LO CHAM, PETITIOTIER, VS. BUENAVENTURA OCAMPO, JUDGE OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, AND FELIPE NATIVIDAD, CITY FISCAL OF CITY OF MANILA, RESPONDENTS.

TUASON, J.:

The sole question presented in the three above entitled cases has to do with
the authority of Gregorio T. Lantin to sign informations as assistant city
fiscal of Manila. Two judges have rendered two divergent views on the matter.
Judge Fernando Jugo, in cases Nos. L-831 and L-876, upheld the affirmative
theory while Judge Rafael Dinglasan, in case No. L-878, sustained the
defendant’s contention in an elaborate ruling.

It appears that Gregorio T. Lantin, a doctor of medicine and lawyer, Acting
Chief, Medico-Legal Section, Division of Investigation, Department of Justice,
was given an assignment by Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon Quisum-bing in a
letter dated October 8, 1945, which reads:

“SIR:

“Pursuant to the request of the City Fiscal of Manila and in accordance with
the provision of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, you are hereby
temporarily detailed to this office effective today, to assist him in the
discharge of his duties, with the same powers and functions of an assistant city
fiscal.”

Following his detail, Doctor Lantin signed and filed informations in the
aforesaid cases after, presumably, conducting preliminary investigations.
Thereafter, the attorneys for the defendants filed motions to quash on the
ground already stated. When two of these motions were denied and one was
sustained, the losing parties instituted the instant proceedings for
certiorari.

Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by section 4 of
Commonwealth Act No. 144, provides :

“SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.—The Secretary of
Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his duties, and with the same authority
therein as might be exercised by the Attornev General or Solicitor
General.”

It will be noted that the law uses general terms. It is a general rule of
statutqry interpretation that provisions should not be given a restricted
meaning where no restriction is indicated. Just as the express enumeration of
persons, objects, situations, etc., is construed to exclude those not mentioned,
according to a well-known maxim, so no distinction should be made where none
appears to be intended. This is not an arbitrary rule but one founded on logic.
Was it the purpose of the legislature to confine the work to be performed by the
lawyer appointed to assist the fiscal to certain duties in the fiscal’s office
and deny him others? If it was, the law does not say so, and one would be at a
loss to know what duties were conferred and what were not. It is fair to presume
that if the legislature had wanted to forbid the lawyer appointed to assist the
fiscal, to sign informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions, it
would have said so or indicated its intention by clear implication. We need to
be reminded that of all the functions of the fiscal, those referred to are the
most important and outstanding and the ones in which the fiscal usually needs
aid.

There is nothing so sacrosanct in the signing of complaints, making of
investigations and conducting of prosecutions that only an officer appointed by
the President or one expressly empowered by law may be permitted to as-. sunie
these functions. Certainly a lawyer who is invested with the same authority as
might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General is presumed to
be competent to be entrusted with any of the duties, without exception,
devolving on a prosecuting attorney. That the person designated in a particular
instance does not measure up to the educational specifications imposed by law is
beside the point. It does not detract from the conclusion that, in the light of
the high standard of training and experience required, there is no anomaly and
no injustice is committed in lodging on the person designated by the Secretary
of Justice those powers of the prosecuting attorney which we have named.

Laws must receive sensible interpretation to promote the ends for which they
were enacted. The duties of a public office include all those which truly lie
within its scope, those which are essential to the accomplishment of the niain
purpose for which the office was created, and those which, although incidental
and collateral, are germane to, and serve to promote the accomplishment of the
principal purposes. (43 American Jurisprudence, 68, 70.) The authority to sign
informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is within the
inferences to be gathered from the circumstances which prompted the passage of
section 4 of Commonwealth Act No. 144 and its predecessors.

The historical background of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code
as amended and the construction placed on its precursors confirm our opinion.
The initial legislation on assistance to provincial fiscals is to be found in
section 45 of Act No. 136, paragraph (c) of which provides that “he (Attorney
General) shall, when required by the public service, or when directed by the
Chief Executive, repair to any province in the Islands and assist the provincial
fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, and shall assist the provincial
fiscal in any’prosecution against an officer of the Government.” This provision
was amended by Act No. 300, section 1, by adding at the end thereof the
following words:

“But, whenever it is impracticable for either the Attorney General or
Solicitor General personally to repair to nny province in the Islands and assist
the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, or in any
prosecution against an officer of any branch of the Government, in accordance
with the provisions of subsection (c) of section forty-five, it shall be lawful
for the Attorney General, with the prior approval of the Civil Governor, to
appoint some person who may be eligible to the office of Attorney General
temporarily to represent him in such prosecution. The person so appointed shall
have all the power of the Attorney General or Solicitor General in conducting
the prosecution for which he may have been especially appointed as in this
section provided. The compensation of the per-Eon so appointed shall be fifteen
dollars per day for the time necessarily employed in the service of the
Government, and actual traveling expenses “necessarily incurred in performance
of the duties.”

