PHILIPPINE ENGINEERS’ SYNDICATE, INC., PETITIONER VS. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, EMILIO C. TABIGNE AND AMADO C. BUGAYONG, PRESIDING JUDG…

Philippine Engineers' Syndicate versus Bautista

The Case

This is a special civil action for certiorari brought by the Philippine Engineers' Syndicate, a domestic corporation engaged in the construction business, against the Presiding Judge of the Court of Industrial Relations and sixty five of its workers led by Federico Benitez. The company asks the Supreme Court to stop the industrial court from taking cognizance of the workers' suit for additional compensation for night work, on the theory that the enactment of Republic Act 875 stripped that court of jurisdiction over such a claim. The case matters because it fixes the boundary of the industrial court's jurisdiction after Republic Act 875, and it settles that a demand for extra pay for regular night work is not beyond that boundary.

Procedural History

On the twenty eighth of December 1958, the workers filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations, sitting in its Pangasinan branch, claiming additional compensation of fifty per cent for nighttime service, plus attorney's fees of ten per cent of the claim. The company moved to dismiss on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter, adding that another action for the same cause was pending before a regional office and that the workers' demands had already been met. On the eighteenth of August 1959, the Presiding Judge ruled that his court was competent to pass upon the complaint, deferred resolution of the other grounds for dismissal, and directed the company to answer within five days. The company's motion for reconsideration was denied by the court en banc on the thirteenth of October 1959. The company then came to the Supreme Court by this special civil action, and the Court affirmed the contested orders and dismissed the petition.

Facts

The Philippine Engineers' Syndicate employed Federico Benitez and sixty four other workers in various capacities. During certain periods these workers rendered nighttime service at various rates per hour. For jobs of similar nature and category, the company paid them only wages equivalent to those of day shift workers, without any extra compensation for the night work.

The workers claimed that for such night work they were entitled to an additional fifty per cent, and that to prosecute their claim they were forced to hire counsel for an agreed fee of ten per cent of the amount claimed. Their complaint attached a schedule of their names, badge numbers, rates of pay, number of days, total daytime compensation actually received, and the expected fifty per cent differential.

The company resisted on jurisdictional grounds, and the industrial court upheld its own competence. The record did not show that the employer employee relation between the sixty five workers and the company had ceased.

Issues

• Whether or not, upon the enactment of Republic Act 875, the Court of Industrial Relations lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night work.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to the four categories of cases to which Republic Act 875 limited the industrial court, as defined in earlier rulings, and the first of these is Section 10 of Republic Act 875, which provides:

When the labor dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court.

This is the certification requirement that marks the first of the four categories, and the company argued that the workers' claim fell in none of them.

The decision also invokes the Eight Hour Labor Law, Commonwealth Act 444, as the source of overtime pay, and Section 5, paragraph a, of Republic Act 875 on unfair labor practice, which together with the Minimum Wage Law, Republic Act 602, complete the four categories. The Court's reasoning rests on Commonwealth Act 103, which conferred on the industrial court general jurisdiction and broad powers to fix just and reasonable wages, powers that Republic Act 875 curtailed but did not erase as to a suit of this nature.

Ruling

The Court held that the industrial court did not lose jurisdiction. The company's position collided with the ruling in the Naric case, where the Court explained that work done at night may also be overtime work, and that although no law then expressly required additional compensation for night work, the industrial court had power under Commonwealth Act 103 to determine the wages night workers should receive.

On the very question of jurisdiction, the Court in the Shell case had spoken thus:

La cuestion que, a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa, esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo; la de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia; y consiguientemente, la de proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. Si este tribunal tiene, en casos de disputa, el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el trabajo de dia, no hay razon por que no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a los salarios de noche; es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro.

The Court acknowledged that in the PAFLU case and those that followed, it had held that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 were curtailed by Republic Act 875, which limited them to the four categories expressed, in line with the public policy of settling industrial disputes through collective bargaining. But it found no cogent reason for concluding that a suit of this nature for extra compensation for night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court, especially since the record did not show that the employer employee relation had ceased.

The Court noted that after Republic Act 875 it had upheld the industrial court's jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime pay, and over claims for additional compensation for work on Sundays and holidays and for night work. It had also supported the ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done in the daytime, and that work beyond regular hours deserves overtime pay. To hold otherwise, the Court said, would amount to a further curtailment of the industrial court's jurisdiction to an extent that may defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor.

Doctrine

First, the curtailment of the industrial court's jurisdiction by Republic Act 875 is not so sweeping as to exclude a claim for additional compensation for regular night work. Second, night work may be treated as a complete day's work that is more burdensome than daytime work, and the industrial court's general power under Commonwealth Act 103 to fix just and reasonable wages extends to fixing night shift wages, including a fifty per cent differential. Third, where the employer employee relation still subsists, a suit for extra compensation for night work falls within the domain of the industrial court. Fourth, any doubt should be resolved against a further curtailment that would defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the contested order of the industrial court and its resolution en banc, and dismissed the petition at the petitioner's cost.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that a suit for extra compensation for night work is within the jurisdiction of the industrial court, for the broad powers under Commonwealth Act 103 were curtailed but not erased by Republic Act 875. Examiners use this case to test the scope of the industrial court's jurisdiction after Republic Act 875, and to test whether night work may be treated as a complete and more burdensome workday deserving a wage differential.