TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED RAYMUNDO MELLIZA Y ANGULO. LAUREANA GABIN, CLAIMANT AND APPELLANT, VS. MARIA MELLIZA ET AL., OPPOSITORS AND APPELLEES.

On January 19, 1944, Raymundo Melliza and Laureana Gabin
entered into a written agreement whereby the former contracted the personal
services of the latter to administer certain haciendas owned by Raymundo Melliza
for a period of thirty years from said date, at the option of Laureana Gabin. As
compensation for said personal services Melliza agreed to pay Gabin 350 cavans
of palay every agricultural year. It was further stipulated that Laureana Gabin
cannot be dismissed from the service without just and legal cause during the
time she cared to serve within the said period of thirty years, and in case of
dismissal she shall have the right to be indemnified for the rest of the period
at the rate of 150 cavans of palay for each agricultural year.

Raymundo Melliza died on December 11, 1945, and testamentary
proceedings were thereafter instituted in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
for the administration and distribution of his estate.

Having been deprived by the executrix Remedios S. de Villanueva
of the administration of the haciendas in question, Laureana Gabin presented to
the probate court a claim against the estate of the deceased Raymundo Melliza
for the payment to her by the executrix of 150 cavans of palay beginning the
agricultural year 1945-1946 until the termination of the testamentary
proceedings, and that thereafter the heir or heirs to whom the haciendas may be
adjudicated be ordered to pay the claimant the same amount of palay every year
until the expiration of thirty years from the agricultural year

The heirs of the deceased opposed said claim on the following
grounds: (1) That, not being a claim for money, it is not a proper claim under
section 5 of Rule 87; (2) that the agreement or contract on which it is based is
one of agency which was terminated by the death of the principal; (3) that
Raymundo Melliza could not, except by will, dispose of the administration of his
properties after his death; and (4) that there was no consideration for the
granting of such administration for 30 years with remuneration.

The probate court sustained the first ground of the opposition
and denied the claim. Hence this appeal.

The question to determine is whether appellant’s claim for 150
cavans of palay a year for the remainder of the thirty-year period mentioned in
the agreement Exhibit A is a proper claim which may be allowed in the
testamentary proceedings under Rule 87. Section 1 of said rule provides that
immediately after the granting of letters testamentary or of administration the
court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against
the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court; and
section 5 provides that all claims for money against the decedent arising
from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses of the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within
the time limited in the notice, “By money claims, is meant any claim for ‘money,
debt, or interest thereon,’ according to section 21 of Rule 3 and section 1 of
Rule 88. Not all money claims may, however, be presented, but only those which
are proper against the decedent, that is, claims upon a liability contracted by
the decedent before his death. Accordingly, claims arising after his death
cannot thus be presented, except funeral expenses.” (Moran on the Rules of
Court, Volume 2, second edition, p. 347.)

Upon the facts and the law involved in this case, we find no
valid reason to reverse the order appealed from.

In the first place, the claim in question arose after the death
of the decedent. Assuming without deciding that the contract on which the claim
is based is valid, the decedent appears to have complied with it up to the time
of his death. It was the executrix who dismissed the claimant from the service
as administratrix or manager of the haciendas of the deceased.

In the second place, the claim is not for money, debt, or
interest thereon but for 150 cavans of palay a year for twenty-nine agricultural
years (one agricultural year having elapsed before the death of Raymundo
Melliza). Even if it wanted to, the probate court could not determine in advance
the value of the palay in money because the price of palay varies from year to
year.

It appears from the record that before presenting the claim in
question the claimant filed a motion in the probate court praying that she be
appointed coadministratrix of the estate of the deceased on the strength of the
contract of service hereinabove mentioned. But Judge Blanco denied said motion
without prejudice to the right of the claimant to present a claim in due form
against the estate. Appellant now contends in her third assignment of error that
said order of Judge Blanco not having been appealed from, “the lower court erred
in not holding that the question of the presentation and admission of the
claimant’s claim has become res judicata.” This assignment of error is
without merit because the mere reservation by Judge Blanco to the claimant of
her right to present the claim in question in lieu of her appointment as
coadministratrix of the estate of the deceased did not preclude the court from
denying said claim if, after hearing, it found the same to be improper or not
allowable in these proceedings.

Wherefore, without deciding whether or not the contract claimed
upon is valid and binding against the heirs of the decedent, and without
prejudice to any proper action that the appellant may bring upon said contract,
we affirm the order appealed from, with costs against the appellant.

Moran, C.J., Paras, Feria, Padilla, Tuason, Montemayor,
Reyes, and Torres, JJ., concur.

MORAN, C. J.:

I certify that Mr. Justice Bengzon voted to affirm the order
appealed from.