Act No. 325, section 1, amending section 47 of Act No. 136, created the
position of supervisor of provincial fiscals, whose duty it was “to assist the
Attorney General and under his direction to prepare rules for the guidance of
all provincial fiscals, and when required by the public service or directed by
the Attorney General, he shall repair to any province in the Islands and assist
the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties.”

The last measure passed on this subject was section 17 of Act No. 867 which
reads:

“SEC. 17. Fiscals may be aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney General;
duties of suck appointees; compensation.—It shall be lawEul for the
Attorney General to appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his office,
or, with the approval of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, a competent
person not in the public service, temporarily to assist the fiscal of a province
or district in the discharge of his duties and to represent the Attorney General
in such matters. The person so appointed shall have all the powers of the
Attorney General or Solicitor General in the conduct of causes in which the
Government is interested and to which he may be assigned. * * *
“

When the administrative laws were reorganized and systematized, some of the
foregoing provisions were eliminated and the rest were condensed into two
paragraphs and embodied in the First Administrative Code as section 1686. The
latter section was reproduced in the Revised Administrative Code, also as
section 1686, which in turn was amended by section 4 of Commonwealth Act No.
144, There has been no material alteration in the law since the administrative
laws were codified, except that, whereas under the former Administrative Code
the Attorney General was the officer authorized to designate a lawyer to assist
a fiscal, under the Revised Administrative Code it was the Solicitor General who
made the detail, and by Commonwealth Act No. 144 the authority to designate was
put in the hands of the Secretary of Justice.

It will be seen that in the original enactment—section 45 of Act No. 136—the
Attorney General himself was called iipon to assist a provincial fiscal in the
discharge of his
duties. We have no knowledge of whether the persons assigned
by the Attorney General to assist fiscals under the subsequent legislation
signed informations; but it is a fact, of which we may take judicial notice,
that the Attorney General signed such informations. And he did it not by virtue
of any express legal provision but on the strength, as we may suppose, of his
authority to assist provincial fiscals. This was a practice that continued for.
a considerable length of time.

As contemporaneous construction this practice should carry great weight in
the operation of the enactment in question. The fact that it was the chief law
officer and legal adviser of the government who put it into effect and that he
did it in the discharge of his duties lends added force to the interpretation.
As has been well said, “interpretations by the Attorney General and the legal
department of a state have important bearing upon statutory meaning, since the
Attorney General and his office are required by law to issue opinions for the
assistance of the various departments of the government administering the law.”
(2 Sutherland’s Statutory Construction, Third Edition, 517.)

It is not to the point to inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the
power to sign informations. Granting that he does not retain such power, a
question which we do not decide, this circumstance nevertheless does not alter
the result at which we have arrived. The reason is that the power to sign
informations, make investigations and conduct prosecutions is inherent in the
power “to assist” a prosecuting attorney, as these words are used in the
Administrative Code. It does not emanate from the powers of the Attorney General
or Solicitor General conferred upon the officer designated by the Secretary of
Justice; it is ingrained in the office or designation itself. The powers of the
Solicitor General bestowed on the appointee to assist the fiscal must be held as
cumulative or an addition to the authority to sign informations, which is
inherent in his appointment In other words, the clause “with the same authority
therein as might’be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor General” does
not exclude the latter authority. The former practice of the Attorney General to
which we have alluded portrays a distinction between and separation of the two
powers or sets of powers. The power of the Attorney General to sign
informations, as we have pointed out, owed its being, not to the powers
legitimately pertaining to his office as Attorney General but to the special
provision authorizing him to assist fiscals. And it may be pertinent to know
that when the Attorney General’s power to assist provincial fiscals ceased, he
stopped signing informations. The phraseology of section 17 of Act No. 867
before cited also affords an illustration of the idea that the authority to
assist is separate and apart from the general powers of the Attorney General. In
the language of this section, the person appointed was (1) to assist the fiscal
in the discharge of his duties and (2) to represent the Attorney General in such
matters. If the two phrases meant the same thing, then one of them would be
superfluous. There is no apparent reason for holding that one or the other was a
surplusage.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the petitions in cases Nos. L-831 and
L-876 are denied and dismissed, and the petition in case No. L-878 is sustained.
Without costs.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Perfecto, Hilado, Bengzon,
Briones, and Padilla, JJ., concur.

