive testimony to the
effect that all these four defendants were present at the scene of the crime
imputed to them, do not suffer from any factual or legal infirmity. No bias of any form, shape or substance is imputed
to any of these two eye-witnesses.
With this view that we take of the testimonial evidence for the
prosecution, it will serve no useful purpose in the disposition of this case to
resolve the issue, squarely raised by the appellants Florencio
Geraldez, Andres Alcontin
and Manuel Marquez, of the involuntariness of their respective extrajudicial
confessions wherein they admit their essential participation in the offense of
robbery with homicide committed in the municipality of Matanao.
As to the proffer of alibi made solely by Rogelio Alcontin as his basic defense, by now it is almost trite to
say that alibi is amongst the weakest of defenses. Easy to concoct, it may be properly credited
only if established by convincing and satisfactory proof. It must be clearly shown not only that the
accused was at some other place but as well that it was physically impossible
for him to be at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Vicenta Argao, who was presented by Rogelio Alcontin
as a witness in support of his alibi, testified merely that Rogelio stayed at
her house in the mountain of Boob
for a period of over a month. This
unembellished declaration cannot serve to dent the testimony of Crisanta But-ay who positively identified him as one of the
invading armed robbers and definitively placed him at the situs
of the crime.
The final error assigned by the appellants is the denial by the
trial court, at the last hearing of the case, of their request for
continuance. It appears from the
appellants’ brief that the reason why they insisted on a continuance was to
gain sufficient time to enable them to present one Natividad
Alcontin and a certain physician to corroborate the
defendant Andres Alcontin’s assertion that he was
violently maltreated by the policemen of Bansalan
into signing his extrajudicial confession.
The names of the other witnesses which the appellants mention in their
brief, were not brought up when they asked the court for continuance (inspite of the fact that the trial court demanded mention
of the names of these witnesses and the time they would be available) and are
obvious afterthoughts. As for the
corroborative testimonies of Natividad Alcontin and the doctor on the alleged maltreatment of Andres,
the same would now be superfluous inasmuch as this Court has, in a manner of
speaking, already eschewed the pertinent confessions admitted in evidence. The question of whether the trial court
abused its discretion in denying the defendants’ motion for continuance may
now therefore be regarded as purely academic.
In People vs. Apduhan, Jr.,[3]
we observed that “with the present wording of article 295 [Revised Penal
Code] there is no such crime as ‘robbery with homicide in band.’ If robbery
with homicide is committed by a band the indictable offense would still be
denominated ‘robbery with homicide’ under article 294(1), but the element of band
… would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating circumstance.
The offense committed by the five appellants in the case at bar
is that of robbery with homicide, punished by authority of paragraph 1 of
article 294 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion perpetua to death.
The aggravating circumstance of the crime having been committed by a
band (art. 14, par. 6, of the Revised Penal Code), was alleged in the
information and proven at the trial. By
virtue of article 63 of the same Code, which prescribes rules for the
application of indivisible penalties, “when in the commission of the deed
there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall
be applied,” and “when both mitigating and aggravating circumstances
attended the commission of the act, the court shall reasonably apply them to
offset one another in consideration of their number and importance.” Thus
the punishment that should be imposed on the appellants Manuel Marquez, Andres
Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin
and Florencio Geraldez is
the death penalty. In the case of
Tomas Navasca, his plea of guilty is offset by the
aggravating circumstance of band; the penalty of reclusion perpetua was therefore correctly imposed on him.
ACCORDINGLY, in criminal case 7050 for robbery with
homicide committed by a band, this Court affirms the judgment a quo
insofar as it imposes the penalty of life imprisonment (reclusion
perpetua) on Tomas Navasca. With respect to the appellants Manuel
Marquez, Andres Alcontin, Rogelio Alcontin
and and Florencio Geraldez, this Court hereby imposes on each and all of them
the death penalty. The
amount of the indemnity which all of the five appellants will pay jointly and
severally to the heirs of the deceased Nicolas Amaba
is hereby increased from P6,000 to P12,000.[4]
The indemnity to be paid by them, jointly and severally, to Crisanta
But-ay and Regina But-ay for the money
and properties carried away by them is hereby reduced from P1,000 to P856,
which latter amount is the sum properly borne by the evidence of record.
Proportionate costs are assessed against all the appellants.
Criminal case 7054 for robbery with multiple rape committed by a
band is hereby ordered remanded to the Court of Appeals for its proper review,
the same being within its exclusive appellate jurisdiction.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,
and Barredo,
JJ., concur.
Sanchez, J., did not take part.
[1]
Sec. 17, par. (4) and Sec. 29, Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
[2]
See People vs. Aspalin, et al., L-14623, December 29, 1960.
[3]
L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24
SCRA 807-808.
[4]
People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, Oct. 11, 1968, 25 SCRA 468.