AMANDA IÑIGO, PETITIONER, VS. GUILLERMO CABRERA, JUDGE OF THE MUNICIPAL COURT OF MANILA, AND LUISA DE LA FUENTE, RESPONDENTS.

BENGZON, J.:

The petitioner Amanda Inigo is the defendant in an ejectment suit in the
Manila municipal court (civil case No. 1954), wherein respondent Luisa de la
Fuente demands the return of the premises known as No. 138-B Guipit, Sampaloc,
leased to the former by the previous owner, Felixberto Iral. The new
proprietress desires to occupy that apartment. After hearing the parties, the
respondent judge rendered on August 27, 1946, a judgment ordering defendant
(petitioner herein) to vacate, and to pay the plaintiff “the sum of P22, which
is the reasonable value of rent of said premises for the period of June 9 to 30,
1946, and the further sum of P100 monthly, by way of damages, beginning July 1,
1946 until the defendant vacates and surrenders to the plaintiff the premises in
question, plus the costs of suit.” (Appendix D.)

In a motion for reconsideration, Amanda Inigo vigorously objected, among
other things, to the award of 100-peso monthly damages; but the respondent judge
declined to reconsider. Consequently, she announced and perfected her appeal to
the Court of First Instance.

Foreseeing the probability that during the pendency of the litigation in the
appellate court she could not make monthly one-hundred-peso deposits, and
believing that the order of ejectment would then be inevitably carried out,
petitioner instituted this special civil action for certiorari to annul that
judicial order, alleging and arguing that it is in excess of jurisdiction or
constitutes a grave abuse of discretion.

The respondents made answer sustaining the validity of the disputed
directive. They assert, furthermore, that certiorari does not lie, because
petitioner has a plain remedy by appeal.

In the light of our controlling decisions,^[1] it might be contended that the award for
damages in the illegal detainer case was improper and erroneous. However,
specific pronouncement on the point becomes unnecessary, because of the pendency
of the ejectment proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Manila, wherein
any mistake on the matter could be expeditiously corrected.

On the other hand, it is fundamental in this jurisdiction that, generally,
the writ of certiorari will not jssue whenever there is a remedy by appeal.^[2] And this principle appears to be decisive
against the herein petitioner.

As to the contention that such appeal is insufficient to protect her rights
because the ejectment order might “at any time be executed for her failure
monthly to pay the 100-peso damages, it is enough to indicate that, under the
Rules of Court,^[3] she is not required
periodically to make such deposit, for the reason that the pleadings and
decision in the municipal court show, and respondents’ attorney admits, that the
amount does not represent a finding by the court on the reasonable rentals or
compensation for the use of the premises. Furthermore, the same attorney said at
the hearing of this petition, that knowing such amount to be real damages—not
rentals—he had no intention to ask for execution of the removal order should
petitioner fail periodically to make one-hundred-peso payments.

In view of the foregoing considerations, the petition for certiorari is
denied. No costs.

Moran, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Hilado, Briones,
Padilla, and Tuason, JJ., concur.

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^[1] Veloso vs. Ang Seng Teng (2 Phil.,
G22), De Castro vs. Justice of the Peace of Bocaue (33 Phil., 595), Mitschiener
vs. Barrios (11 Off. Gaz., 1901).
^[2]
Herrera vs. Barretto (25 Phil., 245), Macasieb vs. Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan (34 Phil., 404), Tirabol vs. Diaz (44 Phil., 587), Rule 67 section
1.
^[3] Rule 72, section 8.

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CONCURRING

PERFECTO, J.:

Petitioner complains against the decision of the municipal court of Manila in
which, besides ordering her to vacate the premises in litigation and to pay the
plaintiff “the sum of P22, which is the reasonable value of rent of said
premises for the period of June 9 to 30, 1946,” she is sentenced to pay “the
further sum of PI00 monthly by way of damages beginning July 1, 1946, until the
defendant vacates and surrenders to the plaintiff the premises in question.”

Upon the facts in this case and in the light of what this court has declared
in Mitschiener vs. Barrios (42 Off. Gaz., 1901), as to what damages may be
adjudicated under Rule 72, it is evident that the granting of the “further sum
of P100 monthly by way of damages,” after the respondent court itself has
declared that the sum of P22, “is the reasonable value of rent of said premises
for the period of June 9 to 30,1946,” which means one peso a day, appears
evidently arbitrary, illegal, and adjudicated in excess of the court’s
jurisdiction.

The record shows that respondent court had stated, at the hearing of
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, that the above “further sum of P100
monthly” was granted to discourage petitioner from appealing from its judgment.
The avowed purpose of the arbitrary and illegal adjudication of the “further sum
of f 100 monthly” only serves to worsen the arbitrariness so brazenly committed.
Our laws, including the Constitution, guarantee the right of appeal, and any
judge trying to defeat or even discourage it, by legal or illegal methods,
violates the solemn commitments of his oath of office and becomes an obstruction
to a fair administration of justice and, by his disregard of the law, a menace
to orderly government.

Feeling that the administration of justice in town and city courts is
unsatisfactory, the drafters of the Constitution inserted the mandate that all
judges of inferior courts must have been admitted to the practice of law
(section 8, Article VIII, of the Constitution) as one of the minimum
requirements. The desideratum would be that they should have the
personal character and qualities that will make them deserving to sit in any
court, no matter how high it may be, and for said purpose give them the
corresponding increased salary. Thus the possibility of such a wanton
arbitrariness as the one the petitioner complained of will be reduced to the
minimum. Let it be remembered that it is in city and town courts where the
majority of the unfortunate citizens who can not afford to obtain relief against
judicial arbitrariness have to appear.

At the hearing of this case, the attorney for respondents had expressly
admitted that the amount does not represent the finding of the court on the
reasonable rentals or compensation for the use of the premises, and upon such
admission made the express commitment that he had no intention to seek the
execution of the order to vacate the premises should petitioner fail to pay
plaintiff or deposit to the court the sum of P100 monthly in question, admitting
that petitioner is not duty bound, under Rule 72, to make said payment or
deposit to stay execution of the judgment pending her appeal.

The petition having been filed to ward off any order that any of the lower
courts may issue for her to vacate the premises in case she failed to pay or
deposit the monthly sum in question, the purpose of her petition has been
attained with the express commitment made by the attorney for respondents, above
mentioned, without which we would have voted to grant the petition. We,
therefore, agree to and concur in the dismissal of the petition.

The dismissal should not encourage the perpetration of the arbitrariness,
such as is depicted in this case. We will not countenance any kind of
arbitrariness, much less if committed by a judicial officer.