CONCURRING ANG DISSENTING

FERIA, J.:

The issue involved in these three cases is whether or not the attorney
detailed or appointed by the Secretary of Justice to assist the city fiscal of
Manila in the discharge of the latter’s duties, with the same authority therein
as might be exercised by the Attorney General or the Solicitor General,
according to the provision of section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code,
has authority to sign informations.

A cursory examination of the source or origin and history of section 1686 in
connection with that of section 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code will
show that the Attorney General and the Solicitor General have, and therefore the
person appointed by the Secretary of Justice to assist the city fiscal of Manila
also has, the authority to sign an information.

Section 41 of the Organic Act No. 136, that created the courts of justice and
the office of Attorney General in these Islands, provided:

“There shall be an officer learned in law * * * and the Attorney General may,
whenever he deems it in the interest of the Philippine Government, either in
person conduct and argue any case in any Court of the Philippines to which the
Philippine Government is interested, or may direct the Solicitor General to do
so.”

And section 45 (a), (b),and (e) of the same Act No. 136 read in part as
follows:

“SEC. 45. Duties of the Attorney General.—The Attorney General shall
perform the following duties:

“(a) He shall attend the Supreme Court and prosecute or defend therein all
causes, civil and criminal, to which the United States, or any officer thereof,
in his official capacity, is a party;

“(b) He shall prosecute or defend therein all causes, civil and criminal, to
which the Government of the Philippine Islands * * * is a party; * * *.

“(e) He shall, when required by the public service, or when directed by the
Chief Executive, repair to any province in the Islands and assist the provincial
fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, and shall assist the provincial
fiscal in any prosecution against an officer of the
Government;”

The above provisions are declaratory of the common-law powers of an Attorney
General, among them to control and manage all litigation in behalf of the state,
and to intervene in all prosecutions or proceedings for the enforcement of the
laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public
rights. (5 American Jurisprudence, pp. 234, 235.)

The language of the law indicates that it was the intention to grant plenary
power to the Attorney General to protect public rights and redress public wrongs
throughout the entire Philippine Islands, independent of the attitude of
provincial or local authorities who might be indifferent, incapable or even
antagonistic, and to use all means afforded by the law to meet the requirements
of any situation, and fully protect the interests of the Government, and thus
make the authority of the latter felt through its chief law officer in every
part of the Philippines. And that, when required by the public service, or
directed by the Chief Executive, the Atorney General or Solicitor General repair
to a province to appear and prosecute criminal proceeding there, he becomes the
prosecuting attorney of that province in those proceedings, and have all the
rights that any prosecuting attorney there may have, including those of signing
information and prosecuting cases to final determination.

Said provisions of section 45, Act No. 136, were taken from similar ones
found in many states. In Kansas the statute provided that “The Attorney General
shall appear for the State, and prosecute and defend all actions and
proceedings, civil or criminal in the Supreme Court, in which the State shall be
interested or a party; and shall also, when required by the governor or any
branch of the Legislature appear for the state and prosecute or defend, in any
court, or before any officer, in any cause or matter, civil or criminal, in
which the state may be a party or interest ed.” And the Supreme Court of Kansas,
in construing that statute in the case of State vs. Bowles, (70 Kan.,
821; 69 L. R. A. 179, held that “when directed by the governor or either branch
of the legislature to appear and prosecute criminal proceedings in any county,
he becomes the prosecuting attorney of that county in those proceedings, and has
all the rights that any prosecuting officer there may have, including those of
appearing before the grand jury, signing: indictments, and pursuing cases to
final determination.” (42 American Jurisprudence, page 235.)

Said section 45 (e) of Act No. 136, was amended by section 1 of Act No. 300,
by providing that “whenever it is impracticable for either the Attorney General
or Solicitor General personally to repair to any province in the Islands and
assist the provincial fiscal there in the discharge of his duties, or in any
prosecution against an officer of any branch of the Government, in accordance
with the provisions of subsection (e) of section forty-five, it shall be lawful
for the Attorney General, with the prior approval of the Civil Governor, to
appoint some person who may be eligible to the office of Attorney General
temporarily to represent him in such prosecution. The person so appointed shall
have all the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General in conducting
the prosecution for which he may have been especially appointed as in this
section provided.”

