PASCUAL STA. ANA, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, VS. ARCADIO NARVADES, SOLEDAD B. MENLA AND PURITA B. TACATA, DEFENDANTS?APPELLEES.

Appeal from the order of dismissal issued, on a motion to
dismiss, by the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur in its Civil Case No. 5443, wherein appellant sought
the declaration of the nullity of the order of reconstitution of Land
Registration Case 568, the whole reconstitution pro­ceeding R-140, and the
order directing the issuance of a de­cree of registration in the said land
registration case.

Way back in 1931, herein appellant was applicant, and herein appellees were oppositors, in
Land Registration Case No. 568 (G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 38905) of the Court of First
Ins­tance of Camarines Sur.  Before the proceedings thereunder
could be terminated, however, war broke out in 1941, and the records of the
case were either lost or destroyed or burned. 
On June 15, 1946, the court a quo issued a notice for the
reconstitution of all its lost judicial records, and in pursuance of said
notice, appellees filed a petition for reconstitution
of the records of the above-mentioned land registration proceedings on June 24,
1947, submitting therewith three (3) documents, among which was a copy of the
decision with the following dispositive portions:

“En su virtud,
se desestima la solici­tud
del solicitante Pascual
Sta. Ana, dec­larando que los opositores Arcadio y Dominga Narvades son los dueños de los lotes
o par­celas de terreno objeto de la solicitud; y previo reembolso a dicho solicitante Pascual Sta. Ana de los gastos de registro de esta solicitud y por el levantamiento de los planos Exhibitos
A y A-1 de acuerdo con los terminos de la presente decision,
y sujeto ademas a un gravamen hipotecario de acuerdo con las disposiciones del codigo del procedimiento civil en la cantidad
de P150.00 a favor de Pascual Sta. Ana pagadera a este dentro de un año desde la expedicion del decreto, se decreta la adjudicacion y registro de las dos parcelas y lotes de terreno objeto de la pre­sente solicitud a favor de dichos opositores Arcadio Narvades y Dominga Narvades, en partes iguales y pro indiviso, como de su exclusiva
propiedad, en virtud de los dispuestos por el articulo 38 de la Ley No. 496 tal como fue enmendada
por la Ley No. 3621 de la Legislatura.

“En consonancia con esta decision, se ordena al solicitante para que dentro de diez
dias desde que haya adquirido
caracter firme la presente decision, someta a este Juzgado el importe de los gastos a cuyo reembolso
tiene derecho de acuerdo con los terminos de esta decision.

“SE ORDENA.

“Dada en Naga, Camarines
Sur, hoy a 28 de Noviembre de 1931.

“C. M. VILLAREAL

Juez,
Decimoquinto

Distrito
Judicial.”

Notice of the hearing of this petition was furnished the
appellant Sta. Ana, who thereupon filed a motion to dis­miss the same on the
ground that it is “barred by the Statute of Limitations.” In an order
dated November 21, 1957,
the court denied the motion to dismiss, on the one hand, and granted the
petition for reconstitution, on the other, as fol­lows:

“Acting upon the motion to dismiss the petition for
reconstitution of the records of this case filed by Pascual
Sta. Ana and it appearing that said petition for recons­titution of the records
of this case together with the decision rendered therein has been filed with
this Court within the time autho­rized by law; and that if said petition was
not determined earlier by the Court, it was because the parties were talking
about the possibility of amicably settling their con­troversy;

“Said motion to dismiss is hereby denied and it is ordered
that the records of this land registration case, namely: (a) the trans­cript of
the stenographic notes taken during the trial; (b) the blue print plan
Psu-96264 covering the land in question; and (c) the decision of the Court
dated November 28, 1931, be, as it is hereby, declared reconstituted in
accordance with the provisions of the Re­constitution Law.”^[1]

