G.R. No. L-16440. February 29, 1964
PHILIPPINE ENGINEERS’ SYNDICATE, INC., PETITIONER VS. HON. JOSE S. BAUTISTA, ARSENIO I. MARTINEZ, BALTAZAR M. VILLANUEVA, EMILIO C. TABIGNE AND AMADO C. BUGAYONG, PRESIDING JUDG…
BENGZON, C.J.:
Relations from assuming jurisdiction of a suit for additional
compensation for night work.
It appears that on December 28, 1958, respondent Federico Benitez
together with sixty four (64) other employees of petitioner, a domestic
corporation engaged in the construction business, lodged a complaint
with respondent court (Case No. 12-V Pang.) alleging that they had been
employed by the firm in various capacities; that they had rendered
nighttime service during certain periods at various rates per hour;
that for jobs similar nature and category, petitioner only paid them
wages equivalent to those of workers on the day shift, without any
extra compensation for night work; that for such night work, they were
entitled to additional compensation of fifty per centum (50%); and that
to prosecute their claim, they were forced to hire counsel for an
agreed fee of ten percent (10%) of such claim. The complaint attached a
schedule of their names, badge numbers, rates of pay, number of days,
total day time compensation actually received and the expected 50%
differential increment pay.
On January 22, 1959, petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint,
asserting mainly that respondent court had no jurisdiction over the
subject matter; other grounds cited were that another action was
pending between the same parties before Regional Office No. 1 (ROI-W
No. 404) for identical cause; and that the workers’ demands had been
duly met.
On August 18,1959, the Presiding Judge below ruled that his court
was competent to pass upon the complaint; ha deferred resolution of the
other grounds for dismissal and directed petitioner to answer the
complaint within five days from receipt of his order. Upon denial of
the motion for reconsideration of such ruling by the Court en banc petitioner filed the instant petition.
Only one issue is raised whether or not upon the enactment of
Republic Act 875, the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for
additional compensation for regular night work. Petitioner says that
this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and limited it to
specific cases which This Court has defined as:* * * (1) when the labor
dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national
interest and is so certified by the President to the industrial court
(Sec. 10, Republic Act 875); (2) when the controversy refers to minimum
wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic Act 602) ; (3) when it
involves hours. of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
(Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair labor
practice [Sec. 5, (a) Republic Act 875]”.[1]
Petitioner insists that respondents’ case falls in none of these
categories because as held in two previous cases, night work is not
overtime but regular work; and that respondent court’s authority to try
the case cannot be implied from its “general jurisdiction and broad
powers” under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act 875 precisely
curb such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations, beyond
which it is not permitted to act.
We believe petitioner to be in error. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric case[2] where we held:
“While it is true that this Court made the above
comment in the aforementioned case, it does not intend to convey the
idea that work done at night cannot also be an overtime work. The
comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the Shell
Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night
work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime
work. In fact the company contended that there was no law that
requiring the payment of additional compensation for night work unlike
an, overtime work which is covered by Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight
Hour Labor Law). And this Court in that case said that while there was
no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night
work, the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night workers
should receive under Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the
additional compensation in the Shell case for ‘hygienic, medical,
moral, cultural and sociological reasons.’ “
Apropos the issue of jurisdiction, this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this fashion;
“La cucstion que, a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre
las facultades generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que
estan admitidas sin disputa, esta la de considerar la jornada de noche
como una jornada completa de trabajo; la de estimarla como mas gravosa
que la jornada de dia; y consiguientemente, la de proveer y ordenar que
se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares diurnos. Nuestra contestation es afirmativa
: todo esto se halla comprendido entre los poderes generates de la Cort
de Relaciones Industriales. Si este tribunal tiene, en casos de
disputal, el poder fijar los salaries que estime justos y razonables
para el trabajo de dia, no hay razon por qué no ha de tener el mismo
poder con respecto a lossalarios de noche; es tan trabajo lo uno como
lo otro. ” * * *.”[3]
True, in PAFLU, et al. vs. Tan, et al., supra, and in a
series of cases thereafter, we held that the broad powers conferred by
Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR have been curtailed by Republic Act 875
which limited them to the four categories therein expressed, in line
with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes
with the collective bargaining process; but we find no cogent reason .
for concluding that a suit of this nature for extra compensation for
night work falls outside the domain of the industrial court. Withal the
record does not show that the employer-employee relation between the 65
respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 875, this Court has not only
upheld the industrial court’s assumption of jurisdiction over cases for
salary differentials and overtime pay[4]
or for payment of additional compensation for work rendered on Sundays
and holidays and for night work5 but has also supported such court’s
ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done
at daytime, and that if that work is done beyond the worker’s regular
hours of duty, he should also be paid additional compensation for
overtime work [5] Besides,
to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond the
powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further
curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to and that if that work
is done beyond the worker’s regular hours of duty, he should also be
paid additional compensation for overtime work. [6]
Besides to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond
the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further
curtailment of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may
defeat the purpose of the Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor. [7]
WHEREFORE, the contested order of August 18, 1959, and the resolution en banc of October 13, 1959, are hereby affirmed; the instant petition is dismissed at petitioner’s cost,
Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L. Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Regala, JJ., concur.
[1] Paflu et al., vs. Tan et al., 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 13, 5836.
[2] National Rice and Corn Corp. (NARIC) vs. NARIC Workers Union, et al., 105 Phil., 891
[3] Shell Co. contra National Labor Union, Ibid at 325-326.
[4] Chua Workers Union
(NLU) us. City Automotive Co. et al., G. R. No. L-11655, April 29,
1959; Prisco. vs. CIR et al., 108 Phil.,134.
[5] Nasco vs. Almiti, et
al., 104 Phil., 835; Detective & Protective Bureau Inc. vs. Felipe
Guevarra, et al., G. R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957.
[6] Naric vs. Naric Workers Union et al., 105 Phil., 891, citing Shell Co. vs. NAtional LAbor Union, 81 Phil. 315.
[7] Luis Recato Dy et al., vs. CIR., G. R. No. L-17788, May 25, 1962.