Subsequently, section 45 of Act No. 136 as amended by Act No. 300, was, so
far as it authorized the Attorney General to appoint lawyers to aid the fiscals,
further amended and superseded by section 17 of Act No. 867, which provides in
part as follows:

“SEC. 17. Fiscals may be aided by lawyers appointed by Attorney General;
duties of such appointees; compensation.—It shall be lawful for the
Attorney General to appoint any lawyer, either a subordinate from his office,
or, “with the approval of the Secretary of Finance and Justice, a competent
person not in the public service, temporarily to assist the fiscal of &
province or district in the discharge of his duties and to represent the
Attorney General in such matters. The person so appointed shall have all the
powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General in the conduct of causes in
which the Government is interested and to which he may be
assigned.”

The above quoted provisions which superseded those of section 45 (e) of Act
No. 136, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 300, contained substantially the
same provisions, with the only modification that the Attorney General was given
discretionary power to appoint a lawyer from his office, or a competent person
not in the public service with the approval of the Secretary of Justice,
temporarily to assist, not only a provincial fiscal according to Act No. 136 as
amended, for this Act was enacted prior to the creation of the office of the
city fiscal of Manila by Act No. 183, but also to the fiscal of a district, and
therefore the City Fiscal of Manila or any other district.

When the administrative laws in force in the Philippines were compiled and
codified, the above quoted provisions of section 41, and section 45 (e) as
amended by Acts No. 300 and superseded by No. 867, were incorporated in sections
1280 and 1305, respectively, of the first Administrative Code (Act No. 2657),
and later on in section 1661 and section 1686 respectively, of the
Administrative Code, Act No. 2771. Said section 1661, as amended by Act No.
2781, provided that “As principal law officer of the Government, the Attorney
General shall have authority to act for and represent the Government of the
Philippine Islands, its officers, and agents in any official investigation,
proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a lawyer.” And section 1686 read
as follows:

“SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.—The Attorney
General may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or,
-with the approval of the Department Head, it competent person not in the public
service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney in the discharge
of his duties, and with the same authority therein as might be exercised by the
Attorney General or Solicitor General.”

Subsequently Act No. 4007 was enacted to amend the provisions of the said
Administrative Code referring to the organization of the Departments, Bureaus,
and Offices of the Insular Government. Section 6 of said Act provided that the
Secretary of Justice shall be the Attorney General and legal adviser of the
Government. And section 19 of same Act prescribed that “the chief and assistant
chief of the Bureau of Justice shall hereafter be known, respectively, as the
Solicitor General and Assistant Solicitor General, and except as herein
otherwise provided, all the powers and duties conferred by law upon the Attorney
General as head of the Bureau of Justice (that is, his powers and duties as
chief public prosecutor and attorney of the Government in all causes, civil or
criminal, in which the latter was interested) shall be exercised by the
Solicitor General.”

When the Revised Administrative Code was promulgated containing the
provisions of the former Administrative Code, as amended, the provisions of the
above quoted sections 1661 and 1686 of the former Code were incorporated
verbatim as sections 1661 and 1686 in the Revised Administrative Code with the
only modification that the Solicitor General was substituted for the Attorney
General, and the Solicitor General was made the principal law officer of the
Government, who has authority to act for and represent the Government of the
Philippines in any official investigation, proceeding or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer, and who may appoint a competent person to assist a fiscal
or prosecuting attorney with the same authority therein as might be exercised by
the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

Lastly, section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code was amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 144, and said section 1686 as amended, under which the
appointment of Dr. Lantin was made by the Secretary of Justice, reads as
follows:

“SEC. 1686. Additional counsel to assist fiscal.—The Secretary of
Justice may appoint any lawyer, being either a subordinate from his office or a
competent person not in the public service, temporarily to assist a fiscal or
prosecuting attorney in the discharge of his ‘duties, and with the same
authority therein as might be exercised by the Attorney General or Solicitor
General.”