Appellant moved for the reconsideration of this order, but his
move was frustrated.  Appellees
filed, on the other hand, a motion on March
26, 1958, alleging that appellant had abandoned his right to
reimbursement of his expenses for registration and praying that a decree for the
registration of the land in their names be issued.  Opposition to this motion was registered by
appellant on the ground that the decision in the case had become final 30 days
after November 28, 1931,
and since oppositors have slept on their rights, their
cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.  The lower court overruled this opposition and
on May 14, 1958, issued an
order declaring appellant as having abandoned his right to reimbursement of his
expenses and direct­ing the issuance of the decree of registration of the
parcels of land involved in the name of said oppositors,
thus:

“Considering that the judgment rendered in this land
registration case, ordering the registration of the land applied for in the names
of the oppositors, Arcadio Narvades and Dominga Narvades has already become final but the applicant refused
to submit the amount of his expenses to be paid by the said oppositors:

“It is ordered, declaring the said appli­cant as having
abandoned his right to the re­imbursement of his expenses for the registra­tion
by reason of his refusal to submit the same, and that a decree is hereby issued
ordering the registration of the two par­cels of land in the names of the opposi­tors, Arcadio Narvades and Dominga Narvades.”^[2]

A motion to reconsider the above order
having been denied, appellant herein pursued an appeal from the two (2)
above-quoted orders directly to this Court where the said orders were affirmed
on April 29, 1961.^[3]

Later, when appellees moved for the
issuance of the decree of registration and for distribution of the land to them
upon the return of the records of the case from this Court to the land
registration tribunal, appellant filed on January 13, 1962 an opposition to the
issuance of the decree, praying at the same time that the “case be
reopened to enable applicant or his heirs to present evidence” in
accordance with the order of said court dated January 28, 1932 giving him the
right to prove and recover the value of certain im­provements introduced by him
in the land in question.^[4]
Not contented with this, on April 14, 1962, appellant filed with the land
registration court a counter-petition, pray­ing for an order declaring null and
void the orders of November 21, 1957 and May 14, 1958 above-quoted, on the
grounds (1) that the land registration tribunal acquired no jurisdiction over
the petition for reconstitution in view of the failure of appellees
to comply with the legal requisites for reconstitution under Section 9 of Act
3110; and (2) that the said appellees acted in bad
faith in the reconstitution case, in not apprising the court of the true and
last status of the land registration case when the records thereof were
destroyed by war, by deliberately con­cealing and not producing before the said
court an order of the land registration tribunal dated January 28, 1932,
granting the reopening of the case,^[5]
and to which order, appellees then registered the
necessary “exception dated February 6, 1932.^[6]

At the proceedings in Land Registration Case No. 568 were at the
stage as above set forth when the present act­ion came.  Under date of 11 June 1962, appellant filed the complaint in Civil Case
No. 5443 of the Court of First in­stance of Camarines
Sur which, as stated at the outset of this decision,
was dismissed by the said court on Septem­ber
13, 1962 in the order, now under review, which reads as follows:

“It appearing that the plaintiff, as applicant in Land
Registration Case No. 568 (R-140), filed therein on April 14, 1962, against the
oppositors there, who are the defendants in this
case, a petition in which he seeks to set aside the very same orders he now
seeks to annul and upon the identical grounds alleged by him in this action,
that the petition is still pending resolution by the Land Registration Court,
and that under section 112 of the Land Registration Act all petitions and
motions filed thereunder after the original
registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the
decree of registration was entered, for which reason the records of Land
Registration Case No. 568 were reconstituted in that same pro­ceeding and the
orders sought to be annulled were likewise issued therein, the motion to
dismiss is granted and this case is DISMISSED.

“SO ORDERED, Given at Naga
City, Philip­pines,
this 13th day of September, 1962.

“(Sgd.) JOSE L. MOYA

Judge”

The appeal from this order of dismissal was immediately taken by
appellant to the Court of Appeals; but said court, in a resolution dated February 16, 1965, certified the
appeal to this Court upon finding that “there are no issues of fact qua
fact”.

With particular reference to the proceedings in Civil Case No.
5443, the facts are, as set forth in the said resol­ution, as follows:

“This is an action for annulment of an order reconstituting
Land Registration Case 568 in the Court of First Instance of Cama­rines Sur. ….