Section 37 of Act No. 4007 which provides that whenever a specific power or
authority is entrusted to a chief of a bureau or office, the same shall be
understood as also conferred upon the proper Department Head who shall have
authority to act directly in pursuance thereof, can not be invoked in support of
city fiscal’s contention; because even assuming, without deciding, that the
Secretary of Justice has the authority to sign an information and prosecute a
criminal case to final determination, either because he is now the Attorney
General and legal adviser (although the latter’s authority to act and represent
the Government in all proceedings was transferred to the Solicitor General), or
because he is the Department Head of the city fiscal of Manila, the authority to
sign information being a quasi-judicial function (42 Am. Jur., 234) can not be
delegated by the Secretary of Justice to another person, without an express
authority of law (Labiano vs. McMahon, 28 Phil., 168), and there is no
law authorizing such delegation. For that reason the law has to expressly
provide that the person appointed by the Secretary of Justice to assist the
prosecuting attorney shall have the same authority which might be exercised by
the Attorney General or the Solicitor General.

The power conferred by law upon the Secretary of Justice to appoint a person
to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney was the power formerly, conferred
upon the Attorney General and subsequently upon the Solicitor General, and the
person appointed by them to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney had the
authority to sign information and prosecute criminal cases, not because of his
appointment to assist, but because the former laws conferred upon the person so
appointed all the powers of the Attorney General or the Solicitor General
(section 18, Act No. 300, section 17, Act No. 867), and the later laws confer
upon him the same authority as might be exercised by the Attorney General or the
Solicitor General (section 1280 of the first and 1686 of the Revised
Administrative Code), and consequently the authority to sign information in a
criminal case, as above stated.

According to the majority opinion “it is a fact, of which we may take
judicial notice, that the Attorney General signed such informations. And he did
it, not by virtue of any express legal provision but on the strength, as we may
suppose, of his authority to assist provincial fiscals. This was a practice that
continued for a considerable length of time.” But “it is not to the point to
inquire whether the Solicitor General has now the power to sign informations * *
*” “The reason is that the power to sign informations, make investigations and
conduct prosecutions is inherent in the power ‘to assist’ a prosecuting
attorney, as these words are used in the Administrative Code. It does not
emanate from the powers of the Attorney General or Solicitor General conferred
upon the officer designated by the Secretary of Justice.”

We disagree with this reasoning. The authority of the Attorney General to
sign informations does not owe its being to his power to assist a prosecuting
attorney. It emanates from his power “to act in person, conduct and argue any
case in any court of the Philippines in which the Philippine Government is
interested,” conferred originally by section 41 of Act No. 136, and incorporated
substantially in section 1280 of the first Administrative Code and 1661 of the
Revised Administrative Code, which provides that “As a principal law officer of
the Government, the Attorney General shall have authority to act for and
represent the Government of the Philippines, its officers, and agents in any
official investigation, proceeding, or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer.” As already stated, the above quoted provisions of sections 41 and 45 of
Act No. 136, and consequently section 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code
are but declaratory of the common law powers of the Attorney General to control
and manage all litigations in behalf of the state and to intervene in all
prosecutions or proceedings for the enforcement of the laws of the state and the
preservation of order, independent of the attitude of local authorities which
might be indifferent or even antagonistic, and thus further protect the
interests of the state or Central Government. As it was held in the case of
State vs. Bowles (supra) the power of the Attorney General to
prosecute or defend in any court or before any officer, in any cause or matter
civil or criminal in which the State may be a party or interested, carry with it
the authority to sign indictments, informations and pursue cases to final
determination.

The mere appointment of a person to assist a fiscal or prosecuting attorney
does not authorize him to sign informations and prosecute criminal cases. As
above stated. the prosecution of a criminal case and signing of the
corresponding information is a quasi-judicial function, that must be exercised
by the officer clothed by law with such function, and can not be delegated by
him to another without an express authority by law. The power conferred by law
upon the Secretary of Justice to appoint a person to assist a fiscal in the
performance of his duties, is not an express and not even an implied authority
for that person to sign an information, for to assist does not imply necessarily
the authority to sign information. The fiscal may be assisted or aided in many
other ways. In the case of People vs. Hayne (23 P. L, 3; 83 Cal., 11; 7
L. R. A. 348), it was held that a statute of California which provided that the
Supreme Court of California shall immediately, upon the expiration of the term
of office of the present Supreme Court Commissioners, appoint five persons of
legal learning and personal worth to assist the Court in the performance of the
Court’s duties and in the disposition of numerous cases now pending in said
Court undetermined, can not be construed as giving the Commissioner the right to
appropriate the function of the Court, or to decide cases, or that they shall
take part in the decision of the cases; it merely means to facilitate the court,
to lessen its labors. The Supreme Court of California in said case said:

“But to our minds there is no doubt about the validity of the statute. In the
language of the court below: ‘The Act in question is not open to objection of a
constitutional character. In order to brinp it into conflict with the
Constitution, a strained construction of its words becomes necessary, as well as
an utter disregard of the natural import of those words. * * * The phrase
assist the court must, for the purpose’of creating a conflict, be
understood not merely to facilitate the court, which is the natural import—to
lessen its labors,—but, beyond this, to assume the exercise of, or a
participation in the exercise of, the appropriate function of the court to
decide causes; that the commissioners are to take part in that decision as the
members of the court themselves take part in it; in short, it is necessary to
say that assistance means supersession. Nothing in the
language used, or in its context, will justify any construction which will bring
the provisions of this Act in relation to the powers” or duties of the
commissioners in conflict with any provision of the Constitution.” (People
vs. Hayne, Lawyers Reports Annotated, Book 7, pp. 348,
350.)

If the authority to assist a fiscal confers the power to sign informations,
it would not have been necessary for section 1, of Act No. 300, section 17 of
Act No. 867, section 1305 of the first Administrative Code of 1916 (Act No.
2657), section 1661 of the Revised Administrative Code, and section 4 of Act No.
144 of the Commonwealth, to add or provide that the person appointed to assist
the fiscal shall have all the powers or the same authority of the Attorney
General or the Solicitor General.

In view of all the foregoing, it is clear that Dr. Lantin, who “was appointed
in the present case by the Secretary of Justice to assist the city fiscal of
Manila, had authority to sign the information in the criminal cases herein
involved.

PABLO, M.:

Concurro con esta opinion.

Petitions in L-831 and LS76 denied and
dismissed; peti’ i tion in L-87S sustained.

RESOLUTION ON MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

March 28, 1947

TUASON, J.:

This is a motion for reconsideration based on two grounds: “(1) That section
1686 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 144,
is not applicable to the City of Manila, and (2) that even assuming that it so
applies, ‘the mere appointment of a person to assist a fiscal or prosecuting
attorney does not authorize him to sign informations,1 as Mr. Justice Feria
stated in his concurring and dissenting opinion.”

1. Section 1686 of the Revised Administrative Code falls under Art II, Chapter
   43 entitled “Bureau of Justice.”

   By its title, the Chapter is a law of general application. It will be noted
   that even though Art. Ill of the same Chapter is captioned “Provincial Fiscal”,
   yet section 1673, which comes under that article, deals in one instance with the
   city fiscal and assistant city fiscals along with provincial fiscals and
   assistant provincial fiscals, fixing the maximum age limit for all of them. We
   further note that the classification or grouping of subjects in the
   Administrative Code has not been adhered to strictly.

2. The second ground of the motion has been specifically and extensively
   treated in the decision, and had been the subject of a thorough deliberation
   before that decision was rendered. We need not say anything more beyond
   reminding: counsel that in expressing approval of the passage which he quotes
   from Mr. Justice Feria’s concurring and dissenting opinion he failed to comment
   on those parts of the latter opinion by which Mr. Justice Feria reached the same
   conclusion to which he (counsel) takes exception.

Of course it is absurd to think, as counsel says, of a private prosecutor
signing an information; but do private prosecutors and officers designated by
the Secretary of Justice under section 1686 of the Administrative Code, as
amended, stand on the same footing? In the failure to recognize the fundamental
distinctions between the two positions lies the fallacy of the argument. An
officer assigned to assist a fiscal under section 1686 of the Administrative
Code, as amended, acts in representation of the State while a private prosecutor
represents the complaining party. As his official designation indicates, a
private prosecutor appears on behalf of his client and not of the People. If he
.sometimes conducts prosecution, he does so by special permission of the court.
The sole justification for the private prosecutor’s intervention in a criminal
trial is the fact that on the defendant’s conviction depends in most cases his
client’s right to recover pecuniary compensation for material damage sustained,
and/or that there is private honor or reputation to vindicate.

The motion is denied.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Hilado, Bengzon, Briones, and Padilla,
JJ., concur.

Feria and Pablo, JJ.:

We concur in the denial of the motion on the strength of our concurring and
dissenting opinion.

Perfecto, J., concurs in the result.