“The complaint filed ….. prayed for a declaration of the
nullity of the order of reconstitution of Land Registration Case 568, the whole
reconstitution proceeding R-140, and the order to issue decree of registration
in Land Reg. Case 568; for a declaration that the records of the said case were
never properly and legally reconstituted; and for damages and costs to be
awarded in favor of the plain­tiff.  The
complaint was premised on the pro­positions (1) that the Land Registration
tribunal acquired no jurisdiction over the petition for reconstitution, in view
of the failure of the defendants to comply with two legal requisites for
reconstitution in such cases; and (2) that the defendants acted in bad faith in
not apprising the court in the reconstitution case of the true and last status
of the registration proceeding.

“In response to the complaint, the def­endants filed a motion
to dismiss the com­plaint on the grounds (1) that the complaint states no cause
of action, because the action is expressly prohibited by section 38 of Act 496;
(2) that the action is barred by prior judgment and the plaintiff is estopped from maintaining the same, because there is an
identity of parties and subject matter between this action, on the one hand,
and the recons­titution proceedings and the proceedings leading to the issuance
of the final decree of registration in which the basic orders were affirmed by
the Supreme Court, on the other; (3) that the court had no jurisdiction over
the subject-matter of the action, as it has no power to set aside final
judgments and orders of the Supreme Court; (4) that the action is barred by the
statute of limitations, as appears from the complaint itself, because an action
or petition for review of a decree of registration can be commenced only within
one year from the date of the entry of the decree; and (5) that there is
another action pending between the same parties and for the same cause, because
earlier the plaintiff as applicant in Land Registration case 568 (R-140) filed
a petition against the oppositors (def­endants)
seeking to set aside the very same orders of the court he now seeks to annul
and for the same grounds, which petition is still pending resolution.

“In his opposition to the motion to dis­miss, the plaintiff
contended, among other things, that the present action must take pre­cedence
over his petition in the land registra­tion case.  The plaintiff prayed that the court allow the
parties to enter into trial.  This was
followed by a reply of the defendants, and then a rejoinder of the plaintiff.

“The Order of the court a quo, dated September 13, 1962, dismissed the
case, thus:

“‘It appearing that the plaintiff, as applicant in Land Registration
Case No. 568 (R-140), filed therein on April 14, 1962, against the oppositors there, who are the defendants in this case, a
petition in which he seeks to set aside the very same orders he now seeks to
annul and upon the identical grounds alleged by him in this action, that the
petition is still pending resolution by the Land Registration Court, and that
under section 112 of the Land Re­gistration Act all petitions and motions filed
thereunder after the original re­gistration shall be
filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree of registration was
entered, for which reason the records of Land Registration Case No. 568 were
reconstituted in that same proceeding and the orders sought to be annuled were likewise issued therein, the motion to dismiss
is granted and this case is DISMISSED.

“‘SO ORDERED, Given at Naga City, Philippines,
this 13th day of September, 1962.’ (Rec. on App., pp. 124-125)

“There was only one hearing in the case.  According to the minutes covering the hearing
of September 13, 1962, the
case was dismissed without trial.

“It is apparent that there are no issues of fact qua
fact.  The five grounds in the def­endants’
motion to dismiss pose legal issues only, which issues were joined upon the
opposi­tion filed by the plaintiff.  The
discussions of the parties in these and subsequent pleadings clearly underscore
the strictly legal nature of the controversy now on appeal.  The Order dismissing the case was undoubtedly
exclusively premised on legal considerations. 
Rather than any question of fact, the sole and central issue in this
appeal is whether or not, under the undisputed facts and circumstances gleaned
from the pleadings, annexes and records, the complaint or case was correctly
dismissed.  Hence, the appeal was erroneously
brought to this Court.

“ACCORDINGLY, let this appeal be cer­tified, as it is hereby
certified, to the Supreme Court under the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended.”

Now appellant comes up here with two (2) assigned errors
allegedly committed by the trial court, to wit:

“The lower Court erred:

“(A) IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT ON THE GROUND OF PENDENCY OF
PETITION OF APRIL 14, 1962 PREDICATED ON IDENTICAL GROUNDS AS THOSE ALLEGED IN
THE COMPLAINT, AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE PRESENT ACTION IS ONE FOR LACK
OF JURISDICTION OF THE RE­CONSTITUTING COURT OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER WHICH MAY
BE RAISED AT ANY TIME AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDING, EITHER COLLATERALLY OR
DIRECTLY;

“(B) IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT UPON A MOTION TO DISMISS THAT
BY ITSELF IS A TRAVERSE OF THE MATERIAL FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT.”

As can be seen, appellant’s first assignment of error presents
the proposition that notwithstanding that the alleged invalidity, for want of
jurisdiction of the Land Registration Court in its case No. 568 to issue the
ques­tioned order of reconstitution due to alleged non-compliance with the
requirements of the Reconstitution Law, Republic Act 3110, has already been
raised in a petition filed in the said land registration case to declare null
and void the said order of reconstitution, the filing of said petition does not
constitute a bar to the present action, which is an ordinary civil action for
no other purpose than to secure exactly the same remedy of having the order of
recons­titution herein involved declared null and void on the identical ground
that the land registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the matter
since there was allegedly no compliance with the requisites of the Reconstitu­tion
Law.  And appellant’s whole argument in
support of this proposition is stated thus:

“IS THE FILING OF THIS CASE PROPER, AND WHAT IS ITS EFFECT ON
PETITION OF APRIL 14, 1962?
Concise is necessarily appellant’s answer to this question:  Appellant had the choice, inasmuch as the
remedy is alternative.  At any time
before resolution by the Land Re­gistration Court,
he had the right to, as what he did, withdraw or abandon said petition and file
a complaint with a court of general jurisdiction.  Appellant’s act in this regard is per­fectly
within legal bounds – not without – he respectfully submits.  The minute he filed the complaint, said
petition was deemed to have been withdrawn.” (P. 13, Appellant’s Brief)

In other words, appellant seems to be proceeding on the theory
that there could be no conflict between the petition he has filed in Land
Registration Case No. 568 and the com­plaint he has also filed in Civil Case
No. 5443, although they involve the same parties, allege identical causes of
action, refer to the same subject matter and pray for the same relief, because
upon the filing of the complaint in the civil action, the petition in the land
registration case must be deemed to have been withdrawn.^[7]
This theory is, of course, plainly erroneous. 
Were the procedural law on the matter as simple as appellant conceives
it, the whole concept of the defense of litis pendentia or pendency of
another action would have no reason at all for being.  Evidently, appellant is unaware of the
principle that underlies this defense. 
Indeed, that a party is not allowed to vex another more than once
regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action is a
principle founded in part in the public policy that the same matter should not
be subject of controversy in court more than once in order that possible conflicting
judg­ments may be avoided, with consequent stability in the rights and status
of persons. This defense is based on the same principle as that of res adjudicata.  It differs from the latter only because of
the stage in which it can be invoked.  In
res adjudicata,
there must be a final judgment on the merits, whereas in litis
pendentia, it is enough that there be another
action pending involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of
action.  As far as the parties themselves
are con­cerned, the beneficient effects of these
defenses are similar to the benefits that an accused in a criminal case gains
under the principle prohibiting double jeopardy, a sacred constitu­tional right
of accused persons.

Appellant devotes a great deal of his discussion in his brief to
the question of whether or not the Land Regis­tration Court acted properly or
within its jurisdiction in Case No. 568 when it ordered the reconstitution of
the re­cords of said case, but such discussion is off-tangent here for the
simple reason that We are not called upon to rule on that issue in this
case.  The present appeal is from the
order of the court in Civil Case No. 5443 holding, in effect, that appellant
cannot raise the alleged invalidity of the reconstitution of the records in said
Land Registration Case No. 568 in a petition in said case and then raise it
again, while the said petition is still pending resolution, in an ordinary
civil action instituted for the same purpose, Civil Case No. 5443, which the
court a quo dismissed.  The
only issue We have to decide here is whether or not the trial court erred in
issuing such order of dismissal on the ground of pendency
of another action.^[8]
Of course, appellant also raises as secondary issue that the motion to dismiss
of appellees traverses facts alleged in the
complaint, but We fail to gather from his discussion any point in support of
such contention.  Not being properly
argued, We cannot consider the said alleged error.  (Section 7, Rule 51)

Accordingly,
We rule that the court a quo did not err in upholding appellees‘ defense of litis
pendentia and in dismissing appellant’s
complaint in Civil Case No. 5443 above-mentioned.  Appellant’s recourse to this Court is
entirely pointless.^[9]

The order of dismissal appealed from is affirmed, with treble
costs against appellant.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, and Teehankee, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “E” to the Complaint, pp. 31-32, Rec. on Appeal.

^[2]
Annex “F”, pp. 33-34, Record on Appeal.

^[3] See
L-15564 (April 29, 1961), 1 SCRA 1294

^[4]
pp. 5-6, Appellant’s Brief.  The order
referred to was acted on appellant’s motion for reconsideration of the original
decision in the land registration case. 
The said order reads thus:

“Considerado
la mocion de reconsideracion
presentada por los abogados Leoncio
Imperial y Pablo C. Sibulo, en representacion
del solitante Pascual Santa
Ana, pidiendo la reconsideracion
de la decision dictada en esto
expediente; con­siderado que aunque solicitante
Pascual Santa Ana no es tenicamente un posedor de buena fe en el sentido legal estricto, sin
embargo, apare­ciendo de las
pruebas que los opositores fueron culpables de una crasa regligencia
de no hacer con-star a tiempo
su alegado titulo al solicitante habiendo dejado transcurrir algunos años y per­mitido y tolerado que dicho
solicitante intro­duzca otras mejoras en el tereno, despues de su adquisicion por sus vendedores
Santiago Jaroc­joc y otra,
de aqui dicho solicitante dentro de una sana equidad
y en armonia con el Art. 364 del codigo
Civil, tiene derecho a reclamar tam­bien el importe de las mejoras introducidas por el, se ordena la reapertura del expediente pero solamente para recibir las
pruebas de las par­tes sobre el vendedero valor de las mejoras in­troducidas por el solicitante desde que tuvo
por compra de sus vendederos, con exclusion de las mejoras originales
en el terreno a tenor de los
terminos de la decision en este
ex­pediente.

Y en cuanto
a la mocion de nueva vista presentada por el solicitante independiente­mente
de su mocion de reconsideracion, apa­raciendo que dicha mocion
se halla practica­mente supeditada al resultado de su mocion de reconsideracion,
entiendase que la reso­lusion de la misma se halla comprendida dentro de los terminos
de la presente.

ASI SE ORDENA.

Dada en Naga,
Camarines Sur, hoy a 28 de Enero de 1932.

(Fdo.)
C. M. VILLAREAL

Juez,
15.o Distrito Judicial”

(pp. 25-26, Rec. on
App.)

^[5]
See footnote 4.

^[6]
pp. 27-28, Record on Appeal.

^[7]
Appellant’s intimation in the above-quoted portion of his brief that the
petition in the land registration case has been actually and expressly
withdrawn by him is not supported anywhere in the record.

^[8]
Appellant has not assigned as error the other holding of  the court a quo that by its
nature, appellant’s remedy can be filed only in the land registration case
pursuant to Section 112, Act 496.

^[9]
Without trying to prejudge the petition filed in Land Re­gistration Case No.
568 for the annulment of the order of reconstitution, it may not be amiss to
emphasize here that said order was appealed to this Court and it was affirmed.
(See footnote No. 3) In the light of this circumstance, it is, at least,
doubtful if even appellant’s contention which is to be resolved in connection
with his said petition in said land registration case, regarding the alleged
irre­gularities in the reconstitution proceedings may still be raised at this
late hour.